Parker v. Cincinnati

[Cite as Parker v. Cincinnati, 2013-Ohio-2192.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
GILBERT PARKER, : APPEAL NO. C-120696
TRIAL NO. A-1103437
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
CITY OF CINCINNATI, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 31, 2013
Gilbert Parker, pro se,
John P. Curp, City Solicitor, and Jessica L. Powell, Assistant City Solicitor, for
Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
SYLVIA S. HENDON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Gilbert Parker appeals from the trial court’s entry
granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee the city of Cincinnati (“the city”)
on the basis of statutory immunity. Parker had filed a complaint against the city
alleging that the city had wrongfully impounded and sold his automobile.
{¶2} Because the city was not entitled to immunity on Parker’s complaint,
we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Factual Background
{¶3} In February of 2009, Parker was arrested and charged with driving
under the influence, refusing to take a chemical test, and a marked lanes violation.
At that time, Parker was placed under an administrative license suspension. In
March of 2009, Parker was again arrested and charged with driving under the
influence. He was additionally charged with refusing to take a chemical test and
driving under an administrative license suspension. Upon Parker’s arrest, the
Cincinnati Police Department seized and impounded his vehicle because he had been
driving under an administrative license suspension.
{¶4} Sometime in March of 2009, Parker was sent notice that his vehicle
had been impounded. This notice informed Parker of the related impoundment fees,
and stated that if Parker failed to obtain the vehicle within 27 days after release of the
court ordered immobilization, it could be sold at public auction. On September 5,
2009, the city sold Parker’s vehicle at auction. Sometime thereafter, Parker
attempted to retrieve his vehicle and learned that it had been sold.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} Parker filed the current action against the city. He contended that the
city had wrongfully impounded his vehicle because he had not been given notice,
following his arrest in February of 2009 for driving while under the influence, that
he had been placed on an administrative license suspension. Parker further alleged
that city had improperly sold his vehicle on September 5, in violation of an entry
issued by the municipal court judge presiding over his criminal charges, ordering the
vehicle released and immobilized for 90 days effective September 3.
{¶6} The city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was
entitled to immunity on Parker’s claims pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. The trial
court granted the city’s motion. Parker has appealed. In two assignments of error,
he argues that the trial court erred in failing to review the evidence that he had
presented, and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city.
We address the second assignment of error first, as it is dispositive of this appeal.
Immunity
{¶7} A three-tiered analysis is employed to determine whether a political
subdivision is immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02. Elston v. Howland Local
Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 10. The first tier
provides a general grant of immunity to political subdivisions for “injury, death, or
loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political
subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a
governmental or proprietary function.” R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The second-tier of the
immunity analysis requires a reviewing court to determine whether any of the
exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply to remove the initial grant of immunity. Id. at ¶
11. If this initial grant of immunity is removed, then under the third-tier of the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
immunity analysis, a court must determine whether immunity is reinstated by one of
the defenses provided for in R.C. 2744.03. Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶8} Here, the city’s action that allegedly resulted in a loss of property to
Parker was its disposal of an impounded vehicle. The city employees who had
impounded Parker’s vehicle and sold it at auction were engaged in a governmental
function. See Peters v. Cincinnati, 105 Ohio App.3d 710, 712, 664 N.E.2d 1329 (1st
Dist.1995) (“it is not customary for nongovernmental persons to order an abandoned
vehicle to be towed from a public street, impounded, and subsequently destroyed”).
See also Pavlik v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 92176, 2009-Ohio-3073, ¶ 18 (the power
to impound a motor vehicle is a governmental function under R.C. Chapter 2744).
Accordingly, the city was entitled to an initial grant of immunity on Parker’s claims.
{¶9} We next consider whether any of the R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions to the
initial grant of immunity apply. In this case, we find that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) is
applicable. This provision states that “a political subdivision is liable for injury,
death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the
political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code.” The city had impounded
Parker’s vehicle under R.C. 4510.41 because he had driven under an administrative
license suspension. R.C. 4510.41(D)(5) provides that
[i]f the impoundment of the vehicle was not authorized under this
section, the court shall order that the vehicle and its license plates be
returned immediately to the arrested person or, if the arrested person
is not the vehicle owner, to the vehicle owner and shall order that the
state or political subdivision of the law enforcement agency served by
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the law enforcement officer who seized the vehicle pay all expenses
and charges incurred in its removal and storage.
Substantively, Parker’s complaint alleged that the city had failed to inform him that
he had been placed under an administrative license suspension, and that the city had
sold his vehicle in contravention of a court’s release and immobilization order. If
Parker were to succeed on the merits of his complaint, R.C. 4510.41(D)(5) would
require the city to return Parker’s vehicle and to pay all expenses and charges
incurred in the vehicle’s storage. This case is unique in that the city has already sold
Parker’s vehicle and consequently cannot return it as a remedy, as required by R.C.
4510.41(D)(5).
{¶10} Should Parker succeed on the merits of his complaint, R.C.
4510.41(D)(5) would operate to expressly impose liability upon the city. The city’s
initial grant of immunity is removed pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).
{¶11} R.C. 2744.03 provides defenses that would operate to reinstate the
city’s grant of immunity. We find that none of the defenses provided for in R.C.
2744.03 are applicable in this case. The city was not entitled to immunity on
Parker’s complaint, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that
basis. Parker’s second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Parker argues that the trial court erred
in failing to review the evidence that he had presented. This assignment of error is
moot, as the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based solely on the issue of
immunity.
{¶13} The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed, and this
cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
HILDEBRANDT and FISCHER, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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