Bishopsgate Properties, L.L.C. v. Heiland

[Cite as Bishopsgate Properties, L.L.C. v. Heiland, 2011-Ohio-4707.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
BISHOPSGATE PROPERTIES, LLC C.A. No. 10CA009854
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ERIC HEILAND COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 10CV165790
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 19, 2011
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Eric Heiland appeals from the entries of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas awarding summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee Bishopsgate
Properties, LLC (“Bishopsgate”). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I.
{¶2} On January 10, 2010, Bishopsgate filed a complaint for forcible entry and
detainer, unpaid rent, and declaratory relief against Mr. Heiland. Bishopsgate asserted in its
complaint that it was the legal owner of the real property at 1226 West 11th Street in Lorain
(“the property”), that Mr. Heiland was “unlawfully and forcibly” detaining the property, and that
Mr. Heiland failed to pay rent. Bishopsgate sought “process and restitution[,]” fair market rent
of the property, and declarations related to Mr. Heiland’s and Bishopsgate’s respective rights in
the property, including declarations to quiet title. Mr. Heiland filed an answer along with several
defenses. Thereafter, Bishopsgate moved for summary judgment. Mr. Heiland responded in
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opposition. Additionally, Bishopsgate filed a preliminary judicial report for the property.
Subsequently, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Bishopsgate and against Mr. Heiland.
The trial court awarded Bishopsgate $2500 plus statutory interest for rent due and ordered Mr.
Heiland to vacate the premises. In addition, the trial court declared Bishopsgate to be the sole
owner of the property. It further found that Mr. Heiland had no right to possession of the
property or contractual rights in the property, that Mr. Heiland unlawfully and forcibly detained
possession of the property, and that Mr. Heiland was a tenant at will. Mr. Heiland then filed a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). After filing a notice of appeal, Mr.
Heiland requested and received a stay of judgment. In addition he filed a supplemental motion
for relief from judgment. Upon motion from Mr. Heiland, this Court remanded the matter to the
trial court so that it could rule on Mr. Heiland’s pending Civ.R. 60(B) motions. As the trial court
has ruled upon Mr. Heiland’s motions for relief from judgment, we turn to addressing the merits
of his appeal. Mr. Heiland has appealed pro se, raising two assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“The Trial Court erred in Applying the Standard of Review For Summary
Judgment to the Prejudice of The Defendant-Appellant.”
{¶3} Essentially Mr. Heiland asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment as there remained genuine issues of material fact. Specifically, Mr. Heiland alleges
that ownership interests, equitable interests, and damages for rent were in dispute. We agree that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
{¶4} We review an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105. “Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriately
rendered when ‘(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in
favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is
adverse to that party.’” Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 339-340, quoting Temple v.
Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327.
{¶5} On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of
demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio
St.3d 280, 292. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide evidence showing that
a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Id. at 293.
{¶6} As we conclude that Mr. Heiland presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine
issues of material fact with respect to both ownership and possession of the property, we likewise
conclude that Bishopsgate was not entitled to summary judgment on its claims.
{¶7} We begin with the observation that none of Bishopsgate’s motions, briefs, or
evidentiary materials present any facts explaining how Bishopsgate came to obtain title to the
property or even how Mr. Heiland came to be on the property in the first place. This is of
particular concern to this Court in light of Mr. Heiland’s assertions in his affidavit concerning
fraud which are detailed below. Even Jeannette Shepler’s affidavit, submitted in support of
Bishopsgate’s motion for summary judgment, is nearly devoid of facts or factual allegations.
Instead, the affidavit consists primarily of legal conclusions. Mr. Heiland correctly objected to
the affidavit on this basis. See Hackathorn v. Preisse (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 768, 771. Thus,
to the extent the affidavit makes bare legal conclusions, we will disregard it in our review.
{¶8} Despite the conclusory nature of Ms. Shepler’s affidavit, it did, along with the
accompanying documents, provide some support for Bishopsgate’s claims. Ms. Shepler averred
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in her affidavit that Bishopsgate is the legal owner of the property. As evidence in support of
Bishopsgate ownership, a deed was attached to the affidavit and referenced therein. Ms. Shepler
further stated that Bishopsgate offered to lease the property to Mr. Heiland, but Mr. Heiland
declined. As evidence of Mr. Heiland’s refusal, Ms. Shepler referenced the lease rejected by Mr.
Heiland which was attached to the complaint. Ms. Shepler also averred that a notice to leave the
premises was issued to Mr. Heiland and that said notice was attached to the complaint.
According to the affidavit, Mr. Heiland refused to leave the premises. Ms. Shepler asserted that
fair market value rent for the property is $500 per month.
{¶9} Nonetheless, even if we were to conclude that Bishopsgate met its initial burden,
we conclude that Mr. Heiland met his reciprocal burden.
{¶10} Mr. Heiland averred in his affidavit that Bishopsgate’s title to the property was
defective as Summit Institute, the grantor listed on the deed attached to Bishopsgate’s summary
judgment materials, admitted to being “a sham trust” and was “without capacity and not legally
eligible to hold or transfer property[.]” Mr. Heiland further asserted that he was told by an
attorney for Summit Institute that he could have possession of the property through at least the
end of 2010. In addition, Mr. Heiland stated that he has an interest in the property as he provided
$50,000 of its purchase price. Mr. Heiland also alleges in his affidavit that persons involved
with Bishopsgate and Summit Institute defrauded him and converted his $50,000 investment.
Mr. Heiland’s assertions were not refuted.
{¶11} Accordingly, based upon the evidence presented to the trial court, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether Mr. Heiland has an ownership interest in
the property. Thus, the trial court’s declarations to the contrary are erroneous at this stage of the
litigation. Further, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Mr. Heiland is
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entitled to possession of the property rendering judgment on Bishopsgate’s forcible entry and
detainer action inappropriate. See Goldstein v. Patel, 9th Dist. Nos. 02CA008183, 02CA008199,
2003-Ohio-4386, at ¶4 (“A forcible entry and detainer action decides the right to immediate
possession of property[.]” ). Moreover, in light of the genuine disputes of material fact with
respect to ownership and possession, we likewise conclude that the award of summary judgment
with respect to the issue of back rent was also erroneous. We sustain Mr. Heiland’s first
assignment of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“The frauds perpetrated by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel ha[v]e so
corrupted the Defendant[’s] due process rights and seriously prejudice[ed]
Appellant[], that the Trial Court erred in * * * granting summary judgment
as a matter of law, damaging the judgment and jurisdiction of the Court.”
{¶12} Mr. Heiland appears to assert in his second assignment of error that fraud
rendered the trial court’s award of summary judgment void. As our resolution of the first
assignment of error has rendered this assignment of error moot, we decline to address it. See
App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶13} In light of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of LORAIN, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
ERIC HEILAND, pro se Appellant.
ROBERT J. GARGASZ, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.