State v. Bradford

[Cite as State v. Bradford, 2012-Ohio-1058.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97283
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
RICARDO BRADFORD
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-442476, CR-443132, CR-445457, CR-451985, and CR-455917
BEFORE: Rocco, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 15, 2012
-i-
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APPELLANT
Ricardo Bradford, pro se
#472-485
Mansfield Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 788
Mansfield, Ohio 44901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Kristen L. Sobieski
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
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KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ricardo Bradford, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
trial court’s order that denied his motion to “dismiss all further proceedings” in five
underlying cases.
{¶2} Bradford presents one assignment of error. He contends the trial court lost
jurisdiction over his cases due to the length of time it took for the court to impose “valid”
sentences.
{¶3} Based upon a review of the record and this court’s precedent, this court
disagrees. Bradford’s convictions and sentences, therefore, are affirmed.
{¶4} The record reflects Bradford was indicted in the five underlying cases in 2003
and 2004. He ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the state, whereby a number
of the charges were dismissed and Bradford relinquished his right to appeal, in exchange
for Bradford’s guilty pleas to the following:
(1) CR-442476 - eight counts of felonious assault, all with three-year firearm
specifications, two counts of improper discharge of a firearm, and one count of having a
weapon while under disability;
(2) CR-443132 - two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of felonious
assault, and two counts of attempted murder, all with three-year firearm specifications;
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(3) CR-445457 - three counts of felonious assault on a peace officer, all with peace
officer specifications and one with a three-year firearm specification, and failure to
comply with order or signal of a police officer, with a peace officer specification;
(4) CR-451985 - intimidation of a crime victim;
(5) CR-455917 - attempted felonious assault, attempted escape, and failure to
comply with order or signal of a police officer.
{¶5} After the trial court accepted Bradford’s pleas, it imposed consecutive
sentences for his convictions in the five cases that totaled 23 years. However, in each of
Bradford’s cases, the court’s journal entry of sentence stated merely that postrelease
control was a “part of this prison sentence for the maximum allowed for the above
felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28.”
{¶6} In June 2007, Bradford filed motions in the trial court in each case seeking
postconviction relief; he based his motions upon the trial court’s failure to properly
impose postrelease control. The following month, the trial court denied his petitions.
{¶7} In April 2008, Bradford filed motions in each case seeking resentencing. All
were based upon the trial court’s failure to properly advise him of postrelease control.
The trial court denied his motions only six days later.
{¶8} In August 2011, Bradford filed motions in the trial court in each case
requesting the court to dismiss “all further proceedings” in his cases “due to the
unreasonable delay in imposing sentence.” Bradford argued that, because his original
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sentences were “void” and no valid sentences had been imposed, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to resentence him.
{¶9} In response, the trial court denied Bradford’s motions to “dismiss all further
proceedings.” In the same journal entry, however, the trial court reconsidered its April
2008 denials of Bradford’s motions for resentencing; the trial court at this point granted
Bradford’s motions and eventually scheduled his cases for a resentencing hearing that
was conducted on September 20, 2011.
{¶10} The record reflects Bradford filed his notices of appeal in these five cases
prior to the date of the scheduled resentencing hearing. Bradford presents one
assignment of error for this court’s consideration, as follows:
“I. The trial court erred by overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss because
of the delay of time between his original conviction until his actual sentencing was
completed.”
{¶11} Bradford asserts that the trial court lost jurisdiction over his cases due to an
unreasonable delay in imposing a “valid” sentence. This court previously has addressed
and rejected the identical assertion Bradford makes in State v. Harris, 8th Dist. No.
95010, 2011-Ohio-482, ¶ 5-8 and State v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 95882, 2011-Ohio-2929,
¶12-14.
{¶12} Thus, more recently, in State v. Najeeb, 8th Dist. Nos. 96689 and 96690,
2011-Ohio-6081, ¶ 9-10:
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This court has repeatedly held that Crim.R. 32(A)’s requirement that
a sentence be imposed without unnecessary delay does not apply to
resentencing. State v. Wright, Cuyahoga App. No. 95096, 2011-Ohio-733;
State v. Harris, Cuyahoga App. No. 95010, 2011-Ohio-482; State v.
Coleman, Cuyahoga App. No. 94866, 2011-Ohio-341; State v. McQueen,
Cuyahoga App. No. 91370, 2009-Ohio-1085; State v. Craddock, Cuyahoga
App. No. 94387, 2010-Ohio-5782; State v. Huber, Cuyahoga App. No.
85082, 2005-Ohio-2625. * * * .
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio
St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, supports this conclusion. In
Fischer, the Court modified the holding in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d
94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, to the extent that Fischer held a
“complete de novo resentencing is not required when a defendant prevails
only as to the postrelease-control aspect of a particular sentence * * * and
the limited resentencing must cover only the postrelease control.” Fischer
at ¶ 17. In so holding, the Court explained that only the postrelease control
portion of the sentence is void, not the entire sentence. * * * (Emphasis
added.)
{¶13} In addition to the foregoing language quoted from Najeeb, see also Fischer
at ¶ 38:
Fischer’s theory is that because the trial court did not properly apply
postrelease-control sanctions, his sentence was void * * * . Because his
sentence was void, he contends, there was no sentence, and without a
sentence, no conviction and no final order. * * * . The argument, though
creative, fails. (Citations omitted.)
{¶14} Since Bradford had not completed his consecutive terms in these cases at the
time he filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court retained jurisdiction to impose valid
terms of postrelease control. State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 973, 2009-Ohio-6434,
920 N.E.2d 958 ¶ 18, citing State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884
N.E.2d 568. Bradford’s assignment of error, accordingly, is overruled.
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{¶15} The trial court’s order is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentences.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J. and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J. Concur