State v. Baker

[Cite as State v. Baker, 2011-Ohio-2784.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95300
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JERMAINE BAKER
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court
Case No. CR-529184
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Boyle, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 9, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
2
James R. Willis
323 W. Lakeside Avenue
420 Lakeside Place
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1009
James C. Young
75 Public Square
Suite 600
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brian D. Kraft
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Jermaine Baker appeals from his conviction rendered in the
court of common pleas. Baker argues the trial court failed to instruct the
jury properly, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, his
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and his convictions
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons,
we affirm Baker’s conviction.
{¶ 2} The facts in the instant case arise from events that occurred on
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August 29, 2009 in the neighborhood of Ansel Road and Korman Avenue in
Cleveland, Ohio. The incident involved individuals from this neighborhood
who knew each other for lengthy periods of time. On August 29, 2009, at
approximately 4:00 p.m., a woman named Calandra Coleman observed a
fight outside of Abco’s Deli located at 1023 Ansel Road, Cleveland, Ohio.
The fight was between defendant- appellant and a man named Mario, also
known as Rio Burks. Calandra testified that the fight was brief, but
punches were thrown between Mario and the defendant, with their
respective friends watching in the background.
{¶ 3} Calandra testified that the fight occurred because Baker
informed authorities in Pennsylvania about the illegal activity of one of
Mario’s friends. Mario learned of what Baker had done and circulated a
multiple page flier with photographs of Baker, labeling him as a snitch. The
fight did not last more than a few moments and all parties went their
separate ways.
{¶ 4} Approximately three hours later, Calandra and her son, D.L.,
who was then four months shy of his third birthday, left Calandra’s mother’s
home located at East 79th and Korman Avenue. Calandra walked behind
her son as he rode a motorized four-wheeler ahead of her. Calandra stated
that she was heading east on Korman Avenue toward Ansel Road when she
ran into Alexander Burks, Mario’s brother. Calandra knew Alexander for
4
several years because he was the boyfriend of one of her friends.
Additionally, Alexander was a friend of Calandra’s boyfriend, Duane
Landers. Alexander stopped Calandra’s son from crossing into the street
and all three individuals were stopped on the corner of Korman Avenue and
Ansel Road.
{¶ 5} At the same time that Calandra and her son were traveling down
Korman Avenue, Louise Lamboy was visiting Wanda Purdue, Baker’s
mother, at her house located at 25400 Grovewood, in Cleveland, Ohio.
{¶ 6} Louise stated that while she was at Wanda’s home, Wanda asked
her to drive Baker somewhere. Louise never asked where she was taking
Baker but agreed and got into the driver’s seat of Wanda’s grey, Buick Park
Avenue. Baker got into the back seat directly behind the driver’s seat and
instructed Louise on where to drive. As she was driving Baker around the
streets of Cleveland, he instructed her to slow down. Although Louise could
not identify the streets, she drove the vehicle to the stop sign at Ansel Road
and Korman Avenue.
{¶ 7} Alexander, Calandra, and her son, D.L., were on the corner of
Korman Avenue and Ansel Road when they observed a grey vehicle drive by.
As the vehicle passed, both Calandra and Alexander observed the rear,
driver’s-side window lower and the occupant shoot what appeared to be a
semi-automatic weapon. Both Calandra and Alexander identified the
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shooter as Baker, a man whom they have known for many years and who
used to live in the neighborhood. When the shooting began, Alexander
jumped on top of D.L. to protect the child while Calandra ducked for cover
behind a nearby vehicle. When the shooting stopped, Calandra frantically
checked D.L. for injuries and discovered that he had been shot in his left foot.
{¶ 8} Louise testified that she heard a series of loud bangs and ducked
her head. However, as she looked around for the source of the noise, she
observed Baker with a gun, in the car’s side mirror. Baker then yelled at
her to flee the area.
{¶ 9} Calandra grabbed her son and ran with him to the home of
Valencia Woods, located at 1031 Ansel Road. When Calandra arrived at
Valencia’s house, she stated, “J’ro shot my baby.” Calandra explained that
J’ro is short for Jermaine and is Baker’s nickname. Valencia called 911 and
reported the shooting.
{¶ 10} Multiple Cleveland police officers and EMS arrived and
transported D.L. to University Hospitals for treatment. Officers Dustin
Miller and Damir Savor assisted and secured the crime scene while officer
Don Meel recovered multiple 9mm shell casings. Officer James Bryant
interviewed Alexander, who had fresh scrapes on his body. Officer Bryant
determined Alexander’s identity and learned that there were two felony
warrants outstanding for his arrest and then placed Alexander into custody.
6
Alexander provided a detailed statement to Detective Vincent Lucarelli while
in custody and identified Baker as the shooter from a photo lineup.
{¶ 11} Calandra spoke with police officers at University Hospitals and
identified Baker as the shooter. Additionally, although Louise returned to
Pennsylvania after the shooting, she read about the incident in a Cleveland
newspaper and contacted Crime Stoppers. Louise eventually contacted
Detective Lucarelli and provided him with a detailed statement, identifying
Baker as the shooter.
{¶ 12} The Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Baker with three
counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and one count of
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). All counts contained
one-, three-, and five-year firearm specifications. The victim in Count 1 of
the indictment was Alexander, the victim in Count 2 of the indictment was
Calandra, and the victim in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment was D.L.
Baker pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial on May 19, 2010.
{¶ 13} The state of Ohio presented the following witnesses: Alexander
Burks, Louise Lamboy, Calandra Coleman, Valencia Woods, Officer James
Bryant, Officer Don Meel, Detective Vincent Lucarelli, Officer Dustin Miller,
and Officer Damir Savor. Baker presented the testimony of his mother,
Wanda Purdue, and his girlfriend, Samantha Zack.
{¶ 14} On May 26, 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all
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counts, including the firearm specifications. On June 17, 2010, the trial
court merged the one- and three-year firearm specifications, merged all
five-year firearm specifications, and merged Counts 3 and 4. The court then
sentenced Baker to thirteen years in prison: three years on the three-year
firearm specification to be served consecutive to five years on the five-year
firearm specification to be served consecutive with and prior to the five-year
concurrent prison sentences on each underlying count.
{¶ 15} Baker appeals from his conviction, raising the seven
assignments of error contained in the appendix to this opinion.
{¶ 16} In his first and second assignments of error, Baker argues the
trial court denied him due process when it failed to instruct the jury on the
lesser charges of aggravated assault and negligent assault. Because these
assignments of error involve similar issues of law and fact, we shall address
them together.
{¶ 17} The basis for both Baker’s first and second assigned errors is
Baker’s argument that, prior to firing a handgun on August 29, 2009, Mario
Burks fired at him while he was riding in the grey, Buick Park Avenue.
Accordingly, based on Baker’s claims, the jury should have been instructed
that he was provoked into defending himself and that under a lapse in due
care, he failed to perceive that returning Mario’s fire could cause harm to
Alexander, Calandra, and D.L.
8
{¶ 18} However, in making these arguments, Baker cites no testimony
or evidence in the record that Mario Burks was present on the corner of
Korman Avenue and Ansel Road at the time Baker shot his handgun or that
Mario fired a weapon at Baker on August 29, 2009. All of the State’s
witnesses testified that Mario was not present when Baker fired the gun
toward Alexander, Calandra, and D.L. and none of the defense witnesses at
trial testified that Mario was present during the shooting. Moreover, Baker
did not request that the court instruct the jury on the charges of aggravated
assault and negligent assault.
{¶ 19} In State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 667 N.E.2d 369, the
Ohio Supreme Court determined that if an attorney failed to object to a jury
instruction, any claim of error on review is waived “unless, but for the error,
the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” Ballew at 251,
citing State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 444 N.E.2d 1332. See,
also, State v. Jackson (May 20, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 73571.
{¶ 20} Crim.R. 52(B) is known as the “plain error rule.” In State v.
Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804, the Ohio Supreme Court, in
interpreting Crim.R. 52(B) stated “[t]he power afforded to notice plain error *
* * is one which courts exercise only in exceptional circumstances, and
exercise cautiously even then.” Long at 94. Quoting the United States
9
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Rudinsky (C.A.6,
1971), 439 F.2d 1074, 1076, Long further explains “[t]he plain error rule is to
be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.” Long at 94.
{¶ 21} As statutorily defined, the offenses of aggravated assault and
negligent assault are inferior degrees of felonious assault. See R.C.
2903.12, and 2903.14; State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d
294; State v. Hawkins, Montgomery App. No. 21691, 2007-Ohio-2979.
Nonetheless, even though an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser
included offense, a charge on the lesser included offense is required only if
the evidence at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the
greater crime charged and a conviction on the lesser included offense. State
v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286. Additionally, a court
is required to provide instructions on a lesser included offense if the evidence
supports the charge, even if counsel does not request this instruction. State
v.Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 415 N.E.2d 303.
{¶ 22} In the present case, there was absolutely no evidence produced
at trial supporting Baker’s position that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on aggravated assault and negligent assault. There was
no testimony from either the State or defense witnesses that indicated Mario
10
was present when the shooting took place. Also, there was no physical
evidence found on the scene indicating more than one shooter. All the
testimony at trial indicated that there was one shooter, and that shooter was
Baker. Accordingly, because there was no evidence supporting a charge on
either aggravated assault or negligent assault, we find the trial court did not
commit plain error in providing its instructions to the jury.
{¶ 23} Baker’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 24} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Baker argues his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to
suppress identification testimony, failing to request lesser included offense
instructions, failing to move for a new trial, and in failing to request a jury
instruction on the weight to be afforded the testimony of an accomplice.
These assigned errors involve the same standard of review; as such, we shall
address them together.
{¶ 25} In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984),
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. Counsel’s performance may be found to be
deficient if counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
11
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland at 687. To establish prejudice, “the defendant must prove that
there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Bradley at 143.
{¶ 26} In determining whether counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland at 689. Because of
the difficulties inherent in determining whether counsel rendered effective
assistance in any given case, a strong presumption exists that counsel’s
conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance.
Id.{¶ 27} It is with this standard in mind, that we address Baker’s claims
of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Failure to File Motion to Suppress Identification Testimony
{¶ 28} Baker argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he
failed to file a motion to suppress the identification testimony of Alexander
and Calandra. In support of this claim, Baker points to one instance where
Alexander testified that he did not see Baker inside the grey vehicle and that
Calandra only identified Baker from a single photograph shown to her by
Detective Lucarelli ten days after the incident.
{¶ 29} In both instances, Baker is incorrect in his statements. The
12
statement from Alexander that he did not see Baker inside the grey Buick
Park Avenue was taken out of context. Alexander testified that he did not
see Baker inside the vehicle until Baker started shooting. Alexander
admitted that other people in the neighborhood told him that Baker was
riding around in a grey vehicle earlier that day. More importantly, while
Alexander may not have seen Baker in the grey vehicle earlier in the day, he
was clear in his identification testimony of Baker as the shooter.
“Q. At what point did you first see the individual firing a gun at you?
“A. He was like right — right behind me like. Right there.
“Q. Were you able to see the individual that was shooting the gun?
“A. Yes.
“Q. How were you able to see the individual?
“A. Because he lift[ed] up out the window and pointed the gun like
this.
“Q. And when you saw the individual pointing the gun at you, did you
recognize the individual?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And how did you recognize him?
“A. I know him.
“Q. And who was the individual firing the gun?
“A. Jermaine Baker.” (Tr. 352-353.)
{¶ 30} Second, with regards to Calandra’s identification of Baker, Baker
13
is also mistaken in his arguments. Baker claims Calandra identified him
from a single photograph provided by Detective Lucarelli some ten days after
the incident. A close review of the record reveals that Detective Lucarelli
never presented Calandra with a photo array because he found it
unnecessary. Specifically, Detective Lucarelli explained that because
Calandra knew Baker for several years and was clear about her
identification of him as the shooter, a photo array was not necessary.
Although Calandra testified that she was presented with a spread of
multiple photos from which she identified Baker as the shooter, this
inconsistency does not weaken her identification testimony.
“Q. When the car was right in front of you, were you able to
determine who that individual was in the back seat?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And did you recognize this individual?
{¶ 31} “A. Yes.
“Q. And how were you able to recognize this individual?
“A. Because this individual was looking right in my eyes and I was
looking right at him.
“Q. And was this individual familiar to you?
“A. From the neighborhood I’m sure he was.
“Q. And who was this individual?
“A. Mr. Baker.” (Tr. 543-544.)
14
{¶ 32} Although trial counsel did not move to suppress the
identification testimony cited by Baker, clearly, the motion would be
unsuccessful. Both Alexander and Calandra knew Baker for several years
prior to this incident and were clear in their identification of Baker as the
shooter. Baker’s trial counsel did not act ineffectively when it did not move
to suppress the identification testimony.
Failure to Request Appropriate Jury Instructions
{¶ 33} Baker argues his trial counsel acted ineffectively when it failed
to request a jury instruction on the charge of aggravated assault. However,
as stated in this court’s analysis of Baker’s first assigned error, the outcome
of Baker’s trial would not have been different, if counsel had made such a
request.
{¶ 34} Reviewing courts need not examine counsel’s performance if a
defendant fails to prove the second prong of prejudicial effect. State v.
Crosby, 186 Ohio App.3d 453, 2010-Ohio-1584, 928 N.E.2d 795. “The object
of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.” Bradley at
143.
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, counsel did not act ineffectively in failing
to request the lesser instruction on aggravated assault.
Failure to File Motion for a New Trial
15
{¶ 36} Next, Baker claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he failed to file a motion for a new trial based on Crim.R.
33(A)(1). Crim.R. 33(A)(1) provides for the granting of a motion for new
trial because of irregularity in the proceedings that prevented the defendant
from receiving a fair trial.
{¶ 37} In making this argument, Baker points to no alleged procedural
irregularity to support his claim. Accordingly, this court is without the
means to review any alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this
issue.
Failure to Request a Jury Instruction on the
Weight Given to Alleged Accomplice Testimony
{¶ 38} In this portion of Baker’s appeal, he argues that his trial counsel
acted ineffectively when he failed to request specific jury instructions
regarding the testimony of State’s witness Louise Lamboy. Baker argues
that Louise was an accomplice and that the jury should have been instructed
as such. Baker also claims that the court should have given a special
instruction regarding Louise’s testimony because she was a paid informant
and a drug addict. Neither of Baker’s arguments have merit.
{¶ 39} Baker’s trial counsel did not request, and the trial court did not
instruct the jury with any specific instruction regarding Louise’s testimony
because Louise was not an accomplice in this matter. She was never
16
charged as a codefendant and did not receive any agreement from the State
in regards to immunity from prosecution. Plainly stated, the trial court did
not provide the instruction mandated by R.C. 2923.03(D) because Louise was
not an accomplice of Baker.
{¶ 40} Furthermore, no special instruction regarding Louise’s testimony
was warranted. Louise was not a paid informant as Baker suggests and
nowhere in the record does it indicate otherwise. Although Louise admitted
that she had prior troubles with alcohol and drugs, her testimony was that
she was currently sober despite repeated attempts by trial counsel to
impeach her.
{¶ 41} We cannot say that the outcome of trial would have been any
different if the jury received special instructions regarding Louise’s
testimony. Louise identified Baker as the shooter, as did Alexander and
Calandra. If the jury chose to provide no weight to Louise’s testimony, they
still could have found Baker guilty based on Alexander and Calandra’s
testimony alone. Accordingly, Baker’s trial counsel did not act ineffectively
when it failed to request specific jury instructions regarding Louise’s
testimony.
{¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, we decline to find that Baker’s trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Baker’s third and fourth
assignments of error are overruled.
17
{¶ 43} In his fifth assignment of error, Baker argues that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the offenses of
felonious assault with firearm specifications. In his sixth assignment of
error, Baker argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Although these arguments involve different standards of review,
we will consider them together because we find the evidence in the record
applies equally to both.
{¶ 44} The standard of review with regard to the sufficiency of the
evidence is set forth in State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381
N.E.2d 184, as follows:
“Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of
judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can
reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a
crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶ 45} Bridgeman must be interpreted in light of the sufficiency test
outlined in State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492,
paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held:
“An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence
submitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed,
would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted.)
{¶ 46} In evaluating a challenge based on manifest weight of the
18
evidence, a court sits as the thirteenth juror, and intrudes its judgment into
proceedings that it finds to be fatally flawed through misrepresentation or
misapplication of the evidence by a jury that has “lost its way.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. As the Ohio
Supreme Court declared:
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount
of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue
rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on
weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater
amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on its effect in inducing belief.’
“* * * The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The
discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.” Id. at 387, 547. (Internal citations omitted.)
{¶ 47} This court is mindful that weight of the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact and a reviewing
court must not reverse a verdict where the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude from substantial evidence that the State has proven the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227
N.E.2d 212, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. The goal of the
reviewing court is to determine whether the new trial is mandated. A
19
reviewing court should only grant a new trial in the “exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction.” State v. Lindsey,
87 Ohio St.3d 479, 2000-Ohio-465, 721 N.E.2d 995. (Internal citation
omitted.)
{¶ 48} In the present case, the jury found Baker guilty of three counts
of felonious assault, which pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) provides as
follows:
“(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
“(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.”
{¶ 49} The jury also found Baker guilty of one count of felonious assault
pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which provides as follows:
“(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
“(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn.”
{¶ 50} The jury also found Baker guilty of one-, three-, and five-year
firearm specifications, which, pursuant to R.C. 2921.141(A), 2941.145 (A),
and 2941.146(A) provide as follows:
“[T]hat the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or
under the offender’s control while committing the offense * * * and
displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the
offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”
R.C. 2921.141(A) and 2941.145(A).
“[T]hat the offender committed the violation of section 2923.161 of the
Revised Code or the felony that includes, as an essential element,
20
purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or
physical harm to another and that was committed by discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home.” R.C.
2941.146(A).
{¶ 51} In support of its case, the state of Ohio presented the following
evidence: the parties involved with this case knew each other for years and
all, at one time or another, lived in the neighborhood where this crime took
place; Calandra’s testimony that Baker and a man named Mario got into a
fight earlier in the day on August 29, 2009; Alexander’s testimony that on
August 29, 2009, he observed Baker shoot at him from the back of a grey
vehicle and that he is the brother of Mario, the man Baker fought with
earlier in the day; Calandra’s testimony that on August 29, 2009, she
observed Baker shoot at her and shoot her son, D.L. from the back of a grey
vehicle; and Louise’s testimony that she witnessed Baker firing a handgun
from the back of the car that she was driving.
{¶ 52} In response, Baker put forth the following evidence: that Louise
had a history of drug and alcohol abuse; that Mario circulated a multiple
page flier identifying Baker as a snitch; that Mario’s friends had weapons on
them during Baker’s fight with Mario; that Baker did not go anywhere in a
vehicle with Louise, and that Baker picked up his daughter in Cleveland and
returned with her to Pennsylvania for the weekend.
{¶ 53} Additionally, Baker argues that the State failed to present
21
sufficient proof to establish the identity of the shooter or “by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was not guilty of felonious assault, but instead was
guilty of the offense of either aggravated assault or negligent assault.” With
regards to the identification testimony, we find that the State presented
sufficient evidence to allow the case to be determined by the trier of fact.
Alexander, Calandra, and Louise all identified Baker as the individual who
shot a handgun from the back of a moving vehicle. Detective Lucarelli
testified that Alexander, Calandra, and Louise all identified Baker as the
shooter during statements made to him. While Calandra did not identify
Baker from a photo lineup, Detective Lucarelli stated that a lineup was
unnecessary as Calandra knew Baker for years and was positive of her
identification of him as the shooter. Although Baker claims the State’s
witnesses testified inconsistently and that Louise’s testimony should be
given no weight, we are viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution. Moreover, we find no true inconsistencies with the
witnesses’ identification of Baker as the shooter. As such, we find there was
sufficient evidence to submit this case to the trier of fact.
{¶ 54} As to Baker’s argument that he should have been found guilty of
either of the lesser charges of aggravated assault or negligent assault, we
addressed this argument in our analysis of Baker’s first and second
assignments of error. Simply put, Baker presented no evidence that Mario
22
shot at him or that he returned fire under provocation, or that he failed to
perceive that returning fire could result in Alexander, Calandra, or D.L.
being hurt.
{¶ 55} Viewing all of the above in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found all
of the elements of felonious assault with one-, three-, and five-year firearm
specifications in this case. Therefore, the State presented sufficient
evidence to support Baker’s convictions.
{¶ 56} We further find that the trier of fact did not lose its way in
convicting Baker of four counts of felonious assault with one-, three-, and
five-year firearm specifications. Though Baker argues that his version of
events should have been relied upon by the trial court, the trier of fact is in
the best position to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. As
the reviewing court, we find that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude
from the substantial evidence presented by the State, that the State has
proven the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we cannot
state that the trier of fact lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.
{¶ 57} For the above-mentioned reasons, we overrule Baker’s fifth and
sixth assignments of error.
23
{¶ 58} For his seventh and final assignment of error, Baker argues that
the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors was prejudicial and denied
him a fair trial. We find this assignment of error to lack merit.
{¶ 59} In State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 598 N.E.2d 1256,
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative error.
Pursuant to this doctrine, a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative
effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a
fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not
individually constitute cause for reversal. State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio
St.3d 49, 656 N.E.2d 623.
{¶ 60} This doctrine is not applicable to the present case as we do not
find multiple instances of harmless error. State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325,
1994-Ohio-425, 638 N.E.2d 1023; Garner, supra. Accordingly, Baker’s
seventh and final assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been
affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
24
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR
Appendix A
Assignments of Error:
I. “Appellant was denied due process when the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on aggravated assault after the trial
court produced competent testimony that appellant was
seriously provoked into defending himself from Rio while
under the influence of sudden passion or a fit of rage.”
II. “Appellant was denied due process when the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on negligent assault after competent
testimony was adduced at trial establishing circumstances
that appellant, during a substantial lapse from due care, failed
to perceive that returning Rio’s fire could result in Coleman,
Burks or Landers being hurt.”
III. “Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel
when he was substantially and unfairly prejudiced by his trial
counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress identification
testimony, to request an aggravated assault instruction and to
move the trial court for a new trial, all of which constituted a
deficient performance in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”
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IV. “The appellant’s rights to due process and effective
assistance of counsel were violated when the trial court did
not instruct the jury on the proper weight to be given, if any,
to the testimony of an alleged accomplice (who admitted to
being drug addicted and sought to be a paid informant) and
trial counsel did not request the instructions.”
V. “The verdicts finding appellant guilty of felonious assault
were not supported by evidence sufficient to justify a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
VI. “The guilty verdicts were against the manifest weight of
the evidence and are contrary to law.”
VII. “The cumulative effect of the errors in the trial violated
due process and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.”