Alvarado v. Rankin

[Cite as Alvarado v. Rankin, 2012-Ohio-5207.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
ANTONIO C. ALVARADO :
Plaintiff-Appellant : C.A. CASE NO. 2012 CA 0023
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 2011 CVH 03768
MIKE RANKIN, REGISTRAR : (Civil Appeal from the
Municipal Court)
Defendant-Appellee :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 9th day of November, 2012.
.........
Wilfred L. Potter, Atty. Reg. No. 0029121, 234 North Limestone Street, Springfield,
Ohio 45503
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Michael F. Sheils, Prosecutor for the City of Springfield, Ohio, by T. Joann Huenke,
Assistant City Prosecutor, Atty. Reg. No. 0073600, 50 East Columbia Street, Springfield,
Ohio 45502
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
.........
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} This appeal is taken from a final order of the Municipal Court denying Antonio
C. Alvarado’s Petition To Grant License pursuant to R.C. 4507.08. Paragraph (D) of that
section states that “no temporary instruction permit or driver’s license shall be issued to or
retained by, any of the following persons”:
[Cite as Alvarado v. Rankin, 2012-Ohio-5207.]
(5) Any person making an application whose driver’s license or driving
privileges are under cancellation, revocation, or suspension in the jurisdiction
where issued or any other jurisdiction, until the expiration of one year after the
license was canceled or revoked or until the period of suspension ends. Any
person whose application is denied under this division may file a petition in the
municipal court or county court in whose jurisdiction the person resides
agreeing to pay the cost of the proceedings and alleging that the conduct
involved in the offense that resulted in suspension, cancellation, or revocation
in the foreign jurisdiction would not have resulted in a suspension,
cancellation, or revocation had the offense occurred in this state. If the
petition is granted, the petitioner shall notify the registrar by a certified copy of
the court’s findings and a license shall not be denied under this division.
{¶ 2} Alvarado was convicted of an OVI offense in the State of Illinois in 1986 and
his driving privileges were suspended by Illinois as a result. He claims that his privileges
were subsequently revoked by Illinois. During the intervening 26 years since his suspension,
Alvarado has made multiple efforts to have his Illinois driving privileges restored, but to no
avail, in a series of what he describes as Kafkaesque bureaucratic frustrations. Alvarado has
been a resident of Ohio for 15 years.
{¶ 3} The petition that Alvarado filed states, at paragraph 3:
Petitioner states that the conduct involved in the offense that resulted in
a revocation/suspension in Illinois would not have resulted in a
revocation/suspension longer than three years had the offense occurred in this
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state. The offense of OVI of which Petitioner was convicted in Illinois would
have a maximum suspension of 3 years in Ohio. More than one year has
elapsed since the end of the Illinois suspension and Petitioner cannot obtain an
Ohio driver’s license, because of the suspension/revocation. It causes an
undue hardship for Petitioner because he cannot drive to and from or during his
employment.
{¶ 4} R.C. 4507.08(D)(5) distinguishes cancellation or revocation of driving licence
or privileges from their suspension. If privileges are cancelled or revoked, a petition may be
filed pursuant to that section at “the expiration of one year after the license was cancelled or
revoked.” If privileges were instead merely suspended, the petition may be filed after “the
period of suspension ends.” In either alternative, in order to be granted driver’s privileges
which R.C. 4507.08(D) otherwise prohibits, the petitioner must demonstrate that “the conduct
involved in the offense that resulted in suspension, cancellation, or revocation in the foreign
jurisdiction would not have resulted in a suspension, cancellation, or revocation had the
offense occurred in this state.”
{¶ 5} Alvarado’s petition was referred to a magistrate, who filed a decision denying
the petition. Alvarado filed objections. The trial court overruled the objections, finding:
R.C. 4507(D)(5) prohibits the issuance of an Ohio license to the
plaintiff until the period of the plaintiff’s Illinois suspension ends. The period
of the plaintiff’s Illinois suspension has not yet ended, because the plaintiff has
not yet met the Illinois requirements for license reinstatement.
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The conduct involved in the plaintiff’s Illinois OVI offenses would
have likewise resulted in suspension of the plaintiff’s right to drive in Ohio,
had the plaintiff’s OVI conduct occurred in Ohio. The plaintiff’s assertion
that the length of time of the suspension is relevant is misplaced, as the Ohio
General Assembly obviously chose not to address the lengths of time of other
jurisdiction license suspensions, as compared to Ohio license suspensions for
similar offense conduct, when it enacted R.C. 4507.08(D)(5). This court
concludes that the legislative intent appears to require that when a driver has
his license suspended in another jurisdiction, that driver should be required to
meet the license reinstatement requirements of the jurisdiction that imposed the
suspension before the driver may be issued a driver’s license by the State of
Ohio.
***
The plaintiff’s Illinois license suspension has not terminated because
the plaintiff has not met the Illinois requirements for reinstatement. The State
of Ohio is prohibited from issuing an Ohio license to the plaintiff under R.C.
4507.08(D)(5) and R.C. 4510.61, Article V. [Dkt. 9(B), (C)].
{¶ 6} Alvarado filed a timely notice of appeal. He presents four assignments of
error.
{¶ 7} First assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DECIDING THAT
APPELLANT’S ILLINOIS LICENSE SUSPENSION HAD NOT TERMINATED.”
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{¶ 8} Second assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DECIDING THAT
THE ILLINOIS LICENSE SUSPENSION PERIOD HAD NOT ENDED.”
{¶ 9} Third assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IGNORING THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF R.C. 4507.08 AND R.C. 4510.61.”
{¶ 10} Fourth assignment of error:
“THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 11} The gravamen of Alvarado’s arguments in support of the errors he assigns is
that had his driving privileges been suspended by Ohio, then due to the passage of time and
opportunities for restoration of the privileges made available to him by Ohio those privileges
would by now have been restored by Ohio. However, and as the trial court found, that is not
the basis for a restoration of driving privileges pursuant to R.C. 4507.08(D)(5).
{¶ 12} R.C. 4507.08(D)(5) expressly provides that the applicant must demonstrate that
“the conduct involved in the offense that resulted in suspension, cancellation, or revocation in
the foreign jurisdiction would not have resulted in suspension, cancellation, or revocation had
the offense occurred in this state.” The trial court found that Alvarado’s 1986 OVI offense in
Illinois, had it occurred in Ohio, would have resulted in a suspension in this state. We agree
with that finding, which required the court to deny Alvarado’s petition. The fact that the
suspension would have been of a shorter duration had it been imposed by Ohio is immaterial.
Any unjustified failure on the part of the State of Illinois to restore Alvarado’s driver’s
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privileges must be resolved in and by Illinois. We note that, in his decision, the magistrate
identified a basis on which Alvarado is now eligible to apply for reinstatement of his driving
privileges by Illinois.
{¶ 13} The assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be
affirmed.
Donovan, J., and Hall, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Wilfred L. Potter, Esq.
T. Joann Huenke, Esq.
Hon. Thomas E. Trempe