Williams v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.

[Cite as Williams v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014-Ohio-1889.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
PREBLE COUNTY
ANTHONY T. WILLIAMS, :
CASE NO. CA2013-09-006
Appellant, :
OPINION
: 5/5/2014
- vs -
:
ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU :
OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, et al.,
:
Appellees.
:
CIVIL APPEAL FROM PREBLE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 11CV28987
Skilken & Skilken, Thomas E. Skilken, 1100 Key Bank Tower, 10 West Second Street, Suite
1100, Dayton, Ohio 45402-3701, for appellant
Steven Fixler, 1600 Carew Tower, 441 Vine Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellee,
Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation
Beirne & Wirthlin Co., L.P.A., Michael Schutte, 1745 Madison Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45206,
for appellee, Parker-Hannifin Corporation
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony T. Williams, appeals from the decision of the Preble County
Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Parker-Hannifin
Corporation, his former employer, in a claim seeking workers' compensation benefits. For
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the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} The stipulated facts are as follows. On August 1, 2000, Williams injured his
lower back while working at Parker-Hannifin, a self-insured employer under Ohio's workers'
compensation laws. The injury occurred when Williams attempted to move a heavy drill
cabinet that had tipped over and trapped a co-worker's foot. The following day, Williams
went to the Preble County Urgent Care Center where he was diagnosed with having
sustained an acute lumbar strain to his lower back. Nevertheless, Williams was cleared to
return to work, albeit limited to light duty for a period of two days. It is undisputed that
Williams received medical benefits as a result of his injury and that the medical bills were last
paid through workers' compensation on November 22, 2000. It is also undisputed that
Williams stopped working for Parker-Hannifin on December 3, 2001.
{¶ 3} On December 9, 2002, Williams submitted a C-84 application to the Ohio
Bureau of Workers' Compensation (OBWC) requesting temporary total disability resulting
from his lower back injury. Thereafter, on December 30, 2002, Williams submitted a C-86
motion to the OBWC requesting the same. The OBWC referred the matters to the Industrial
Commission of Ohio (Industrial Commission) for a hearing on the matter. A hearing was then
scheduled for March 27, 2003. However, on March 12, 2003, Williams withdrew his request
for temporary total disability benefits and the hearing was cancelled.
{¶ 4} Over three years later, on July 19, 2006, Williams submitted another C-86
motion, wherein he requested allowance for an "additional condition of Recurrent Herniated
Disc at L4-L5 by aggravation of a pre-existing condition." Other than his newly filed C-86
motion, Williams did not submit any other application or requests to the OBWC or Industrial
Commission. The Industrial Commission subsequently denied Williams' motion after finding
the request for the additional condition was not causally related to his low back injury he
sustained on August 1, 2000. As part of this decision, the Industrial Commission did not
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make any findings in regards to a request for temporary total disability benefits.
{¶ 5} On December 28, 2006, Williams filed an appeal from the Industrial
Commission's findings to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas. After some delay, the
matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial. Following trial, Williams was found to be entitled to
participate in workers' compensation for the requested additional condition of a herniated disc
at L4-L5. This court later affirmed that decision in Williams v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 188
Ohio App.3d 715, 2010-Ohio-1719 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 6} On November 10, 2009, Williams submitted a C-92 application to the OBWC
requesting the determination of percentage of permanent partial impairment. Thereafter, on
January 28, 2010, the OBWC issued a tentative order awarding Williams 8 percent whole
person impairment that entitled him to receive 16 weeks of compensation pursuant to R.C.
4123.57. Both Williams and Parker-Hannifin filed appeals from the tentative order, only to
later dismiss their appeals on March 5, 2010.
{¶ 7} Approximately one year later, on March 3, 2011, Parker-Hannifin filed its own
C-86 motion with the Industrial Commission requesting it to exercise its continuing jurisdiction
and vacate the tentative order previously issued by the OBWC on January 28, 2010. In
support of this motion, Parker-Hannifin claimed the OBWC did not have jurisdiction or
authority to enter that order as the six-year time limitation found in R.C. 4123.52 had expired
since no medical benefits had been paid to Williams since November 22, 2000. The
Industrial Commission agreed with Parker-Hannifin and vacated the tentative order in a
decision issued on April 1, 2011. Williams then appealed the Industrial Commission's
decision to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 8} While that matter was pending, on May 5, 2011, Williams filed another C-86
motion requesting the payment of temporary total disability benefits. After holding two
separate hearings on the matter, the Industrial Commission ultimately denied Williams'
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request by finding it no longer had jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the six-year time
limitation found in R.C. 4123.52. In so holding, the Industrial Commission explicitly stated:
[Williams] argues that his request is not statutorily barred
because his C-86 Motion filed on [07/19/2006] to amend the
claim included an 'implicit' request for payment of a concomitant
period of unspecified temporary total disability compensation
benefits. The District Hearing Officers finds that [Williams] did
not seek payment of temporary total disability compensation
benefits by this motion, but simply sought amendment of the
claim. The District Hearing Officer further finds that [William's] C-
86 Motion filed on 12/30/2002 requesting payment of temporary
total disability compensation was withdrawn by [Williams] and
dismissed pursuant to an ex parte order of the Industrial
Commission, date mailed 03/18/2003. The District Hearing
Officer finds that the filing of a separate motion for temporary
total disability compensation benefits, that was subsequently
withdrawn, demonstrates that the motion filed on [07/19/2006]
was solely filed to seek amendment of the claim, and not to seek
an award of temporary total disability compensation benefits,
either explicitly or implicitly.
Williams also appealed from this decision to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas.
Both of Williams' appeals were then consolidated by the common pleas court in an entry filed
on August 20, 2012.
{¶ 9} After Williams' appeals were consolidated, the parties entered into a joint
stipulation of fact and submitted a number of joint exhibits to the common pleas court. The
parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. On August 13, 2013, the court
issued a decision granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. As
part of that decision, the common pleas court specifically found "medical benefits were paid
(last payment November 22, 2000), but no compensation was paid, so the six year limitation
period would run on November 22, 2006."
{¶ 10} Williams now appeals from the decision granting summary judgment to Parker-
Hannifin, raising two assignments of error for review.
{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1:
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{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTED THE EMPLOYER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE SIX-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD APPLIED TO
THE WORKER'S CLAIM.
{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues the lower court erred by
granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
{¶ 14} Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when
there are no issues in a case requiring a formal trial. Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc., 197 Ohio
App.3d 435, 2011-Ohio-6223, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). On appeal, a trial court's decision granting
summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Moody v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2011-07-141, 2012-Ohio-1478, ¶ 7, citing Burgess v. Tackas, 125 Ohio App.3d 294,
296 (8th Dist.1998). In applying the de novo standard, the appellate court is required to
"us[e] the same standard that the trial court should have used, and * * * examine the
evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial." Bravard
v. Curran, 155 Ohio App.3d 713, 2004-Ohio-181, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), quoting Brewer v.
Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶ 15} "R.C. 4123.52 governs the continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission
of Ohio and essentially places a statute of limitations on workers' compensation claims."
Perez v. Univ. Hosp. Health Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98427, 2012-Ohio-5896, ¶ 12,
citing Sechler v. Krouse, 56 Ohio St.2d 185 (1978). For purposes of this appeal, the relevant
version of R.C. 4123.52 provided, in pertinent part, the following:
The jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the authority of
the administrator of workers' compensation over each case is
continuing, and the commission may make such modification or
change with respect to former findings or orders with respect
thereto, as, in its opinion is justified.
R.C. 4123.52 then continued by providing:
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No modification or change nor any finding or award in respect of
any claim shall be made with respect to disability, compensation,
dependency, or benefits, after six years from the date of injury in
the absence of the payment of medical benefits under this
chapter, in which event the modification, change, finding, or
award shall be made within six years after the payment of
medical benefits, or in the absence of payment of compensation
under section 4123.57, 4123.58, or division (A) or (B) of section
4123.56 of the Revised Code or wages in lieu of compensation in
a manner so as to satisfy the requirements of section 4123.84 of
the Revised Code, in which event the modification, change,
finding, or award shall be made within ten years from the date of
the last payment of compensation or from the date of death, nor
unless written notice of claim for the specific part or parts of the
body injured or disabled has been given as provided in section
4123.84 or 4123.85 of the Revised Code, and the commission
shall not make any modification, change, finding, or award which
shall award compensation for a back period in excess of two
years prior to the date of filing application therefor.
In other words, if medical benefits have been paid, but there has not been a payment of
compensation for temporary, partial or total disability under R.C. 4123.56, 4123.57 or
4123.58 (or wages in lieu thereof), the claim expires "six years after the payment of medical
benefits." Cocherl v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1100, 2007-Ohio-
3225, ¶ 12.
{¶ 16} Here, Williams claims the common pleas court erred by finding the Industrial
Commission lacked jurisdiction to award benefits because the six-year limitation period found
in R.C. 4123.52 had expired. However, based on the parties' joint stipulation of fact, as well
as the joint exhibits submitted to the lower court, it is clear that Williams was only paid
medical benefits, not compensation under R.C. 4123.56, 4123.57 or 4123.58 for temporary,
partial or total disability. Moreover, just as the lower court found, it is undisputed that the last
of these medical benefits were paid on November 22, 2000, thereby establishing a six-year
limitation period that expired on November 22, 2006. Once the applicable six-year period
under R.C. 4123.52 expired, the Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to make any
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further findings, awards, or orders, and Williams' claim was deemed to have lapsed. The
common pleas court, therefore, did not err in its decision granting summary judgment to
Parker-Hannifin.
{¶ 17} Despite this, Williams argues he "tolled" the six-year limitation period by the
filing of his C-84 application for temporary total disability on December 9, 2002, as well as by
the filling of his C-86 motion on December 30, 2002. Yet, the stipulated record establishes
that Williams later withdrew this request before the Industrial Commission could even hold a
hearing on the matter. Again, it is undisputed that Williams was only plaid medical benefits,
not compensation. We fail to see how a withdrawn motion for temporary total disability could
impact the six-year limitation period clearly established by R.C. 4123.52 when no
compensation was ever paid out. Williams' argument to the contrary is without merit and
overruled.
{¶ 18} Williams also argues he "tolled" the six-year limitation period by the filing of his
C-86 motion on July 19, 2006, wherein he requested the additional condition of a herniated
disc at L4-L-5. According to Williams, although not expressly requesting compensation as
part of this motion, the motion should nevertheless be construed as an application for
compensation, thereby falling within the six-year limitation period found in R.C. 4123.52. In
support of this claim, Williams relies on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel.
General Refractories Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 44 Ohio St.3d 82 (1989), which found a
request for additional condition can, under certain circumstances, also constitute a request
for compensation.
{¶ 19} That decision, however, dealt exclusively with how far back retroactively, under
a two-year statutory period, the Industrial Commission could award benefits. See State ex
rel. Drone v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio St.3d 151, 153 (stating the issue in General Refractories
was "the date to which – based on the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 4123.52 –
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temporary total disability compensation could be backdated"). This is an entirely different
provision of R.C. 4123.52 than at issue here. As noted above, this case deals exclusively
with the six-year time limitation where medical benefits are paid, but not compensation. The
Ohio Supreme Court's decision in General Refractories is simply not applicable to the case at
bar.
{¶ 20} Regardless, even if we were to find the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
General Refractories was applicable, which we do not, there is simply nothing in the record to
suggest Williams was seeking compensation as part of his C-86 motion filed on July 19,
2006. When considering whether a request for an additional condition may also be
considered a request for temporary total disability compensation, we are guided by the
following factors: "(1) the document's contents, (2) the nature of relief sought, (3) how the
parties treated the document, and (4) the liberal construction mandate of R.C. 4123.95."
Drone, 93 Ohio St.3d at 153, citing General Refractories, 44 Ohio St.3d 82.
{¶ 21} In this case, however, Parker-Hannifin did not respond to the motion indicating
it treated the motion as a request for compensation, nor did the Industrial Commission
construe the motion as a request for compensation when acknowledging William's
withdrawal. In addition, the motion, which was filed over five years after Williams had
stopped working at Parker-Hannifin, was not supported by any evidence of disability related
to the requested additional condition.
{¶ 22} When considering Williams' motion in light of these factors outlined by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Drone and General Refractories, we find Williams' motion for an additional
condition simply cannot be construed as a request for compensation. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 17 (1992) (finding a similar application for
additional condition could not be construed as a request for compensation). Just as the
Industrial Commission found, "the filing of a separate motion for temporary total disability
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compensation benefits, that was subsequently withdrawn, demonstrates that the motion filed
on [07/19/2006] was solely filed to seek amendment of the claim, and not to seek an award
of temporary total disability compensation benefits, either explicitly or implicitly."
{¶ 23} It is well-settled that a workers' compensation claimant like Williams is
responsible for preventing the running of the statute of limitations. Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62410, 1993 WL 215390, *6 (June 17, 1993). "Failure to file an
application for modification of an award within the prescribed time period results in the loss of
the substantive right for additional benefits." Sechler, 56 Ohio St.2d at 190, citing State ex
rel. Hammond v. Indus. Comm., 144 Ohio St. 477, 480 (1945). Merely because Williams now
"says that [he] intended [his] initial motion to be an application for compensation does not,
under these facts, make it one." Id. at 21. Therefore, because we find no merit to either of
the arguments advanced by Williams challenging the lower court's decision granting Parker-
Hannifin's motion for summary judgment, Williams' first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 25} THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RULE ON THE ISSUED RAISED BY THE
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT'S SECOND CASE (11CV029182) IN WHICH THE INJURED
WORKER HAD REQUESTED A HEARING ON HIS C-84 REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY
TOTAL DISABILITY FROM 2002 WHICH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE SIX-YEAR
LIMITATION PERIOD.
{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Williams argues the common pleas court
erred by failing to rule on his C-86 motion filed on May 5, 2011, which sought a hearing on
his request for payment of temporary total disability benefits. However, as part of its decision
and entry granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment, the lower court
specifically stated that both cases had been consolidated for purposes of issuing its decision
on appeal from the Industrial Commission's findings. Williams even acknowledges this fact
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as part of his appellate brief before this court. The common pleas court's decision finding the
Industrial Commission and the OBWC lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the six-year time
limitation found in R.C. 4123.52 effectively denied all of Williams' claims. As noted above,
we find no error in the court's decision granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, Williams' second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 27} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
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