Myers v. Brown

[Cite as Myers v. Brown, 192 Ohio App.3d 670, 2011-Ohio-892.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
MYERS, : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Appellee, : Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
:
-v- :
: Case No. 2010-CA-00238
BROWN; AMCO Insurance Company, :
:
Appellant. : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2009CV03124
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 22, 2011
APPEARANCES:
The Okey Law Firm and Steven P. Okey; and Joyce Kimbler, for appellee.
Ralph F. Dublikar and Eric J. Stecz, for appellant.
GWIN, Presiding Judge.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant AMCO Insurance Company appeals a judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, which overruled its motion to
bifurcate plaintiff-appellee Louise A. Myers’s claim for punitive damages from her claim
for compensatory damages. Appellant assigns a single error to the trial court:
{¶ 2} “I. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied appellant’s
motion to bifurcate plaintiff’s punitive damages claim pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(B).”
{¶ 3} The record indicates that this case arose out of a traffic accident. Appellee
alleged that defendant David L. Brown1 caused an accident while under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs, which resulted in personal injury to her. She alleged that Brown
acted in malice, hatred, ill-will, a spirit of revenge, and/or a conscious disregard for the
rights and safety of other persons, and she sought punitive damages. Her claim against
appellant AMCO is for uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage and medical-payment
coverage. Appellant AMCO has filed a cross-claim against Brown for indemnification if
appellee prevails on her claims against it.
{¶ 4} On July 2, 2010, appellant filed a motion to bifurcate the punitive-damages
claim from the compensatory-damages claim pursuant to R.C. 2315.21. The court
overruled the motion, finding that the case appellant relied on, Hanners v. Ho Wah
Genting Wire & Cable, Franklin App. No. 09AP-361, 2009-Ohio-6481, was not binding
on the trial court, because it arose out of the Tenth District and there was no case law
from the Fifth District.
{¶ 5} Appellee relies on a conflicting case out of the Eighth District, Havel v.
Villa St. Joseph, Cuyahoga App. No. 94677, 2010-Ohio-5251.
{¶ 6} The first question that arises is whether the denial of a motion to bifurcate
is a final, appealable order. On this issue, Hanners and Havel both found that the order
is final and appealable. We agree.
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On October 9, 2009, defendant David Brown moved the trial court to bifurcate the proceedings. The
court overruled the motion on October 28, 2009. He renewed his motion on December 21, 2009. When
the trial court overruled the motion a second time, he filed an appeal that he subsequently voluntarily
dismissed. He filed no notice of appeal in the present case, and although he urges reversal of the trial
court’s decision, he designates himself an appellee. We will refer to him as a defendant.
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{¶ 7} R.C. 2315.21 (B), as amended effective April 7, 2005, states that in a tort
action that will be tried to a jury, if there is a claim for compensatory damages and for
punitive and exemplary damages and any party moves for bifurcation, then the trial
court shall bifurcate the matter.
{¶ 8} This court has jurisdiction to review the final orders or judgments of trial
courts pursuant to Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2501.02.
R.C. 2505.02 lists the circumstances under which an order is final. Subsection 6 is the
provision pertinent here: “An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to
the Revised Code * * * made by S.B. 80 of 125th General Assembly, including the
amendments of Section[ ] * * * 2315.21 of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 9} Both the Hanners court and the Havel court found that a trial court’s order
denying a motion to bifurcate implicitly determines that the mandatory bifurcation
language in R.C. 2315.21(B) is unconstitutional. Hanners, 2009-Ohio-6481, at ¶ 13;
Havel, 2010-Ohio-5251, at ¶ 19.
{¶ 10} We find that the order appealed from implies that the bifurcation language
in the statute is unconstitutional, although it does not state so expressly. We conclude
that we have jurisdiction to review the matter.
{¶ 11} R.C. 2315.21(B) makes bifurcation of a tort action mandatory if there are
claims for both compensatory and punitive and exemplary damages and if any party
requests it. By contrast, Civ.R. 42 (B) provides that a court may order a separate trial of
a claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims. Thus, the rule expressly vests the trial court with discretion in
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deciding whether bifurcation is necessary. The rule contains no exception for tort
actions. The statute and the rule are clearly in conflict.
{¶ 12} Section 5(B), Article IV, of the Ohio Constitution gives the Ohio Supreme
Court exclusive authority to prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure in all
courts of the state. The constitution provides that when a law conflicts with a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the law has no force or effect. This section
articulates one of the basic concepts of United States jurisprudence, the separation of
powers of the judicial and legislative branches. State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 108 Ohio
St. 3d 86, 2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E. 2d 1062.
{¶ 13} If there is a conflict between the rule and the statute, the court’s rules
prevail on procedural matters, but the legislature’s statutes prevail on substantive
matters. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368,
2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E. 2d 500. Substantive laws or rules relate to rights and duties
giving rise to a cause of action, while procedural rules concern the “machinery” for
carrying on the suit. Norfolk S. RR. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248,
875 N.E. 2d 919, citing Jones v. Erie RR. Company (1922), 106 Ohio St. 408, 140 N.E.
366.
{¶ 14} The Hanners court found that R.C. 2315.21 (B) is a substantive law
because even though it mandates particular procedures for tort actions, the legislative
intent was to create and define a defendant’s right to ensure that the jury does not
inappropriately consider the defendant’s misconduct when determining questions of
liability or compensatory damages. Hanners, 2009-Ohio-6481, at ¶ 28.
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{¶ 15} By contrast, the Havel court found that the statute is procedural, because
it “plainly and unambiguously regulates the procedure at trial for determining
compensatory and punitive damages in a tort action.” Havel, 2010-Ohio-5251, at ¶ 29.
We agree.
{¶ 16} We find that R.C. 2315.21 (B) is not substantive, because it does not
create or define rights and duties giving rise to a cause of action. The statute gives
defendants no additional rights, but sets out the procedural rules whereby courts can
better protect the rights to a jury and to due process that the parties have always
possessed.
{¶ 17} We find that R.C. 2315.21 (B) clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
rules, and the rule controls. We also conclude that insofar as R.C. 2315.21(B)
mandates bifurcation, it is unconstitutional, because it violates Section 5(B), Article IV of
the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 18} The assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
FARMER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
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