DocketNumber: No. 08AP-1.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 6679
Judges: BROWN, J.
Filed Date: 12/18/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} Appellant met the victim, Jelisa James, in a Columbus psychiatric hospital, and the two became friends. After both appellant and James were released, they started dating, and they eventually lived together. The relationship was turbulent, and James moved in with her mother, Norma Hudson. Appellant persistently telephoned James, sent her angry and threatening e-mails, and showed up at her home uninvited.
{¶ 3} On September 19, 2006, Hudson arrived home, where appellant was waiting inside. Appellant stabbed Hudson in the face with a knife and bound her in the bedroom. Appellant told Hudson he was going to drown James and cut off James' head, and said he had already filled the bathtub with water. James eventually arrived at the home, at which point appellant threatened her with a knife. Appellant made James tie her mother to a chair in the bedroom, and then appellant made James take off all of her clothes before tying her to another chair. Appellant made Hudson use her credit cards to wire him money, and, the following morning, appellant took Hudson and James to several grocery stores and a Western Union store to retrieve money, but the money had already been transferred. Appellant had James and Hudson drop him off at a house, and James and Hudson went to the hospital and eventually contacted police.
{¶ 4} Appellant was subsequently apprehended and questioned by police, at which time he made a statement. Appellant was indicted for aggravated burglary, felonious assault, two counts of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and two counts of robbery. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements made to the police, which the trial court denied after a hearing on November 27, 2007. After the motion hearing, the *Page 3 case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found appellant guilty on all counts as charged in the indictment but without the specifications. On December 3, 2007, for purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged the robbery counts into the aggravated robbery count, and sentenced appellant to maximum, consecutive prison sentences on the five counts, for a total sentence of 48 years. Appellant appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following three assignments of error and one supplemental assignment of error, which we will refer to as his fourth assignment of error:
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REQUIRING THE DEFENDNAT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE JURY WHILE SHACKLED IN ORDER TO DELIVER HIS OWN TESTIMONY[.]
[II] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS ORAL STATEMENTS[.]
[III] DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT AFFORDED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COU[N]SEL[]
[IV] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UPON COUNTS 5, 6 AND 7 WHEN THOSE COUNTS ALLEGED NO MENTAL ELEMENT.
{¶ 5} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it required him to appear before the jury while shackled during his testimony at trial. It is well-established that no defendant should be tried while shackled, except as a last resort.Illinois v. Allen (1970),
{¶ 6} However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to be free from shackles in the courtroom. State v. Blackmon (Feb. 14, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APA05-773. In some circumstances, shackling is necessary for the safe, reasonable, and orderly progress of the trial.Morgan, at 232, citing State v. Carter (1977),
{¶ 7} Furthermore, because it is the responsibility of the trial court to insure that an accused receives a fair and impartial trial, it is a matter of due process that the trial court must exercise its discretion in such matters. Cunningham, supra. The trial court is in a position to consider the prisoner's actions both inside and outside the courtroom, as well as his demeanor while court is in session. Franklin, at ¶ 79. However, the trial court must actually exercise its own discretion and not simply defer to security personnel *Page 5
without inquiring into the specific circumstances upon which officials' security concerns are based. State v. Nickelson (Sept. 27, 1994), Franklin App. No. 94APA04-582. The record should reflect factors upon which the trial court exercised its discretion. State v. Jones, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1390,
{¶ 8} In the present case, at the commencement of trial, appellant's counsel had the following dialogue with the court outside the presence of the jury:
*Page 6MR. IRELAND: * * * Your Honor, if I may make a further motion as to my client. He is presently both shackled with the feet and hands. If we could have the handcuffs removed before the jury hears.
THE COURT: Based on the advice from the sheriff's department for the protection of the attorneys, the witnesses, the Court, anyone else in the courtroom, it's necessary to have both the hands and the ankles shackled, so that is denied.
MR. IRELAND: If I may just a moment, Your Honor, preserve the moment.
Your Honor, having consulted further with my client, he assures me that he has no intent to harm anybody here. It's noteworthy, in fact, the alleged victims in this case are not present. I feel that the handcuffs would potentially be prejudicial for the jury to see him in the handcuffs and assume, based on that fact, he's a violent person and/or —
THE COURT: With all the charges in this case and what I've heard, I'm not going to reconsider it. No, nothing is coming off.
* * *
THE COURT: We will take care and make sure the jury doesn't see them unless he wants them to.
{¶ 9} As indicated above, a trial court must actually exercise its own discretion and not simply defer to security personnel without inquiring into the specific circumstances upon which officials' security concerns are based, and the record should reflect factors upon which the trial court exercised its discretion. See Nickelson and Jones, supra. Here, the trial court cited that the sheriff's department had advised it that appellant should be shackled for the protection of the attorneys, the witnesses, and the court, and the trial court explained that shackling appellant was necessary based upon the charges in the case.
{¶ 10} However, we believe there exists a legitimate question as to whether the trial court exercised its own discretion. There was nothing in the record to indicate that appellant's demeanor in the court prompted any security concerns. The trial court also did not inquire as to the specific reasons why security personnel believed shackling was necessary. Further, the trial court provided limited reasoning as to why it found a compelling need to keep appellant shackled. Although the trial court noted that the crimes with which appellant was charged included violent crimes and the underlying facts demonstrated appellant may be capable of violent conduct, these reasons are generic and non-specific and could apply to a substantial number of defendants at trial.
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, even if the trial court lacked the requisite independent discretion and failed to exercise the proper degree of reflection, we find any error was harmless. Shackling a defendant without exercising the required discretion is an error that does not require automatic reversal. State v. Cardinal, Franklin App. No. 05AP-992,
{¶ 12} In the present case, the error was harmless on three bases. First, there is no evidence that the jury ever saw appellant wearing the shackles. The transcript of the hearing is devoid of any reference that would indicate the jury knew appellant was wearing shackles. SeeState v. Wightman, Fayette App. No. CA2006-12-045,
{¶ 13} Second, as in Cardinal, in which this court found harmless error in shackling the defendant due to the defendant's admissions, in the present case, appellant's admissions made the case against him so strong, we find the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, did not deprive appellant of due process. At trial, appellant admitted he broke Hudson's window, stabbed Hudson in the face, made James tie up her mother, tied up James, made Hudson transfer money to him, and sent *Page 8 James threatening e-mails. Coupled with the testimony of Hudson, James, and the other state's witnesses, the evidence against appellant was overwhelming.
{¶ 14} Third, appellant does not claim that he was unable to effectively communicate with his attorney with regard to his legal representation. The record is devoid of any suggestion that the shackles prevented appellant from conferring with his counsel with respect to his own defense. Wightman, supra, at ¶ 12 (the record did not show that the shackles inhibited defendant's ability to consult with his attorney or assist in his defense). Appellant also does not claim the restraints were an impediment to his ability to follow the proceedings and take an active interest in the presentation of his case. See State v.Leonard,
{¶ 15} Appellant urges us to view any error with regard to shackling as a structural error and, thus, incapable of being harmless. Structural errors are constitutional defects that defy analysis by "harmless error" standards because they affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply being an error in the trial process itself.Arizona v. Fulminante (1991),
{¶ 16} However, only federal constitutional errors can be structural and then only if the Supreme Court has labeled them so. See Gray v.State (Tex.Crim.App.2005),
{¶ 17} Our review of case law in Ohio and other jurisdictions has failed to reveal any court that has viewed the shackling of a defendant during trial as a structural error, and appellant cites no authority. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that harmless error analysis applies to the use of physical restraints on a criminal defendant at trial. See Deck v. Missouri (2005),
{¶ 18} Appellant argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements. The standard of review with respect to a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Winand (1996),
{¶ 19} In the present case, appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police because his waiver of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966),
{¶ 20} A suspect may waive his Miranda rights, but the government has the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Id., at 475. A proper waiver of Miranda rights is not a matter of form; rather, the question is whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. State v. Scott (1980),
{¶ 21} To meet the first aspect of a voluntary waiver, the waiver must be non-coercive. A suspect's decision to waive his
{¶ 22} Determining whether a valid waiver of Miranda rights occurred requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation as to whether statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, and whether defendant decided to forgo his rights to assistance of counsel and to remain silent. Fare v. MichaelC. (1979),
{¶ 23} In the present case, appellant claims the police tactics were successful in psychologically overbearing appellant's will. Appellant claims he was reticent from the beginning of the interview, said he did not want to speak until the interviewer spoke to another detective about his prior work as an informant, stated he was not going to sign anything, continued to say "no" to the interviewer even afterMiranda warnings were *Page 13 given, was talked out of saying "no," and requested to be read his rights again only a few minutes after they had already been read to him.
{¶ 24} After reviewing the interview between appellant and Detective Guy Patete, we find appellant's statements to police were voluntary and knowing. Appellant began the interview by stating "[i]t don't matter to me." Then he stated:
* * * Before I say anything, I need somebody to call Detective Dan McGahhey from homicide and let him — let him tell you what I done for him, so wherever they take me to, whatever jail they take me to, they can house me properly. Before I can say anything, I need that to happen.
* * *
I need somebody be aware of it for when we go to the jail. I'm not talking until that happens.
Apparently, appellant had worked as an informant for McGahhey in another case, and appellant claimed McGahhey told him that he should contact McGahhey if he were ever arrested so that precautions could be taken for his safe imprisonment.
{¶ 25} After Patete and appellant discussed McGahhey at length, Patete then asked appellant, "[a]re you going to talk to me or not?" Appellant replied he would talk if Patete would contact McGahhey. Patete replied he would call McGahhey and tell him what was happening after they "t[ook] care of what's going on here at headquarters[,] * * * [b]ut right now I'm not going to do anything because I want to figure out — I want to hear your side of what's going on here."
{¶ 26} At this point, Patete told appellant he was going to read him his rights, and then stated, "[y]ou can answer questions; you cannot answer questions," to which appellant replied "I'm not signing nothing." Patete replied, "[i]t's up to you." Appellant then said again, "I'm not answering your questions. I'm not signing nothing and no tape *Page 14 recorder, so read me my rights." Patete replied "Okay," and asked appellant to stand up. Appellant then talked about contacting McGahhey again so that appellant would not have any problems in jail. Patete again assured appellant that he would contact McGahhey after they were done. After assuring appellant it was not a problem to contact McGahhey, Patete stated, "[a]ll right. All right. This is a constitutional rights waiver I'm going to read to you, okay? I'm going to get a little background here from you real quick." Patete then asked appellant a few questions regarding his ability to read and write, whether he was under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, and whether he had any impairments before reading the constitutional rights waiver form to appellant. After Patete read appellant his rights, appellant replied that he had read and been read his rights, he understood his rights, he did not want a lawyer at that time, he was willing to answer questions, he knew what he was doing, no promises or threats had been made, and no pressure had been used against him. Appellant then signed the waiver of rights form.
{¶ 27} At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Patete testified that he did not threaten or coerce appellant in any way during the interview. Patete stated that appellant never indicated during the course of the interview that he wanted to stop talking or obtain a lawyer.
{¶ 28} The first three-quarters of the interview consisted mostly of appellant's pleas for Patete to contact McGahhey. At no point during this period did appellant seek to stop the interview or request an attorney. To the contrary, as indicated above, appellant specifically stated that he would speak with Patete if Patete would agree to contact McGahhey. Patete agreed to contact McGahhey after he and appellant were finished talking. When Patete brought up the waiver of rights form, appellant stated he would not *Page 15 sign anything and he would not answer his questions. Thus, this appears to be the critical point of the interview for determining the voluntariness of the statement.
{¶ 29} Immediately after telling Patete that he would not sign anything and would not answer his questions, appellant stated "so read me my rights." Initially, we note that, contrary to appellant's claims upon appeal, appellant had not yet been read his rights prior to his statement "so read me my rights." Notwithstanding, a plain reading of the conversation suggests that appellant requested to have his rights read to him, and he subsequently waived them after being so informed. At no time after Patete informed appellant of his rights did he explicitly ask to stop the interview or request an attorney. Although appellant did say he was not going to answer any of Patete's questions, it appears that appellant's statements in this respect were based on his desire for Patete to first speak to McGahhey. After Patete reassured appellant that he would speak to McGahhey, appellant signed the waiver of rights. Patete's assurances, in this regard, were not coercive. An investigator's offer to help if a defendant confesses is not improper.State v. Chase (1978),
{¶ 30} In addition, the other circumstances surrounding appellant's statements do not reveal any of the indicators of involuntariness enunciated in Edwards, supra. Appellant's age did not impact his statement, he had a college degree, he had prior criminal experiences, the interview at issue was no more than one hour, Patete noted that appellant had been cooperative, there is no indication in the transcript that the interview was unusually combative or intense, there was no evidence of physical deprivation or mistreatment, and Patete never threatened appellant. Also important is that, contrary to appellant's claims herein, there is no evidence in the record that he continued to say "no" to Patete after Miranda warnings were given.
{¶ 31} Accordingly, we find the state satisfied its burden to demonstrate appellant's statement was voluntary and knowing. Lacking evidence that appellant's will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was impaired because of any coercive police conduct, we find appellant's decision to waive his Miranda rights was voluntary. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 32} Appellant argues in his third assignment of error that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The
{¶ 33} An attorney properly licensed in Ohio is presumed competent.State v. Lott (1990),
{¶ 34} In the present case, appellant argues his counsel was ineffective in three aspects: (1) his attorney failed to further move to redact the prejudicial portions of the videotape of appellant's interrogation; (2) his attorney allowed appellant's criminal record to be used on cross-examination for impeachment purposes; and (3) his attorney failed to aggressively cross-examine the alleged victims. With regard to appellant's first contention, appellant asserts that, although his counsel made a motion to redact prejudicial portions of the videotape during the motion to suppress hearing, he failed to renew the motion when the tape was played at trial, thereby subjecting the jury to appellant's "personality traits" that were prejudicial.
{¶ 35} We first note that, in order to find appellant's counsel was ineffective, we must find that counsel's actions were prejudicial. However, appellant has failed to indicate how his "personality traits" were prejudicial and fails to describe these traits. At the motion to suppress hearing, appellant's counsel argued that the tape included several minutes of "rambling" and "peculiarity," although he also does not specify the precise nature of these *Page 18 claims. We do not have a copy of the videotape before us for review. Thus, adjudging any prejudicial impact from the vantage of this appellate court is not possible. Our review of the transcript of the interview fails to illuminate with any certainty to which "personality traits" appellant refers.
{¶ 36} Notwithstanding, it is true that a court may permissibly exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid. R. 403(A). However, it has been held that it would be the rare case in which an accused's own actions, language or overall demeanor and appearance would be unfairly prejudicial. State v. Geasley (1993),
{¶ 37} Appellant also argues that his attorney was ineffective when he allowed appellant's criminal record to be used on cross-examination of appellant for impeachment purposes instead of raising appellant's record on direct examination to lessen the negative impact. However, we fail to find appellant's counsel was ineffective in this respect for two reasons. Although appellant claims that there is never a reason not to raise a defendant's criminal record on direct examination, the state points out one very reasonable trial strategy for waiting for the state to raise it on cross-examination: the defendant has to testify about it only one time, and the jury is able to hear about it only *Page 19 one time. In addition, appellant must show that the outcome of his trial would probably have been different if not for the alleged errors by trial counsel. Strickland, supra, at 694. Appellant has failed to demonstrate, or even assert, that the outcome of the trial would have been different if his criminal record would have been raised on direct examination rather than on cross-examination, and we cannot presume that it would have been. For these reasons, we find appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective in this respect.
{¶ 38} Appellant further argues that his attorney was ineffective when he failed to aggressively cross-examine the alleged victims. However, appellant's argument, in this respect, is comprised only of this single conclusory assertion without any further explanation of any error. Appellant's failure to provide any substantive argument in support of his position is exceedingly detrimental to his proposition. Notwithstanding, our review of the record fails to reveal ineffectiveness. Although the victims were cross-examined for ten and sixty-three transcript pages each, effectiveness of cross-examination cannot be judged by the length of cross-examination. State v.Robinson, Lucas App. No. L-06-1182,
{¶ 39} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by sentencing him upon Counts 5, 6, and 7, when those counts alleged no mental element, relying upon State v. Colon,
* * * in attempting or committing a theft offense as defined in section
2913.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, in respect to Norma Hudson, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense did have a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife and/or firearm, on or about his person or under his control, and did display the weapon, and/or did brandish the weapon, and/or did indicate that Norman David Chester did possess the weapon, and/or did use the weapon, and/or inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm to Norma Hudson[.]
In Count 6 of the indictment, appellant was charged with robbery in violation of R.C.
* * * in attempting or committing a theft offense in respect to Norma Hudson, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, did have a deadly weapon on or about his person or under his control, and/or inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another, to wit: Norma Hudson and/or Jelisa James[.]
In Count 7 of the indictment, appellant was charged with robbery without specification in violation of R.C.
*Page 21* * * in attempting or committing a theft offense in respect to Norma Hudson, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, did use or threaten the immediate use of force against another, to wit: Norma Hudson and/or Jelisa James.
{¶ 40} Here, appellant failed to raise the mens rea issue at trial. InColon I, the Ohio Supreme Court found that "[w]hen an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment." Id., at syllabus. Thus, we must determine whether the indictments failed to charge a mens rea element of the crimes at issue. In Colon I, the appellant was charged with robbery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 41} On reconsideration, the Ohio Supreme Court declared thatColon I was prospective, and applied only to those cases pending on the date Colon I was announced. See State v. Colon,
{¶ 42} We will first address appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 43} With regard to the charge of robbery under R.C.
{¶ 44} As to Count 7 of the indictment, appellant was indicted for robbery in violation of R.C.
{¶ 45} Accordingly, appellant's first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled, appellant's fourth assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
KLATT and KLINE, JJ., concur.
KLINE, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting by assignment in the Tenth Appellate District. *Page 1
United States v. Jeffery Scott Durham , 287 F.3d 1297 ( 2002 )
People v. Mar , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 ( 2002 )
Arizona v. Fulminante , 111 S. Ct. 1246 ( 1991 )
State v. Shoen , 598 N.W.2d 370 ( 1999 )
Illinois v. Allen , 90 S. Ct. 1057 ( 1970 )
North Carolina v. Butler , 99 S. Ct. 1755 ( 1979 )
Fare v. Michael C. , 99 S. Ct. 2560 ( 1979 )
Culombe v. Connecticut , 81 S. Ct. 1860 ( 1961 )
Miranda v. Arizona , 86 S. Ct. 1602 ( 1966 )
Chapman v. California , 87 S. Ct. 824 ( 1967 )
McMann v. Richardson , 90 S. Ct. 1441 ( 1970 )
Moran v. Burbine , 106 S. Ct. 1135 ( 1986 )
Deck v. Missouri , 125 S. Ct. 2007 ( 2005 )
Strickland v. Washington , 104 S. Ct. 2052 ( 1984 )
Yglesias v. State , 252 S.W.3d 773 ( 2008 )
Gray v. State , 159 S.W.3d 95 ( 2005 )
Rose v. Clark , 106 S. Ct. 3101 ( 1986 )
Colorado v. Connelly , 107 S. Ct. 515 ( 1986 )
State v. Neyland (Slip Opinion) , 139 Ohio St. 3d 353 ( 2014 )
State v. Green , 2022 Ohio 101 ( 2022 )
State v. Neal , 2016 Ohio 64 ( 2016 )
State v. Robertson , 2008 Ohio 6909 ( 2008 )
State v. Palacios, 08ap-669 (3-17-2009) , 2009 Ohio 1187 ( 2009 )
State v. Woodward , 2019 Ohio 908 ( 2019 )