State v. Taylor

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2021-Ohio-758.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-20-1045
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201402544
v.
Michael Taylor DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 12, 2021
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michael Taylor, pro se.
*****
ZMUDA, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} In this pro se accelerated appeal, appellant, Michael Taylor, appeals the
judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, denying his application for a writ
of mandamus. Finding no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s application, we
affirm.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On May 14, 2015, at the conclusion of a jury trial, appellant was found guilty
of two counts of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and (F), along with
firearm specifications attached to each count. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to
two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a mandatory
term of three years in prison for each firearm specification. Appellant timely appealed his
convictions to this court, prompting the issuance of our September 16, 2016 decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court in State v. Taylor, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1151,
2016-Ohio-5862. In our decision in Taylor, we summarized the underlying facts of this
case as follows:
This case centers around the murders of three young men, two of
whom were very closely associated with appellant. Ultimately, appellant
was charged with and convicted of the murders of those two men.
The first murder was that of Darren Smith. Darren, of the Overton
family, was killed on April 24, 2010, in approximately the 1300 block of
Grand Avenue, in Toledo, Ohio. At that time, appellant lived at 1346
Grand with his sons, Michael Taylor III (“Michael III”) and Montelle
Taylor. On May 7, 2010, Michael III, appellant’s oldest son, was charged
with Darren’s murder, and on January 27, 2012, convicted of Darren’s
murder. Thereafter, Michael III was sentenced to 18 years to life in prison.
2.
The second murder occurred during the early morning hours of
June 10, 2011. Sergeant Daniel Raab, with the Toledo Police Department,
responded to a dispatch concerning a man found lying in the street.
Sergeant Raab discovered Montelle, appellant’s youngest son, partly on the
curb and partly on the street at West Bancroft and Auburn, in Toledo Ohio.
Montelle was alive but had a serious gunshot wound to his body.
According to his testimony, Sergeant Raab asked Montelle where he was
shot and Montelle pointed down the street. Sergeant Raab then asked
Montelle who shot him. While gasping for breath, Montelle responded,
“Little Chris.” Sergeant Raab asked Montelle a second time who the
shooter was and Montelle stated, “Chris” and what sounded like “No-
Veley.” Sergeant Raab later learned Chris Snow-Veley was the name
associated with Little Chris. Montelle died while being transported to
nearby Toledo Hospital. Montelle was officially pronounced dead at 1:45
a.m.
This same Chris or Christian Snow–Veley was the victim of the third
murder. Although appellant and Snow–Veley were unrelated, appellant
treated Snow-Veley, who was a longtime friend to both Montelle and
Michael III, as if he was another son.
According to the testimony of appellant’s brother, Vincent Witcher,
Snow-Veley was killed on May 27, 2013, by appellant and Elijah “Ratchet”
3.
Dyer (“Ratchet”), during a Memorial Day party held at appellant’s house at
263 East Hudson Street in Toledo, Ohio. After Snow-Veley was killed, his
body was placed in a director’s chair then put in the shower in the
basement. Snow-Veley’s body was then moved several times until it was
left at an abandoned house on Streicher Street.
On July 31, 2013, two workers discovered the decomposed remains
of a body in the stairway of an abandoned house on Streicher. A Lucas
County Deputy Coroner testified she discovered eight bullets in the corpse
found at the abandoned house. The eight bullets were from two different
guns. An expert in the field of forensic odontology, after comparing dental
records of the remains to Snow-Veley’s dental records, concluded the
remains were indeed Snow-Veley.
Prior to these murders and over the course of several years, appellant
had taken out numerous life insurance policies on Montelle, Snow-Veley
and Michael III.
On August 1, 2014, Christian Jackson, who was friends with Snow-
Veley and closely associated with appellant, was indicted for the murder of
Montelle. A year later, Jackson entered a guilty plea pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970),
to one count of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years
in prison.
4.
On September 26, 2014, appellant was indicted on two counts of
aggravated murder, for the murders of Montelle and Snow-Veley.
Id. at ¶ 3-11.
{¶ 3} On October 22, 2019, three years after we issued our decision in Taylor,
appellant, acting pro se, filed a “Request for Production of Documents Pursuant to Rule 6
Governing 28 U.S.C. 2255 Proceeding” with the trial court, in which he sought disclosure
of his presentence investigation report so that he could use the information contained
therein to support his arguments on appeal to this court in case No. L-19-1142. On
November 5, 2019, the state filed its opposition to appellant’s request, arguing that the
request was moot in light of our dismissal of appellant’s appeal in case No. L-19-1142 on
July 29, 2019.
{¶ 4} While his request for production of documents remained pending, on
January 2, 2020, appellant filed an application for a writ of mandamus in the trial court,
seeking an order from the trial court directing one of the trial court’s judges to mail him a
copy of his presentence investigation report. Four days later, the state filed its opposition
to appellant’s application, asserting that the trial court only had the statutory authority
under R.C. 2731.01 to issue a writ of mandamus to a tribunal that was inferior to itself,
and thus could not issue the writ to itself.
{¶ 5} On January 27, 2020, the trial court issued its decision on appellant’s request
for production of documents and application for a writ of mandamus. As to appellant’s
request for production of documents, the trial court noted that this court had already
5.
dismissed appellant’s appeal, and thus dismissed appellant’s request as moot. Regarding
the application for a writ of mandamus, the trial court agreed with the state that it could
not issue the requested writ to itself under R.C. 2731.01, and consequently denied
appellant’s application. Thereafter, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging
the trial court’s denial of his request for production of documents as well as its denial of
his application for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 6} On March 13, 2020, we sua sponte dismissed appellant’s appeal of the trial
court’s order denying his request for production of documents after we concluded that
such order was not final and appealable. This appeal then proceeded as to the trial
court’s denial of appellant’s application for a writ of mandamus and, on March 26, 2020,
the matter was placed on our accelerated calendar.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The Common Pleas Court Unconstitutionally Denied Taylor’s
Right to Retrieve a copy of his Presentence Investigation Report and he is
Entitled to Relief
II. Taylor was Denied a Fundamentally Fair Trial and Due Process
of Law by Improper Tactics Employed by the Prosecutor to Obtain
“Impeachment”
6.
III. It is unconstitutional for a state rule to preclude appellant as a
pro se counsel the access to sentencing evidence that was relied upon by the
trial court
{¶ 8} As each of appellant’s assignments of error challenge the trial court’s denial
of his application for a writ of mandamus, they are interrelated and we will address them
together.
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} In his assignments of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his application for a writ of mandamus. We review the trial court’s denial of
appellant’s application de novo. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284,
2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 10. Dismissal of appellant’s application was
appropriate only if it “appear[ed] beyond doubt from the complaint that [appellant could]
prove no set of facts warranting relief, after all factual allegations of the complaint are
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in [appellant’s] favor.” State ex
rel. Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court, 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-
Ohio-1704, 129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4.
{¶ 10} Under R.C. 2731.01 a writ of mandamus is defined as “a writ, issued in the
name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” (Emphasis added.)
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish, by clear and convincing
evidence: (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) a clear legal duty on the part
7.
of the respondents to provide it; and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659,
81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.
{¶ 11} In its decision in State ex rel. Russell v. Klatt, 159 Ohio St.3d 357, 2020-
Ohio-875, 150 N.E.3d 943, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District’s
dismissal of a petition for a writ of mandamus, in which the relator, Russell, sought to
compel the Tenth District and its judges to correct factual findings that were made in its
decision on Russell’s direct appeal. In affirming the Tenth District’s dismissal of
Russell’s complaint, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that “Russell’s complaint asks the
Tenth District to issue a writ compelling itself to correct alleged inaccuracies in a 2004
decision. Mandamus will not lie to compel an entity to order itself to act.” Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 12} Based upon the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Klatt, it is clear that
appellant was not entitled to the mandamus relief he sought in the trial court. Like the
relator in Klatt, appellant requested a writ of mandamus from the same court that would
be ordered to act under that writ. The trial court cannot be inferior to itself, and thus
cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing itself to act under R.C. 2731.01. Therefore,
the trial court properly denied appellant’s application for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 13} Additionally, appellant’s application for a writ of mandamus fails because
the trial court has no legal duty to provide appellant with a copy of his presentence
investigation report. Indeed, the trial court may not provide a copy of the presentence
8.
investigation report to appellant, but must “retain the report or summary under seal.”
R.C. 2951.03(D)(3).
{¶ 14} In light of our conclusion that the trial court could not issue a writ of
mandamus against itself, and because appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court has a clear legal duty to provide him with a copy of his presentence investigation
report, appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his application for a writ
of mandamus lacks merit, and his assignments of error are not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant under
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
_______________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
9.