State v. Rich

[Cite as State v. Rich, 2018-Ohio-1226.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 27337
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 14-CR-3225/2
:
LISA J. RICH : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 30th day of March, 2018.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Montgomery
County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301
West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
GEORGE KATCHMER, Atty. Reg. No. 005031, 1886 Brock Road NE, Bloomingburg,
Ohio 43106
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
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HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Lisa J. Rich appeals from her conviction and sentence on one count of
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, five counts of receiving stolen property, and one
count of money laundering.
{¶ 2} Rich advances ten assignments of error. The first two challenge the legal
sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to support her convictions for receiving
stolen property. The third and fourth assignments of error challenge the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to support her convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and
money laundering. The fifth assignment of error addresses the trial court’s admission of
“other acts” evidence, which Rich claims was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The sixth
assignment of error challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s receiving-stolen-property
statute, which Rich contends criminalizes civil negligence. The seventh assignment of
error challenges the trial court’s denial of her pre-trial suppression motion. The eighth
assignment of error challenges the trial court’s denial of her Crim.R. 29 motion. The ninth
assignment of error addresses the trial court’s jury instructions. In her tenth assignment
of error, Rich maintains that cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial.
{¶ 3} The present appeal stems from Rich’s purchase of stolen merchandise from
a loosely-knit group of drug addicted “boosters” for resale on the internet and at a pawn
shop she operated with her husband, co-defendant Jeffrey Rich. At trial, the State
presented nine witnesses who testified that they participated in the theft of merchandise
from area businesses and the sale of that merchandise to Moraine City Pawn, which was
owned by Lisa Rich. The witnesses testified that they stole the merchandise and sold it
to the pawn shop over a period of several months to satisfy their heroin addictions. The
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stolen merchandise frequently consisted of bulk items in original packaging. Among other
things, it included fishing hooks, lures and reels, tools, batteries, headphones, Nicorette
gum, cosmetics and hygiene items, movies, video games, flea and tick medication and
gift cards. The items came from Dick’s Sporting Goods, Wal-Mart, Lowes, Home Depot,
PetSmart, Sears, Kroger, Kohl’s, Big Lots, and Target, as well as various dollar stores
and drug stores.
{¶ 4} The nine witnesses who admitted “boosting” the items testified that they sold
the stolen merchandise to Moraine City Pawn practically every day and sometimes
several times a day between late 2012 and early 2013. They frequently brought the same
types of items into the pawn shop multiple times a day. They usually removed security
stickers or tags from the stolen merchandise before taking it to the pawn shop. If they did
not, Jeffrey Rich would insist that the stickers or tags be removed and then buy the items.
At trial, the witnesses identified a number of dated Moraine City Pawn “buy slips” or
“tickets” bearing their names and signatures, identifying the stolen items sold, stating the
price paid, and including the initials of the pawn-shop worker who entered the information
into a computer. Although the witnesses typically dealt with Jeffrey Rich and negotiated
with him, Lisa Rich was involved too, sometimes dealing with the customers, completing
paperwork for the transactions, and re-selling stolen merchandise on eBay. Over a six-
week period between December 1, 2012 and January 13, 2013, one witness, Nathan
Woodard, had sixty-two buy tickets in his name. His girlfriend had thirty-five more in her
name. Woodard believed it was “pretty self-explanatory” where he was getting “every day
brand new stuff” he sold to the pawn shop. He also testified that if Jeffrey Rich did not
know he was a drug addict, then he “weren’t that bright.” Another witness, Randall James
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Alcorn, admitted selling “thousands” of stolen items to the pawn shop, usually carrying
the items inside in large bags.
{¶ 5} Several witnesses testified that Jeffrey Rich sometimes would loan them
money in the morning, enabling them to purchase heroin to start their day before engaging
in retail theft. The fronted money typically then would be deducted from what the
witnesses earned selling stolen items to the pawn shop later that day. One witness, Jeff
Bowling, testified that Jeffrey Rich asked him to stop bringing in dollar-store batteries
because they included a note on the cover asking the purchaser to contact a particular
phone number if the batteries were found for sale elsewhere. Bowling testified that Jeffrey
Rich also asked him to vary the use of identification cards when bringing items to the
pawn shop because he did not want the same identification card used too many times.
According to Bowling, Jeffrey Rich stated that if the group got caught, not to “let it come
back on him.”
{¶ 6} Moraine City Pawn employee Jessica Proud testified that she became
suspicious about the group of individuals repeatedly selling new merchandise to the pawn
shop. She was concerned because “the same kind of people were coming in
continuously, bringing in the same types of items, in packages, multiples, coming in
multiple times of day, the same kind of people.” Proud testified that Jeffrey Rich
negotiated the price and purchased most of the merchandise although Lisa Rich was
involved too. According to Proud, Lisa Rich bore primary responsibility for re-selling the
merchandise on the internet. In Proud’s opinion, the merchandise “was obviously stolen,
or obtained some way that was not legal.” Proud testified that she expressed her concerns
to Lisa Rich, who agreed with her. Jeffrey Rich overheard one such conversation between
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Proud and his wife. He responded by telling them to mind their own business and “shut
up.” At one point, Jeffrey Rich also instructed Proud to stop taking pictures of the
merchandise and not to be so specific about the items on buy slips or tickets she
completed.
{¶ 7} In January 2013, detective Jason Neubauer visited Moraine City Pawn in
connection with an investigation into the possible sale of stolen merchandise on eBay.
Neubauer met with Lisa Rich and her husband on that occasion. During the meeting,
Jeffrey Rich identified twenty boxes of Nicorette gum that he had purchased from Nathan
Woodard. In response, Neubauer explained “that this was a sign of an obvious retail theft”
as “[t]ypically thieves will target property that is small and easy to conceal, also with a
high dollar amount so they get a higher return.” The Riches then showed Neubauer two
new Dyson vacuum cleaners and a new Generac generator. At that point, Neubauer
explained to them that “thieves would target these types of property and that typically they
either go directly into the store, pick the merchandise up, and walk out, or load it up into
a cart and push the property out the door that way.”
{¶ 8} Thereafter, in April 2013, Neubauer and other officers arranged an
undercover operation at Moraine City Pawn. On that occasion, a drug addict named John
Cox took twenty boxes of Prilosec into the pawn shop to sell. The boxes had been
provided by Kroger. Upon seeing the boxes, Jeffrey Rich gave Cox a knife or a
screwdriver and had him remove the Kroger stickers outside and then bring the boxes
back inside. Cox complied, and Jeffrey Rich purchased the merchandise. During the
transaction, he also asked Cox to bring “a tool or something” in with the Prilosec the next
time so he could “write it up like that” and it wouldn’t be recorded as “Prilosec directly.”
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{¶ 9} The following day, a second undercover operation took place. On that
occasion, Cox and an undercover officer took ten boxes of Prilosec, six boxes of Crest
white strips, and six boxes of a weight-loss product into Moraine City Pawn. Once again,
all of the merchandise had been provided by Kroger. The officer wandered around the
shop while Cox sold the merchandise to Jeffrey Rich and received payment from Lisa
Rich. A third undercover operation occurred five days later. On that occasion, Jeffrey Rich
came outside the pawn shop to look at two new Dyson vacuum cleaners in an undercover
van. He discussed the vacuums with Cox but ultimately declined to purchase them.
{¶ 10} Three days later, police executed a search warrant at Moraine City Pawn.
At that time, they recovered numerous items, including large quantities of new
merchandise in its original packaging of the type reportedly stolen and sold to the pawn
shop by the State’s nine witnesses. Some of the items still had store stickers on them,
and some of the items had the sellers’ names associated with them. These names
included some of the prosecution witnesses at trial. Approximately $3,000 worth of
merchandise recovered from the pawn shop—including approximately seventy-five
percent of the fish hooks—was traced to Dick’s Sporting Goods. Additional stolen items
were traced to CVS pharmacy. Some Crest 3D white strips still had active security tags
attached.
{¶ 11} Lisa Rich ultimately was indicted in connection with the foregoing incidents,
along with her husband. As set forth above, a jury convicted her of engaging in a pattern
of corrupt activity, a first-degree felony. She also was convicted on one count of money
laundering, a third-degree felony, and five misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen
property. The trial court sentenced her to five years of community control and imposed a
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“weekends only” 180-day jail term.
{¶ 12} In her first two assignments of error, Rich challenges the legal sufficiency
and manifest weight of the evidence to support her convictions for receiving stolen
property. 1 Her primary argument is that the convictions depended largely on the
information contained in the buy tickets or slips about which the prosecution witnesses
testified. As set forth above, those tickets, which included the witnesses’ signatures,
identified the stolen merchandise sold to the pawn shop on the dates contained in the
indictment. Without those tickets, the witnesses lacked independent recollection of what
stolen merchandise they sold to the pawn shop on any particular day. Rich argues on
appeal, however, that the tickets constituted inadmissible hearsay because no one
identified as a custodian of the records testified and qualified them as business records
under Evid.R. 803(6). Rich also argues that the State failed to link the numerous buy
tickets to specific merchandise seized from the pawn shop. Finally, Rich asserts that the
prosecution witnesses were heroin addicts who had no real memories of the discrete
transactions in question.
{¶ 13} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, she is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App. 3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d
Dist.2000). “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
1Although Rich’s first assignment of error recites six counts of receiving stolen property,
we note that she was convicted and sentenced on only five counts. (Doc. #265, 273).
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When
a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 15} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Rich’s convictions
for receiving stolen property are supported by legally sufficient evidence and are not
against the weight of the evidence. Under R.C. 2913.51(A), the State was required to
establish that Rich had received, retained, or disposed “of property of another knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that the property [had] been obtained through
commission of a theft offense.” Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could have found the foregoing elements proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In finding Rich guilty of receiving stolen property, the jury also did not
clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice because the evidence
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does not weigh heavily against her convictions. To the contrary, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports a finding that Rich received stolen merchandise from drug-
addicted “boosters” while knowing or having reasonable cause to believe the property
had been obtained by theft.
{¶ 16} Rich’s argument about the pawn-shop buy tickets being inadmissible
hearsay is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, when considering a challenge to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all of the evidence presented at
trial, regardless of whether it was admitted erroneously. State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St. 3d
202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 17–20. In State v. Renner, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 25514, 2013-Ohio-5463, this court extended the same principle to a manifest-weight
challenge. Id. at ¶ 20 (“Considering all of the evidence presented at trial (including any
evidence that may have been improperly admitted), the jury did not lose its way * * *.”).
As this court recognized in Renner, the prosecution is entitled to rely on the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings in deciding how to present its case. Id. at ¶ 8. That rationale applies
equally to legal-sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges. 2 Therefore, contrary to
Rich’s argument, we are entitled to consider the challenged buy tickets when evaluating
the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 17} Second, Rich did not raise a hearsay objection to the buy tickets. She
argued only that the tickets were not linked to evidence found at the pawn shop. In
2 This does not mean, of course, that a defendant has no recourse when a trial court
makes an evidentiary error. If the error is preserved for appeal, a defendant may raise the
evidentiary issue on appeal. And if the error is deemed prejudicial, reversal may be
obtained. That presents a different question, however, than whether the evidence
introduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a conviction or whether a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence that was introduced at trial.
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essence, Rich argued below that no one could say any particular merchandise seized
from the pawn shop was the actual merchandise identified in the buy tickets. For example,
although fish hooks from Dick’s Sporting Goods were seized from the pawn shop, and
prosecution witnesses testified about selling the pawn shop fish hooks stolen from Dick’s
Sporting Goods, the State did not prove that its witnesses stole the particular hooks found
in the pawn shop when police raided it. But no such showing was required. Nothing in
R.C. 2913.51(A) obligated the State to track down the exact fish hooks stolen from Dick’s
Sporting Goods and sold to Moraine City Pawn or to link those exact fish hooks to
corresponding buy tickets. See State v. Loch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1065, 2003-
Ohio-4701, ¶ 34 (“The level of proof appellant demands to demonstrate that each stolen
item sold by the thieves to VIP was the same item later confiscated from VIP would be
nearly impossible to obtain. The present circumstances do not lend themselves to direct
proof that the items confiscated were the same items admittedly stolen and sold to VIP.
Rather, due to the extremely high volume of items confiscated and stolen, many of which
were the exact same make and model as each other, the present circumstances are the
type that must depend upon circumstantial evidence.”). In any event, this argument is not
a hearsay argument, which is what Rich raises on appeal.
{¶ 18} As to the hearsay issue, we are limited to plain-error review. Courts apply
the plain-error doctrine to prevent a “manifest injustice.” Rich must show that but for plain
error, “the outcome of [her] trial clearly would have been otherwise.” State v. Chinn, 85
Ohio St. 3d 548, 562, 709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999). We see no plain error here. Consistent
with Evid.R. 803(6), the record reflects that the buy tickets were created when the pawn
shop purchased the stolen merchandise, the tickets were kept by the pawn shop in the
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course of business, it was the regular practice of the pawn shop to create the tickets, and
the tickets were completed by the Riches or Jessica Proud, each of whom would have
had actual knowledge of the transactions. Proud testified to the foregoing facts, in so
many words, which may be why defense counsel did not raise a hearsay objection. (See,
e.g., Tr. Vol. VII at 777, 790-795). Although Proud did not refer to herself as the
“custodian” of the records, she undoubtedly was at least an “other qualified witness” within
the meaning of Evid.R. 803(6), which enabled her to lay a foundation establishing the
tickets as business records. See State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St. 3d 137, 2012-Ohio-6208,
984 N.E.2d 1057, ¶ 40 (“A ‘qualified witness’ for this purpose would be someone with
‘enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of the business in question to explain
how the record came into existence in the ordinary course of business.’ ”). Therefore, any
hearsay objection to the buy tickets ultimately would have been futile. Proud at least
arguably did qualify the buy tickets as business records. But even if she did not, she
certainly could have qualified them as such if Rich had raised the issue by objecting to
their admission.3 That being so, we see no manifest injustice to support a finding of plain
3 We note that it could have been argued that some of the buy tickets do not qualify as
business records because they contain inaccuracies with regard to merchandise
descriptions, quantities, or other characteristics intended to conceal the pawn shop’s
receipt of stolen property. Under Evid.R. 803(6), such defects could show a “lack of
trustworthiness” in the records. Ironically, in part, that is why the “falsified” tickets were
introduced. In any event, the buy tickets qualified as non-hearsay insofar as they
constituted admissions of a party-opponent under Evid.R. 801(D)(2), which covers a
party’s own statements, in either an individual or representative capacity, as well as
statements by a party’s agent or employee. Here the buy tickets bearing the initials of
Jeffrey or Lisa Rich essentially constituted written admissions that on particular dates they
purchased certain items from certain individuals. We believe these buy tickets could be
excluded from the hearsay rule within the scope of Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Compare United
States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir.2004) (“The next question is whether the
invoices were hearsay. They were not. When offered against Pang, Pang’s invoices were
admissions, and therefore non-hearsay as defined by Rule 801(d)(2).”).
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error.
{¶ 19} Finally, we are unpersuaded by Rich’s argument about the State’s key
witnesses being heroin addicts who had poor memories. Although the witnesses could
not recall, years later at the time of trial, what they sold the pawn shop on any particular
day, they identified their signatures on dated buy tickets that listed the items they sold.
They also admitted that those items would have been stolen merchandise because
virtually everything they sold to Moraine City Pawn was stolen merchandise. For the
foregoing reasons, Rich’s convictions for receiving stolen property are based on legally
sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Her first two
assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 20} In her third assignment of error, Rich challenges the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support her conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Her entire
argument is as follows:
In the present matter, there is no evidence of the retail value of any
of the items purportedly stolen. Nor is there any evidence of the amounts
paid to the witnesses in this matter for the reasons argued in Appellant’s
First Assignment of Error. Nor is there any evidence as to when items
testified to and sold to the Appellant were stolen. Thus, there is no evidence
that “. . . the same person or persons within any one-hundred-eighty-day
period . . .” stole the property in question, permitting aggregation of
amounts. Thus there is no evidence that the $1,000.00 limit was reached.
Nor can the items used by the CI on or after April 10, 2013 be used
for aggregation. A conviction for Receiving Stolen Property requires that the
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property received is, in fact, stolen. State v. Ray, 2010-Ohio-513, State v.
Parra, 2011-Ohio-3977. Hearsay statements cannot be used to supply
evidence that an item is stolen. Id. As argued by Counsel in the present
matter, the items from the sales by John Cox on April 10, 2013 involved
products supplied by Kroger and were not stolen from the store. As such,
there can be no evidence that any stolen property was received by the
Appellant on this date.
Thus, there is insufficient evidence under the R.C. 2923.31 to
support a conviction under R.C. 2923.32.
(Appellant’s brief at 11).
{¶ 21} Upon review, we find Rich’s argument to be unpersuasive. She was
convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). As
relevant here, the statute required proof that Rich, while employed by or associated with
an “enterprise,” namely Moraine City Pawn, had participated in the affairs of the enterprise
through a “pattern of corrupt activity.” Under R.C. 2923.31(E), a “pattern of corrupt
activity” means “two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been
a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated,
and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they
constitute a single event.” The corrupt activity alleged by the State included money
laundering and receiving stolen property, both of which are identified as corrupt activity in
R.C. 2923.31(I). Under R.C. 2923.32(B)(1), the offense was a first-degree felony because
one of the incidents of corrupt activity, money laundering, was a third-degree felony.
{¶ 22} In our view, the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that Rich
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engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity. Moraine City Pawn qualified as an “enterprise,”
which “includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership,
corporation, * * * or other legal entity, or any organization, association, or group of persons
associated in fact although not a legal entity.” R.C. 2923.31(C). Rich does not argue
otherwise. She also does not dispute that she was employed by or associated with the
enterprise. Finally, the record supports a finding that she participated in the affairs of the
enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity, namely money laundering and receiving
stolen property. Rich’s participation in numerous acts of receiving stolen property is
addressed in our analysis of her first two assignments of error above. With regard to
money laundering, the State was required to prove that Rich conducted or attempted to
conduct a transaction “knowing that the property involved in the transaction is the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with the purpose of committing or furthering
the commission of corrupt activity.” R.C. 1315.55(A). On appeal, Rich does not address
the elements of the money-laundering charge in any detail. Regardless, the evidence
supports a finding that she participated in buying stolen property from drug-addicted retail
thieves or “boosters.” She then conducted numerous transactions in which she re-sold
the stolen merchandise in the pawn shop and on the internet with knowledge that it
constituted the proceeds of theft offenses. She did so with a purpose to convert the stolen
property into “clean” cash, thereby exhibiting a purpose to further the commission of her
corrupt activity.
{¶ 23} Rich asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient because the State failed
to prove the “retail” value of the stolen merchandise. She also claims there is no evidence
establishing how much the witnesses who sold the pawn shop stolen merchandise were
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paid or when these transactions occurred. It does not appear, however, that Rich raised
her argument about proof of “retail value” below. In any event, the State correctly notes
that it was not required to prove the retail value of the stolen merchandise. The phrase
“retail value” pertains to R.C. 2923.31(I)(5)(a)(i), which defines corrupt activity as
including “[o]rganized retail theft.” Under R.C. 2923.31(Q), “[o]rganized retail theft” means
“the theft of retail property with a retail value of one thousand dollars or more from one or
more retail establishments with the intent to sell, deliver, or transfer that property to a
retail property fence.”
{¶ 24} The State was not required to prove a “retail” value of $1,000 or more
because Rich was not charged with engaging in corrupt activity based on her committing
organized retail theft. Rather, she was charged with engaging in corrupt activity based on
her committing acts of money laundering and receiving stolen property. Under R.C.
2923.31(I)(2)(c), receiving stolen property constitutes “corrupt activity” when the
proceeds, payments, or “value” of the property in the aggregate exceeds $1,000. As the
State points out, buy tickets reflect that Nathan Woodard alone received more than
$3,000 for stolen merchandise he sold to the pawn shop over a 45-day period during the
relevant time. Thus, the State undoubtedly presented legally sufficient evidence to
establish an aggregate “value” exceeding $1,000, regardless of the actual “retail” value
of the stolen merchandise.4
{¶ 25} As for Rich’s other arguments, the record belies her claim that there is no
evidence establishing how much the witnesses who sold stolen merchandise were paid
4 Even if the State had been required to prove the “retail” value of the stolen merchandise,
the jury reasonably could have inferred a retail value in excess of $1,000 given that
Woodard received $3,000 for items he sold to the pawn shop.
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or when these transactions occurred. As set forth in our analysis of the first two
assignments of error, the buy tickets established what the witnesses sold, how much they
received, and when the transactions occurred. The witnesses testified about the buy
tickets and made clear that they typically sold the stolen merchandise to the pawn shop
almost immediately after stealing it. Finally, Rich’s argument about the April 2013
undercover operation is misdirected. She contends the merchandise involved in that
operation cannot be considered because it was supplied by Kroger and was not actually
stolen. Assuming, arguendo, that this is true, Rich was not convicted of receiving stolen
property based on the items involved in the undercover operation, and we have not
considered that merchandise or its value when evaluating the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support her conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.
Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 26} In her fourth assignment of error, Rich challenges the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support her money-laundering conviction. Her entire argument is as
follows:
Appellant incorporates her argument in her Third Assignment of
Error as if fully re-written herein. Due to the evidential failure to establish
corrupt activity under Count 1, or in any testimony in the trial, there is a
failure to establish corrupt activity under the Money Laundering statute and
this conviction must be reversed.
(Appellant’s brief at 12).
{¶ 27} Rich presents no new argument in support of this assignment of error,
relying instead on the argument raised under her third assignment of error. Having
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rejected that argument and overruled that assignment of error above, we likewise overrule
the fourth assignment of error.
{¶ 28} In her fifth assignment of error, Rich contends the trial court erred in
admitting “other acts” evidence that was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. In particular,
she challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning the prosecution
witnesses’ drug addiction, the cost of their drug habits, the extent of their theft activities,
their sales of merchandise to Moraine City Pawn on occasions other than those specified
in the indictment, and their borrowing of money from her husband to satisfy their drug
habits. Rich also complains about the trial court (1) allowing the jury to see pictures of
large quantities of merchandise on the sales floor at the pawn shop and in a storage area,
and (2) allowing the prosecutor to present some of the physical evidence itself to the jury.
She asserts that the pictures and physical evidence were irrelevant and also inadmissible
under Evid.R. 403(A), and Evid.R. 404.
{¶ 29} We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the
challenged items. The fact that the prosecution’s witnesses were drug addicts who
regularly were stealing and selling large quantities of new merchandise to the pawn shop
helped provide background and context for the charged offenses. This evidence also was
relevant to the issue of Rich’s knowledge that the merchandise was stolen. The extent of
the witnesses’ addiction explained why they sometimes brought the same types of stolen
items to the pawn shop multiple times a day. The challenged evidence also was relevant
insofar as it suggested that the Riches took advantage of their situation and supported
their habits by loaning them money and later buying their stolen merchandise at a
discount for re-sale. The fact that Jeffrey Rich loaned the witnesses money additionally
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was relevant because it helped establish the extent and nature of the Riches’ relationship
with the witnesses, which in turn made it more likely that Lisa Rich and her husband knew
what they were doing. All of the witnesses’ sales of stolen merchandise to the pawn shop
within the applicable time frame were relevant to the existence of a pattern of corrupt
activity, regardless of whether any particular sale was the basis for a separate receiving-
stolen-property charge. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Darke Nos. 97 CA 1441, 97
CA 1444, 1998 WL 57796, *6 (Feb. 13, 1998) (recognizing that “uncharged conduct may
be used to establish a ‘pattern of corrupt activity’ ” because nothing in R.C. 2923.31(E)
“requires a defendant to be separately indicted for, or convicted of, the underlying corrupt
activity”). Finally, the pictures of large quantities of merchandise on the pawn shop’s sales
floor and in a storage area were relevant because the pictures were at least
representative of the items that were stolen and sold to the pawn shop. To that extent,
the pictures corroborated the testimony of the State’s witnesses. In addition, some of the
pictured items were identified as being the actual stolen merchandise. The State likewise
limited its introduction of physical evidence seized from the pawn shop to items that
corresponded to merchandise its witnesses testified about stealing and selling to Moraine
City Pawn. We note too that the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction concerning
the pictures and physical evidence introduced at trial. (Tr. Vol. VII at 859).
{¶ 30} With regard to Evid.R. 403(A), relevant evidence must be excluded “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or confusion
of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Here Rich suggests that the evidence she
challenges was unfairly prejudicial or misleading. “ ‘Unfair prejudice is that quality of
evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury decision. Consequently, if
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the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or
appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. Usually,
although not always, unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather
than intellect.’ ” Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St. 3d 169, 172, 743 N.E.2d 890
(2001), quoting Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence (2000) 85-87, Section 403.3. “Because
fairness is subjective, the determination whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court and will be overturned only if the discretion is
abused.” State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St. 3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 25.
We see no abuse of discretion here. The State’s theory of the case was that the Riches
knowingly relied on a group of drug-addicted “boosters” to supply them with stolen
merchandise, which they re-sold for a profit through the pawn shop. All of the challenged
evidence was tied to this theory, and the trial court had discretion to conclude that it was
not misleading and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
{¶ 31} We also reject Rich’s reliance on Evid.R. 404(B), which provides: “Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Rich’s complaint about “other acts” evidence
is directed toward the prosecution witnesses’ testimony about their drug use and their
uncharged thefts and sales of stolen merchandise to Moraine City Pawn. However, the
witnesses’ drug use went to their motive for committing the thefts. It also formed part of
the immediate background of the crimes charged in the indictment. See State v. Morris,
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132 Ohio St. 3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 13. Additionally, evidence about
numerous sales of stolen merchandise to the pawn shop helped establish a pattern of
corrupt activity, regardless of whether each incident formed the basis for a separate
charge of receiving stolen property. That being so, the evidence was an integral part of
the State’s proof of the charge of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, not “other acts”
evidence. In addition, evidence that the pawn shop regularly bought large quantities of
the same types of stolen merchandise from the same group of drug-addicted thieves
helped establish the Riches’ knowledge that the merchandise was stolen and their lack
of mistake or accident in buying stolen goods. For each of the foregoing reasons, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the challenged evidence under
Evid.R. 404(B). The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 32} In her sixth assignment of error, Rich challenges the constitutionality of
Ohio’s receiving-stolen-property statute, which she contends criminalizes civil
negligence. The statute, R.C. 2913.51(A), provides that “[n]o person shall receive, retain,
or dispose of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the
property has been obtained through commission of a theft offense.” (Emphasis added).
Rich asserts that the statute’s “reasonable cause to believe” language unconstitutionally
criminalizes civil negligence.
{¶ 33} Upon review, we find Rich’s argument to be unpersuasive. Other Ohio
appellate courts have addressed and rejected the same argument. See, e.g., State v.
York, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 49952, 1985 WL 8502, *4 (Oct. 24, 1985); State v.
Skorvanek, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 2545, 1990 WL 94226, *2 (June 27, 1990); State v. Miller,
4th Dist. Pickaway No. 82 CA 24, 1984 WL 4270, *2-3 (March 6, 1984). We now join
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them.5 The receiving-stolen-property statute includes a culpable mental state of “knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe.” We agree with the Fourth District that “having
reasonable cause to believe” is essentially “a refinement of the knowledge state of
culpability.” Miller at *3; see also United States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 943 (9th
Cir.2006) (recognizing that “reasonable cause to believe” is “substantially similar to
knowledge” and that “[i]t is often proven largely through circumstantial evidence and
inferences”).
{¶ 34} In arguing to the contrary, Rich suggests the statute’s reference to
“reasonable cause” implies a wholly-objective “reasonable man” standard, leaving open
the possibility of a conviction based on simple negligence. But the statute’s mens rea
requirement fairly may be read to have a subjective component insofar as it requires the
offender himself or herself to know or to have reasonable cause to believe the property
at issue was stolen. Compare United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268-1269 (10th
Cir.2000) (“[W]e hold that the ‘knowing or having reasonable cause to believe’ standard
in 21 U.S.C. §841(d)(2) imposes a constitutionally sufficient mens rea requirement. In so
holding, we note that the standard involves a subjective inquiry that looks to whether the
particular defendant accused of the crime knew or had reasonable cause to believe the
listed chemical would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. This requires
scienter to be evaluated through the lens of this particular defendant, rather than from the
prospective of a hypothetical reasonable man. In this context, the ‘reasonable cause to
5In State v. Emmons, 57 Ohio App. 2d 173, 386 N.E.2d 838 (2d Dist.1978), this court
held that the “having reasonable cause to believe” language in R.C. 2913.51 was not
unconstitutionally vague. In Emmons, this court did not address whether the statute
unlawfully criminalizes civil negligence.
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believe’ standard is one akin to actual knowledge.”); United States v. Johal, 428 F.3d 823,
827-828 (9th Cir.2005) (“[W]e hold that ‘reasonable cause to believe,’ in the context of
§841(c)(2), requires that a defendant subjectively know facts that either cause him or
would cause a reasonable person to believe that the ingredients are being used to
produce illegal drugs. This standard limits the likelihood that a defendant will be
prosecuted for mere inadvertent conduct and is consistent with the longstanding principle
presuming a mens rea requirement for criminal activity. * * * [R]easonable cause to
believe is not purely objective, but turns on the facts actually known by the defendant in
a particular case—facts from which the jury can infer that any reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have had to know that the ingredients were being bought to
make illegal drugs. As a practical matter, therefore, the differences between actual and
constructive ‘knowledge’ under the statute are not substantial.”).
{¶ 35} With regard to Ohio’s receiving-stolen-property statute, we note too that “[i]f
the legislature had omitted ‘reasonable’ and had defined this element as ‘knowing or
having cause to believe’ the property was stolen, the courts undoubtedly would have
construed it to mean ‘reasonable cause,’ following our long-established tradition of
fairness in the application of criminal law.” State v. Bentz, 2 Ohio App. 3d 352, 353, 442
N.E.2d 90 (1st Dist.1981). Finally, we note that “reasonable cause to believe” language,
or similar terminology, is found in many statutes and has been upheld many times,
including by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S.
19, 27-28, 61 S. Ct. 429, 85 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1941) (“The obvious delimiting words in the
statute are those requiring ‘intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained
is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.’
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This requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith. The sanctions apply only when
scienter is established. * * * The language employed appears sufficiently definite to
apprise the public of prohibited activities and is consonant with due process.”); Jae Gab
Kim at 943 (citing cases and observing that “reasonable cause to believe” or analogous
language “is found in other statutes”).
{¶ 36} In arguing that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard unconstitutionally
imposes criminal liability for civil negligence, Rich relies exclusively on Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 192 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2015). In that case, the defendant was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which prohibits transmitting a communication containing a threat
to kidnap or injure another person. The statute does not specify any mental state with
respect to any of its elements. The issue was what mental state, if any, should be read
into the statute regarding the fact that a communication contains a threat. At trial, the
judge had instructed the jury that a statement is a threat “when a defendant intentionally
makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily
injury or take the life of an individual.” Id. at 2007. On review, the Supreme Court reversed
the defendant’s conviction because it “was premised solely on how his [internet] posts
would be understood by a reasonable person.” Id. at 2011. The majority opined that
having guilt turn on whether a “reasonable person” perceives a communication as a
threat, regardless of what the defendant subjectively thinks, reduces culpability to
negligence. Id. It expressed reluctance to infer that a negligence standard was intended
in a criminal statute. Id. The majority then read a mental-state requirement into the statute
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and held that it would be satisfied if the defendant transmitted a communication “for the
purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as
a threat.” Id. at 2012.
{¶ 37} Upon review, we find Rich’s reliance on Elonis to be misplaced for at least
two reasons. First, Elonis involved statutory interpretation, whereas Rich argues that
criminalizing simple negligence violates the Constitution, which is something Elonis did
not address. The Supreme Court simply declined to infer that Congress had intended a
negligence standard to apply and, instead, read purpose or knowledge into the federal
statute. Second, the Elonis majority reasoned that the trial court had applied a negligence
standard by focusing exclusively on whether a hypothetical “reasonable person” would
have perceived the defendant’s communications as threats. Unlike the jury instruction in
Elonis, however, R.C. 2913.51(A) includes a culpable mental state requiring the
defendant herself to know or to have reasonable cause to believe the property at issue is
stolen. As we have explained, this standard has a subjective component that requires
examining the facts from the perspective of the defendant, not just from the perspective
of a hypothetical “reasonable person.” That being so, we conclude that “having
reasonable cause to believe” is substantially similar to knowledge. Consequently, we find
Elonis to be distinguishable. The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 38} In her seventh assignment of error, Rich challenges the trial court’s denial
of her pre-trial suppression motion. In particular, she contends a search-warrant affidavit
failed to establish the reliability of sources relied on by investigators. She also asserts
that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that she was buying and re-selling
stolen merchandise. She notes that referenced items from a Kroger store involved in
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undercover transactions were not actually stolen. Finally, Rich claims the search warrant
was so generalized that it permitted seizure of virtually anything.
{¶ 39} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in
support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” State v. George, 45 Ohio St. 3d 325, 544 N.E.2d
640 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-
239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
{¶ 40} “In reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in
support of a search warrant issued by a magistrate, neither a trial court nor an appellate
court should substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate by conducting a de novo
determination as to whether the affidavit contains sufficient probable cause upon which
that court would issue the search warrant.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. “Rather,
the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. In conducting any after-the-fact scrutiny
of an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, trial and appellate courts should
accord great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, and doubtful
or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” Id.
{¶ 41} In the present case, police actually obtained two warrants, one in April 2013
and one in May 2013, both based on affidavits from Moraine detective Jason Neubauer.
As relevant here, the April 2013 affidavit sought a warrant to search Moraine City Pawn
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for evidence related to receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51, improper
maintenance of pawn and purchase forms in violation of R.C. 4727.08, and engaging in
prohibited transactions in violation of R.C. 4727.10.6
{¶ 42} In paragraph two of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that detective Bryan
Sears from Centerville informed him in January 2013 about an investigation concerning
the theft of baseball gloves from Play-It-Again Sports. Sears had discovered that the
stolen gloves were being sold on eBay by Lisa Rich. According to Neubauer, Lisa Rich
later confirmed buying the gloves at the pawn shop and selling them on eBay. Sears also
informed Neubauer that the Riches were “selling other suspicious retail items such as
Nicorette Gum and Dyson Vacuums.”
{¶ 43} In paragraph three of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he spoke with the
Riches at Moraine City Pawn on January 16, 2013. While there, the Riches showed him
approximately twenty boxes of Nicorette gum they had purchased from Nathan Woodard.
Neubauer also observed two new Dyson vacuums and a new generator that the Riches
had purchased from Michael Elam. Neubauer warned the Riches not to buy new retail
merchandise, particularly high-end items, because of the likelihood that such
merchandise might be stolen.
{¶ 44} In paragraph four of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that on March 29, 2013
detective Mark Brown from Beavercreek advised him about an investigation of retail thefts
from Dick’s Sporting Goods by a suspect named Herlon Curtis. Brown told Neubauer that
Curtis was stealing “Hummingbird Fishfinders, Cuddeback Ambush Game Cameras, and
6Violations of the latter two statutes are third-degree misdemeanors on the first offense
and second-degree misdemeanors thereafter. R.C. 4727.99.
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Gamakatsu fish hooks” and selling these to Moraine City Pawn. Neubauer then searched
the Riches’ eBay account, which was in Lisa Rich’s name and used the pawn shop’s
phone number. The account had a “substantial transaction history” that included selling
Hummingbird Fishfinders, Cuddeback Ambush Game Cameras, and Gamakatsu fish
hooks, as well as other items including “Nicorette Gum, Osteo Bi-Flex Glucosamine
Chondroitin, Engerizer batteries, Venus Vibrance Razors, Dyson Vaccuums, Olay
products, and Crest White Strips.”
{¶ 45} In paragraph five of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he visited Moraine
City Pawn on April 1, 2013. During that visit, he observed a large box full of Crest white
strips. He also discovered that Jeffrey Rich had purchased a Home Depot gift card from
a person named Tyler Wise, who Neubauer knew from a prior investigation was selling
stolen gift cards. Wise previously had been “flagged” and identified to Jeffrey Rich as
someone who was selling stolen property and whose business should be refused by the
pawn shop. Neubauer also noticed that the pawn shop’s buy tickets lacked serial numbers
for property and did not include the amount paid.
{¶ 46} In paragraph six of his affidavit, Neubauer described an April 2, 2013
meeting in which he and other detectives discussed eight Middletown residents selling
stolen merchandise to Moraine City Pawn. Detective Jon Rawlins stated that Jeffrey Rich
was giving suspects a list of items he wanted to purchase. According to Rawlins, one of
the suspects had admitted selling stolen items to the pawn shop and had said Jeffrey
Rich was recording the transactions under other people’s names.
{¶ 47} In paragraph seven of his affidavit, Neubauer described obtaining twenty
marked boxes of Prilosec OTC from Kroger on April 10, 2013 for use in an undercover
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operation. Each box included a sticker that advised purchasers to contact a certain phone
number if the box was found for sale elsewhere. Neubauer showed the boxes to a
confidential informant (CI) who predicted that Jeffrey Rich would buy the boxes for seven
or eight dollars each but would require the stickers to be removed. While wearing a
recording device, the CI then took the boxes into the pawn shop. Upon seeing the boxes,
Rich gave the CI a knife and told him to go outside and remove the stickers. After the CI
complied, Jeffrey Rich purchased the boxes for eight dollars each. During the incident,
he also inquired about Herlon Curtis, who was known to Neubauer to be stealing large
quantities of retail merchandise. Jeffrey Rich proceeded to say that he had told Curtis a
Miami Township police officer had been in the pawn shop looking for him. Jeffrey Rich
also told the CI that Curtis had a “hold” on him and that Jeffrey Rich could not do business
with Curtis any more. When talking about Curtis, Rich added: “He ain’t like one of these
little boosters that come in with a whole bunch of cheap” merchandise. With regard to the
Prilosec OTC purchase, Jeffrey Rich advised the CI to bring some kind of tool with it the
next time so he could mention a tool when writing up the buy ticket. He also suggested
another pawn shop for the CI to sell to “every other time.” Jeffrey Rich told the CI to tell
Curtis about the other pawn shop too because he could not see Curtis much.
{¶ 48} In paragraph eight of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he accessed
“Leads Online” on April 11, 2013 and located a buy ticket for Jeffrey Rich’s Prilosec OTC
transaction with the CI. The ticket failed to list an identification number for the CI. It
described the item as “Prilosec Household” and failed to include a quantity, the purchase
price, or a picture.
{¶ 49} In paragraph nine of his affidavit, Neubauer described a second undercover
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operation at Moraine City Pawn. During this operation, which occurred on April 11, 2013,
Neubauer obtained from Kroger multiple marked boxes of Prilosec OTC, Crest white
strips, and Alli weight-loss capsules. The total retail value of these items exceeded
$1,000. Before giving the items to the CI, Neubauer removed the stickers described
above. Again, the CI wore a recording device and took the items into the pawn shop.
Upon seeing a large box of Alli, Jeffrey Rich stated that he was “gonna have a hard time
with that.” They also discussed Dyson vacuum cleaners. They then proceeded to
negotiate a total purchase price of $188, and Lisa Rich completed the transaction with
the CI.
{¶ 50} In paragraph ten of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he accessed “Leads
Online” on April 16, 2013 and located a buy ticket for the second undercover transaction.
The clerk was listed as Lisa Rich. The ticket did not include an identification number for
the CI. It described the merchandise as “Household; Alli Crest Prilosec.” It did not include
the quantity, the purchase price, or a picture.
{¶ 51} In paragraph eleven of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that on April 16, 2013
he obtained two Dyson vacuum cleaners from Kroger for use in another undercover
operation. On that occasion, the CI wore a recording device and took the vacuum cleaners
to Moraine City Pawn. The CI discussed the vacuums with Jeffrey Rich, who stated that
he could not take any more. Jeffrey Rich added that “[t]hey’re coming down pretty hard.”
He also stated that he had not heard anything about the CI. Jeffrey Rich then made a
couple of phone calls for the CI in an unsuccessful attempt to find a buyer for the
vacuums. After the CI left, Jeffrey Rich called Neubauer and left a message for the
detective to call him.
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{¶ 52} In paragraph twelve of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he searched Lisa
Rich’s eBay account and found 119 listings, including listings for Prilosec, Crest white
strips, Alli, Gamakatsu fish hooks, and a “Wildgame” game camera. Neubauer suspected
that these items were stolen.
{¶ 53} In paragraph thirteen of his affidavit, Neubauer averred that he returned
Jeffrey Rich’s phone call. Jeffrey Rich told the detective about a person trying to sell him
two new Dyson vacuum cleaners. Jeffrey Rich said the items made him suspicious and
he thought the detective should know. Rich added that he “owed” the detective one, and
he would let the detective “have this one.”
{¶ 54} In paragraph fourteen, Neubauer averred that, based on his training and
experience, “the actions of the occupants at Moraine City Pawn * * * are consistent with
individuals buying and selling stolen goods.”
{¶ 55} The proposed search warrant provided by Neubauer identified the following
items as being subject to seizure from Moraine City Pawn:
1. Stolen property, including but not limited to: personal care/hygiene
products, cameras, sporting equipment, tools, electronic equipment,
vacuums, and other items commonly associated with large scale retail theft
organized crime.
2. Any surveillance equipment including but not limited to: digital
video recorders, computers, and monitors and the contents of these
devices.
3. Currency of any type or other items of value.
4. Personal papers, documents, books, financial records, e-Bay
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records, purchase and pawn slips, computers and related computer
hardware and software all of which are believed to be derived from or
instrumental in purchasing and selling stolen goods.
5. Firearms and ammunition, including but not limited to guns, pistols,
revolvers, rifles, shotguns, machine guns and other weapons, and any and
all records pertaining to firearms and ammunition.
[6.] Paper documents or utility records indicating the ownership or
occupancy of said premises.
[7.] Labels, identifiable stickers, or documentation indicating the
original owner of property.
[8.] Further photograph, fingerprint, buccal swab, at the scene, any
adult subjects found inside the premises for the purpose of comparison to
any evidence found at the scene.
{¶ 56} Upon review, we conclude that Neubauer’s affidavit supplied the issuing
judge with a more-than-sufficient basis for finding a fair probability that stolen
merchandise would be discovered inside the pawn shop. Although Neubauer provided
little detail with regard to the veracity of some of his sources or his basis of knowledge
with regard to some of his averments, other averments were sufficiently supported. We
note too that the affidavit mentions Lisa Rich admittedly selling stolen baseball gloves on
eBay and Jeffrey Rich buying a gift card from someone who previously had been identified
to him as a known thief. In addition, Jeffrey Rich’s recorded interactions with the CI
provided strong evidence to support a finding of probable cause with regard to the Riches’
involvement in receiving stolen property. Jeffrey Rich’s words and actions supported a
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reasonable inference that he believed he was purchasing stolen property. Although the
items from Kroger were not actually stolen, Jeffrey Rich did not know that fact. His
interactions with the CI demonstrated his willingness to purchase merchandise that he
believed was stolen, thereby supporting a finding, particularly when viewed in the context
of the rest of the affidavit, that stolen property likely would be found inside the pawn shop.
In addition, some of Jeffrey Rich’s comments to the CI were themselves indicative of the
pawn shop’s involvement in criminal activity and suggested that he knowingly had been
purchasing stolen merchandise. In short, after considering Neubauer’s affidavit in its
entirety, we see no basis for rejecting the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination.
{¶ 57} Rich also argues that the search warrant was defective because it was so
generalized that it permitted seizure of virtually anything. Upon review, we agree that
portions of the warrant, particularly when read in isolation, were general. For example,
the warrant authorized seizure of currency or “any other item of value.” It also authorized
seizure of “items commonly associated with large scale retail theft organized crime.”
Interpreted literally, these examples would permit the seizure of just about anything. In
addition to being broad and general, the second example provides no guidance with
regard to what constitutes an item associated with large scale retail theft (other than the
specific examples that precede this language). We note too that the warrant authorized
seizure of items seemingly unrelated to the information in Neubauer’s affidavit. For
example, the affidavit provided no information about theft of firearms. Yet the warrant
authorized seizure of all types of firearms and weapons. And inventory receipts reflect
that several firearms were seized.
{¶ 58} We nevertheless conclude that any shortcoming in the warrant’s description
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of items to be seized does not justify reversal. In addition to containing some generalized
language, the warrant also specifically authorized seizure of items that were related to
Neubauer’s affidavit and his investigation into the pawn shop receiving stolen property.
Among other things, the warrant specifically authorized seizure of personal care/hygiene
items, cameras, sporting equipment, tools, electronic equipment, and vacuums. These
are the types of items involved in Neubauer’s investigation. In addition, the warrant
specifically authorized seizure of computers and records that reasonably may have been
involved in the Riches’ buying and selling of stolen merchandise. It also specifically
authorized seizure of labels, stickers, and documents indicating ownership of the property
at issue.
{¶ 59} Having reviewed the trial transcripts, we fail to see how Rich was prejudiced
by the fact police acted pursuant to a warrant that included some general language and
that authorized seizure of some items that perhaps were irrelevant to the charges against
her. Rich was not convicted based on the prosecutor presenting the jury with firearms
seized from the pawn shop, currency, or random “item[s] of value.”7 Rather, she was
convicted based on the testimony of numerous prosecution witnesses who admitted
stealing new merchandise from area businesses and selling it to Rich and her husband
under circumstances that made it virtually impossible for the Riches not to have known
the merchandise was stolen. The witnesses’ testimony was corroborated by buy tickets,
pictures of merchandise, and actual physical merchandise that was illustrative of, if not
7 Although the State presented boxes of property seized from the pawn shop at trial, the
prosecutor was careful to display only those items that corresponded with the types of
merchandise about which the government’s witnesses previously had testified. (See Tr.
Vol. VII at 851, 892-922).
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identical to, the items they sold to the pawn shop. The buy tickets and these pertinent
items properly were seized pursuant to the warrant, which described them with sufficient
particularity. Rich simply has not shown how she was prejudiced by the fact that the
warrant also enabled police to seize some extraneous items.
{¶ 60} With regard to the second search warrant, which was issued in May 2013,
the record reflects that it pertained solely to the contents of computers and thumb drives
seized from Moraine City Pawn during execution of the first search warrant. In his affidavit
in support of the second search warrant, Neubauer averred that the Riches had admitted
using eBay to sell items they purchased at the pawn shop. Neubauer also averred that
Lisa Rich had told him she kept business records on a pawn shop computer. In addition,
Neubauer stated that Jeffrey Rich had told him the pawn shop used a computerized
surveillance system that included audio and video files, which potentially might have
documented criminal transactions. Finally, the requested search warrant specifically
identified the pertinent computer central processing units and thumb drives by serial
number. Having reviewed Neubauer’s affidavit and the second search warrant, we again
see no basis for rejecting the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination.8 For the
foregoing reasons, we overrule the seventh assignment of error.
{¶ 61} In her eighth assignment of error, Rich challenges the trial court’s denial of
her Crim.R. 29 motion. She raises three issues. First, she cryptically asserts “that money
laundering cannot be a predicate for money laundering.” Second, she cites an unspecified
“conflict in men [sic] rea between the money laundering and receiving statutes which can
8 Parenthetically, we note too that the State represented below and in its appellate brief
that no evidence obtained from the second search warrant was used at trial. (Appellee’s
brief at 57; Tr. Vol. VII at 850). Rich has not disputed this assertion.
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lead to an unclear verdict.” Third, she insists “there was no evidence that any of the items
were actually stolen.”
{¶ 62} Upon review, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Rich’s Crim.R. 29
motion. Rich’s argument about money laundering being a predicate for money laundering
includes a transcript citation and a reference to State v. Pugh, 9th Dist. Summit No.
24905, 2010-Ohio-2741. On the cited transcript page, defense counsel actually argued
that a money-laundering conviction could not be predicated solely on receiving stolen
property. (Tr. Vol. IX at 1170-1171). In support, counsel cited Pugh. The Ninth District
observed in Pugh that “[t]he act of transacting money alone does not amount to money
laundering.” Pugh at ¶ 13. Although the appellant had transferred certain funds into her
own account, the Ninth District found no evidence that she did so with the purpose to
promote, manage, establish, or carry on a “corrupt activity” as required for a money-
laundering conviction under R.C. 1315.55(A)(3). Id. With one judge dissenting, the Ninth
District rejected the State’s argument that the appellant transferred the money with the
purpose to promote, manage, establish or carry out the “corrupt activity” of money
laundering. The majority rejected the State’s “cyclical argument that it proved Pugh
laundered money by proving that she laundered money.” Id. at ¶ 15. The majority opined
that the State could not “rely upon money laundering as the basis for a corrupt activity
with regard to a single transaction or the first of multiple transactions.” Id.
{¶ 63} Regardless of the merits of the Ninth District’s decision, we find it to be
distinguishable. As an initial matter, Rich was convicted of money laundering under R.C.
1315.55(A)(1), not R.C. 1315.55(A)(3). The two subdivisions criminalize substantially
different conduct, limiting the relevance of Pugh. As set forth above, R.C. 1315.55(A)(1)
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provides: “No person shall conduct or attempt to conduct a transaction knowing that the
property involved in the transaction is the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with
the purpose of committing or furthering the commission of corrupt activity.” Here Rich
conducted transactions involving re-selling stolen merchandise with knowledge that the
merchandise represented the proceeds of theft offenses. The jury reasonably could have
found that she did so with the purpose of furthering the commission of corrupt activity by
converting the stolen property into untraceable cash. Unlike Pugh, the present case did
not involve using money laundering to prove money laundering. At most, the State used
Rich’s commission of the offense of receiving stolen property to help prove the offense of
money laundering. We see no error and no conflict with Pugh. Compare State v. Clayton,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22937, 2009-Ohio-7040, ¶ 31-33 (holding that the appellant
engaged in money laundering in violation of R.C. 1315.55(A)(1) by stealing funds from
escrow accounts and then transferring the money into a business operating account for
his own benefit).
{¶ 64} Rich’s other two arguments are even less persuasive. She cites a “conflict”
between the mens rea in the statutes defining the offenses of money laundering and
receiving stolen property. She suggests that this conflict “can lead to an unclear verdict.”
As set forth above, the money-laundering statute, R.C. 1315.55(A)(1), prohibits
conducting a transaction while knowing that the property involved is the proceeds of
unlawful activity and with the purpose of committing or furthering corrupt activity. The
receiving-stolen-property statute, R.C. 2913.51(A), requires an offender to know or have
reasonable cause to believe that the property has been obtained through commission of
a theft offense. Rich fails to explain how the fact that these statutes are worded differently
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obligated the trial court to grant her relief under Crim.R. 29, which addresses the
sufficiency of the State’s evidence to sustain a conviction.
{¶ 65} Finally, Rich asserts that she was entitled to relief under Crim.R. 29
because “there was no evidence that any of the items were actually stolen.” As we
explained in our analysis of her first two assignments of error, however, the record
contains legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Rich participated in
purchasing and re-selling stolen merchandise from drug-addicted thieves while knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe the property had been obtained through theft. This
conclusion is supported by the buy tickets discussed above and testimony from numerous
prosecution witnesses who admitted stealing merchandise and selling it to the Riches
under circumstances indicating that the Riches knew or had reasonable cause to believe
the merchandise was stolen. Accordingly, the eighth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 66} In her ninth assignment of error, Rich addresses the trial court’s jury
instructions. She presents the following one-sentence argument: “Objections were raised
as to the defining of receiving stolen property as corrupt activity in itself and to using the
phrase ‘reasonable cause to believe’ which is not statutorily defined and utilizes a civil
negligence standard as argued above.”
{¶ 67} This assignment of error lacks merit. In the proceedings below, defense
counsel objected to the trial court instructing the jury that the offense of receiving stolen
property qualifies as “corrupt activity.” Defense counsel specifically argued that receiving
stolen property qualifies as “corrupt activity” only if it is accompanied by money
laundering. (Tr. Vol. IX at 1214). Standing alone, defense counsel asserted that receiving
stolen property does not constitute “corrupt activity.” (Id. at 1216-1217). The trial court
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disagreed. (Id. at 1219). It later instructed the jury “as a matter of law that receiving stolen
property is a corrupt activity.” (Id. at 1294). We see no error in the trial court’s rejection of
defense counsel’s argument. The offense of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C.
2913.51 explicitly is identified as “corrupt activity” under R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).9 See State
v. Pennington, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA93-03-006, 1993 WL 414191, *2 (Oct. 18, 1993)
(“Receiving stolen property is a violation of R.C. 2913.51, and it is specifically defined as
a corrupt activity.”).
{¶ 68} We also reject Rich’s challenge to the jury instruction about having
“reasonable cause to believe.” Defense counsel objected to this instruction, which related
to the receiving-stolen-property counts. As set forth above, the State was required to
prove that Rich had obtained the merchandise at issue knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe it had been obtained through the commission of a theft offense. Defense
counsel argued that “reasonable cause to believe” as a mens rea was not statutorily
defined and, therefore, should not be defined by the trial court. (Tr. Vol. IX at 1220). The
trial court overruled the objection. (Id.). When addressing the charges against Jeffrey
Rich, it then gave the jury the following instruction, which tracks OJI section 513.51(4):
9 Although R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is not a model of clarity, it appears that the only limitation
on receiving stolen property qualifying as “corrupt activity” is that the value of the property
at issue in any violation or combination of violations must exceed $1,000. In neither her
Crim.R. 29 motion nor her objections to the jury instructions, however, did Rich raise the
$1,000 threshold as an issue or argue that it had not been met. While the trial court’s jury
instructions did not specify that receiving stolen property qualifies as “corrupt activity” only
if the value of the property exceeds $1,000, that omission is not the basis of Rich’s
assignment of error either. In any event, because she failed to raise that particular
objection below, we would be limited to plain-error review. We would not find plain error
here because the stolen merchandise unquestionably was worth much more than $1,000.
Therefore, but for the trial court’s omission the outcome would not have been otherwise.
To the contrary, if Rich had objected, the trial court simply could have added language
addressing the value of the property, and the result would have been the same.
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In determining whether the Defendant Jeffrey Rich had reasonable
cause to believe that the property had been obtained though the
commission of a theft offense, you must put yourself in the position of the
Defendant with his knowledge or lack of knowledge and under the
circumstances and conditions that surrounded him at that time.
You must consider the conduct of the persons involved and
determine whether their acts and words and all the surrounding
circumstances would have caused a person of ordinary prudence and care
to believe that the property was obtained through the commission of a theft
offense. * * *
(Tr. Vol. IX at 1297).
{¶ 69} We see no error in the foregoing instruction, which the trial court also
applied to the charges against Lisa Rich.10 The first paragraph correctly instructed the
jury to place itself in the defendant’s position with the information known to him (or her)
to determine whether he (or she) personally had reasonable cause to believe the property
at issue was stolen. The second paragraph assisted the jury in determining whether the
personal, subjective belief the defendant had about the nature of the property was a
reasonable one. Taken together, the two paragraphs correctly conveyed the point that
“reasonable cause to believe” was not purely objective insofar as it depended on facts
actually known to the defendant and a belief personal to him (or her) from which the jury
10After defining “reasonable cause to believe” in connection with the charges against
Jeffrey Rich, the trial court turned to the charges against Lisa Rich. With regard to the
meaning of “reasonable cause to believe,” the trial court stated: “Reasonable cause to
believe has previously been defined for you and has the same meaning as above.” (Tr.
Vol. IV at 1303-1304).
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also could infer that any reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known
the property was stolen. Finally, we note that the trial court’s instruction about having
“reasonable cause to believe” has been upheld by other Ohio appellate courts as well.
See, e.g., State v. Gimenez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71190, 1997 WL 547950, *9 (Sept.
4, 1997) (“Appellant contends that the trial court’s instruction, as taken from 4 Ohio Jury
Instructions (1994), Section 513.51(4), improperly transformed the crime of receiving
stolen property into one requiring a mere showing of negligence on the part of appellant.
This court and other Ohio courts have specifically sanctioned the constitutionality,
specificity and clarity of complained-of instructions relating to the element of ‘reasonable
cause to believe.’ ”); State v. Overholt, 9th Dist. Medina No. 02CA0108-M, 2003-Ohio-
3500, ¶ 17-18 (citing cases and holding that the OJI “definition of ‘reasonable cause’
properly explains the term for purposes of R.C. 2913.51”). Having found nothing
objectionable about the challenged instruction, we overrule the ninth assignment of error.
{¶ 70} In her tenth assignment of error, Rich maintains that “cumulative error”
deprived her of a fair trial. She asserts that several of the alleged errors she addressed
above, even if individually harmless, constitute prejudicial error when aggregated.
{¶ 71} It is true that separately harmless errors may violate a defendant’s right to
a fair trial when the errors are aggregated. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St. 3d 378, 397, 721
N.E.2d 52 (2000). To find cumulative error, we first must find multiple errors committed at
trial. Id. at 398. We then must find a reasonable probability that the outcome below would
have been different but for the combination of separately harmless errors. State v.
Thomas, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000-CA-43, 2001 WL 1103328, *9 (Sept. 21, 2001). Here,
however, we have not found multiple instances of separately harmless error. That being
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so, we have nothing to aggregate. The tenth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 72} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
.............
WELBAUM, P. J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck
Heather N. Jans
George Katchmer
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz