DocketNumber: Court of Appeals No. H-99-009.
Judges: RESNICK, M.L., J.
Filed Date: 9/17/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE HURON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES WHEN THE DEPARTMENT ADMITTEDLY DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REUNIFY THE CHILD WITH HER MOTHER AND WHERE THE CASE PLAN PREORDAINED A MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE HURON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
The juvenile court conducted a hearing on appellee's motion for permanent custody on February 9, 1999 when Stephanie was eleven years old. Appellee first became involved with Stephanie in 1992, seven years earlier. At that time, a dependency case filed in Lorain County was transferred to Huron County.1 That initial case ended when Stephanie was restored to her mother's custody in February 1993.
Two years later, appellee received a complaint that Tracy could not properly care for Stephanie. Stephanie behaved violently and had seizures. Appellant acknowledged that she could not care for Stephanie in her home at that time.2 Appellant had younger children in the home who were not removed from her care.
As a result, appellee filed a complaint alleging Stephanie was a dependent child in February 1995, which was assigned Case No. 95-16235. Stephanie was placed in the temporary custody of her maternal aunt. The court ordered that, pursuant to a case plan for reunification, appellant would have supervised visits with Stephanie and that appellant would complete parenting classes and start mental health counseling. In February 1996, however, appellee requested an extension of the temporary custody order. Stephanie was placed in foster care at that time because her aunt had health difficulties. The court granted that motion and again ordered appellant to complete parenting classes and attend counseling.
In August 1996, custody of Stephanie was restored to her mother because Tracy had completed parenting classes and counseling. However, the court awarded protective supervision of Stephanie to appellee. The court ordered appellant to initiate additional counseling immediately.
Four months later, Stephanie was again placed in the home of her maternal aunt because appellant made no progress with a social services program. At that time, the court granted legal custody of Stephanie to her maternal aunt and the maternal aunt's husband and allowed appellant to have supervised visitation with Stephanie. The case was dismissed and appellee's interest in the case ended.
In August 1997, the maternal aunt asked that Stephanie be removed from her home because Stephanie had inappropriate sexual contact with the aunt's eighteen-month old daughter. On October 28, 1997, appellee filed a dependency complaint in the underlying case no. 97-18501. Appellee requested permanent custody of Stephanie. Alternatively, appellee requested that the court grant temporary or legal custody to a relative or interested party, or grant temporary custody or protective supervision to appellee. See R.C.
"Stephanie is a special needs child. She has severe behavior problems, her IQ is in the 50's and she additionally has a seizure disorder. Her condition requires a lot of supervision. Tracy [H.], Stephanie's mother is low functioning herself. All efforts to reunite Stephanie with her mother fell apart and her mother was not able to provide adequate monitoring of Stephanie, which led to putting Stephanie at risk."
The juvenile court awarded temporary custody of Stephanie to appellee after conducting a shelter care hearing on November 13, 1997. Stephanie was again placed in a foster home. An attorney was appointed to represent appellant.
When the adjudication hearing was conducted on December 3, 1997, appellant admitted the allegations of the complaint. The court adjudicated Stephanie to be dependent as alleged in the complaint. The court further found that appellee had made all reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home and reasonable efforts had been made to reunify the child with her family. See R.C.
At the disposition hearing on January 21, 1998, the court ordered Stephanie to remain in temporary custody and approved the case plan proposed by the agency, which was dated October 31, 1997. The goal of that case plan was to seek permanent custody of Stephanie and arrange adoption. No services were offered to appellant to allow reunification with Stephanie, although she was permitted to have supervised visitation "as arranged with social worker."
On March 24, 1998, the juvenile court granted appellee's request for a six-month extension of temporary custody. The extension allowed appellee to investigate whether Stephanie could be placed with her maternal grandmother.
On October 20, 1998, appellee filed a motion for permanent custody. The juvenile court conducted an "adjudicatory" hearing3 on the motion for permanent custody on February 9, 1999. The court awarded permanent custody of Stephanie to appellee. It found that Stephanie had been in and out of her mother's custody with seven different placements since July 1992. The court also determined that appellant had visited her daughter only four times since she had been placed in foster care in December 1997. The trial court found that Tracy had not shown the capability to properly care for Stephanie since her placement in foster care in December 1997, and no relatives were willing to care for Stephanie. The juvenile court concluded:
"Based upon clear and convincing evidence, Stephanie [H.] has not been able to be placed with either of her parents within a reasonable time and should not be placed with her parents.
"2. Based upon clear and convincing evidence of the background and circumstances involving Stephanie [H.], it is in her best interest to place her in the permanent custody of the Huron County Department of Human Services."
In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that appellee should have provided her with a case plan4 to allow her to complete services to regain custody of Stephanie. That proposition is not well-taken.
A public children services agency may request permanent custody of a child in one of two ways. First, the agency may request "original" permanent custody in an initial abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding under R.C.
It appears that appellee originally intended to pursue "original permanent custody" under the first alternative in R.C.
However, for reasons which are not clear in the record, appellee acquired temporary, not permanent, custody of Stephanie on January 21, 1998. As a result, to pursue its initial goal of securing permanent custody of Stephanie, appellee had to proceed under R.C.
However, effective January 1, 1989, the language, which the Ohio Supreme Court construed in Baxter to require a reunification plan, was eliminated from the R.C.
"The legislature has apparently supplanted the requirement of good faith in favor of the standard stated in R.C.
2151.414 (E)(1). If applicable to a particular case, this provision refers to the `reasonable case planning and diligent efforts' in which the agency is to engage `to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home.'"
In re Brittany and Marcus B. (Jan. 12, 1996), Wood App. No. WD-95-002, unreported.
However, it is unnecessary to determine whether appellee was required to prepare a case plan with a goal to reunite appellant and Stephanie after appellee obtained temporary custody of Stephanie No transcripts of the adjudication or disposition hearings were submitted on appeal. Consequently, we cannot determine whether appellant objected to the lack of a reunification goal in the case plan when the trial court approved it at the disposition hearing on January 21, 1998.
Additionally, pursuant to the language of R.C.
Consequently, we decline to address, for the first time on appeal, appellant's first assignment of error where the record does not disclose that appellant raised the issue to the trial court. See In re M.D. (1988),
Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.
In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law are not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion that appellant had not "shown the capability to undertake proper care and custody of" Stephanie.
In order to grant an agency's motion for permanent custody, a juvenile court must consider the child's status under R.C.
The juvenile court determined that Stephanie could not be placed with either of her parents and should not be placed with her parents. In support of its determination that Stephanie could not be placed with either parent, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
"1. * * * Stephanie * * * is a special needs child * * *.
"* * *
"3. Stephanie * * * has been involved in the juvenile court system through dependency cases practically her entire life * * *.
"4. Between 1992 and December 1996, Stephanie * * * was in and out of her mother's custody with both relative and foster care place placements * * * [because] her mother [was] unable to properly care for her.
"5. [Since December 1997, appellant] has only visited her daughter four times.
"* * *
"8. [Since December 1997, appellant] has not show the capability to undertake proper care and custody of Stephanie * * *."
The existence of the predicate condition in R.C.
Here, the record shows that appellee became involved with appellant's care of Stephanie as early as 1992. Although appellant cared for Stephanie for two years after custody was restored to her in 1993, appellant acknowledged she could no longer care for her daughter. From 1995 until 1997, Stephanie lived with her maternal aunt and with foster parents. Custody of Stephanie had been restored to appellant for less than four months in 1996 before Stephanie again resided with her maternal aunt and foster parents.
Based on these facts showing Stephanie resided with appellant for less than four months between 1993 and 1997, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that appellant had "demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by * * * actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child." R.C.
Appellant also suggested that distance and transportation difficulties prevented her from visiting her daughter in foster care for more than four times in 1997. Thus, appellant also challenges whether clear and convincing evidence supported the court's determination that appellant had demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able
to do so, as set out in the first portion of R.C.
Clear and convincing evidence supports the predicate conclusion that appellant was unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for Stephanie under the second half of R.C.
We note, however, that the juvenile court's findings determined that appellant had been "unable to properly care for"
Stephanie between 1992 and December 1996. (Emphasis added). It also concluded that since Stephanie was placed in foster care in December 1997, appellant "has not shown the capability to undertake proper care and custody of Stephanie [H.]." (Emphasis added). However,
Consequently, while appellant's second assignment of error is found not well-taken, we remand this case to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of entering appropriate findings consistent with the language of R.C.
On consideration whereof, the court finds substantial justice has been done the party complaining, and the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed, except that the case is remanded to the extent correct findings of facts must be entered in the record. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App. R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Melvin L. Resnick, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Richard W. Knepper, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ JUDGE
CONCUR.
In addition, a public children services agency must consider six priorities to develop a case plan for a child in its temporary custody. R.C.