Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe Des 40 Hommes Et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe Des 40 Hommes Et 8 Chevaux

[Cite as Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe Des 40 Hommes Et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La
Societe Des 40 Hommes Et 8 Chevaux, 2021-Ohio-2429.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
GRANDE VOITURE D’OHIO LA :
SOCIETE DES 40 HOMMES ET 8 :
CHEVAUX : Appellate Case No. 29064
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CV-1457
:
v. : (Civil Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
MONTGOMERY COUNTY VOITURE :
NO. 34 LA SOCIETE DES 40 :
HOMMES ET 8 CHEVAUX, et al.
Defendants-Appellants
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OPINION
Rendered on the 16th day of July, 2021.
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KEVIN A. BOWMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0068223, 130 West Second Street, Suite 900,
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CHARLES J. SIMPSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0007339, 157 Lammes Lane, New Carlisle, Ohio
45344
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
.............
TUCKER, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Charles J. Simpson appeals from an order of the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas authorizing plaintiff-appellee “to make a
filing with the Ohio Secretary of State restoring the name of the corporation, Montgomery
County Voiture No. 34 La Societe des 40 Homme[s] et 8 Chevaux.” Order, Mar. 13,
2021. Simpson challenges the trial court’s authority to take such action. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} This is the fourth appeal Simpson has filed in this protracted litigation
between various factions of a charitable organization known as La Societe des 40
Hommes et 8 Chevaux. The group, which consists of a national organization (hereinafter
“National Voiture”) as well as state and local level associations, was formed in 1920. For
ease of reference we will refer to the state and Montgomery County associations as Ohio
Voiture and County Voiture. County Voiture was established by charter as part of the
national and state organizations. The charter provided that County Voiture would be
subject to the constitution, laws, rules, regulations and orders of the national and state
organizations.
{¶ 3} In 2017, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Simpson, and he was
permanently expelled from membership in the organization. Nonetheless, Simpson
continued to act as an officer of and attorney for County Voiture. Simpson ultimately
took steps to separate the county organization from the national and state organizations.
{¶ 4} In 2018, Ohio Voiture brought an action against County Voiture and Simpson
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seeking declaratory judgment, an order for an accounting, and injunctive relief. The suit
alleged that the County Voiture had committed violations of its own constitution and
bylaws as well as the constitutions of both Ohio Voiture and National Voiture. The suit
identified Simpson as the instigator of the violations.
{¶ 5} On April 28, 2019, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Ohio
Voiture, granting injunctive relief barring Simpson from participating in or interfering with
the affairs of County Voiture. The judgment also ordered Simpson to provide an
accounting of assets and debts. Simpson and County Voiture appealed from that
judgment, which was affirmed by this court. See Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe des
40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe des 40 Hommes
et 8 Chevaux, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28388, 2020-Ohio-3821 (Grand Voiture I).
{¶ 6} Less than two weeks after the trial court rendered summary judgment,
Simpson filed a bankruptcy action on behalf of the County Voiture while purporting to act
as an officer thereof. Thus, on May 9, 2019, Ohio Voiture filed a motion seeking to hold
Simpson in contempt for violating the court’s judgment. On July 2, 2019, Ohio Voiture
renewed its motion for contempt and noted that Simpson had also failed to provide an
accounting as required by the trial court’s April 2019 judgment.
{¶ 7} On July 5, 2019, Simpson filed documents with the Ohio Secretary of State
changing the name of County Voiture to Huber Heights Veteran’s Club. On July 11,
2019, Simpson filed a general warranty deed transferring property from County Voiture
to Huber Heights Veteran’s Club. Ohio Voiture filed a supplemental motion for contempt
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on August 28, 2019.1
{¶ 8} Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on March 4, 2020, finding
Simpson in contempt. The order required Simpson to pay Ohio Voiture’s attorney fees
and expenses, with the amount to be determined at a later hearing. The order also
required Simpson to take all necessary actions and to pay all necessary costs related to
restoring the name and property of County Voiture. Finally, the court ordered Simpson
to provide a full accounting related to County Voiture within 30 days. A hearing on the
attorney fees and expenses was conducted, and on June 29, 2020, Ohio Voiture was
awarded the sum of $39,767.22. On July 24, 2020, Simpson filed an appeal of the
contempt judgment and sanction award.
{¶ 9} On September 16, 2020, Ohio Voiture filed a motion in the trial court seeking
to correct the record title to the property conveyed by Simpson, as Simpson had failed to
comply with the March 2020 contempt order. The motion was granted, and the trial court
ordered the County Recorder to (1) file the order granting the motion, (2) remove Huber
Heights Veteran’s Club from the record of title, and (3) return title to County Voiture. On
October 2, 2020, Simpson filed an appeal of that order. The appeal of the contempt
judgment and sanctions and the title correction were consolidated. We again affirmed
the trial court’s orders on April 23, 2021. See Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe des 40
Hommes et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe des 40 Hommes
et 8 Chevaux, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28854 and 28929, 2021-Ohio-1430 (Grand
Voiture II).
1
The record demonstrates that Simpson took numerous other actions in violation of the
trial court’s orders. However, as those actions in contempt are not relevant to this
appeal, they will not be further discussed.
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{¶ 10} On March 9, 2021, Ohio Voiture filed a Civ.R. 70 motion to authorize the
filing of a name change with the Secretary of State due to Simpson’s continued failure to
comply with the court’s order. Simpson filed a motion to strike Ohio Voiture’s motion as
frivolous and to impose sanctions. On March 13, 2021, the trial court granted Ohio
Voiture’s motion and overruled Simpson’s motion.
{¶ 11} Simpson appeals.
II. Order Authorizing Change of Name
{¶ 12} Simpson’s first assignment of error states:
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN
ORDER AUTHORIZING THE FILING OF A CHANGE OF NAME WITH THE
SECRETARY OF STATE.
{¶ 13} Simpson contends that the trial court had no authority to order the filing of
documents to effectuate the restoration of the organization’s name from Huber Heights
Veteran’s Club to County Voiture. In support, he first argues that the trial court had no
authority to act because a stay of execution pending appeal was in effect. He also
argues that “the contempt proceedings against Simpson do not support any claim or
action against the Corporation, Huber Heights Veterans Club, Inc., on account of its
change of name.”
{¶ 14} We first address Simpson’s claim that the trial court violated a stay pending
appeal when it entered the subject order. The record demonstrates that the decisions
regarding the finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions were appealed by Simpson
on July 24, 2020. On October 1, 2020, Simpson filed a motion for stay of execution
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pending appeal. On October 28, 2020, this court granted the requested stay,
conditioned upon the posting of a $60,000 bond with the trial court. On December 22,
2020, Simpson filed a document with the trial court purporting to be an appellate bond.
The document identified Simpson as both principal and surety. On February 10, 2021,
the trial court issued an order striking the bond, finding that Simpson was not allowed to
act as his own surety under Loc.R. 1.21 of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
Simpson did not contest the trial court’s ruling with either the trial court or this court, and
he did not attempt to rectify the deficiency with the posted bond.
{¶ 15} R.C. 2505.09, which sets forth the requirements for a stay of execution of
judgment pending appeal, states in part that “an appeal does not operate as a stay of
execution until a stay of execution has been obtained pursuant to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure or in another applicable manner, and a supersedeas bond is executed by the
appellant to the appellee[.]” Further, R.C. 2505.10 provides that a bond does not operate
to effectuate a stay until it is approved by the trial or appellate court. Likewise, Civ.R.
62(B) provides that a stay is only effective when the bond is approved by the court.
{¶ 16} In this case, the trial court expressly rejected the bond posted by Simpson
on the basis that Montgomery County Loc.R. 1.21 does not permit attorneys to act as
sureties. Thus, since the bond was not approved by the trial court or this court, no stay
was in effect at the time the trial court issued its order.
{¶ 17} While the issue of the stay was not challenged or appealed, we note “an
appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a stay of execution of judgment
and request for bond for an abuse of discretion.” Hamilton v. Ebbing, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2011-01-001, 2012-Ohio-2250, ¶ 30, citing Civ.R. 62(B) and Ohio Carpenter's
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Pension Fund v. La Centre, LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 86597, 86789, 2006-Ohio-
2214, ¶ 31, citing Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18873, 1998 WL 597704, *2
(Sept. 2, 1998). The trial court concluded that the bond posted by Simpson was
inadequate as Simpson was prohibited from acting as surety by the provisions of Loc.R.
1.21, which expressly prohibits attorneys acting as sureties on bonds. Thus, even were
this claim properly before us, we would find no abuse of discretion.
{¶ 18} Simpson also asserts that the contempt action against him cannot be
enforced because doing so would adversely affect Huber Heights Veterans Club, which
was not mentioned in the injunction order. This argument is nonsensical. The Huber
Heights Veterans Club is a legal nullity. It was created solely as a result of Simpson’s
actions in violation of the injunction. Further, this argument is barred by res judicata
given our affirmance of the trial court’s contempt judgment.
{¶ 19} Finally, it is well-established that courts have inherent power to enforce their
final judgments. Rieser v. Rieser, 191 Ohio App.3d 616, 2010-Ohio-6227, 947 N.E.2d
222, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.); City of Cleveland v. Laborers Internatl. Union Local 1099, 2018-Ohio-
161, 104 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties
II, Ltd., 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-Ohio-1101, 37 N.E.3d 1211, ¶ 27. Civ.R. 70 is a
procedural rule “intended to provide as easy and effective method as possible to carry
out a court order for conveyance of land, property or performance of another specific act.”
Civ. R. 70, 1970 Staff Note. Civ.R. 70 states, in part:
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, to transfer
title or possession of personal property, to deliver deeds or other
documents, or to perform any other specific act, and the party fails to comply
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within the time specified, the court may, where necessary, direct the act to
be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed
by the court, and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the
party.
{¶ 20} “Civ.R. 70 gives a trial court the authority to enforce a previous court order
that required a specific act to be performed.” Alexander v. Urban Communications
Television Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18696, 2001 WL 896945, *2 (Aug. 10, 2001),
citing Tessler v. Ayer, 108 Ohio App.3d 47, 52, 669 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1st Dist.1995). The
rule, which is rarely mentioned in appellate decisions, “is reserved for particularly
obstinate parties[.]” Tessler at 52, fn. 3. See also Freeman v. Freeman, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 07APF05-706, 1997 WL 781999, *2 (Dec. 16, 1997) (the purpose of Civ.R.
70 is to give the court power to deal with parties who refuse to obey specific-act orders).
{¶ 21} We conclude that the trial court’s contempt judgment was a final judgment
which the court was permitted to enforce. To that end, the trial court properly utilized
Civ.R. 70 to effectuate its order. Simpson’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, the first assignment of error overruled.
III. Motion to Strike and Request for Sanctions
{¶ 23} The second assignment of error asserted by Simpson states:
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE
AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS.
{¶ 24} Simpson claims that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion to
strike Ohio Voiture’s motion for Civ.R. 70 relief and in failing to grant his related motion
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for sanctions. In support, Simpson asserts that the motion was frivolous with no support
in law.
{¶ 25} R.C. 2323.51 provides that a court may “award court costs, reasonable
attorney's fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with a civil action
or appeal * * * to any party to the civil action or appeal who was adversely affected by
frivolous conduct.” R.C. 2323.51(B)(1). “Conduct” encompasses “[t]he filing of a civil
action, the assertion of a claim, defense, or other position in connection with a civil action,
the filing of a pleading, motion, or other paper in a civil action, * * * or the taking of any
other action in connection with a civil action.” R.C. 2323.51(A)(1)(a). Frivolous conduct
is defined as conduct that (1) serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party
to the civil action, (2) is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a
good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or (3)
consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support.
R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a).
{¶ 26} In our disposition of the prior assignment of error, we found that Ohio
Voiture’s motion for Civ.R. 70 relief was warranted and permitted by law and the facts of
this case. Therefore, we must necessarily conclude that Ohio Voiture did not engage in
frivolous conduct in filing the motion and that it was not subject to sanctions for such filing.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 28} Both assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
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WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Kevin A. Bowman
Charles J. Simpson
Edward Dowd
Hon. Gerald Parker