State v. Lynn

[Cite as State v. Lynn, 2011-Ohio-6014.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 17-11-08
v.
RIAN LYNN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 10 CR 000138
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 21, 2011
APPEARANCES:
Mark A. Puthoff for Appellant
Ralph Bauer and Jeffrey J. Beigel for Appellee
Case No. 17-11-08
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Rian Lynn (“Lynn”), appeals the January 19,
2011 judgment of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶2} On June 24, 2010, Lynn was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury
on two counts of rape, both felonies of the first degree and each with a sexually
violent predator specification; one count of aggravated burglary, a felony of the
first degree; one count of kidnapping, a felony of the first degree with the
additional specification that Lynn committed the kidnapping offense with a sexual
motivation and a sexually violent predator specification; and one count of
abduction, a felony of the third degree.
{¶3} The charges stemmed from an incident, in which Lynn allegedly broke
into the home of a thirteen-year-old girl and raped her. Lynn subsequently pled
not guilty to the charges.
{¶4} On December 7, 2010, Lynn filed a petition to enter a plea of guilty to
one count of rape, a felony of the first degree with a sexually violent predator
specification. The trial court held a hearing on the matter the same day, in which
it conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Lynn before he entered his guilty plea.
The trial court advised Lynn that he faced a possible prison sentence of ten years
to life, a fact which Lynn acknowledged on the record. Prior to accepting his plea,
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the trial court also asked Lynn if he was under the influence of medication or
intoxicating substances, if he suffered from any mental illness, or if anyone
threatened him to cause him to enter a guilty plea. Lynn answered no to each
question. Lynn also stated on the record that he was satisfied with his counsel’s
representation on the matter. After Lynn entered his guilty plea, the prosecution
moved to dismiss the remaining charges in the indictment. The trial court
subsequently accepted Lynn’s guilty plea.
{¶5} On December 29, 2010, prior to sentencing, Lynn moved to
withdrawal his guilty plea, claiming that he “was under duress and undue
influence from his family and friends to accept the plea agreement” and therefore
his change of plea was not voluntarily given. (Mot. to Withdraw Plea Dec. 19,
2010).
{¶6} On January 13, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Lynn’s motion
to withdraw his plea. Lynn was the only witness to testify.1 On direct
examination, Lynn recalled that he felt pressure from his mother and fiancée to
take the plea agreement. Being nineteen-years-old, Lynn explained that he relied
heavily on his mother’s advice. Lynn testified that he also experienced trouble
sleeping during the nights leading up to his change of plea because he was
1
We note that Lynn’s mother was supposed to testify, but failed to appear. There was no subpoena issued
for her and no explanation given for her non-appearance. The trial court concluded that the critical issue
was Lynn’s state of mind at the time he entered his plea and therefore his mother’s testimony was not
indispensible to determining the merits of Lynn’s motion to withdraw his plea.
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grappling with the consequences of the decision he was about to make. Finally,
Lynn stated that this was his first time in the adult felony court system and he felt
overwhelmed by the entire situation.2
{¶7} On cross-examination, Lynn revealed that, prior to entering his guilty
plea, he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and ADHD by a psychiatrist.
While on the stand, the prosecutor had Lynn review his written petition to change
his plea, and had Lynn recall each question asked by the trial court and his
responses in the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Lynn was able to verify that he understood
the petition he signed to enter a change of plea and that he also understood the trial
court’s questions and his answers given during the change of plea hearing.
{¶8} On re-direct examination, Lynn’s counsel asked him about his mental
health diagnosis. Lynn testified that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and ADHD at age twelve and was treated by a counselor for five years. Lynn
explained that in the past he had taken medication for these conditions, but was
not on medication at the time he entered his guilty plea. When asked why he did
not bring his bipolar diagnosis to the trial court’s attention during the Crim.R. 11
colloquy, Lynn answered that the thought mental illness was “like, mental
retardation, like not all the way there. * * * I’ve never been in any kind of special
2
Even though Lynn claims that this is his first experience with adult felony court system, the trial court
noted at sentencing that Lynn has a lengthy juvenile record going as far back as age eleven and that some
of those juvenile cases involved offenses of a sexual and/or violent nature.
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ed. or anything like that.” (Hrg. Jan. 13, 2011 at 29). However, Lynn presented
no other evidence regarding his mental health besides his own recollection of his
medical history. In addition, Lynn failed to present any evidence demonstrating
that not being medicated for his bipolar disorder at the time he pled guilty affected
his ability to voluntarily enter the plea.
{¶9} On January 19, 2011, the trial court entered its judgment denying
Lynn’s motion to withdrawal his guilty plea, finding it not well-taken. The trial
court subsequently sentenced Lynn to serve an indefinite prison term of fifteen
years to life and subject to registration as a Tier III sexual offender.
{¶10} Lynn filed this appeal, asserting the following assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT OVERRULED THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA PRIOR TO
SENTENCING.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT OVERRULED THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA AFTER
LEARNING OF APPELLANT’S HISTORY OF MENTAL
ILLNESS.
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First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶11} Because Lynn’s assignments of error are interrelated, we elect to
address them together.
{¶12} On appeal, Lynn maintains that the trial court erred in denying his
pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea when he testified that he felt
pressured by his mother and fiancée to take the plea, that he did not sleep well
during the nights preceding the change of plea hearing and that he was
overwhelmed by his first encounter in the adult felony court system. Lynn also
contends that the trial court did not give adequate consideration to his testimony
indicating that he suffered from bipolar disorder and ADHD. Lynn argues that all
of these things contributed to his guilty plea being involuntarily made.
{¶13} Rule 32.1 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty* * * may be made only before sentence is
imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside
the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
Generally, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that is filed prior to sentencing will
be freely allowed. State v. Drake (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 640, 598 N.E.2d 115;
State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. No. 1-08-36, 2008-Ohio-6067, ¶ 6.
{¶14} However, this does not mean that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
will be granted automatically. Drake, at 645, 598 N.E.2d 115. “A defendant does
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not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial
court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and
legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d
521, 584 N.E.2d 715, at paragraph one of the syllabus. It is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to determine whether there is a legitimate and
reasonable basis for the withdrawal of a guilty plea and, absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court’s decision on the matter must be affirmed. Id. at 527,
584 N.E.2d 715. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it
implies that the decision was “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State
v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144.
{¶15} Ohio Appellate Courts consider several factors when reviewing a
trial court’s decision to grant or deny a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to
withdraw a plea, including: (1) whether the withdrawal will prejudice the
prosecution; (2) the representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the
extent of the hearing held pursuant to Crim.R. 11; (4) the extent of the hearing on
the motion to withdraw the plea; (5) whether the trial court gave full and fair
consideration of the motion; (6) whether the timing of the motion was reasonable;
(7) the stated reasons for the motion; (8) whether the defendant understood the
nature of the charges and potential sentences; and (9) whether the accused was
perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the charges. State v. Lane, 3d
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Dist. No. 1–10–10, 2010–Ohio–4819, ¶ 21, citing State v. Griffin (2001), 141 Ohio
App.3d 551, 554, 752 N.E.2d 310.
{¶16} In this instant case, the trial court specifically addressed each of these
factors in its entry denying Lynn’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Lynn’s
primary contentions on appeal are that the trial court abused its discretion because
it failed to adequately consider the reasons stated in his motion supporting the
withdrawal of his plea. Notably, Lynn does not dispute the trial court’s analysis
with regard to the other applicable factors.
{¶17} At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Lynn
testified that he was diagnosed with bipolar and ADHD, and treated by a counselor
for these conditions in Sidney for at least five years. However, Lynn failed to
provide any documentation substantiating his claims regarding his mental health.
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Lynn had difficulty obtaining
the medical records documenting his mental health history to enter as evidence for
the trial court’s review. The only evidence Lynn chose to present was his
testimony, which the trial court was free to disbelieve.
{¶18} In addition, even though he argues his judgment was impaired
because he was not medicated for his bipolar disorder at the time he entered his
guilty plea, Lynn again fails to provide evidence to corroborate this claim. There
is nothing in the record demonstrating what kind of medication Lynn was
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prescribed, how long he took it for, or that failing to take the medication could
affect his ability to voluntarily enter a plea.
{¶19} Finally, with regard to the other reasons set forth by Lynn in his
motion, trial court concluded the following:
The Court finds that the reasons for the Motion are inadequate.
Apparently, the Defendant has just changed his mind. The
Court does not find that the influences of his mother overbore
his will and decision to enter the guilty plea. He had
representation of competent counsel to give him advice on the
plea. Considering the multiple counts he was facing, the
recommendation of counsel to plead to the negotiated charge is
understandable.
(JE, Jan. 13, 2011 at 3).
{¶20} In sum, the record in this case demonstrates that the trial court
considered all the applicable factors for withdrawing the plea and the record
supports the trial court’s findings in that regard. Accordingly, we find no abuse of
the trial court’s discretion in its ultimate decision to deny Lynn’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶21} For all these reasons, Lynn’s assignments of error are overruled and
the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
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