McDougall v. Smith

[Cite as McDougall v. Smith, 191 Ohio App.3d 101, 2010-Ohio-6069.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
PAULDING COUNTY
McDOUGALL ET AL.,
APPELLANTS, CASE NO. 11-10-04
v.
SMITH, OPINION
APPELLEE.
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CI-09-233
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 13, 2010
APPEARANCES:
John T. Murray and Frederick N. Hadley, for appellants.
Robert B. Fitzgerald and Angela M. Elliott, for appellee.
Case No. 11-10-04
WILLAMOWSKI, Presiding Judge.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants Matthew A. McDougall (“McDougall”) and
Benjamin Rager (“Rager”) bring this appeal from the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas of Paulding County granting summary judgment to defendant-
appellee, William C. Smith (“Smith”). For the reasons set forth below, the
judgment is affirmed.
{¶ 2} On July 20, 2007, a vehicle operated by Smith struck a vehicle
operated by Timothy Wells (“T. Wells”). Armelda Wells (“A. Wells”), Robert
Wells (“R. Wells”), and David Brummett were passengers in the vehicle. Due to
their injuries, two ambulances were dispatched. The first ambulance took T.
Wells and Brummett to the hospital. The second ambulance was staffed by
McDougall, Heidi McDougall (“Heidi”), Kelly Rager (“Kelly”), and driver
Sammy Smith. This ambulance carried A. Wells and R. Wells. While the victims
were being transported to the hospital, a second accident occurred involving the
ambulance and a semitruck. The only survivor was McDougall.
{¶ 3} On July 16, 2009, McDougall and Rager filed a complaint in their
individual capacities and as administrators of the estates of their wives, Heidi and
Kelly. The complaint alleged that Smith’s negligence in causing the first accident
resulted in the injuries arising from the second accident. Smith filed his answer on
September 14, 2009. An amended answer was filed on February 17, 2010. On
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March 22, 2010, Smith filed a motion for summary judgment. McDougall and
Rager filed their response to the motion on April 12, 2010. On May 4, 2010, the
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
McDougall and Rager appeal from this judgment and raise the following
assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court committed reversible error by holding, as a
matter of law, that [Smith] did not proximately cause injury.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court committed reversible error by holding, as a
matter of law, that [Smith] owed no duty under the common law
rescue doctrine.
{¶ 4} When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must
proceed cautiously and award summary judgment only when appropriate. Franks
v. Lima News (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 408, 672 N.E.2d 245. “Civ.R. 56(C)
provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined
that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the
evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse
to the nonmoving party.” State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d
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587, 589, 639 N.E.2d 1189. When reviewing the judgment of the trial court, an
appellate court reviews the case de novo. Franks.
{¶ 5} McDougall and Rager allege in the first assignment of error that the
trial court erred in finding that Smith’s actions in causing the first accident were
not the proximate cause of their injuries. “Proximate cause” has been defined as a
happening or event that as a natural or continuing sequence, produces an injury
without which the injury would not have occurred. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co.
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 575 N.E.2d 828. There may be more than one
contributing proximate cause of an injury. Brinkmoeller v. Wilson (1975), 41
Ohio St.2d 223, 325 N.E.2d 233.
Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection
between negligence and injury depends upon whether that
intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the one who was
guilty of the negligence. * * * The causal connection of the first act
of negligence is broken and superseded by the second, only if the
intervening negligent act is both new and independent. The term
“independent” means the absence of any connection or relationship
of cause and effect between the original and subsequent act of
negligence. The term “new” means that the second act of
negligence could not reasonably have been foreseen. * * *.
(Emphasis omitted.) R.H. Macy & Co., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co. (1990), 51 Ohio
St.3d 108, 110-111, 554 N.E.2d 1313. “The test * * * is whether the original and
successive acts may be joined together as a whole, linking each of the actors as to
the liability, or whether there is a new and independent act or cause which
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intervenes and thereby absolves the original negligent actor.” Cascone v. Herb
Kay Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 155, 160, 451 N.E.2d 815.
{¶ 6} Here, the question is whether the second accident was a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of the first accident or whether it was a new and independent
act. One is permitted to assume that others will follow the law and exercise
ordinary care. Hicks v. Prelipp, 6th Dist. No. H-03-028, 2004-Ohio-3004, ¶ 10,
quoting Swoboda v. Brown (1935), 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N.E. 274. As a matter
of law, one need not anticipate that another driver will violate the law and that a
collision will occur. Id. Thus, such a collision is not foreseeable. Id. If the
second collision is not a foreseeable consequence of the first accident, then the
causal chain is broken and Smith is not liable for the injuries to McDougall and
Rager. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 7} In the second assignment of error, McDougall and Rager allege that
the trial court erred in finding that the rescue doctrine did not apply. Since this
court has determined that Smith’s actions in causing the first accident were not
the proximate cause of the second action, there can be no finding of negligence.
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this basis, and any
other determinations by the trial court are irrelevant. The second assignment of
error concerning whether the rescue doctrine applies is moot and will not be
addressed by this court.
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{¶ 8} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ROGERS and PRESTON, JJ., concur.
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