State v. Eaton

[Cite as State v. Eaton, 2010-Ohio-6065.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-10-10
v.
DARREN EATON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-10-11
v.
DARREN EATON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court
Trial Court Nos. 09 TRC 3316 and 09 CRB 340
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: December 13, 2010
Case No. 2-10-10 and 2-10-11
APPEARANCES:
Jon J. Saia for Appellant
Darren L. Meade for Appellee
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Darren A. Eaton (“Eaton”) appeals the
February 12, 2010 judgments of the Auglaize County Municipal Court finding him
guilty of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A), refusing to submit to a chemical
test under R.C. 4506.17, and resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33.
{¶2} On June 6, 2009, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Officer Welker of the
Wapakoneta Police Department noticed a rogue set of tire tracks crossing the curb
and extending over the grassy lawn situated in front of the Neil Armstrong
Museum. Officer Welker observed that the tracks continued through the grass for
approximately 100 yards and ended in the parking lot of the Museum. Officer
Welker drove his patrol car around to the parking lot where the tracks appeared to
end. There, he found a commercial vehicle driven by Eaton with the engine still
running. Officer Welker activated the overhead lights on his vehicle to signal
Eaton to stop. Eaton reversed his vehicle to park in one of the marked parking
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spaces. However, in his attempt to park the vehicle, Eaton failed to park within
the designated lines, and drove the vehicle onto the sidewalk finally bringing it to
a complete stop.
{¶3} The dashboard camera in Officer Welker’s cruiser recorded the stop.
Officer Welker asked Eaton to get out of the vehicle and confirmed Eaton’s
identity by reviewing his commercial driver’s license. Officer Welker testified
that upon his initial contact with Eaton he immediately noticed a strong odor of
alcohol coming from inside Eaton’s vehicle. He further testified that he noticed
Eaton’s eyes appeared bloodshot and glassy, and that Eaton was also unsteady on
his feet. At this point, Officer Cox had arrived on the scene to offer his assistance
to Officer Welker with the stop. Officers Welker and Cox conducted a search of
Eaton’s vehicle and found a half-emptied beer bottle which was still cold to the
touch. Officer Welker administered standard field sobriety tests to Eaton and
based on Eaton’s performance determined that he was under the influence.
{¶4} Officer Welker advised Eaton that he was under arrest and asked
him to turn around and place his hands on the hood of the police cruiser so that
Officer Welker could handcuff him. Eaton failed to comply with these orders and
prevented Officer Welker from securing the handcuffs around his hands. Officer
Welker warned Eaton that he would be tasered if he persisted in being
uncooperative. Despite these warnings, Eaton refused to comply with Officer
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Welker’s instructions which resulted in Eaton being tasered twice before he finally
permitted Officer Welker to handcuff him.
{¶5} Officer Welker then transported Eaton to the Auglaize County
Sheriff’s Office so that he could administer a breath test to Eaton. The
conversation that took place between Eaton and Officer Welker was captured on
the microphone attached to the lapel of Officer Welker’s uniform. Officer Welker
read to Eaton the contents on the back of the BMV Form 2255 which included the
consequences for refusing to submit to a chemical test for a person driving a
commercial vehicle. Eaton then signed the BMV Form 2255 acknowledging that
the information on the back of the form was read to him and that he received a
copy of the form. Officer Welker then mistakenly informed Eaton that the legal
blood-alcohol content for a commercial driver was .02 of one per cent or more by
whole blood or breath, when in fact the legal limit was .04 of one per cent or more
by whole blood or breath for someone operating a commercial vehicle. Initially,
Eaton agreed to submit to the breath test, but upon further consideration ultimately
refused to submit to any chemical testing.
{¶6} Eaton was charged with the following offenses: refusing to submit to
a chemical test under R.C. 4506.17; operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); reckless operation of a motor
vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.201; open container in a motor vehicle in
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violation of R.C. 4301.62; and, resisting arrest in violation R.C. 2921.33(A).1
Eaton was also placed under an immediate administrative license suspension
(“ALS”) of his commercial driver’s license for a period of not less than one year
pursuant to R.C. 4506.17.
{¶7} On June 10, 2009, Eaton appeared before the court and entered a
plea of not guilty to the charges. On October 26, 2009, Eaton filed a motion in
limine to preclude evidence of his refusal to submit to a chemical test. As the
basis for his motion to preclude evidence of his refusal, Eaton argued that his
refusal was “coerced” because Officer Welker incorrectly informed him of the per
se legal blood-alcohol limit for commercial drivers. On October 26, 2009, Eaton
filed an ALS appeal. On December 1, 2009, the trial court overruled Eaton’s
motion in limine.
{¶8} On January 4, 2010, Eaton’s case was tried before a jury. Officers
Welker and Cox testified for the prosecution and Eaton testified on his own behalf.
The video and audio recordings of the stop and subsequent events including
Eaton’s refusal were played for the jury. The court ultimately dismissed the
charges of open container and reckless operation pursuant to a Crim.R. 29 motion.
The charges of refusing to submit to a chemical test, OVI and resisting arrest were
1
Eaton’s criminal charge for resisting arrest was filed under case number 2009 CRB 00340 which
corresponds to appeal number 02-10-11. The traffic charges were file under case number 2009 TRC 03316
corresponding to appeal number 02-10-10. The trial court joined the two cases for the purposes of trial.
The two cases were also subsequently consolidated on appeal.
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submitted to the jury. On January 6, 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
all three counts.
{¶9} At the February 9, 2010 sentencing hearing, the court placed Eaton
on non-reporting community control sanctions, ordered him to pay applicable
fines and suspended his driver’s license for one year. On February 12, 2010, the
court overruled Eaton’s ALS appeal.
{¶10} Eaton filed the instant appeal, asserting the following assignments of
error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION IN LIMINE AND PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL OF A BREATHALYZER TEST
TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S
APPEAL OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE
SUSPENSION
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROVIDING THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PERMITTED THE JURY TO
CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF ANY “MEASURABLE OR
DETECTABLE” AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL AND
DEFENANT’S REFUSAL OF A BREATHALYZER,
RESULTING IN HIS CONVICTION
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH AND
CONVICTED OF A VIOLATION OF R.C. § 4506.15(F),
WHEN HE WAS ACTUALLY CHARGED WITH A
VIOLATION OF R.C. § 4506.17(D)
First Assignment of Error
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Eaton maintains that the trial court
erred when it overruled his “Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of a Refusal
of a Chemical Test.”
{¶12} The record reflects that Eaton filed a motion in limine, seeking to
exclude the evidence of his refusal of a chemical test, but failed to object to the
evidence at trial. “[A] motion in limine does not preserve the record on appeal [;]
* * * [a]n appellate court need not review the propriety of such an order unless the
claimed error is preserved by an objection * * * when the issue is actually reached
* * * at trial.” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Grubb (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 199,
203, 503 N.E.2d 142.
{¶13} While there is significant authority indicating that the failure to
object to the questioned evidence at trial constitutes an absolute waiver of the
issue on appeal from a denial of the motion in limine, we elect to proceed on a
plain error analysis in this instance. See for example, State v. Scott, Montgomery
App. No. 22745, 2010-Ohio-1919, at ¶ 29; Indep. Furniture Sales, Inc. v. Martin,
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184 Ohio App.3d 562, 570, 2009-Ohio-5697, 921 N.E.2d 718, 725; State v.
McCarley, Summit App. No. 23607, 2008 -Ohio- 552, ¶ 30; Estate of Beavers v.
Knapp, 175 Ohio App.3d 758, 787, 889 N.E.2d 181, 2008-Ohio-2023, ¶ 69.
Accordingly, in this case we will proceed on the basis that Eaton waived all but
plain error with regard to the issue on appeal. See State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio
St.3d 101, 116, 2005-Ohio-6046, ¶ 97, 837 N.E.2d 315.
{¶14} Plain error exists where there is an obvious deviation from a legal
rule which affected the defendant’s substantial rights, or influenced the outcome of
the proceeding. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d
1240. An error does not rise to the level of a plain error unless, but for the error,
the outcome of the trial would have been different. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio
St.3d 57, 67, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032.
{¶15} As the basis for his argument, Eaton contends that his refusal to
submit to a chemical test was “coerced” because Officer Welker incorrectly
informed him that the legal blood-alcohol content for a commercial driver was .02
of one per cent or more by whole blood or breath when in actuality the relevant
statutory authority states that the legal limit for commercial drivers is .04 of one
per cent or more by whole blood or breath. See R.C. 4506.15(A)(2). Eaton
maintains that Officer Welker’s misstatement regarding the per se blood-alcohol
limit for commercial drivers rendered his refusal “involuntary.”
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{¶16} In support of his argument, Eaton directs our review to cases finding
that a defendant’s consent to take a chemical test was rendered involuntary when
the consent was induced by the improper actions by the arresting officer.
However, after reviewing these cases cited by Eaton, we find them to be
inapposite to the case at hand. Specifically, the cases cited by Eaton involve
excluding evidence of the defendant’s consent when the officer requested the
defendant to submit to a chemical test without placing the defendant under arrest
or when the officer improperly advised the defendant of the implied consent
provisions and/or misstated the consequences of refusal—i.e. imposition or length
of license suspension—upon requesting the defendant to submit to a chemical test.
In each of these cases, the arguments set forth by the defendant complain that the
arresting officer’s error resulted in a violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights.
{¶17} In this case, Eaton does not allege that Officer Welker’s
misstatement regarding the per se blood-alcohol limit for a commercial driver in
anyway impinged upon his constitutional rights. The sole basis for Eaton’s
contention that his refusal should be rendered involuntary and that the evidence of
his refusal should be excluded, is based on statutory law. However, in the context
of R.C. 4511.191, the Supreme Court of Ohio has made the distinction between
statutory and constitutional requirements and has found that suppression of
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evidence is only reserved for alleged violations of constitutional rights.2 Hilliard
v. Elfrink, 77 Ohio St.3d 155, 158, 1996-Ohio-333, 672 N.E.2d 166.
{¶18} Our review of the record reveals that Officer Welker properly
advised Eaton both as to the statutory provisions governing a licensed driver’s
implied consent to submit to a chemical test and as to the consequences for a
driver of a commercial vehicle for refusing to submit to chemical testing. In fact,
the conversation between Eaton and Officer Welker at the Auglaize County
Sheriff’s Office was captured by Officer Welker’s lapel microphone and was
recorded.
{¶19} Prior to reading the relevant portions of the BMV Form 2255 to
Eaton, Officer Welker made it a point to specifically bring to Eaton’s attention the
information pertinent to drivers of commercial vehicles. Officer Welker then
asked Eaton to follow along with him as he read the implied consent provisions on
the BMV Form 2255 regarding the charge of OVI and the following provision of
the form governing an offender driving a commercial vehicle:
2
Moreover, Eaton neglects to cite more recent cases which reject defense arguments that an officer’s
misinformation or other statements coerced a suspect’s consent. See e.g. Columbus v. Dixon, 10th Dist.
No. 07AP-536, 2008-Ohio-2018, at ¶ 7 (“despite the fact that the police officers informed appellant that if
she refused the test she would be held in custody for 12 to 24 hours, we find that the officers did not coerce
appellant into taking the Breathalyzer test”); Wickliffe v. Hromulak, 11th Dist. No.2000-L-069, 2001 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1835, at *13 (“[t]he fact that appellant * * * failed to recognize that he would be subject to
penalties beyond the ninety-day administrative suspension * * * does not call into question the validity of
his consent in submitting to the BAC test”); State v. Tino, 1st Dist Nos. C-960393, C960394, and C-
960395, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 747, at *6 (“[t]he results of the [chemical] test * * * were admissible in
the disposition of appellant’s criminal case regardless of whether the ALS provisions were properly
communicated”).
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I am a law enforcement officer; I have probable cause to stop or
detain you. After investigating the circumstances, I have
probable cause to believe you were operating a commercial
motor vehicle in violation of section 4506.15 of the Ohio Revised
Code. I request that you submit to a test or tests of your blood,
breath, or urine for the purpose of determining your alcohol
concentration or the presence of any controlled substance. If
you refuse to submit to the test or tests you will immediately be
placed out-of-service for twenty-four-hours; you will be
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a
period of not less than one year; and you will be required to
surrender you commercial driver’s license to me.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶20} Officer Welker then asked Eaton if he had any questions regarding
the provisions read to him. Eaton asked for clarification on the length of
disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle for refusing to submit to a
chemical test. Officer Welker reiterated that if Eaton chose to refuse the chemical
test, his disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle would be for period
of not less than one year.
{¶21} Officer Welker then simplified Eaton’s situation by informing him
that he had two choices, submit to the test or refuse. Officer Welker further
explained to Eaton that if he submitted to the test and was found under the legal
limit, Eaton’s license would not be suspended. Officer Welker then incorrectly
stated that the per se legal limit for drivers of a commercial vehicle was .02 of one
per cent or more by whole blood or breath and asked Eaton if he was willing to
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submit to a chemical test. However, Officer Welker clearly informed Eaton that in
any event a refusal would result in an automatic suspension of his license.
{¶22} Initially, Eaton agreed to submit to the chemical test. However,
while Officer Welker prepared the breathalyzer, Eaton continued to grapple with
this decision by repeatedly asking Officer Welker what he thought Eaton should
do. Each time Officer Welker refused to give Eaton advice on the subject and
reminded Eaton that he was an adult and had to make his own decisions. It
appears that Eaton was struggling to calculate whether the two beers he admitted
to consuming hours earlier, between 9:30p.m. and 11:30p.m., would place him
over the .02 limit as stated by Officer Welker. Eaton now argues that based on his
“calculations,” he surmised it would be best to refuse to submit to a chemical test.
Eaton’s testimony at trial further elaborated on his thought process during this
time:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: When you heard the point 0 two,
what was your thought process then?
EATON: Well, he—I was trying to get information out of one of
the Officers to help me try to calculate how my blood alcohol
was going to be—uh at that time I told them I drank two beers
at nine-thirty to eleven-thirty—give or take in a half-an-hour-
hour—I am not gonna be precise and to the moment—I don’t
know exactly. And I am trying to calculate in my head how
much alcohol—I asked him numerous times I said—is that one
beer-every two hours? Because I was worried that the point o
two—I knew it used to be-uh-one o when I was in High School
and everybody always said that it was one beer per hour. That’s
how—I am from West Liberty and that’s how we were
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instructed that if you drank more than one beer per hour you
were over the legal limit.
***
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So, what’s the next thing that goes
through your mind as you [sic] thinking about point o two?
EATON: I am trying to calculate in my head how many beers—
I am not real smart and I have tried to calculate what my blood
alcohol content would be. * * * I’m trying to figure out how close
I am to being—I thought he had me going or coming if I am at
point four. You know what I mean? And I was too tense over—
then he was going to get me here if I refused, he was going to get
me here. I was trying to make a legitimate uh-conclusion.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So what did you figure—in your way
of calculating did you calculate as to what you thought was the
highest you could get?
EATON: Yes, numerous different times I kept—and I am
trying to talk to the Officers and ask them and I am trying to
come up with it, and the way I had it figured I was between two
and [sic] o two and o four. And it was about a four or five hour
period and two beers and I figured one beer per hour divide that
by four—I had it all figured out in my head. A couple different
times of course I would come up with something different cause
I am not too smart. But I was trying and I was asking for his
advice and the other Gentleman’s advice. And I understand
they don’t have to give me advice.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Ok, if the Officer had told you point o
four—would you have taken the test?
EATON: I believe I would today. That night I was going over
my math and that opportunity wasn’t given to me so I don’t
know. Uh-I was right there and I guess I probably would have
taken it. I almost took it at point o two. And I probably should
have—I know it’s one of those things.
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(Tr. pp. 260-62).
{¶23} There is a significant difference between the argument that a law
enforcement officer failed to fulfill certain statutory obligations to inform a
defendant as to the legal consequences of a refusal or that the officer provided
false information to coerce the defendant’s consent to take the test and the
argument that a law enforcement officer failed to provide all of the proper
information necessary for the defendant to personally determine whether it was in
his best legal interests to take the test or not.
{¶24} There is no statutory or constitutional authority to require that law
enforcement officers must accurately advise defendants as to all of the information
necessary to determine whether taking the test is in their best personal or legal
interests. Eaton attempts to blur the distinction between these two circumstances
but we decline to adopt his argument.
{¶25} We further note that “[t]he reason [a defendant] refused to take a
breath test is a disputed fact to be resolved by the jury.” Maumee v. Anistik, 69
Ohio St.3d. 339, 344, 1994-Ohio-157, 632 N.E.2d 497. At trial, Eaton was given
the opportunity to advance and further develop the same arguments against the
“voluntariness” of his refusal as he did in his motion in limine. In the end, it was
left to the jury to weigh the credibility of the testimony elicited at trial to
determine the “voluntary” nature of Eaton’s refusal.
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{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we do not find that the trial court’s decision
to overrule Eaton’s motion in limine to preclude evidence of his refusal to the jury
was an obvious deviation from a legal rule which affected Eaton’s substantial
rights, or influenced the outcome of the proceeding so as to constitute plain error.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to overrule Eaton’s
motion in limine to preclude evidence of his refusal.
{¶27} Eaton’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Eaton maintains that the trial court
erred when it denied Eaton’s appeal of his administrative license suspension
(“ALS”). Again, Eaton argues that Officer Welker’s misstatement regarding the
per se legal limit should render his ALS ineffective.
{¶29} At the outset, we note that R.C. 4511.197(C) governs the scope of
the ALS appeal and expressly limits a court’s review to determining whether one
or more of the specified conditions have not been met. These conditions as they
relate to Eaton’s case are: (1) whether arresting officer had reasonable ground to
believe the appellant was operating a vehicle in violation of a state or municipal
OVI statute and whether the appellant was in fact placed under arrest; (2) whether
the officer requested the appellant to submit to a chemical test; (3) whether the
arresting officer informed the appellant of the consequences of refusing to be
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tested or of submitting to the test; (4) whether the appellant refused to submit to
the chemical test requested by the officer. See R.C. 4511.197(C).
{¶30} As discussed above, each of these conditions were met by Officer
Welker at the time of Eaton’s arrest. The facts support that Officer Welker had
reasonable grounds to believe that Eaton was operating his vehicle while
intoxicated. Officer Welker then asked Eaton to submit to a chemical test and
advised Eaton, at length, of the consequences of refusal which included a
suspension of his commercial driver’s license for a period not less than a year.
Ultimately, Eaton chose not to submit to the breath test.
{¶31} It should be noted that nowhere in the statutory conditions
mentioned above is the requirement that the officer inform the appellant of the
applicable per se legal limit prior to requesting the appellant to submit to chemical
test.3 Nor does Eaton direct our attention to any statutory provision which requires
that he be given such notice. Simply put, Eaton was properly advised of the
consequences of his refusal to the chemical test and having been apprised of the
ramifications of his refusal, made the conscious decision to refuse to submit to any
chemical testing. Moreover, Eaton was found guilty of refusing to submit to a
3
See R.C. 4506.17(C) the applicable statutory provisions for commercial drivers which states “[a] person
requested to submit to a test under division (A) of this section shall be advised by the peace officer
requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the test will result in the person immediately being placed out-
of-service for a period of twenty-four hours and being disqualified from operating a commercial motor
vehicle for a period of not less than one year, and that the person is required to surrender the person's
commercial driver's license to the peace officer.”
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chemical test while driving commercial vehicle—an offense that made Eaton
subject to a disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle for a period of
one year by the registrar of motor vehicles. See R.C. 4506.16(D). Accordingly,
we find no error in the trial court’s decision to overrule Eaton’s motion and uphold
his ALS.
{¶32} The second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Third Assignment or Error
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Eaton argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by improperly instructing the jury to consider whether Eaton
had a “measurable or detectable” amount of alcohol in his system while driving
his commercial vehicle at the time of incident. Again, Eaton’s argument under
this assignment of error is based, in part, upon a finding that evidence of his
refusal to submit to a chemical test should have been excluded. Having found
otherwise in the first assignment of error, we will proceed with Eaton’s remaining
argument which maintains that the trial court’s instruction on this matter was
misleading and confusing to the jury.
{¶34} The giving of jury instructions is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless the record reflects that the
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Guster (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271-
272, 421 N.E.2d 157. A strong presumption exists in favor of the propriety of jury
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instructions. Burns v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 167 Ohio App.3d 809, 2006-
Ohio-3550, 857 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 41. A jury instruction must be viewed in the
context of the entire charge rather than in “artificial isolation.” State v. Price
(1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus.
Instructions that, in their totality, are sufficiently clear to permit the jury to
understand the relevant law will not be the cause of a reversal upon appeal. Burns,
2006-Ohio-3550, at ¶ 41, 167 Ohio App.3d 809, 857 N.E.2d 621. Whether the
jury instructions correctly state the law is a question of law, which we review de
novo. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d
828.
{¶35} The jury instruction at issue concerned Eaton’s charge for refusing
to submit to a chemical test under R.C. 4506.17, the statutory section that governs
commercial drivers. The court’s instruction submitted to the jury stated the
following:
The defendant is charged with refusing to submit to a test under
section 4506.17. Before you can find the defendant guilty you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 6th
day of June, 2009, that the defendant, Darren A. Eaton did in
Auglaize County, Ohio, drive a commercial vehicle. You must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer did have
reasonable grounds to stop and detain Mr. Eaton and that after
investigating the circumstances surrounding the operation of the
commercial vehicle you must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant had a measurable or detectible amount of alcohol in
his system. Finally, you must find that the defendant did refuse
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to submit to the test or tests requested by the officer after having
been warned that a refusal to submit to the test will result in the
person being immediately being [sic] placed out of service for a
period of twenty four hours and being disqualified from
operating a commercial vehicle for not less than one year, and
that the person is required to surrender the person’s commercial
driver’s license to the peace officer.
***
Evidence was presented regarding the legal limit of [sic] as to the
blood alcohol content of a person operating a commercial
vehicle. The law prohibits anyone driving a commercial vehicle
while having a measurable or detectible amount of alcohol in the
person’s breath, blood or urine and also prohibits a person from
driving a commercial vehicle with an alcohol concentration of
.04 of one percent or more by whole blood or breath. There are
additional penalties that are imposed when the person’s alcohol
concentration is at the .04 level or greater.
{¶36} Eaton especially takes issue with the second component of the jury
charge above and argues that the instruction misled to the jury to believe that “if
they were persuaded that [Eaton] had a ‘measurable and detectable’ amount of
alcohol in his system while driving his commercial vehicle, that he would be
found guilty of the charges against him.” (Appt’s Brief, at 21). However, upon
taking the disputed instruction out of “artificial isolation” and reviewing it in the
context of the entire charge, we do not reach the same conclusion as Eaton.
{¶37} The first component of the instruction cited above tracks the relevant
statutory law describing the offense with which Eaton was charged. Specifically,
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R.C. 4506.17 expressly includes the contended language “measurable and
detectable” in the following manner:
(A) Any person who holds a commercial driver's license or
operates a commercial motor vehicle requiring a commercial
driver's license within this state shall be deemed to have given
consent to a test or tests of the person's whole blood, blood
serum or plasma, breath, or urine for the purpose of
determining the person’s alcohol concentration or the presence
of any controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled
substance.
(B) A test or tests as provided in division (A) of this section may
be administered at the direction of a peace officer having
reasonable ground to stop or detain the person and, after
investigating the circumstances surrounding the operation of the
commercial motor vehicle, also having reasonable ground to
believe the person was driving the commercial vehicle while having
a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol or of a controlled
substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's
whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine. Any such
test shall be given within two hours of the time of the alleged
violation.
{¶38} After reviewing the relevant statutory language above, it is evident
that a necessary element of the offense with which Eaton was charged is that
Officer Welker had reasonable ground to believe that Eaton was driving the
commercial vehicle while having a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in
his system. Once Officer Welker made this threshold determination, the statute
permitted Officer Welker to then ask Eaton to submit to a chemical test, which
Eaton ultimately refused. In order to convict Eaton, the jury must have found
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beyond a reasonable doubt that this element was proven by the prosecution as a
necessary and predicate requirement of the offense that Eaton, as a licensed
commercial driver, refused to submit to a chemical test.
{¶39} Moreover, while the inclusion of the second component of the jury
instructions stating the current law as it relates to a commercial driver may have
been unnecessary, we do not find that its presence mislead the jury in the manner
that Eaton suggests. Additionally, Eaton was also found guilty of OVI in violation
of 4511.19(A)(1)(a). The instructions on this charge stated the following:
Evidence has been introduced indicating the defendant was
asked but refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood,
breath, or urine to determine the amount of alcohol in his system
for the purpose of suggesting that the defendant believed he was
under the influence of alcohol. If you find that the defendant
refused to submit to said test or tests, you may, but are not
required, to consider this evidence along with all the other facts
and circumstances in evidence in deciding whether the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 4
{¶40} We believe that upon reading the instructions as a whole, it is clear
the jury instructions articulated that in order to find Eaton guilty of refusing to
submit to a chemical test, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Eaton refused Officer Welker’s request to submit to a chemical test. With regard
to the OVI charge, the instructions clearly stated that the jury was permitted to
consider Eaton’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as evidence in deciding
4
It must be noted that the content of this jury instruction was expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Maumee v. Anistik, 69 Ohio St.3d. 339, 334, 1994-Ohio-157, 632 N.E.2d 497.
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whether he was guilty of the offense of operating a vehicle while under the
influence. The jury was not charged, as Eaton argues, that in order to find him
guilty of the refusal or OVI offenses they needed to merely find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had a measurable and detectable amount of alcohol in his
system while driving his commercial vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court’s instructions were sufficiently clear to permit the jury to understand the
relevant law governing the charges for which Eaton was being tried. As such, we
do not find the trial court abused its discretion in giving the jury these instructions.
{¶41} Accordingly, we overrule Eaton’s third assignment of error.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶42} In his fourth assignment of error, Eaton contends that trial court
committed plain error in finding that he was charged and convicted of “R.C.
4506.15(F)” when no subsection (F) currently exists. Because Eaton failed to
object to this issue during the trial proceedings, we review this assignment of error
for plain error.
{¶43} The traffic citation charging the offense stated that Eaton “did refuse
to submit to a chemical test under 4506.17 ORC.” The ticket then listed
“4506.15(F)” as the offense charged. The actual code section proscribing a
commercial driver from refusing to submit to a chemical test is R.C.
4506.15(A)(7). The statute describes the offense as, “No person shall * * * refuse
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to submit to a test under section 4506.17 of the Revised Code.” Section 4506.17,
as discussed in the previous assignment of error, describes the prohibition of a
commercial driver’s refusal to submit to chemical test in more detail and sets forth
the elements of the offense.
{¶44} Despite the misnumbering in the citation, we find that Eaton was
fully apprised of the charges against him. Based on the description of the offense
listed on the citation, R.C. 4506.15(A)(7) is the only subsection which proscribes a
commercial driver’s refusal a chemical test under R.C. 4506.17. It should also be
noted that there is no code subsection (F) to R.C. 4506.15 which could have
misled Eaton as to with what offense he was being charged. The citation directed
Eaton to R.C. 4506.15 and (A)(7) was the only subsection relevant to the charge
described on the citation. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated,
“traffic court procedure is not controlled by the stricter, more elaborate rules that
govern procedures in more serious cases. Therefore, a complaint prepared
pursuant to Traf.R. 3 simply needs to advise the defendant of the offense with
which he is charged, in a manner that can be readily understood by a person
making a reasonable attempt to understand.” Barberton v. O’Connor (1985), 17
Ohio St.3d 218, 221, 478 N.E.2d 803 (Internal citations omitted).
{¶45} Furthermore neither Eaton nor his counsel ever objected to the
misnumbering of the statute on the citation prior to the trial. Criminal Rule
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12(C)(2) mandates that “[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the
indictment, information, or complaint” must generally be raised “[p]rior to” trial,
and Eaton’s failure to timely object to the defects in the citation against him
constituted a waiver of the issues involved. See Crim.R. 12(H).
{¶46} In addition, Crim.R. 7(B) states, in pertinent part: “Error in the
numerical designation or omission of the numerical designation shall not be
ground for dismissal of the indictment or information, or for reversal of a
conviction, if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant.”
In raising this assignment of error, Eaton fails to identify or otherwise direct our
review to demonstrate how this error in the numerical designation prejudiced him
or in any way prohibited him from fully defending himself against the charge.
{¶47} Rather, our review of the record indicates that at all points
throughout the trial proceedings Eaton and his counsel understood that Eaton was
charged with refusing to submit to a chemical while driving a commercial vehicle
governed by R.C. 4506.17 and R.C. 4506.15(A)(7). This awareness of the precise
charges against him is evident in Eaton’s motion in limine to preclude evidence of
chemical testing where he acknowledges that sections R.C. 4506.15(A)(7) and
R.C. 4506.17 govern the facts and circumstances of this case. Moreover, at no
time before or during trial did Eaton bring to the court’s attention any different
witnesses he would have called or additional evidence he would have presented,
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nor did he ask for a continuance to make additional preparations based upon any
alleged confusion or lack of apprisal as to what charges he was being required to
defend. Under the totality of these circumstances, including the fact that the trial
court properly instructed the jury as to the correct code section describing the
offense, we cannot find that the defendant was prejudicially misled by the error in
numerical designation.
{¶48} However, as a matter of housekeeping, we must note that the trial
court also made minor clerical errors when it misnumbered the relevant code
section in its February 12, 2010 judgment entering Eaton’s sentence. Criminal
Rule 36 provides, “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be
corrected by the court at any time.” Therefore, we must remand this case for the
purpose of correcting the Judgment Entry imposing Eaton’s sentence on the
refusal charge to properly list R.C. 4506.15(A)(7) the correct code section for the
offense of which Eaton was convicted. Accordingly, to this extent only, we
sustain the assignment of error.
{¶49} In addition, we note that there are two consolidated cases before us
on appeal. Eaton’s assignments of error pertain only to his conviction in case
number 2009 TRC 03316, appeal number 02-10-10. However, despite there being
no assignment of error addressing Eaton’s conviction for resisting arrest in case
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number 2009 CRB 00340, appeal number 02-10-11, there is one issue we must
raise sua sponte and address in this opinion. In reviewing the previous assignment
of error concerning the clerical error of the misnumbered statute in the February
12, 2010 Judgment Entry imposing Eaton’s sentence, we also noticed that there is
an additional clerical error in the statement reflecting Eaton’s conviction for the
charge of resisting arrest. Therefore, we also must remand case number 2009
CRB 00340, appeal number 02-10-11, to the trial court for the purpose of
correcting the Judgment Entry imposing Eaton’s sentence for resisting arrest to list
the proper code section R.C. 2921.33.
{¶50} For all these reasons, the judgments of the Auglaize County
Municipal Court are affirmed as to the first, second and third assignments of error
and reversed, in part, as to the fourth assignment of error for the purpose of
correcting the clerical errors in the Judgment Entries imposing Eaton’s sentence
identified herein.
Judgment Affirmed in Part,
Reversed in Part and
Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., concurs.
/jlr
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ROGERS, J., Concurring Separately.
{¶51} I concur with the majority’s conclusions as to the Second, Third, and
Fourth Assignments of Error. However, on the First Assignment of Error, I would
find that the trial court’s denial of the motion in limine to exclude evidence of
Appellant’s refusal was not preserved for appeal. Having so determined the issue,
I would decline to address the merits of the trial court’s ruling.
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