Hines v. Camper

[Cite as Hines v. Camper, 2012-Ohio-4110.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
COREY T. HINES, A MINOR, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, CASE NO. 2-11-31
v.
BRANDEN R. CAMPER, ET AL., OPINION
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2011-CV-110
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 10, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Kevin W. Attkisson for Appellants
Paul B. Roderer for Appellees
Case No. 2-11-31
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Corey Hines, a minor, and Gina Hines
(“Hines”), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Auglaize
County granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Allstate
Insurance Company (“Allstate”), on Hines’ uninsured/underinsured motorist
claim. On appeal, Hines contends that the trial court erroneously granted
summary judgment because the following genuine issues of material fact exist: (1)
whether Hines was a participant in the underlying drag race that gave rise to this
action; and (2) whether Hines assumed the risk of injury when he entered the
automobile involved in the street race. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} This matter arose from a drag race in Auglaize County. On May 14,
2010, a group of young men, including Hines, gathered at the house of Nick
Forbess. At some point, the group traveled together to a nearby gas station. After
getting gas, they decided to head towards Washington Pike where they could race
their cars.
{¶3} Branden Camper and Forbess drove the cars involved in the race.
Hines was a passenger in Camper’s car, which lacked an operative safety belt for
the front side passenger. To procure a working safety belt, Hines decided to sit in
the back seat, where he buckled in. After the race commenced, Camper lost
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control of his automobile. It veered off the road and flipped upside down in a
nearby field. Hines suffered several injuries, including lacerations and back and
neck injuries.
{¶4} At the time of the accident, Camper’s parents had an automobile
insurance policy with Allstate (the “Policy”) that covered the car that Camper was
driving. The Policy contained an uninsured/underinsured motorist provision. This
provision was subject to a number of exclusions, including the following:
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured person or an additional
insured person is legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury:
...
6. arising out of the participation in any prearranged, organized, or
spontaneous:
a. racing contest;
b. speed contest; or
c. use of an auto at a track or course designed or used for racing or
high performance driving . . . . (Docket No. 52, Policy, p. 13).
After the accident, Hines sought recovery from Allstate under the
uninsured/underinsured provision of the Policy. However, Allstate refused to pay
Hines’ claim, citing the applicability of the above exclusion.
{¶5} On May 9, 2011, Hines initiated a personal injury action against
Camper, Forbess, and several other defendants. He also brought an
uninsured/underinsured action against Allstate for its failure to pay on his claim.
Allstate answered and denied coverage.
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{¶6} On July 29, 2011, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment.
Allstate advanced two alternative bases for summary judgment: (1) the
applicability of the above exclusion; and (2) Hines’ purported assumption of the
risk of injury. Attached to the motion were several of Hines’ written admissions
and a copy of his police statement regarding the accident. The written admissions
reflect that Hines admitted he was “aware prior to this accident that it was the
intention of [Camper] and [Forbess] to race their automobiles.” (Docket No. 52,
Exhibit A-1, p. 3). Meanwhile, the police statement shows that when the
responding officer asked whether his intention was to race when he reached the
road, Hines responded in the affirmative. (Docket No. 52, Exhibit A-2, p. 1).
{¶7} After allowing a continuance for Hines to complete additional
discovery, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment on
November 2, 2011. The trial court found that Hines was a participant in the drag
race that led to the accident and that he was consequently excluded from the
uninsured/underinsured coverage under the Policy. It further found that summary
judgment was appropriate due to the assumption of risk doctrine. As a result, the
trial court dismissed Hines’ complaint against Allstate and certified its order under
Civ.R. 54(B). Hines’ other claims against the other defendants remain before the
trial court for adjudication.
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{¶8} Hines filed this timely appeal presenting the following assignment of
error.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
AND THAT APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Hines asserts that the trial court’s
summary judgment order was improper because genuine issues of material fact
exist. Specifically, Hines claims that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
(1) whether he was a participant in the drag race and (2) whether he assumed the
risk of injury by entering Camper’s automobile knowing that a drag race was
going to occur. We disagree.
Summary Judgment Standard
{¶10} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment order de novo.
Hillyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (8th Dist.
1999). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse an otherwise correct
judgment merely because the lower court utilized different or erroneous reasons as
the basis for its determination. Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Dayton
Heidelberg Distr. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.),
citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 69 Ohio St.3d
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217, 222 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when, looking at the evidence
as a whole: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). In conducting this
analysis the court must determine “that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for
summary judgment is made, [the nonmoving] party being entitled to have the
evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the [nonmoving] party’s favor.”
Id. If any doubts exist, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59 (1992).
{¶11} The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of
producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of
material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). In doing so, the
moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must
identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument.
Id. The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the
existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E).
Insurance Policy Interpretation
{¶12} This matter revolves around the meaning of “participation” in the
Policy. We apply the precepts of contract interpretation when construing
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insurance policies. See, e.g., Yeager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 Ohio St. 71(1956), paragraph two of the syllabus. Insurance coverage is assessed by
interpreting the contract “in conformity with the intention of the parties or
gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language
employed.” King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 211 (1988). When
the policy is clear and unambiguous, the court “may look no further than the four
corners of the insurance policy to find the intent of the parties.” (Citation
omitted.) Crow v. Dooley, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-59, 2012-Ohio-2565, ¶ 8.
{¶13} Courts have developed several rules of interpretation to protect
insureds. First, “[w]hen provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” King at syllabus. Second, “there
is a presumption that all coverage applies unless it is clearly excluded in the
contract.” Crow at ¶ 10. And, third, the insurer must prove the applicability of
any policy exclusion. Beaverdam Contracting, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Co., 3d Dist. No.
1-08-17, 2008-Ohio-4953, ¶ 19.
“Participation” in Allstate’s Policy
{¶14} “Participation” is not a defined term in the Policy. But this fact,
standing alone, does not render the term ambiguous. See Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108 (1995) (“The mere absence
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of a definition in an insurance contract does not make the meaning of the term
ambiguous.”). Participation is neither a term of art nor a word that is amenable to
multiple interpretations. Rather, it is a common word and we consequently
construe it without resorting to any of the above construction rules benefitting
insureds. Id. As such, we reject Hines’ suggestion that we read R.C. 4511.251’s
definition of “participant” into the Policy’s terms. Instead, we use the ordinary
and commonly understood definition of participation, which is the “act or state of
participating: as a: the action or state of partaking of something . . . [or] b: the
association with others in a relationship or an enterprise.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1646 (2002).
{¶15} Under this definition, the evidence in the record manifestly shows
that Hines was participating in the common scheme to drag race. Before the race,
he spent time with Forbess and Camper at Forbess’ home. Hines then traveled
with the group to a gas station and admitted that during this time, the group
formed the drag racing idea. Further, he willingly got into Camper’s automobile
intending to be part of a drag race. This all shows the existence of a joint
enterprise in which Hines was a willing participant.
{¶16} Hines suggests that there is a triable issue as to whether he was a
participant under the policy because he did not drive a car during the drag race.
But, under its common and ordinary meaning, participation encompasses more
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conduct than driving. Here, by forming the plan to drag race and then willingly
getting into an automobile that he knew would be involved in the race, Hines was
a participant.
{¶17} In light of Hines’ failure to present additional evidence besides the
fact that he was not the driver, Hines is unable to show the existence of a triable
issue of fact regarding his status as a participant in the drag race. Consequently,
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Allstate on the basis of the
Policy’s exclusion for participation in car races.
Assumption of Risk
{¶18} Our resolution of the policy exclusion’s applicability renders it
unnecessary to address the trial court’s ruling regarding the operation of
assumption of risk doctrine in this matter. Consequently, we decline to address
the assumption of risk prong of the ruling. See App.R. 12(A)(2).
{¶19} Accordingly, we overrule Hines’ sole assignment of error.
{¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to Plaintiffs-Appellants, Corey
Hines, a Minor and Gina Hines, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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