Lyons v. Lyons

[Cite as Lyons v. Lyons, 2009-Ohio-6868.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY
HOLLY B. LYONS,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-09-12
v.
JOHN G. LYONS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 85-DR-0509
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 28, 2009
APPEARANCES:
John G. Lyons, Appellant
Clifford J. Murphy for Appellee
Case No. 3-09-12
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, John G. Lyons (hereinafter “Lyons”), appeals
the June 23, 2009 judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Crawford County,
Ohio, finding that Lyons owed an arrearage on child support and spousal support,
that the Crawford County Child Support Enforcement Agency is the exclusive
agency authorized by law to collect this support, and that the collection and
enforcement of the support order was not time barred.
{¶2} Our review of this case begins by noting that the procedural history
of the case dates back to August 1, 1984, when Lyons’ then-wife, Holly Lyons,
nka, Holly Workman (hereinafter “Holly”), filed for divorce, Case No. 39883-84-
414. On August 10, 1984, the trial court awarded temporary custody of the two
Lyons children to their mother, and ordered Lyons to pay child support in the
amount of $60.00 per week ($30.00 per week for each child).
{¶3} On October 9, 1985, the trial court denied the request for a divorce
on the grounds stated in the complaint, but granted leave to Holly to file an
amended complaint at such time as the parties had lived separate and apart without
cohabitation for a year. However, the trial court also awarded custody of the
children to their mother, ordered the same amount of child support to be paid by
wage assignment to commence on April 19, 1985, ordered Lyons to pay a lump
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sum of $1,205.00 in alimony1 to be paid by wage assignment, and divided the
parties’ personal property. Further, the court found Lyons in contempt for failing
to pay child support under the temporary order.
{¶4} Lyons appealed to this Court, and we found that the trial court erred
in awarding alimony, dividing the parties’ personal property, conditionally
sentencing Mr. Lyons to ten days in jail upon his future compliance with court
orders, and awarding custody of the children to their mother without first finding
that it was in their best interests. See Lyons v. Lyons (Mar. 19, 1987), 3rd Dist. No.
3-85-22, 1987 WL 8156. However, we affirmed the trial court’s determination as
to the amount of child support to be paid by wage assignment as of April 19, 1985,
that Lyons was in arrears on his child support under the temporary order of August
10, 1984, and that Lyons was in contempt for failing to pay child support under
the temporary order. Id.2
{¶5} Meanwhile, on September 18, 1985, Holly filed a new complaint for
divorce, Case No. 40671-85-509, in the trial court. Lyons filed an answer and
counter-claim, wherein he also requested that he be granted a divorce. On
1
This term has since been changed to the term “spousal support.”
2
Also, on June 20, 1985, Holly filed a new motion for contempt against Lyons for failing to pay child
support since April 19, 1985. The trial court found Lyons in contempt and determined the arrears to be
$360.00. He was sentenced to ten days in jail, seven of which would be suspended if Lyons purged himself
of the contempt by paying the arrearage within ten days of the journalization of the entry. Lyons appealed
to this court, and we affirmed the finding of civil contempt (the seven day sentence that was suspended if
Lyons purged himself) and the amount of arrearages, but we reversed the court’s decision as to the
remaining three days on his jail sentence for failing to find he was in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt
(a necessary finding for a criminal contempt). See Lyons v. Lyons (Mar. 16, 1987), 3rd Dist. No. 3-85-23,
1987 WL 8153.
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November 12, 1985, the trial court issued temporary orders in the case. Among
these orders was that Lyons pay temporary alimony of $75.00 per week to Holly
through the Bureau of Support. The trial court further acknowledged the existing
child support order in the 1984 case and that this support was placed on wage
assignment. This action was stayed pending the result of the appeal in the 1984
case. However, the trial court specifically ordered that all orders regarding
custody, support, and alimony were to remain in full force and effect during the
pendency of the appeals proceeding. Despite the stay of the proceedings, a
contempt motion was filed by Holly against Lyons on May 7, 1986, which
contained several allegations, including a failure to pay alimony. On June 13,
1986, the trial court found, inter alia, that Lyons was in contempt for failing to pay
the previously ordered alimony. Thus, the court ordered that alimony was also to
be paid by way of wage assignment through the Bureau of Support.
{¶6} On December 18, 1986, Holly filed a motion with the trial court,
requesting that the previously stayed matter be allowed to proceed on the issue of
the divorce only. The trial court granted this motion, and on March 16, 1987, it
granted Holly’s request for a divorce and specifically retained jurisdiction to
determine the other matters in the divorce action pending resolution of Case No. 3-
85-22 by this Court.
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{¶7} This matter came before the court for final hearing on September 1
and 4, 1987. On November 30, 1987, the trial court rendered its judgment on the
pending matters. In this entry, the court ordered that Case No. 39883-84-414 and
Case No. 40671-85-509 be consolidated into Case No. 40671-85-509. The court
further found that Lyons was in arrears in his child support obligation in Case No.
39883-84-414 in the amount of $2,465.00 as of September 4, 1987, and awarded
this amount in a judgment in Holly’s favor. The court also found Lyons in arrears
in his alimony obligation in the amount of $7,430.00 as of September 4, 1987, and
awarded this amount in a judgment in Holly’s favor. The court also awarded both
parties a divorce, ordered that they and their children submit to a psychiatric
evaluation, and awarded custody of the two children to Holly with Lyons having
rights of visitation. The court also ordered Lyons to pay child support of $57.87
per child per week through the Bureau of Support and by way of wage assignment.
{¶8} Lyons filed an appeal of the trial court’s November 30, 1987 entry,
asserting as error, inter alia, the granting of a divorce, the consolidation of the two
divorce cases, the award of alimony, and the amount of child support he was
obligated to pay. On August 29, 1989, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
See Lyons v. Lyons (Aug. 29, 1989), 3rd Dist. No. 3-87-37, 1989 WL 100127.
{¶9} On April 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order to Lyons, requiring
him to seek work. This order also stated that Lyons was to report at least ten
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places where he applied for employment each month in writing to the Child
Support Enforcement Agency. He was also ordered to notify the court if he
obtained employment, received income from any source, or obtained ownership of
any asset with a value of $500.00 or more. In August of 1990, Holly filed another
motion for contempt against Lyons for non-payment of child support and alimony.
On September 18, 1990, the trial court found Lyons in contempt for failure to pay
child support and alimony but withheld disposition. The court further ordered
Swan Hose, Lyons’ former employer, to deliver any monies held by it to the
Crawford County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) to be applied to
the support arrearage of Lyons.
{¶10} On September 20, 1991, Holly’s new husband, Rick Deems, filed a
petition for the adoption of the two Lyons children in the Court of Common Pleas
of Crawford County, Ohio, Probate Division. In this petition, Deems alleged that
the petition for adoption should proceed without the consent of their father, Lyons,
because Lyons failed to support the children for a period of one year as required
by R.C. 3107.07(A). Lyons objected to the adoption, and the matter proceeded to
a hearing. Thereafter, the probate court granted Deems’ petition for adoption.
Lyons also appealed that judgment to this Court. See In re Adoption of Deems (3rd
Dist. 1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 552, 632 N.E.2d 1347.
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{¶11} In that appeal, this Court found that the evidence at the adoption
hearing revealed that Lyons voluntarily left his employment with Swan Hose to
help his parents “full time” in their farming operation. Id. at 556. Although Lyons
claimed that he worked more than forty hours per week on the farm, he received
no monetary compensation, only “room and board,” and his parents provided him
with a vehicle, insurance, and gasoline. Id. The record also demonstrated that
Lyons willfully failed to seek gainful employment as required by the seek work
order in the divorce action. Id. Thus, we held that the probate court did not err in
determining that Lyons failed without justifiable cause to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor children as required by judicial decree for a
period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition,” and we
affirmed the decision of the probate court. Id.
{¶12} Immediately preceding and while the adoption proceedings were
occurring, Lyons’ parents filed a motion to intervene and for visitation with their
grandchildren in the divorce case. Lyons also filed a number of “notices” and
motions in the divorce case regarding, inter alia, support, restitution, and
visitation, and he informed the court that he underwent a psychological evaluation.
He also filed a motion for shared parenting on December 19, 1991. Holly filed a
motion to stay the proceedings pending the resolution of the adoption proceedings
and subsequent appeal. The trial court granted the request to stay. Upon
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discovering that the adoption of the children was affirmed by this Court on
November 12, 1993, the trial court in the divorce action found that “all pending
matters in the within action have been rendered moot because the minor children
of the parties have been adopted” on November 19, 1993. Accordingly, the trial
court dismissed them.
{¶13} In 1995, Lyons was injured in a farming accident and lost a leg. He
began receiving social security disability benefits in 1998. On November 27,
2002, the trial court issued a judgment entry ordering the Social Security
Administration to deduct from any lump sum benefit payable to Lyons any part up
to the amount of $36,132.74, which was the arrearage owed by Lyons and to
forward the deducted funds to the Ohio CSPC in Columbus, Ohio. Lyons objected
to the withholding.
{¶14} On May 23, 2003, CSEA filed a motion for contempt against Lyons.
On July 3, 2003, a hearing was held on these matters before a magistrate. At this
hearing, CSEA requested that the withheld amount, which was being held in
escrow, be immediately released to CSEA. Lyons maintained, albeit loosely, that
the doctrine of laches applied due to the length between the order of support, his
last payment, and CSEA’s attempt to collect the arrearage from his social security
payments. Lyons also asserted that the order required him to pay through the
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Bureau of Support, which was dissolved, not to CSEA.3 On August 26, 2003, the
magistrate found Lyons in contempt for failing to pay child support and sentenced
him to thirty days in jail. The court further ordered that the monies held in escrow
be released to CSEA.
{¶15} Lyons also appealed this decision to this Court. On April 5, 2004,
we found that the trial court erred in finding Lyons in contempt and sentencing
him to thirty days in jail because there was no evidence regarding the amount of
social security withholdings that were held in escrow in order for the court to
determine whether that amount would actually satisfy the arrearages, thereby
purging Lyons of contempt. Lyons v. Lyons, 3rd Dist. No.3-03-36, 2004-Ohio-
1721, at ¶ 4. Thus, we reversed this portion of the judgment and remanded the
matter for further proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6. However, we affirmed the trial
court’s decision to release the funds held in escrow to CSEA. Id. at ¶ 5.
Specifically, we found that Lyons was aware that CSEA was claiming that he
owed back support, that the funds were being held in escrow, and that the evidence
was clear that Lyons had an arrearage. Id. Therefore, we held that the trial court’s
3
At the time of Lyons’ divorce from Holly, the court was responsible for the collection of child support
and alimony through the Bureau of Support. However, subsequent to the divorce, the General Assembly
enacted legislation, creating the office of child support in the department of job and family services and
requiring each county to have a child support enforcement agency. Each county CSEA is responsible for
the enforcement of support orders and shall perform all administrative duties related to the enforcement of
any support order, including child and spousal support. Further, these agencies are the successors in
interest to their respective counties’ former bureaus of support and vested with all duties related to the
enforcement of child and spousal support that their predecessors once had. See R.C. 3125.01, et seq.
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decision to release the funds from escrow was well within its discretion and a
separate hearing before releasing the funds was not required. Id.
{¶16} Once the proceedings were remanded, CSEA filed a motion to
dismiss its prior motion for contempt against Lyons. On May 19, 2004, the trial
court granted this motion and, accordingly, dismissed the motion for contempt and
vacated the date set for hearing on the matter.
{¶17} Over four years later, on September 11, 2008, Lyons filed a motion
with the trial court entitled, “Motion To Show Cause of Contempt, Malicious
Prosecution, Fraud, And Criminal Liability By Steven Walker And Other
Administrative Agents, And Defendant Motion For Relief.” A hearing date was
set for May 4, 2009. Lyons filed a number of subpoenas, including one for the
county prosecutor, the Common Pleas Court judge, and the magistrate who found
him in contempt in 2003. Motions to quash were filed on the behalf of all three of
these witnesses.
{¶18} Lyons’ motion was heard on May 4, 2009. At that time, the trial
court asked Lyons to clarify his motion in order for the court to understand the
purpose of the motion. It then became clear that he was asking the court to find
those he thought were responsible for the withholdings from his social security
payments, i.e agents of CSEA and the agency attorney, in contempt for what he
perceived were violations of the law. In essence, Lyons maintained that his case
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was dismissed on November 19, 1993, when the trial court found all pending
motions moot because of the adoption of the Lyons children, and that CSEA
ceased to have any authority to collect arrearages after that time. Further, he
asserted that he was never ordered to pay CSEA, only the Bureau of Support, and
that once the Bureau of Support ceased to exist, he was no longer obligated to pay.
{¶19} After permitting Lyons to elicit testimony on this matter and to
explain to the court his basis for the motion, the trial court informed Lyons that it
could not find CSEA and/or any of its agents in contempt because they were
actually following the November 30, 1987 order of the court for support and
because it could not find a person in contempt for a violation of the law, if any
such violation even existed. However, sua sponte, the trial court ordered the
assistant prosecutor, who was representing the agency at the hearing, to investigate
whether Holly was still interested in receiving the arrearages and whether the
agency wanted to continue to pursue the matter given the age of the case.
{¶20} On May 27, 2009, CSEA filed a notice to the court that Holly
wanted the agency to collect the arrearage owed to her and wanted to be present at
future hearings in this matter. CSEA also attached a certified copy of the
arrearage calculation worksheet for Lyons as to both child support and spousal
support to the notice. This notice was also sent to Lyons. On June 11, 2009,
Lyons filed the following: “Defendant Notice of Continuing His Testimony and
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Defendant Recommendation.” This document contained sixty-four paragraphs,
purporting to be Lyons’ testimony in support of his position, and fourteen
paragraphs with his recommendations on how to resolve this matter. Also
attached to this notice were numerous documents.
{¶21} The hearing in this matter reconvened on June 15, 2009. At that
time, the trial court informed Lyons that it had read his notice of June 11, 2009,
and permitted him to further be heard. Once Lyons rested, CSEA presented the
testimony of Pat Siebert, an employee of CSEA in their accounting department.
Siebert performed an audit in Lyons’ support case and completed an arrearage
calculation. This document showed that Lyons ceased making any support
payments in 1989. For the years 1990-2002, no payments were made. However,
in 2003, $2,888.50 was collected. Thereafter, $1,200.00 was paid each year, and
as of May 1, 2009, $500.00 was collected for the year 2009. According to the
child support arrearage calculation, $42,673.20 was owed, $21,435.47 was paid as
of May 1, 2009, and a prior arrearage amount of $2,465.00 was owed prior to the
November 30, 1987 entry establishing his final support obligation, leaving a total
arrearage of $23,702.73. In addition, this arrearage calculation also contained a
separate sheet for spousal support, which reflected that Lyons owed $7,430.00 in
spousal support.
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{¶22} Holly also testified for CSEA. She testified that the numbers
reflected in the arrearage calculation worksheet appeared to accurately reflect what
was owed to her by Lyons. She also testified that the payments appeared to be
accurate. After her testimony, CSEA rested, and the parties were permitted to give
closing arguments. The court then took the matter under advisement.
{¶23} On June 23, 2009, the trial court found that Lyons owed $23,702.73
in child support arrearage, $7,430.00 in spousal support arrearage, that CSEA was
the agency with exclusive authority to collect support, having succeeded by
operation of law to the duties and responsibilities of the Bureau of Support, that
the court could not and did not modify or vacate any order of support, and that the
collection and enforcement of the support claims was not time barred. The court
then ordered as follows: “insofar as judgment has not previously been granted, the
amounts of child support and spousal support are reduced to a lump sum and
judgment is awarded in the amounts hereinabove stated as of May 1, 2009.”
{¶24} This appeal followed, and Lyons now asserts three assignments of
error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDINGS OF THE
PARTIES HAD BEEN DIVORCED BY A JUDGMENT, OF
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN GRANTED CUTODY [sic] OF
PARTIES MINOR CHILDREN, OF CHILD SUPPORT HAD
BEEN ESTABLISHED OR FIXED AT $57.87 PER WEEK PER
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CHILD WITH NO MODIFICATION, OF EXISTANCE [sic]
OF ARREARS OF SUPPORT THAT DEFENDANT OWES,
AND OF A FINDING THAT THE PRIOR JUDGE COULD
NOT INVALIDATE THE JOURNAL ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT, AS ALL SUCH FINDINGS IS [sic] A
DETERMINATION AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE;
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING
WITNESSES TO BE CALLED FOR DEFENDANT, AS THE
TESTIMONY OF THOSE WITESSES [sic] COULD HAVE
BEEN PERTINENT OR RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON
BEHAVE [sic] OF DEFENDANT, DEPENDING ON THOSE
WITNESSES STATEMENTS;
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING AWARDS AND
ORDERING THE CONTINUED COLLECTION OF
AMOUNTS IN THE SAME MANNER.
{¶25} Initially, we note that Mr. Lyons’ first and third assignments of error
are related, and as such, we elect to address them together.
First and Third Assignments of Error
{¶26} In his first assignment of error, Lyons maintains that the trial court’s
judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of this
position, he asserts that the divorce action was not finalized because custody of the
children was left open. Additionally, he contends that the November 19, 1993
judgment entry of the trial court dismissed the case. Thus, he maintains that he
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never owed support. Similarly, Lyons asserts in his third assignment of error that
all entries, including the June 23, 2009 judgment entry, by the trial court after the
November 19, 1993 dismissal are invalid. Further, he contends that the CSEA is
not a party to the case and has no authority to enforce support. In response, CSEA
maintains that all of these issues are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶27} “The doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts
of claim preclusion, also known as * * * estoppel by judgment, and issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio
St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226, 1995-Ohio-331. This Court has recently
addressed this issue and held that “[c]laim preclusion prevents subsequent actions,
by the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a
transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action. Dawson v. Dawson,
3rd Dist. Nos. 14-09-08, 10, 11, 12, 2009-Ohio-6029, at ¶ 36, citing Fort Frye
Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395,
692 N.E.2d 140, 1998-Ohio-435. Further, “[w]here a claim could have been
litigated in the previous suit, claim preclusion also bars subsequent actions on that
matter.” Dawson, supra, citing Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 382. In essence, estoppel
by judgment bars the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same
parties. Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 137, 140, 500 N.E.2d
358.
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{¶28} Here, the parties divorce on November 30, 1987, was a final,
appealable order. Lyons appealed that judgment to this Court, challenging, inter
alia, the granting of a divorce, the award of spousal support (alimony), and the
award of child support. These issues were all affirmed and are now the law of the
case. In addition, the court awarded custody of the minor children to Holly but
also issued an order that the parents and children submit to psychological
examinations. This did not leave the matter of custody in dispute. It simply left
the parties and the court with options concerning any modifications to custody
and/or visitation. In any event, this issue was never appealed. Thus, Lyons is
precluded from challenging the award of support and the collection of arrearages
thereon now.
{¶29} As for the November 19, 1993 judgment that Lyons relies on to
claim that the case was dismissed, including any past due amounts for support, he
is also precluded from raising this issue. First, when CSEA began collecting the
arrearages through a social security withholding and filed a contempt motion
against Lyons, the trial court found he was in arrears, held him in contempt, and
ordered that the funds held in escrow be released to CSEA. As previously noted,
Lyons challenged this decision. Although we held that the contempt finding was
improper because the evidence did not establish whether the amount held in
escrow would purge Lyons of contempt, we specifically found that the evidence
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was clear that he was in arrears and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
releasing the funds to CSEA. Lyons, 2004-Ohio-1721, at ¶¶ 4-5. Lyons did not
raise any issues concerning the November 19, 1993 decision. Thus, he may not
raise them now.
{¶30} Second, this judgment did not affect the case in the manner that
Lyons appears to believe it does. As previously noted, in November of 1993, the
trial court dismissed the pending motions of Lyons and his parents concerning
grandparent visitation, support, restitution, visitation, and shared parenting, which
were each rendered moot by the adoption of the children by Rick Deems. This
dismissal also terminated Lyons’ obligation to provide support for the children
pursuant to the 1987 court order in the future and terminated the order permitting
Lyons to exercise visitation with the children. This judgment did not terminate
Lyons’ obligation to support his children prior to their adoption, did not terminate
the award of spousal support, and did not terminate the amount of child support
previously owed in the 1984 divorce action.
{¶31} As for CSEA being the entity that enforces and collects the support,
its involvement was never an issue that was appealed. Therefore, Lyons cannot
make such an assertion now. Moreover, as previously noted, after the Lyons’
divorce, the General Assembly created the office of child support in the
department of job and family services and required each county to have a child
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support enforcement agency. See R.C. 3125.01, et seq. Each county CSEA is
responsible for the enforcement of support orders and shall perform all
administrative duties related to the enforcement of any support order, including
child and spousal support. Id. Further, these agencies are the successors in
interest to their respective counties’ former bureaus of support and vested with all
duties related to the enforcement of child and spousal support that their
predecessors once had. Id. Therefore, CSEA is not only entitled to collect the
support arrearages, it is required by law to do so.
{¶32} For all of these reasons, the first and third assignments of error are
overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶33} In his second assignment of error, Lyons maintains that the trial
court erred by quashing a number of subpoenas issued by him. He asserts that by
not allowing these people to testify it resulted “in defendant not having relevant
and significant evidence by testimony from those witnesses, even if they might be
officers of the court.”
{¶34} Although Lyons does not specify the names of those witnesses
whose subpoenas were quashed, the transcript of the May 4, 2009 hearing reflects
that the court quashed the subpoenas issued by Lyons for Judge Russell Wiseman,
Magistrate Mary Eileen Holm, and Prosecutor Stanley Flegm. In his argument to
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the trial court as to why they were necessary witnesses, Lyons essentially stated
that he needed Judge Wiseman and Magistrate Holm to explain why they rendered
the decisions that they did in 2003. He also stated that he needed Prosecutor
Flegm as an expert witness about the law pertaining to the issues he raised in his
motion. The trial court found that the judge and magistrate did not have to explain
their reasons for their decisions, stating that any challenge to these decisions could
be made by appealing the judgments. The court also found that the prosecutor’s
function was not to act as an expert witness for a private party.
{¶35} Evidence Rule 103(A)(2), in pertinent part, states: “Error may not
be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and * * * [i]n case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court.” The
purpose of this rule is to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the
determination by the trial court is prejudicial. State v. Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio
St.2d 80, 82, 430 N.E.2d 943. “‘[I]n the absence of a proffer, the exclusion of
evidence may not be assigned as error.’” Id., quoting Pokorny v. Local 310
(1973), 35 Ohio App.2d 178, 184, 300 N.E.2d 464, reversed on other grounds, 38
Ohio St.2d 177, 311 N.E.2d 866; but see, State v. Gilmore (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d
190, 194, 503 N.E.2d 147 (modifying Hipkins by holding that “a party is not
required to proffer excluded evidence in order to preserve any alleged error for
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review if the substance of the excluded evidence is apparent to the court from the
context within which questions were asked”).
{¶36} Here, Lyons did not proffer the substance of the evidence. Rather, in
his argument to the trial court he merely stated that he needed the judicial officers
to explain their decisions. He provided no information as to what those
explanations would be. Likewise, he stated that the prosecutor was needed to
provide his opinion on the law, yet he provided no information as to what that
opinion would be. Further, his statements to the trial court and the actual wording
of this assignment of error demonstrate that Lyons had no idea what reasons the
judicial officers would give or the opinion the prosecutor would render. Since no
proffer was made in this case and the evidence is not apparent, Lyons’ argument
must necessarily be rejected. Moreover, Evid.R. 402 states that “[e]vidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.” The reasoning of the judicial officers in 2003
and the prosecutor’s opinion of whether a violation of law occurred were not
relevant to determining whether CSEA’s agents were in contempt for failing to
obey a court order, as the court’s orders speak for themselves. Thus, the second
assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶37} For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Common Pleas
Court of Crawford County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J., and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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