Vanderhoff v. Vanderhoff

[Cite as Vanderhoff v. Vanderhoff, 2009-Ohio-5907.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
ANGELA S. VANDERHOFF, CASE NO. 13-09-21
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
FELIX E. VANDERHOFF, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 08-DR-0006
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: November 9, 2009
APPEARANCES:
Charles R. Hall, Jr. for Appellant
Nancy Nava-Wade for Appellee
Case No. 13-09-21
WILLAMOWSKI, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Felix Vanderhoff (“Felix”), appeals the
judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, granting a divorce from Plaintiff-Appellee, Angela S. Vanderhoff
(“Angela”). Felix contends that the trial court made errors in the property division
when the court issued a different, revised judgment more than seven months after
its original decision. For the reasons stated below, the trial court’s second
judgment entry is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
{¶2} Felix and Angela were married on September 4, 2004. They
separated on October 5, 2007, and a contested divorce hearing was held on July
25, 2008. On September 22, 2008, the trial court issued a detailed Journal Entry
granting the divorce, naming Angela the residential parent of the parties’ two
minor children, granting Felix visitation, ordering Felix to pay child support, and
awarding Angela limited spousal support. The trial court found that the parties’
residence was Felix’s premarital separate property and awarded it to Felix but
permitted Angela and the children to reside in the home for six months.
{¶3} In this September 22, 2008 judgment, the trial court also divided the
couples’ debts and a seven-page listing of personal property. Pertinent to this
appeal, the trial court awarded a motorcycle and camper to Felix. It also ordered
that the parties equally split $12,642, which had already been withdrawn by Felix
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from his 401(k) plan, with Angela being awarded $6,321. Any other items that
were not awarded and could not be agreed upon were to be sold with the proceeds
split fifty/fifty.
{¶4} Thereafter, Angela filed a timely request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R.52 and she subsequently filed a “Proposed
Findings of Fact on Division of Personal Property.” In her proposed findings of
fact, Angela asked the trial court to award her the Dodge Durango, one half the
value of the motorcycle, and one half the value of the camper. She further argued
that the division of personal property was not equitable because she claimed that
many of the items she was awarded were already her separate property, and
therefore, she requested that she receive several additional items, including the
refrigerator, stove, washer, and dryer. She also requested that Felix be ordered to
pay her the $6,321 from the 401(k) withdrawal in a lump sum payment within a
two month time period.
{¶5} Felix filed a Motion to Dismiss Angela’s Request for Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, claiming that there was no basis for this filing, that
the judgment entry was thorough, and that the filing was done to further burden
him and to delay the implementation of the judgment entry. Felix did not file any
additional findings of fact or conclusions of law. On January 15, 2009, a hearing
was held and Felix’s Motion to Dismiss was overruled.
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{¶6} On May 7, 2009, the trial court issued another judgment, modifying
several of the property awards it had made in the original judgment. The trial
court stated that because the “Proposed Findings of Fact” filed by Angela were
only applicable to personal property, the trial court’s previous order relative to
residential parent status, child support, social security, tax dependency, real estate,
medical insurance, debts, attorney fees, and court costs would not be delineated
further. The trial court then went on to address the issues raised by Angela and, in
this new judgment entry, ordered that the motorcycle and camper were to be sold
and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. The trial court further
ordered that the $6,321 from the 401(k) should be paid to Angela by June 15,
2009. As to the other items of personal property, the trial court stated that it had
taken into account the evidence concerning premarital/separate property and did
not make any further modifications.
{¶7} It is from this judgment that Felix appeals, presenting the following
two assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred by ordering the motorcycle sold.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred by ordering the payment of $6,321.00 to
[Angela].
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{¶8} Before we address Felix’s assignments of error, this court must first
determine whether the trial court had the authority to modify its original
September 22, 2008 Journal Entry, which disposed of all the matters between the
parties, was signed by the judge, filed, and labeled a “Final Appealable Order.”
An appellate court may sua sponte consider whether the trial court possessed the
power to entertain an action, even if the litigants themselves fail to raise the issue.1
See, e.g., Burns v. Daily (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 693, 700, 683 N.E.2d 1164.
We consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify its original
judgment and property division in response to Angela filing a request for findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
{¶9} Civil Rule 52 provides:
When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury,
judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of
the parties in writing or orally in open court requests otherwise
***, in which case, the court shall state in writing the
conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.
{¶10} The purpose of the trial court's issuance of findings of fact and
conclusions of law is “to aid the appellate court in reviewing the record and
determining the validity of the basis of the trial court's judgment.” Werden v.
Crawford (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 122, 124, 435 N.E.2d 424, 426. Findings and
conclusions “must articulate an adequate basis upon which a party can mount a
1
We note that Felix did file a Motion to Dismiss the request for findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which was overturned by the trial court. However, this Court was not provided with a transcript of the
January 15, 2009 hearing at which this matter was discussed.
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challenge to, and the appellate court can make a determination as to the propriety
of, resolved disputed issues of fact and the trial court's application of the law.”
Kroeger v. Ryder (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 438, 442, 621 N.E.2d 534. A trial court
may substantially comply with Civ.R.52 when its judgment adequately explains
the basis for the decision. Truex v. Truex, 179 Ohio App.3d 188, 901 N.E.2d 259,
2008-Ohio-5690, ¶27. “If the [trial] court's ruling or opinion, together with other
parts of the trial court's record, provides an adequate basis upon which an appellate
court can decide the legal issues presented, there is * * * substantial compliance”
with the procedural rule requiring the court to make separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Abney v. W. Res. Mut. Cas. Co. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 424,
431, 602 N.E.2d 348. When a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law
has been filed in accordance with Civ.R. 52, the time period for filing a notice of
appeal is tolled under App.R.4(B)(2) until the trial court files its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Walker v. Doup (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 229, 522 N.E.2d
1072, syllabus; Salisbury v. Smouse, 179 Ohio App.3d 426, 902 N.E. 2d 83, 2008-
Ohio-6196, ¶17.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “a timely motion for
separate findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civ.R. 52 prevents an
otherwise final judgment from becoming final for the purposes of App.R. 4 until
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed by the trial court.” (Emphasis
added.) Walker, supra, 36 Ohio St.3d. at 229, 522 N.E.2d at 1073. After a trial
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court enters a final judgment, a party's legal options are limited by the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Pitts v. Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 379-380, 423
N.E.2d 1105; Avon Lake Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Huntington Environmental
Systems, 9th Dist. No. 03CA008393, 2004-Ohio-5957, ¶11. Thus, the only
motions a trial court may consider and grant to relieve a party from a final order
are motions pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) (motion notwithstanding the verdict), Civ.R.
59 (motion for new trial), and Civ.R. 60(B) (motion for relief from judgment).
Ham v. Ham, 3d Dist. No. 16-07-04, 2008-Ohio-828, ¶15; Barnhisel v. Barnhisel,
6th Dist. No. WD-06-024, 2007-Ohio-446, ¶17.
{¶12} Filing a Civ.R. 52 motion means the judgment is not final for
purposes of appeal, pursuant to App.R.4, but that does not mean that it is not final
for other purposes. The clear purpose of Civ.R. 52 is to provide the litigants and
the appellate court with a record containing sufficient information concerning the
facts and conclusions of law that formed the basis for the trial court’s decision
when that information is lacking in the original judgment. There is no provision in
Civ.R. 52 to permit the trial court to reconsider or change its judgment pursuant to
a request for findings of facts and conclusions of law. Civ.R. 52 provides a
vehicle for a trial court to clarify its judgment, not to modify an otherwise final
judgment.2 Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to make substantive
2
We also note that the original judgment did contain detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
did not find that the second judgment entry expanded upon those proffered in the original judgment.
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changes to the final judgment entry based upon Angela’s motion for findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
{¶13} Moreover, Angela’s purported submission of “findings of fact”
consisted primarily of a request to the trial court to reconsider portions of the
property division. Angela was unhappy with the trial court’s decision concerning
the award of some of the personal property. Instead of appealing the decision to
the Court of Appeals, Angela asked the trial court to modify its original, final
judgment entry. We find that Angela’s motion was essentially a motion for
reconsideration.
{¶14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the Rules of Civil
Procedure do not allow a party to obtain relief from final judgment in a trial court
via a motion for reconsideration, as this method “is conspicuously absent within
the Rules.” Pitts, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 380. Accordingly, “motions for
reconsideration of a final judgment in the trial court are a nullity.” Id. at 379; Ham
v. Ham, supra, 2008-Ohio-828, at ¶15. Therefore, any order that a trial court may
have entered granting or denying such a motion for reconsideration is also a legal
nullity. Robinson v. Robinson, 168 Ohio App.3d 476, 2006-Ohio-4282, at ¶17,
citing Pitts, supra.
{¶15} The trial court’s judgment entry of September 22, 2008 was a final
judgment. See R.C. 2505.02; Civ.R. 54; and Civ.R. 75(F). It determined the
issues of custody, child support and visitation, spousal support, and property
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division, and prevented any further judgment on those issues. Therefore, the trial
court had no authority to reconsider and change its own final judgment. See
Barnihisel v. Barnihisel, supra, 2007-Ohio-446, at ¶16. Although a trial court
does not have continuing jurisdiction to modify a marital property division incident
to a divorce decree, it does retain the power to clarify and construe its original
property division in order to effectuate its judgment. See Jones v. Jones, 179
Ohio App.3d 618, 903 N.E. 329, 2008-Ohio-6069, ¶20.
{¶16} The trial court lacked jurisdiction to make substantive changes to the
property division in its second judgment entry. Consequently, those portions of
the May 7, 2009 judgment that modified the original property division are void
and have no legal effect. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 3d Dist. Nos. 4-04-28, 4-04-
32, 2005-Ohio-2355. However, to the extent that there was any confusion in the
original order concerning the timeframe for the distribution of the funds from the
401(k) withdrawal, the trial court retained the authority to clarify and construe its
original judgment entry to effectuate this payment.
{¶17} Felix’s first assignment of error is now moot because the trial court
did not have the authority to modify the original property division. As to his
second assignment of error, the division of the funds that awarded $6,321 to
Angela is still valid because this was ordered by the trial court in its original
judgment. The portion of the second judgment clarifying the time for this
payment was a proper order within the trial court’s powers.
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{¶18} Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court’s property
division modifications in the second judgment entry were a nullity, but the
clarifications regarding the date of payment for the $6,321 were valid. Therefore,
the May 7, 2009 judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate its September 22, 2008
judgment in accordance with this decision.
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
PRESTON, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
/jnc
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