State v. Schmidt

[Cite as State v. Schmidt, 2010-Ohio-4809.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MERCER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 10-10-04
v.
PHILLIP SCHMIDT, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 09-CRM-064
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 4, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Gerald F. Siesel for Appellant
Matthew K. Fox for Appellee
Case No. 10-10-04
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Schmidt (“Schmidt”), appeals the
judgment of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of
reckless homicide and two related drug offenses. On appeal, Schmidt claims that
the trial court erred when it denied his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his
Alford guilty plea and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. For the
reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} On the evening of June 9, 2009, Brett Riley (“Mr. Riley”) and his
wife, Michelle Riley (“Mrs. Riley”), decided that they wanted to purchase
Fentanyl drug patches for recreational drug use at their residence in Celina, Ohio.
Mr. Riley told the police that he had purchased Fentanyl from Schmidt in the past
and he called Schmidt again to arrange a purchase. Mr. Riley met Schmidt, paid
$56 for the patch, and returned home to ingest the Fentanyl patch with his wife.
{¶3} Fentanyl is a Schedule II controlled prescription drug that is a
powerful synthetic opiate many times stronger than morphine. A Fentanyl patch is
designed to be applied to the skin and used for 48 to 72 hours for timed-release
dispensing of the drug in order to manage pain. Drug abusers will cut up and
chew on the patch in order to ingest the drug and experience a high.
{¶4} The Rileys’ children found their parents passed out and were unable
to awaken them, so they called 9-1-1. The police and EMS squads arrived and
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found that Mrs. Riley was completely unresponsive without a pulse, heartbeat or
blood pressure; she was deceased. Mr. Riley was very near death, but they were
able to resuscitate him and transport him to the hospital. His condition eventually
improved and he survived. The cause of death for Mrs. Riley was determined to
be Fentanyl and alcohol intoxication.
{¶5} On July 16, 2009, the Mercer County Grand Jury returned a thirteen-
count indictment against Schmidt, charging him with multiple counts of
Involuntary Manslaughter, Reckless Homicide, Corrupting Another with Drugs,
Trafficking in a Schedule II Controlled Substance (Fentanyl), and Possession of
Drugs. In all, he was charged with five first degree felonies, six third degree
felonies, and two fifth degree felonies, carrying an aggregate penalty of
approximately 89 years of imprisonment. (Dec. 23, 2009, Sentencing Hearing Tr.,
pp. 29-31.) Due to the fact that several of the counts were allied offenses and
potentially subject to merger at sentencing, the total maximum prison time for all
of the offenses was thought to be approximately 26 to 36 years. (Id. at p. 31.)
{¶6} Counsel was appointed for Schmidt1 and he entered pleas of not
guilty to all thirteen counts in the indictment. Plea negotiations remained on-
1
Schmidt’s original appointed counsel withdrew because of a conflict. Another counsel was appointed,
and then Schmidt requested co-counsel, so Schmidt was represented by two attorneys throughout the
proceedings. The day before his scheduled trial, Schmidt requested new counsel, but this request was
denied. Schmidt also requested new counsel after he asked to withdraw his guilty plea, but discussions
with the trial court indicated that this request would not be granted.
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going in the weeks and days leading up to trial. The trial was originally scheduled
for October 6, 2009, but was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 2009.
{¶7} On the morning of the trial, while a prospective jury panel was
awaiting voir dire, the State offered to allow Schmidt to enter an Alford guilty plea
to three of the counts: Count 5 – Reckless Homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.41,
a third degree felony; an amended Count 9 – Corrupting Another with Drugs, in
violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3);(c)(1), a second degree felony (which was
reduced from a first degree felony by deleting reference to the offence occurring
within 1,000 feet of a school); and Count 10 – Trafficking in Drugs, in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(1);(C)(1)(b), a third degree felony. This negotiated plea
agreement reduced the potential maximum prison time down to no more than 18
years. The State also agreed to forgo filing a community control violation arising
from Schmidt’s previous felony weapons conviction. Schmidt continued to
dispute the acts that were attributed to him but agreed to enter an Alford guilty
plea in order to avoid the risks of proceeding to trial.
{¶8} The trial court then held a change of plea hearing and accepted
Schmidt’s Alford plea of guilty to the reduced charges. The trial court questioned
Schmidt extensively to verify that he had had an opportunity to discuss the plea
with his attorneys and to be certain that he understood what an Alford plea meant.
Schmidt answered in the affirmative and the trial court stated:
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The court’s understanding is that an Alford Plea is a complete
admission of a guilty plea, but you do not admit the operative
facts of the offenses and continue to maintain your actual
innocence of the charges. The guilty plea is based upon a
substantial certainty of a far greater penalty and finding by the
jury in this case than would occur by which the State is willing
to allow you to plead to these three offenses. Is that your
understanding?
(Dec. 8, 2009 Hearing Tr., p. 5.) Schmidt again answered in the affirmative, and
indicated that he did not have any questions about the procedure. The State
outlined its case against Schmidt and summarized all of the evidence that it had
been prepared to present. The trial court continued with the Criminal Rule 11
colloquy and then found Schmidt guilty of the three counts and approved the nolle
prosequi of the remaining counts. Sentencing was scheduled for December 23,
2009. Schmidt also signed a written negotiated plea agreement and a waiver of
constitutional rights prior to entering a plea.
{¶9} Two days prior to the sentencing hearing, Schmidt filed a motion to
withdraw his Alford plea. He claimed that “given the undue influence exerted on
me by my own attorney’s [sic] and [the prosecutor] on a quick decision, I signed
the plea bargain against my better judgment and wishes.” Schmidt contended that
his legal counsel had misled him and exerted undue pressure on him to agree to
the plea in the context of the immediacy of the trial waiting to go forward on the
morning of December 8th.
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{¶10} On December 23, 2009, the trial court conducted a full hearing on
Schmidt’s motion to withdraw his plea. After hearing Schmidt’s testimony and
professional statements from his attorney and the prosecutor, the trial court denied
his motion to withdraw the plea, finding that “evidence would support that it is
simply a change of heart on the part of the defendant after the fact.” (Dec. 23,
2009, Sentencing Hearing Tr., p. 33.) The trial court further stated that “there is
reason to believe that the defendant’s motion is simply an effort to delay the
inevitable.” (Id. at p. 34.)
{¶11} The trial court sentenced Schmidt to five years in prison on each of
Counts 5 and 10, and three years on Count 9, with the sentences to be served
consecutively for a total of thirteen years in prison. It is from this judgment that
Schmidt now appeals, raising the following three assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in not allowing [Schmidt] to withdraw his
Alford guilty plea prior to sentencing and thereby violated
[Schmidt’s] constitutional right to due process under the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial Court abused its discretion by denying [Schmidt’s]
pre-sentence motion to withdraw his Alford guilty plea,
pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 32.1.
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Third Assignment of Error
[Schmidt] was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial
counsel failed to recuse themselves after it became evident
counsel were potential witnesses in [Schmidt’s] motion to
withdraw his Alford plea, and because trial counsel failed to
present sufficient evidence at [Schmidt’s] hearing to withdraw
his Alford plea of guilty.
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Schmidt maintains that he should
have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court violated his
constitutional rights when it failed to follow requisite procedures before accepting
his Alford guilty plea. Specifically, Schmidt claims that: there was no meaningful
dialogue by the Court with Schmidt; there was no statement summarizing the
defense counsel’s separate investigation; and, there was no sworn statement of
evidence presented by the State.
{¶13} An “Alford plea” is a specialized type of guilty plea where the
defendant, although pleading guilty, continues to deny his or her guilt but enters
the plea because the defendant believes that the offered sentence is better than
what the outcome of a trial is likely to be. State v. Howe, 3d Dist. No. 13-02-01,
2002-Ohio-2713. The term “Alford plea” originated with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford (1971), 400 U.S. 25, 91
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, wherein the Supreme Court held that guilty pleas
linked with claims of innocence may be accepted provided the “defendant
intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the
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record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id., 400 U.S. at
37, 91 S.Ct. at 167, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171. “An individual accused of a crime may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime.” Id. An Alford plea has the same legal effect as a guilty
plea. State v. Vogelsong, 3d Dist. No. 5-06-60, 2007-Ohio-4935, ¶15.
{¶14} All pleas, including an Alford plea, must meet the general
requirement that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived
his right to trial. See, e.g., State v. Padgett (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 337-38,
586 N.E. 2d 1194, construing Crim.R. 11(C). Because pleas accompanied by
protestations of innocence give rise to an inherent suspicion that a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver may not have occurred, an Alford plea places a
heightened duty upon the trial court to ensure that the defendant's rights are
protected and that entering the plea is a rational decision on the part of the
defendant. Id.; State v. Jackson, 3d Dist. No. 9-99-50, 2000-Ohio-1700 (Shaw, J.,
concurring in judgment only.) “In accepting an Alford plea, absent the
presentation of some basic facts surrounding the charge, there can be no
determination that the accused made an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea,
because the absence of a basic factual framework precludes a trial judge from
evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's decision to plead guilty
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notwithstanding the protestation of innocence.” State v. Hayes (1995), 101 Ohio
App.3d 73, 75, 654 N.E.2d 1348, 1350.
{¶15} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a court may find that an
Alford guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently made where the record
affirmatively discloses that “(1) defendant's guilty plea was not the result of
coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) counsel was present at the time of the plea;
(3) counsel's advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the
indictment; (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the
charges; and, (5) defendant was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser
penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both.” State v. Piacella
(1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852, at the syllabus. This Court has also
recognized a heightened duty associated with the acceptance of an Alford plea.
In order for the trial court to establish that an Alford plea is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the court must conduct
what is commonly referred to as an “Alford inquiry.” An “Alford
inquiry” requires that the trial court question the defendant
concerning the reasons for deciding to plead guilty,
notwithstanding the protestations of innocence. The record also
must contain strong evidence of guilt before an Alford plea may
be accepted. Therefore, the plea should not be made without the
presentation of some basic facts surrounding the offenses
charged. (Citations omitted.)
State v. Scott, 3d Dist. No. 13-2000-34, 2001-Ohio-2098.
{¶16} In this case, the trial court conducted a thorough hearing and
addressed Schmidt at length about his Alford plea, his understanding of the plea,
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and his understanding of the rights he was waiving. Prior to the acceptance of
Schmidt’s guilty plea, the trial court asked Schmidt over twenty-four questions
concerning his understanding of his Alford plea and whether he was voluntarily
changing the plea of his own free will, and another dozen questions concerning his
understanding of the ramifications of the plea and the potential sentences and
consequences that he would be facing as a result. Schmidt answered in the
affirmative to every one of the trial court’s inquiries, including the following:
The Court: Mr. Schmidt, this is what we call an Alford plea.
Have you had time to discuss the import of this type of plea with
your attorneys this morning?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
***
The Court: Have you read the negotiated plea agreement and
waiver of rights form that was presented to you this morning?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you think you understand everything in those
forms?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
The Court: Have you had ample opportunity to discuss these
forms and the facts therein with your attorneys here this
morning?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
***
The Court: Are you satisfied with the service and advice of
your attorneys up to the present time?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
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The Court: Do you understand that no one can compel you to
enter this plea?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
The Court: Are you changing this plea freely and voluntarily?
Schmidt: Yes, sir.
(Dec. 8, 2009, Change of Plea Hearing Tr., pp. 4-5, 8, and 21.) Although Schmidt
did not personally state his specific reasons for the Alford plea in his own words,
he concurred with the trial court’s statement of its understanding of his reasoning.
(See ¶8 above.) Schmidt’s attorney also spoke on Schmidt’s behalf. See State v.
Harvey, 3d Dist. No. 1-09-48, 2010-Ohio-1627, ¶10 (stating that “[w]hen an
accused is present in the court; when the record shows clearly that he knew and
understood what was being done; and when it is clear that he acquiesced in a
guilty plea entered for him by his attorney; then the plea has the exact same force
and effect as though he had personally spoken the words of the attorney.”) His
attorney stated:
Mr. Schmidt has made it abundantly clear, I think, throughout
this that by his Alford plea that he does dispute the acts that are
attributed to him; but in terms of entering his plea of guilty, he
does so because of the risk of proceeding to trial.
(Dec. 8, 2009, Change of Plea Hearing Tr., pp. 27-28.)
{¶17} The trial court complied with all of the Crim.R. 11 plea acceptance
requirements and also conducted an enhanced “Alford inquiry.” Based on the
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above, it is clear that the record discloses that Schmidt’s plea met all of the factors
outlined in State v. Piacella that would enable a trial court to find that an Alford
guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently made. There is no merit to
Schmidt’s contention that the trial court did not conduct a “meaningful dialogue”
with Schmidt.
{¶18} Furthermore, we do not find, nor does Schmidt provide, any legal
support for his complaints that his constitutional rights require that there must be a
statement summarizing the defense counsel’s separate investigation and a sworn
statement of evidence presented by the State.2 While this Court has held that the
record should contain strong evidence of guilt before an Alford plea is accepted
and it should contain “the presentation of some basic facts surrounding the
offenses charged,” there are no requirements such as those suggested by Schmidt.
See State v. Scott, supra, citing State v. Nicely, 6th Dist. No. F-99-014, 2000 WL
864448. See, also, State v. Howe, supra, at ¶23, fn.1.
{¶19} At the change of plea hearing, the State made a professional
statement outlining the case it was prepared to present against Schmidt, including
the many witnesses it planned to call, a summary of their proposed testimony, and
a review of the physical evidence that it had. The State represented that Mr. Riley
2
Although this did occur in the original North Carolina v. Alford case, that type of evidentiary presentation
is not a requirement for accepting an Alford plea. Furthermore, in the federal courts, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11
expressly provides that a court “shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea.” Ohio’s Crim.R. 11 does not contain that language.
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would testify that for some period of time prior to June 9, 2009, he had purchased
Fentanyl patches from Schmidt; that Schmidt was a regular dealer of drugs for the
Rileys; and that Schmidt had sold Mr. Riley a Fentanyl patch on the evening of
June 9, 2009. In addition to the testimony of Mr. Riley, EMS responders, doctors,
and a toxicologist, the State was prepared to submit surveillance video tapes and
telephone records linking Schmidt with Mr. Riley that evening, along with
literature found in Schmidt’s apartment delineating the nature and potency of
Fentanyl, as well as its potential dangers.
{¶20} Notwithstanding Schmidt's protestations of innocence, the State was
prepared to present considerable evidence of his guilt. We find that the trial court
had before it sufficient basic facts to allow the trial judge to ascertain that Schmidt
had made a rational calculation that it was in his best interest to accept the plea
bargain offered by the State. There was no indication that any of Schmidt’s
constitutional rights to due process were violated. Based on all of the above,
Schmidt’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Schmidt asserts that he should
have been permitted to withdraw his presentence plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1
because Ohio courts have held that a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should be freely and liberally granted. See, e.g., State v. Peterseim (1980), 68
Ohio App.2d 211, 213-214, 428 N.E.2d 863. Schmidt claims that there existed
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cogent reasons for allowing the withdrawal of his guilty plea in this case, namely
that he believed he was under considerable duress and was coerced into making
the plea; that he had requested the termination of his legal counsel because they
unduly influenced him into entering the plea; and that he did not understand the
charge and possible penalties in the case.
{¶22} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty *
* * may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice
the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” Generally, a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea that is filed prior to sentencing will be freely allowed. State v. Drake (1991),
73 Ohio App.3d 640, 598 N.E.2d 115; State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. No. 1-08-36,
2008-Ohio-6067, ¶6.
{¶23} However, this does not mean that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
will be granted automatically. Drake, at 645. “A defendant does not have an
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial court must
conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis
for the withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 584
N.E.2d 715, at paragraph one of the syllabus. It is within the trial court's sound
discretion to determine whether there is a legitimate and reasonable basis for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea and, absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
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decision on the matter must be affirmed. Id. at 527. An abuse of discretion is
more than an error of judgment; it implies that the decision was “unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404
N.E.2d 144.
{¶24} Appellate courts often consider the following factors when
reviewing a trial court’s decision concerning a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea:
1) whether the State will be prejudiced by withdrawal; 2) the
representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; 3) the
extent of the Crim.R.11 plea hearing; 4) the extent of the hearing
on the motion to withdraw; 5) whether the trial court gave full
and fair consideration to the motion; 6) whether the timing of
the motion was reasonable; 7) the reasons for the motion; 8)
whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and
potential sentences; and 9) whether the accused was perhaps not
guilty or had a complete defense to the charge.
State v. Leffler, 3d Dist. No. 6-07-22, 2008-Ohio-3057, ¶11; State v. Lewis, 3d
Dist. No. 1-02-10, 2002-Ohio-3950, ¶11; State v. Fish (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d
236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788, 790.
{¶25} An examination of the above factors, first enumerated in State v.
Fish, supra, does not weigh in Schmidt's favor. He had a full change of plea
hearing and a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. Schmidt was
represented by competent counsel at both the change of plea hearing and the plea
withdrawal hearings. He filed the motion only two days prior to the final date of
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sentencing. The record of the plea hearing indicates that Schmidt was completely
aware of the charges and potential sentences he faced when he entered the plea.
The trial court gave careful consideration to the motion. Although Schmidt
maintained his innocence, the record is devoid of any defenses he may have had
and the prosecutor’s overview of the case demonstrated that the State was
prepared to present compelling evidence of Schmidt’s guilt. Furthermore,
Schmidt’s reasons for withdrawing his plea were not persuasive.
{¶26} In his letter in support of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
Schmidt claimed he was under a great deal of pressure and “badgering” from his
attorneys and the prosecutor, and that he “was not aware from any source that I
was about to be given only fifteen minutes to make a decision that would affect
me for the rest of my life.” However, the record before the trial court and
Schmidt’s own testimony strongly refutes Schmidt’s allegations.
{¶27} At the hearing, Schmidt had the opportunity to testify at length as to
his reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea. His attorney and the prosecutor also
gave professional statements. Schmidt acknowledged that the answers he had
given to the trial court on the day of his change of plea hearing were truthful, “I
thought they were truthful from my heart, yes sir.” (Dec. 23, 2009. Hearing Tr., p.
25.)
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{¶28} Although Schmidt originally claimed he had only “fifteen minutes”
to make up his mind, the evidence demonstrated that plea negotiations had been
ongoing for months; that the final plea offer that was made on the day of trial was
substantially similar to an offer he had received weeks before (except that for the
fact that the plea would be an “Alford plea”); that he actually had approximately
three hours to consider the offer that day; and that his family was brought in to
discuss the matter with him. Furthermore, when Schmidt indicated he was
reluctant to sign the plea agreement, his attorneys, the State, and the trial court
were all prepared and willing to proceed with the trial. It appears that Schmidt
claims he felt he was “badgered” when he was informed that if he did not want to
sign the plea agreement, then they would go forward with the trial in fifteen
minutes, since the jury had been waiting all morning. A trial by jury is a right; it
does not constitute a threat or a manner of “duress.” Furthermore, his attorneys’
assessment as to his likelihood of prevailing at trial does not constitute “coercion.”
{¶29} While Schmidt was undoubtedly under stress at the time that he
entered his plea, it is certainly not unusual for a criminal defendant to be under a
great deal of stress when entering a plea to criminal charges. See Leffler, 2008-
Ohio-3057, at ¶19. Schmidt’s testimony at the plea withdrawal hearing again
confirmed that he had understood the plea agreement and the ramifications of
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making an Alford plea. (Dec. 23, 2009 Hearing Tr. pp. 10-12.) Schmidt’s claim
that his plea was the result of duress and coercion is not supported by the record.
{¶30} In his pro-se letter accompanying the motion to withdraw, Schmidt
also claimed that he was under the mistaken impression that he could potentially
face up to a maximum of 89 years in prison if he did not accept the plea.
However, Schmidt himself did not raise this issue at the hearing and there was no
testimony or evidence in the record that he was ever told he could be subject to 89
years in prison.3 In any case, Schmidt, age 60, gained a considerable reduction in
the maximum prison time by entering an Alford plea. Instead of a potential prison
sentence of 26-36 years (plus additional penalties for violating community
control), Schmidt’s plea reduced the maximum prison time to 18 years, and he was
actually sentenced to 13 years in prison.
{¶31} The record does not reflect that Schmidt was subject to any undue
coercion or duress, and there is no evidence that he did not understand his plea and
the maximum potential penalties associated with accepting the plea agreement. It
is well-settled that a mere “change of heart” is insufficient grounds for allowing
the withdrawal of a guilty plea.” State v. Ramsey, 3d Dist. No. 1-06-2001, 2006-
Ohio-2795, ¶11, citing State v. Drake, 73 Ohio App.3d at 645. Therefore, we do
3
Although Schmidt did not raise the issue, the trial court did. Schmidt’s attorneys and the prosecutor
denied ever representing to Schmidt that he could be subject to 89 years in prison.
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not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Schmidt’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶32} In his final assignment of error, Schmidt asserts that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest with his attorneys
concerning the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Schmidt claimed that his attorneys
“coerced” him into accepting the State’s plea offer, thereby making it difficult for
them to represent Schmidt at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea.
{¶33} Although Schmidt states that trial counsel failed to “recuse”
themselves, the record shows that they were cognizant of the potential conflict and
requested permission from the trial court to withdraw. The trial court did not
permit them to withdraw, so it would appear that Schmidt is claiming that the trial
court’s denial of their request to withdraw resulted in Schmidt being afforded
ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶34} Schmidt must satisfy the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington
(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 524. The Strickland test was
applied to guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88
L.Ed.2d 203.” Id. Strickland requires a defendant to show that “(1) counsel's
performance was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances; and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Brooks, 3d Dist. No. 4-08-
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09, 2008-Ohio-6188, ¶16; State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306, 2001-Ohio-191,
750 N.E.2d 148, quoting Strickland, at 687. To establish prejudice when
ineffective assistance of counsel relates to a guilty plea, a defendant must show
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient or unreasonable
performance, he/she would not have pled guilty. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 524, citing
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.E.2d 203. The decision not
to remove court-appointed counsel is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 523, 2001-Ohio-112, 747 N.E.2d
765.
{¶35} The facts of this case fail to show that counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. In fact, the record shows that
Schmidt’s attorneys advocated diligently on his behalf. Counsel has a critical
obligation to advise a client of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea
agreement. Padilla v. Kentucky (2010), -- U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176
L.Ed.2d 284. To obtain relief on a claim that an attorney provided ineffective
assistance by failing to properly advise a defendant on the consequences of a
guilty plea, a defendant must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Id.{¶36} Schmidt’s attorneys believed that his best interests would be served
by accepting the plea agreement. Apparently that is not the advice that Schmidt
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wanted to hear and he claimed that he felt pressured and coerced into accepting the
plea agreement. However, “[a] lawyer has a duty to give the accused an honest
appraisal of his case. *** Counsel has a duty to be candid; he has no duty to be
optimistic when the facts do not warrant optimism. If the rule were otherwise,
appointed counsel could be replaced for doing little more than giving their clients
honest advice.” State v. Congrove, 5th Dist. No. 09 CAA09 0080, 2010-Ohio-
2933, ¶36 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Based on the
overwhelming evidence against Schmidt and the fact that the plea agreement
represented a significant reduction in the potential sentences he was facing, we
cannot say that Schmidt’s attorneys acted unreasonably. Cf. State v. Brown, 2nd
Dist. No. 2002-CA-23, 2003-Ohio-2959, ¶7 (wherein trial court granted
defendant’s motions and allowed him to withdraw his Alford plea and replace the
appointed counsel who had advised him to accept the plea offer of concurrent
three-year sentences. New counsel was appointed, the case went to trial, and the
defendant received an aggregate sentence of life in prison.)
{¶37} We also do not find any evidence that Schmidt suffered prejudice as
a result of counsel’s advice or as a result of the trial court’s refusal to allow
counsel to withdraw. The record shows that Schmidt’s attorney argued strongly
in favor of granting the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and allowed Schmidt
ample opportunity to testify. In addition to asking many specific questions which
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Case No. 10-10-04
permitted Schmidt to set forth his rationale for wanting to withdraw the plea, his
attorney gave Schmidt an open-ended opportunity to explain his reasoning when
he concluded by asking, “Is there anything else you want to tell the court?”
{¶38} There is no evidence that Schmidt’s attorneys’ performance was
deficient or unreasonable, or that Schmidt suffered any prejudice as a result of the
trial court’s denial of his request for new counsel. Schmidt’s third assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶39} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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