State v. Bowling

[Cite as State v. Bowling, 2011-Ohio-4946.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-100323
TRIAL NO. B-0903357
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
DAVID BOWLING, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 30, 2011
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Ravert J. Clark, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
S YLVIA S IEVE H ENDON , Judge.
{¶1} On May 22, 2009, defendant-appellant David Bowling, who was
required to register as a sex offender on the basis of a July 14, 1997, conviction for rape,
was indicted for failing to provide notice of an address change, a first-degree felony.
Bowling had been classified on July 29, 1997, as a sexual predator under former R.C.
Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”). See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2560, enacted in 1996, amended in 2003 by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV,
6556. He had been reclassified as a Tier III sex offender by the Ohio Attorney General
under Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”), which the General Assembly enacted in
2007 to implement the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.
{¶2} Bowling initially pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. After a
court-clinic evaluation, Bowling pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of an address
change as a second-degree felony. He was sentenced to seven years’ incarceration.
Bowling has appealed, raising three assignments of error for our review.
{¶3} We note that the indictment incorrectly referred to Bowling’s failure-to-
notify offense as a violation of R.C. 2950.05(E)(1), and that the sentencing entry
incorrectly referred to the offense as a violation of R.C. 2950.05(E)(2). R.C.
2950.05(E)(1) and (E)(2) set forth the duties of the sheriff upon receiving an offender’s
change-of-address notification or an offender’s registration of a new residence, school,
institution of higher learning, or place of employment. The indictment and the
sentencing entry should have referred to R.C. 2950.05(F)(1), which provides that “[n]o
person who is required to notify a sheriff of a change of address * * * shall fail to notify
the appropriate sheriff * * *.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} A clerical error in an indictment that does not mislead or prejudice a
defendant, even if carried through to the judgment entry, does not affect the validity of
the conviction and may be corrected in a nunc pro tunc entry. See State ex rel.
Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶13, citing
State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263,
¶18-19; State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Nos. C-100309 and C-100310, 2011-Ohio-1029; State
v. Marzolf, 9th Dist. No. 24459, 2009-Ohio-3001; Crim.R. 36. The language of the
indictment and the facts set forth by the prosecutor during Bowling’s plea hearing
clearly indicated that he was charged with and convicted of an offense under R.C.
2950.05(F)(1). Bowling pleaded guilty to facts establishing a violation of R.C.
2950.05(F)(1). It is clear from the record that Bowling was not misled or prejudiced by
the clerical error. Therefore, it may be corrected. See State v. Freeman, 1st Dist. No. C-
100389, 2011-Ohio-4357.
{¶5} Bowling’s first assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
accepting his guilty plea. Bowling argues that his plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily because he was under the influence of prescription
medication.
{¶6} The record shows that in accepting Bowling’s plea, the trial court
conducted a thorough colloquy with Bowling, strictly complying with the provisions
of Crim.R. 11(C) and correctly informing him about the constitutional rights
enumerated in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709. The court
substantially complied with the rule in all other respects. See State v. Ballard (1981),
66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115; State v. McCann (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 505,
698 N.E.2d 470.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶7} Regarding Bowling’s medication, the trial court addressed him as
follows:
{¶8} “THE COURT: Today, are you under the influence of drugs,
medication or alcohol?
{¶9} “THE DEFENDANT: Medication.
{¶10} “THE COURT: What medication?
{¶11} “THE DEFENDANT: Morphine, Oxycodone, Neurontin, for pain.
{¶12} “THE COURT: Okay. And do those affect your ability to understand
and make intelligent choices?
{¶13} “THE DEFENDANT: I don’t believe so, no.
{¶14} “THE COURT: Okay. All right. The Court has observed the
defendant for a little while here now at this point and it is apparent to me that the
defendant understands what’s going on and appears to be competent to make
decisions that he’s making today.”
{¶15} The court specifically asked Bowling about his medications and their
effects on him. Bowling indicated that his medications did not affect his ability to
understand the plea proceedings. The trial court stated on the record that Bowling
did not appear to be affected by the medications. The record shows that the trial
court conducted a meaningful dialogue with Bowling to ensure that his plea was
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. There is no indication in the record
that Bowling was confused, or that he did not understand the nature of the
proceedings or the consequences of his plea. The first assignment of error is
overruled.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶16} Bowling’s second assignment of error alleges that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel advised him that he would
receive “probation” in exchange for pleading guilty.
{¶17} Counsel’s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until
it is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation
and to have prejudiced the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s
deficient performance, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate to a reasonable
probability that were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. See id.; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d
373.
{¶18} The record does not demonstrate Bowling’s alleged error. When the
trial court asked Bowling if he had been promised “anything * * * to plead guilty,” he
answered, “No.” Bowling also stated that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation. Further, during sentencing, Bowling’s counsel stated, “If the court
were to consider community control, he’d be supervised by the probation
department as well as his parole officer in addition to his duties to continue to
report,” indicating that community control was a possibility, not a condition of the
guilty plea.
{¶19} The record does not support Bowling’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶20} Bowling’s third assignment of error, raised in his supplemental brief,
alleges that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea to the failure-to-notify
offense because the offense was based upon an unconstitutional reclassification under
Senate Bill 10.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶21} In State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d
753, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, which require
the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders whose classifications have already
been adjudicated by a court and made the subject of a final order, violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine by requiring the reopening of final judgments.” See
id., paragraph three of the syllabus. Further, the court held that the statutes violate
the separation-of-powers doctrine because they “impermissibly instruct the
executive branch to review past decisions of the judicial branch.” See id., paragraph
two of the syllabus. The court severed the statutory provisions, holding that “R.C.
2950.031 and 2950.032 may not be applied to offenders previously adjudicated by
judges under Megan’s Law, and the classifications and community-notification and
registration orders imposed previously by judges are reinstated.” See id. at ¶66.
{¶22} In State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 N.E.2d
192, the Ohio Supreme Court held, citing Bodyke, that an offender who was judicially
classified as a sexually oriented offender and ordered to register annually for ten years
under Megan’s Law could not be prosecuted for failing to comply with a more
restrictive registration requirement imposed after reclassification as a Tier III sex
offender under Senate Bill 10.
{¶23} Bowling was classified under Megan’s Law as a sexual predator on July
29, 1997. He was subsequently reclassified under Senate Bill 10 as a Tier III sex
offender. Pursuant to Bodyke, Bowling’s Megan’s Law classification, community-
notification, and registration orders were reinstated. Bowling’s classification under
Megan’s Law as a sexual predator required him to register for life and to verify his
information every 90 days. He also had an ongoing duty to notify the sheriff of any
change of address. That duty remained the same under both versions of R.C. Chapter
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2950 and was not affected by any reclassification. Therefore, his failure-to-notify
offense was not based upon an unconstitutional reclassification.
{¶24} Bowling also alleges that the trial court erred in applying current R.C.
2950.99, which prescribes the penalty for Bowling’s failure-to-notify offense. Bowling
argues that the court should have applied the version of R.C. 2950.99 that was in effect
at the time of his original classification as a sexual predator.
{¶25} “A statute is retroactive if it penalizes conduct that occurred before its
enactment.” See State v. Williams, 103 Ohio St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-4747, 814 N.E.2d
818, ¶7. A statute that “does not ‘change * * * the legal consequences of acts completed
before its effective date,’ but simply mandates an enhanced penalty for acts committed
after the effective date of the provision,” is not retroactive. See State v. Clark (Aug. 5,
1992), 1st Dist. No. C-910541, citing Miller v. Florida (1987), 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct.
2446.
{¶26} Current R.C. 2050.99’s penalty provisions became effective January 1,
2008. Bowling pleaded guilty to failing to notify the sheriff of an address change on or
about May 1, 2009. Although Bowling’s duty to register stemmed from his sex offense,
his failure to notify the sheriff of an address change was a new offense that he had
committed after the effective date of current R.C. 2950.99’s penalty provisions. See
Freeman, supra at ¶25; State v. Richey, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-36, 2009-Ohio-4487.
Therefore, current R.C. 2950.99 was not applied retroactively to Bowling’s conduct.
See Freeman, supra at ¶25.
{¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Williams, ___ Ohio
St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-3374, ___ N.E.2d ___, does not require a different result. In
Williams, the court held that “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied to defendants who
committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.” Id.,syllabus. The court concluded that Senate Bill 10’s more stringent classification,
registration, and community-notification provisions imposed “new or additional
burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction” and created “new
burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities not existing at the time” upon
sex offenders who had committed their crimes prior to Senate Bill 10’s enactment. Id.
at ¶19. The court held that Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, and community-
notification provisions were punitive and could not constitutionally be retroactively
applied to sex offenders who had committed their sex offenses before its enactment.
{¶28} As we pointed out in Freeman, “Williams dealt with the imposition of
Senate Bill 10’s more stringent registration requirements upon an offender who had
committed his sex offense prior to its enactment.” See Freeman, supra at ¶21. The
instant case deals with the imposition of current R.C. 2950.99’s penalty provisions on
Bowling, who committed his failure-to-notify offense after the effective date of that
statute. Although current R.C. 2950.99 has the same effective date as Senate Bill 10, it
was not enacted as part of Senate Bill 10. It was enacted as part of Am.Sub.S.B. 97
(“Senate Bill 97”), which, among other things, modified the penalties for violations of
the sex-offender registration and notification laws. See Freeman, supra at ¶21.
{¶29} Bowling had committed a sex offense and had been classified under
Megan’s Law as a sexual predator. Pursuant to that classification, he was required to
register as a sex offender every 90 days for life and to notify the sheriff of any change in
his address. Senate Bill 10 did not affect Bowling’s duty to notify the sheriff of a change
of address. Bowling committed his failure-to-notify offense on or about May 1, 2009,
well after the effective date of current R.C. 2950.99. Bowling had an ongoing duty to
notify the sheriff of any change of address. He failed to do so. Bowling’s sentence was
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
based on his failure-to-notify offense, which occurred after R.C. 2950.99’s effective
date. The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶30} We, therefore, remand the cause for correction of the record to reflect a
conviction under R.C. 2950.05(F)(1), but in all other respects we affirm the judgment of
the court below.
Judgment affirmed in part, and cause remanded.
H ILDEBRANDT , P.J., and C UNNINGHAM , J., concur.
Please Note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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