State v. Hair

[Cite as State v. Hair, 2016-Ohio-2679.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2015-08-158
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
OPINION
: 4/25/2016
- vs -
:
CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAIR, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2015-02-0217
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Willa Concannon, Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Michael R. Haas, 404 East 12th Street, 2nd Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-
appellant
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher Hair, appeals a decision of the Butler County
Court of Common Pleas convicting him of obstructing official business, resisting arrest, illegal
use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under a suspension.
{¶ 2} Appellant was charged with a number of offenses as a result of his actions
during a traffic stop by a Butler County Sheriff's deputy. Appellant challenged the propriety of
Butler CA2015-08-158
the initial stop in a motion to suppress. After a hearing, the trial court found the deputy's stop
was proper and denied the motion to suppress. A jury found appellant guilty as charged and
he was sentenced accordingly.
{¶ 3} On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court's decision to deny his motion to
suppress and raises one assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 4} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT[']S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶ 5} The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government
searches and seizures. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct 675 (1985). It is
well-established that a police officer may stop motorists in order to investigate a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St. 3d 295, 299 (1999). To justify
an intrusion, an officer must demonstrate "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). This determination involves consideration of "the
totality of the circumstances." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690
(1981). The stop must be "viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police
officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training." State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio
St.2d 291, 295 (1980).
{¶ 6} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. State v. Cochran, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-10-023, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶
12. As the trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate witness credibility and a reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings
of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Oatis, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2005-03-074, 2005-Ohio-6038, ¶ 10. "An appellate court, however, independently
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions, based on those facts and determines, without
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deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the
appropriate legal standard." Cochran at ¶ 12.
{¶ 7} The sole witness at the suppression hearing was the deputy who stopped
appellant's vehicle. The deputy testified that on the night of the traffic stop, he was in uniform
and in a marked police cruiser. He further testified that he was on special assignment in the
area along Cincinnati-Dayton Road, in the Route 129 area, due to a recent spate of break-ins
to area businesses. He indicated that the description given to law enforcement in one of the
break-ins involved a small, four-door car occupied by a male and a female.
{¶ 8} On the night of the stop, the deputy was parked in a shopping area near Hot
Head Burritos and Caravelle Nail Salon, two businesses which had been broken into
recently. He indicated that from where his cruiser was parked, he had a good view of the
back of the building. The deputy observed appellant drive a smaller four-door vehicle into the
rear area of the building. Appellant parked near a dumpster and right behind the employee
entrance, in an area not visible from the street. It was midnight and none of the businesses
in the area were open.
{¶ 9} The deputy turned on his headlights and appellant immediately put his vehicle
in reverse and exited the parking lot onto the street. When appellant pulled out, the deputy
observed that a male and female occupied the vehicle. The deputy pulled behind appellant,
turned on the cruiser's lights and sirens, and stopped the vehicle. Appellant refused to get
out of the car or to give the deputy his identification. Appellant's actions and refusal to
cooperate after the initial stop of his vehicle led to his arrest and the filing of charges.
{¶ 10} The trial court considered the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
and found the deputy's testimony was credible. The court determined that the deputy had
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle. On appeal, appellant argues that
the deputy did not observe any criminal acts or traffic violations and was not aware of any
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warrants associated with appellant's vehicle. Appellant further contends that the deputy did
not provide any specific information, including the dates or locations of break-ins,
documentation or reports of the break-ins, an age of the suspects, or the make and model of
the car.
{¶ 11} However, we find no merit to appellant's arguments. A Terry stop is
investigatory, and therefore reasonable suspicion may be based on behavior that is not
illegal. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). After reviewing the
facts presented at the suppression hearing, we find the deputy had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle. Although, as appellant argues, none of his actions were
illegal, taken together they amount to reasonable articulable suspicion.
{¶ 12} Appellant was observed pulling into a shopping area at midnight when none of
the businesses were open, in an area where numerous break-ins had recently occurred.
Appellant pulled around to the back of the building and parked in an area obscured from the
road, near a dumpster and the employee entrance. When the deputy turned on his
headlights, appellant immediately backed out of the parking space and began to leave. The
deputy observed a man and woman in a small, four-door vehicle, matching the description
given to police. These facts provided a basis for the deputy to perform an investigatory stop
in order to confirm or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity.
{¶ 13} Although appellant argues the deputy did not provide specific information, such
as the dates and locations of all of the break-ins, age of the suspects, and make and model
of the car, these facts were not necessary in order to establish reasonable, articulable
suspicion. The deputy testified that he was on special assignment to the area because of
numerous break-ins, and that two of the businesses in the area of where he was parked had
been broken into recently.
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{¶ 14} The state admitted an aerial photograph of the area, and the deputy pointed out
where he was located, the two businesses near where he was parked, and the location of a
Penn Station which had been broken into. He also indicated another area nearby where
multiple break-ins had occurred and indicated that he was concentrating on those areas that
evening. The deputy further testified that he was working the night of another break-in in the
area, at Ely's bar. These facts, along with appellant's actions, were sufficient to establish
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle.
{¶ 15} Because the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress, the
sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 16} Judgment Affirmed.
RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.
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