State v. Blankenship

[Cite as State v. Blankenship, 2014-Ohio-3600.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 13CA3417
vs. :
ANTHONY L. BLANKENSHIP, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Lori J. Rankin, 14 South Paint Street, Second Floor, Suite
1, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney,
and Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, 72 North Paint Street, Chillicothe, Ohio
45601-3202
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED: 8-14-14
ABELE, P.J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction
and sentence. The court found Anthony L. Blankenship, defendant below and appellant herein,
guilty of cocaine possession.
{¶ 2} Appellant assigns the following error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF MR.
BLANKENSHIP’S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULED MR.
BLANKENSHIP’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS [THE] EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 3} On November 4, 2011, a Ross County Grand Jury returned an indictment that
charged appellant with the possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. Appellant entered
a not guilty plea and later filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his interaction
with Chillicothe Police Officer Michael Short. Appellant argued, in part, that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to seize him.
{¶ 4} On June 8, 2012, the trial court held a hearing to consider appellant’s motion to
suppress. Officer Short testified that on July 23, 2011, at approximately 3:40 p.m., he noticed
appellant in a gas station parking lot leaning into the passenger side window of a vehicle and
“observed some type of hand to hand action as if [appellant and the passenger] were passing an
item back and forth.” Officer Short stated that “a lot of drug transaction[s]” occur “at our gas
station parking lots * * * * They kind of pick a spot, and then they quickly do an exchange and
they’re gone.” Officer Short pulled his cruiser into the lot and approached appellant and the
passenger, who had exited the vehicle. Officer Short engaged the passenger in conversation, but
appellant “would not make eye contact with [the officer], he was very nervous, knees, hands were
shaking, was just looking around trying to * * * just get away from me type of thing * * * not
really wanting to look at me.” Officer Short described appellant’s “nervousness” as “extreme.”
He further stated that appellant “kept adjusting his pants,” and that in his experience, “when
someone is nervous they also touch what they’re nervous about.” The officer explained that he
could see a “little bulge” in appellant’s pant pocket. He then “just told [appellant] to step over
here with me and just have [the passenger] stay.” He explained that they “took a couple of steps
ROSS, 13CA3417 3
to the right, because [the passenger] was trying to do all the talking” and Officer Short wanted to
hear from appellant. Officer Short asked appellant if “anything illegal” was occurring. Appellant
stated that he had “powder” on him. Officer Short stated that “powder” meant “cocaine in powder
form.” Officer Short subsequently arrested appellant.
{¶ 5} On July 27, 2012, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
The court found:
“Officer Short testified that on July 23, 2011 he was working in his
employment as a patrol officer when he noticed [appellant] at a gas station leaning
into the passenger’s side of a red Chevy. He noticed [appellant] conduct ‘hand to
hand action’ with another person appearing to pass something between them. As
soon as the individuals noticed Officer Short they quickly exited their vehicle.
Officer Short testified that in his experience when an individual quickly puts
distance between themselves and a vehicle it suggests to him that they have
something to hide in the vehicle. Officer Short was aware of complaints of drug
activity occurring at local gas stations so he parked his vehicle and approached the
individuals. Short made contact with [appellant] and James Seward outside the red
Chevy at the rear of the vehicle and told them that their behavior was ‘suspicious.’
Seward agreed with the officer, but said nothing illegal was going on. [Appellant]
refused to make eye contact and was very nervous, his knees and hands were
shaking and trembling. Officer Short approached the two on his own, with no
other officers present, he did not activate his lights or order either man to remain.
[Appellant] kept adjusting his pants and and kept touching his right hand pocket.
Officer Short noticed a bulge in the pocket and asked [appellant] to step away from
James Seward. Officer Short testified that [appellant] was free to leave the entire
time and that nothing was blocking his path if he decided to walk away. Officer
Short asked him why he was so nervous and asked him if he had anything on him.
[Appellant] replied that he had ‘powder’ on his person. Officer Short said “I
appreciate you being honest with me,’ and he then detained [appellant] and advised
him of his Miranda rights.”
The court determined that the initial encounter was not a seizure and explained:
“Officer Short was on routine patrol when he pulled into a public gas
station. There is no doubt that he had the same right to be there as any other
citizen. Officer [S]hort did not activate his overhead lights or demonstrate his
authority in any manner. He did not command anyone to stop or stay and speak
with him. The only thing he did that might be construed as a show of authority is
ROSS, 13CA3417 4
that he asked [appellant] to move away from James Seward so they could speak
alone. This simply is not enough to constitute a seizure within constitutional
guidelines.”
The court additionally determined that even if Officer Short had seized appellant, the officer
possessed reasonable suspicion to do so.
{¶ 6} Subsequently, appellant entered a no contest plea. This appeal followed.
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by
overruling his motion to suppress evidence. In particular, appellant contends that the trial court
improperly determined that the encounter between appellant and Officer Short was consensual and
did not constitute a seizure. Appellant argues that the encounter lost its consensual nature and
became a seizure when the officer ordered appellant to “step over here.” Appellant recognizes
that the trial court characterized the officer’s statement as a request to “step over here.” Appellant
points out, however, that the officer testified that he “told” appellant to “step over here.”
Appellant argues that the officer’s testimony thus establishes that he did not phrase his statement as
a question, but instead, phrased it as a command. Appellant contends that because the officer
phrased his statement as a command, the encounter lost its consensual nature and ripened into a
seizure subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 8} Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Codeluppi, — Ohio St.3d —, 2014-Ohio-1574, — N.E.2d —, 7;
State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶40; State v. Burnside,
100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8; State v. Moore, – Ohio App.3d —,
ROSS, 13CA3417 5
2013-Ohio-5506, 5 N.E.3d 41 (4th Dist.), ¶7. The Burnside court explained this standard as
follows:
“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept
the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”
Id. (citations omitted).
II
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
{¶ 9} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well
as Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, protect individuals against unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Gullett, 78 Ohio App.3d 138, 143, 604 N.E.2d 176 (1992). “Once
the defendant demonstrates that he was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden
shifts to the State to establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally
permissible.” State v. Hansard, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 07CA3177, 2008–Ohio–3349, ¶14, citing
Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), and Xenia v. Wallace, 37
Ohio St.3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 10} Although the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not every
police-citizen encounter constitutes a “seizure” subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“Obviously, not all personal
ROSS, 13CA3417 6
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.”). Rather, Fourth
Amendment concerns arise “[o]nly when the officer, by means of a physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Id.; Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S.
429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Thus, a “seizure” occurs when the police
conduct and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter “‘communicate[] to a
reasonable person that he [i]s not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
business.’” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108
S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); accord Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629-630, 123 S.Ct.
1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (“A person has been ‘seized’ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.”).
“Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person
of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer’s request might be compelled. In the absence of some such
evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the
police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.”
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-555 (citations omitted).
{¶ 11} A consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur
when a law enforcement officer “merely approach[es] an individual on the street or in another
public place” and “ask[s] him if he is willing to answer some questions.” Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see, also, Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (stating
that “a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a
ROSS, 13CA3417 7
few questions”). An encounter will not lose its consensual nature “[s]o long as a reasonable
person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’” Bostick, 501 U.S. at
434, quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).
{¶ 12} In the case at bar, appellant does not dispute that the encounter with the officer
began as a consensual encounter. The officer merely approached appellant and his companion to
engage in conversation. Appellant contends, however, that the encounter lost its consensual
nature and ripened into a seizure when the officer “told” appellant to “step over here.” Appellant
argues that the officer’s statement constituted a show of authority sufficient to transform the
encounter from a consensual one to a seizure.
III
CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER OR SEIZURE
{¶ 13} While no “litmus-paper test [exists] for distinguishing a consensual encounter from
a seizure,” Royer, 460 U.S. at 506, certain factors may indicate that a seizure has occurred.
“[A]n encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in conduct which a
reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive even if performed by
another private citizen. This would include such tactics as pursuing a person who
has attempted to terminate the contact by departing, continuing to interrogate a
person who has clearly expressed a desire not to cooperate, renewing an encounter
with a person who earlier responded fully to police inquiries, calling to such a
person to halt, holding a person’s identification papers or other property, blocking
the path of the suspect, physically grabbing and moving the suspect, drawing a
weapon, and encircling the suspect by many officers * * *.”
4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3 Ed.1996) 102-04, Section 9.3(a) (footnotes omitted).
Additionally, as this court held in State v. Cookson, 4th Dist. Washington No. 00CA53 (Sept. 25,
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2001): “Encounters * * * become seizures only when the police demonstrate a sufficient show of
authority such that a reasonable person would conclude that he must comply.”
{¶ 14} “[T]he test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not whether
the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s
words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628.
Additionally, “because so much of the meaning of [an officer’s] comment is carried in the tone of
voice of the person making it,” a reviewing court should generally defer to the trial court’s
characterization of the comment. In re Nesser, 4th Dist. Ross No. 00CA2551 (Dec. 1, 2000).
{¶ 15} In United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002),
the court determined that law enforcement officers engaged bus passengers in consensual
encounters when the officers did not give the passengers any reason to believe that they were
required to answer their questions, did not brandish any weapons or make any intimidating
movements, left the aisle clear so that the passengers could exit, and spoke to the passengers in a
“polite, quiet voice.” Id. at 203-24. The court explained: “There was no application of force, no
intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking
of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice.” Id. at 204.
{¶ 16} Even when a law enforcement phrases a statement in an imperative or
declarative–rather than in an interrogative–fashion, courts have generally ruled that an imperative
or declarative statement, by itself, does not transform a consensual encounter into a seizure. See
Columbus v. Body, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-609, 2012-Ohio-379; State v. Duncan, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 21155, 2003-Ohio-241; United States v. Brown, 447 Fed.Appx. 706, 708-709 (C.A.6,
2012). Instead, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances present in each case in order
ROSS, 13CA3417 9
to ascertain whether an imperative or declarative statement constitutes a sufficient show of
authority to ripen a consensual encounter into a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
See, e.g., Kaupp, supra (stating that courts must take into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter).
{¶ 17} Thus, in Body, for example, the court determined that a law enforcement officer had
not seized the defendant by approaching the defendant in a public place and stating “come over
here.” Id. at ¶16. The court further noted that the officer (1) acted “without the ‘threatening
presence of several officers,’” (2) “did not activate his siren or search light,” (3) “did not attempt to
block [the defendant]’s vehicle or path,” (4) did not “attempt to pursue [the defendant],” and (5)
did not use a threatening voice. Id. at ¶20, quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. The court also
observed that the officer testified that he stated “come over here” “in the form of a request rather
than a command.” Id.{¶ 18} In reaching its decision, the Body court relied upon State v. Smith, 45 Ohio St.3d
255, 544 N.E.2d 239 (1989), reversed on other grounds, Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct.
1288 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990). In Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a consensual
encounter did not ripen into a seizure when an officer stated to the defendant, “hey, come here a
minute.” Id. at 258-259. The Smith court additionally observed that the officers did not display
any weapons, did not physically touch the defendant, did not use a threatening tone of voice, did
not order the defendant into the police cruiser, did not indicate that the defendant’s noncompliance
would lead to his arrest, and did not block the defendant’s exit with their cruiser.
{¶ 19} The Body court also relied upon State v. Duncan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21155,
2003-Ohio-241. In Duncan, the court determined that a consensual encounter did not ripen into a
ROSS, 13CA3417 10
seizure when the officer stated to the defendant, “come over here for a second.” Id. at ¶15. The
court also observed that the officer “did not display any physical force or order [the defendant] to
do anything.” Id. at ¶16.
{¶ 20} The Body court further looked to federal courts and noted that those “courts have
also recognized that ‘simply calling out to someone to come over to talk does not constitute a
seizure.’” Id. at ¶18, quoting United States v. Brown, 447 Fed.Appx. 706, 708-709 (C.A.6, 2012),
citing United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560, 562 (C.A.6, 2002), abrogated on other grounds,
United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (C.A.6, 2011) (holding that officer’s statement, “[h]ey,
buddy, come here,” did not constitute a seizure because the addressee could have “politely declined
to do so, and walked away”).
{¶ 21} In State v. Cook, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20427, 2004-Ohio-4793, the court
determined that an officer’s imperative statement, coupled with his actions, ripened a consensual
encounter into a seizure. In Cook, the officer “ordered” the defendant to “open up [her] hand so
[the officer could] see what’s inside of it. Id. at ¶15. The court concluded that the officer’s
language indicated that he “commanded—not requested–” the defendant to open her hand. The
court further observed that the officer’s police cruiser “imped[ed]” the defendant’s “path of travel.”
Id. The court found that “a reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore the order of a
police officer and to walk away.” Id. The court thus determined that the defendant “was subject
to an investigatory detention when she was ordered to open her hand.” Id.
{¶ 22} In State v. Kelly, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 3007 (Sept. 24, 1993), the court determined
that a seizure–and not a consensual encounter–occurred when the officer pursued the defendant
after the defendant had ignored the officer’s first request to talk. In Kelly, the officer pulled his
ROSS, 13CA3417 11
police van alongside the defendant and asked if the officer could talk to the defendant. The
defendant ignored the officer and continued walking. The officer continued to follow the
defendant and pulled the van alongside him again. The officer stated, “I need to talk to you.”
The defendant replied that he had not done anything wrong and continued walking. The officer
then exited the van, walked up to the defendant, and stated, “I am going to talk to you.” In
concluding that these facts demonstrated a seizure, the court explained:
“It is evident from these facts that [the defendant] was not, at least after
Officer King had exited his van, free to disregard the officer’s questions, and that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Under the totality of
these facts and circumstances a reasonable person would not believe that he was
free to leave. As the actions of police in this case constitute a restraint upon [the
defendant]’s liberty, a seizure of [the defendant]’s person occurred and, absent a
warrant, that seizure is presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.”
{¶ 23} In the case at bar, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that when the officer
first approached appellant, no “seizure” occurred within the context of the Fourth Amendment.
We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the officer’s statement to appellant to “step
over here” did not turn the encounter into a seizure. No evidence exists that the officer used a
threatening voice when he told appellant to “step over here.” Moreover, the trial court found that
the officer phrased the statement in terms of a request. Even if the officer did not phrase the
statement as a question, the court could have determined, based upon the officer’s testimony at the
suppression hearing, that the officer intended the statement to be a request instead of a command.
As we stated in Nesser, supra, the tone in which an officer phrases a statement is difficult to
perceive from the written record and thus we must generally defer to the trial court’s
characterization of the statement. We see nothing in the record to make us believe that the trial
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court mischaracterized the officer’s statement as a request, even though it was not grammatically
phrased in an interrogatory fashion.
{¶ 24} Furthermore, the officer did not engage in any other conduct that could be construed
as a show of authority sufficient to constitute a seizure. The officer did not (1) pursue appellant,
(2) continue to interrogate appellant against his expressed desire, (3) call to appellant to halt, (4)
hold his identification or other property, (5) block his path, (6) physically grab or move him, (7)
draw his weapon, or (8) encircle him with many officers. LaFave, supra. Additionally, like the
officers in Body and Smith, the officer in the case sub judice did not (1) activate his siren or cruiser
lights, (2) block appellant’s path, (3) attempt to pursue appellant, (4) display a weapon, (5) use a
threatening tone of voice, or (6) indicate that appellant’s noncompliance would lead to his arrest.
Moreover, Officer Short acted alone during the initial encounter and there was not a “threatening
presence of several officers.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Additionally, unlike the situation in
Kelly, appellant had not attempted to ignore or walk away from Officer Short, and Officer Short
did not have to engage in any pursuit in order to interact with appellant. Although appellant
suggests that the instant case is indistinguishable from Cook, we do not agree. In Cook, not only
did the officer order the defendant to reveal an item she had concealed in his hand, but the officer
also blocked the defendant’s path of travel. In the case sub judice, the trial court characterized
Officer Short’s statement to “step over here” as a request, not an order. Even if the officer’s
statement to “step over here” could be construed as an order, Officer Short did not block
appellant’s path of travel like the officer did in Cook. More important, we believe that a
distinction exists between ordering an individual to reveal an item concealed in her hand and
requesting or ordering an individual to “step over here.” Normally, when an individual steps from
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one location to another, that individual will not reveal incriminating information by the simple act
of movement. In contrast, when an individual opens his hand in response to an officer’s directive
to open it, that individual may reveal incriminating information by the simple act of opening his
hand. Thus, an officer’s order to an individual to “open up” his hand suggests that the officer is
attempting to obtain incriminating information, while an order to “step over here” may be for
simple convenience, as it was in the case at bar. We therefore do not believe that an officer’s
statement to “step over here” is equivalent to ordering an individual to “open up” his hand and
necessarily ripens a consensual encounter into a seizure.
{¶ 25} Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we do not believe that a reasonable person
would have construed Officer Short’s statement to “step over here” as an order restraining that
person’s movement and as indicating that the person was not free to leave. Bostick, 501 U.S. at
434; Hodari D., 449 U.S. at 628. Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that the
encounter between appellant and Officer Short was consensual, that a seizure had not occurred.
Thus, the court correctly overruled appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
{¶ 26} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we hereby overrule appellant’s sole
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
[Cite as State v. Blankenship, 2014-Ohio-3600.]
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee shall recover of appellant the
costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County
Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted, it is
continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stay during the pendency
of the proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the expiration of
the sixty day period.
The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio
Supreme Court in the forty-five day period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to
the expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
McFarland, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:
Peter B. Abele
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the
time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.