State v. Hurst

[Cite as State v. Hurst, 2013-Ohio-4016.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 10CA33
:
vs. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
MICHAEL HURST, : ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 09/11/13
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Francisco E. Lüttecke, Assistant
State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
James E. Schneider, Washington County Prosecutor, and Alison L.
Cauthorn, Washington County Assistant Prosecutor, Marietta, Ohio, for
Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, P.J.
{¶1} This matter comes before us following our decision under
App.R. 26(B) to reopen Appellant, Michael Hurst’s, direct appeal. Here,
Appellant raises a single assignment of error, contends the trial court erred in
imposing separate sentences for offenses, which he claims arose from the
same conduct, were not committed separately or with a separate animus, and
should have been merged for sentencing purposes under R.C. 2941.25.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not apply the test for
determining allied offenses of similar import set forth in State v. Johnson,
Washington App. No. 10CA33 2
128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, the portion of the
trial court's order sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences for his
convictions on eleven counts in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1)1 and
eleven counts in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3)2 is hereby vacated and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
{¶2} As noted in our decision granting Appellant’s application for
reopening, Appellant was convicted of eleven counts of illegal use of a
minor in nudity oriented material or performance, second degree felonies in
violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1), eleven counts of illegal use of a minor in
nudity oriented material or performance, fifth degree felonies in violation of
R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), as well as tampering with evidence, a third degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(2). Appellant was sentenced on each
count, to a combined prison term of twenty six and a half years, as
evidenced in the trial court’s October 13, 2010.
{¶3} Appellant filed an initial appeal from his convictions and
sentences, which we affirmed in State v. Hurst, 4th Dist. No. 10CA33, 2012-
Ohio-2465. Appellant subsequently filed an application for reopening.
Over the objection of the State, this Court granted Appellant’s application
1
These convictions were for illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance, which
involved the transfer of the material or performance.
2
These convictions were also for illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance, but
simply involved possession of the material or performance.
Washington App. No. 10CA33 3
for reopening regarding to whether appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise an assignment of error based upon the trial court’s imposition
of separate, consecutive sentences for offenses which Appellant argues were
allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25. In granting
Appellant’s application, this Court concluded that Appellant had raised a
colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon appellate
counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s imposition of separate,
consecutive sentences for offenses which possibly should have been merged
as allied offenses of similar import under the test set forth in State v.
Johnson, supra. Thus, the matter is now before us once again, via a
reopened direct appeal, wherein Appellant raises a single assignment of error
for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED SEPARATE
SENTENCES FOR OFFENSES THAT AROSE FROM THE SAME
CONDUCT, WERE NOT COMMITTED SEPARATELY OR WITH
A SEPARATE ANIMUS, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MERGED
FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES UNDER R.C. 2941.25.”
{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred in imposing separate sentences for offenses, which he claims
arose from the same conduct, were not committed separately or with a
separate animus, and should have been merged for sentencing purposes
under R.C. 2941.25. More specifically, Appellant contends that the offenses
Washington App. No. 10CA33 4
of which he was convicted, which involved both the “transfer” and
“possession” sections of the illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material
or performance statute, were committed by the same conduct and are
therefore allied offenses of similar import under the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Ohio in State v Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-
6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061.
R.C. 2941.25 provides:
“(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in
two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment
or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them.”
{¶5} As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Johnson at ¶ 47,
under R.C. 2941.25, “the court must determine prior to sentencing whether
the offenses were committed by the same conduct.” The initial question is
whether it is possible to commit the two offenses with the same conduct.
Washington App. No. 10CA33 5
Johnson at ¶ 48. If so, we must then look to the facts of the case and
determine whether the two offenses actually were committed by the same
conduct, “i.e., ‘a single act, committed with a single state of mind.’ ”
Johnson at ¶ 49; quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-
4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50.
{¶6} “If the answer to both questions is yes, then the offenses are
allied offenses of similar import and will be merged.” Johnson at ¶ 50.
“Conversely, if the court determines that the commission of one offense will
never result in the commission of the other, or if the offenses are committed
separately, or if the defendant has separate animus for each offense, then,
according to R .C. 2941.25(B), the offenses will not merge.” Johnson at ¶
51.
{¶7} As we noted in our decision granting Appellant’s application for
reopening, Appellant was sentenced just prior to the release of the Johnson
decision and the new allied offenses test contained therein; therefore, if any
test was employed by the trial court in imposing Appellant’s sentence, it
would have been the test set forth in State v. Rance..3 However, the Johnson
decision expressly overruled the Rance decision. Johnson at syllabus. Thus,
although Appellant was sentenced just prior to Johnson being released, the
3
A review of the sentencing transcript, however, reveals that the issue of allied offenses was never actually
discussed by counsel or the trial court, but rather there was simply a request for concurrent sentences based
upon the similarity of the offenses of possession and transfer.
Washington App. No. 10CA33 6
reasoning of Johnson was nevertheless applicable as Appellant’s underlying
case was pending on direct appeal at the time of its release. State v. Literal,
4th Dist. No. No. 12CA3479, 2012-Ohio-6298, FN. 1.
{¶8} Again, as we have previously noted, we are mindful that the trial
court could not have applied the test set forth in Johnson at the time of
Appellant’s sentencing hearing as the decision had not yet been released.
However, as the matter was pending on direct appeal at the time the Johnson
decision was released, the issue of merger and the question of the
appropriate test to be applied in reaching that determination should have
been raised as part of Appellant’s direct appeal. The record before us
indicates that the question of allied offenses was minimally discussed, if it
was discussed at all, during sentencing.
{¶9} Faced with this procedural history, we find that the most
appropriate remedy at this juncture is to remand this matter to the trial court
for further review to determine whether Appellant’s conduct is allied under
State v. Johnson, supra. State v. Grube , -- Ohio App.3d --, 2013-Ohio- 692,
987 N.E.2d 287, ¶ 52; citing, State v. Delawder, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3344,
2012-Ohio-1923, ¶ 41. We find it to be inappropriate for this Court to make
such an initial determination when the trial court has yet to consider this
particular question, and failed to have the benefit of applying the new test.
{¶10} In light of the foregoing, the portion of the trial court's order
Washington App. No. 10CA33 7
sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences on the eleven “transfer”
convictions and the eleven “possession” convictions is hereby vacated and
this matter is remanded. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is
reversed in part and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.
Washington App. No. 10CA33 8
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED IN PART and that the CAUSE
IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. Appellant and Appellee shall split the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it
is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously
posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme
Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court.
If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the
sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court
of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of
the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _______________________
Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.