Fields v. Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc.

[Cite as Fields v. Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., 2013-Ohio-693.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PIKE COUNTY
JAMIE FIELDS, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 12CA827
:
vs. :
:
HERRNSTEIN CHRYSLER, INC., : DECISION AND
et al., : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendants-Appellees. : Released: 02/07/13
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Jason Shugart and D. Dale Seif, Jr., Seif & Shugart, LLC, Waverly, Ohio,
for Appellant.
Christina J. Marshall and John R. Conley, Sutter O’Connell, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellees, Chrysler Group, LLC, Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Bart
Herrnstein and Todd Montgomery.
Dale A. Stalf, Wood & Lamping LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee,
Capital One Auto Finance, a division of Capital One, N.A.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, P.J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a decision by the Pike County Common
Pleas Court which granted Appellees’ joint motion to compel arbitration and
stayed the below action pending arbitration.1 On appeal, Appellant, Jamie
Fields, raises two assignments of error, contending that 1) the trial court
1
The motions of Appellees were actually granted in part and denied in part, which will be more fully
discussed infra.
Pike App. No. 12CA827 2
committed reversible error by rewriting the arbitration agreement between
the parties and ordering to arbitration Appellant’s claims against parties,
Todd A. Montgomery and Bart Herrnstein, who were neither parties to the
superseding arbitration clause, nor signatories to the arbitration agreement or
contracts; and 2) the trial court committed reversible error by ordering to
arbitration Appellant’s claims against defendant Chrysler Group, LLC, when
Chrysler Group, LLC is neither a signatory, nor a party to the contract or
arbitration agreement.
{¶2} Because we conclude that the claims against the nonsignatories
stemmed from the same transaction as the claims against the signatories, and
because we conclude that the claims are intertwined as between the two and
alleged interdependent and concerted misconduct, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering a stay and referring the
matter to arbitration. Thus, both of Appellant’s assignments of error are
overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
{¶3} On July 10, 2010, Appellant, Jamie Fields, purchased a new,
2010 Jeep Grand Cherokee from Appellee, Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc. The
vehicle purchase was financed by Capital One Auto Finance, Inc., an
assignee of Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc. under the Retail Installment Sale
Pike App. No. 12CA827 3
Contract signed by Appellant and Appellee, Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc. This
contract specified that Appellee, Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. was an
assignee under the terms of the agreement. The contract also contained an
arbitration clause, which provided in pertinent part as follows:
“Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or
otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this
Arbitration Clause, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute),
between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or
assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application,
purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such
relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract)
shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding
arbitration and not by a court action.”
{¶4} Appellant and Appellee, Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., also executed
another, separate arbitration agreement that day, entitled Agreement to
Arbitrate. This agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
“By entering into this Agreement to Arbitrate (“Agreement”),
Customer(s) and Dealership, including any Assignee
(collectively referred to as “the Parties”) agree, except as
Pike App. No. 12CA827 4
otherwise provided in this Agreement, to settle by binding
arbitration any dispute between them regarding: (1) the
purchase/lease by Customer(s) of the above-referenced Vehicle;
(2) any products and services purchased in conjunction with the
Vehicle; (3) any financing obtained in connection with the
transaction; and/or (4) any dispute with respect to the existence,
scope or validity of this Agreement. Matters that the Parties
agree to arbitrate include, but are not limited to, disputes related
to the Retail Purchase/Retail Lease Agreement and any
documents incorporated therein by reference (whether such
references made in the Agreement or in the document itself),
the application for and terms of financing for the transaction,
the Finance/Lease Contract, any alleged promises,
representations and/or warranties made to or relied upon by the
Parties, and any alleged unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable
acts or practices.”
The Agreement to Arbitrate further provided that “[i]f any term of this
Agreement conflicts with the terms of any other document or agreement
between the Parties, the terms of this Agreement shall prevail.” The
Agreement to Arbitrate also provided that “THIS AGREEMENT IS
Pike App. No. 12CA827 5
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE RETAIL
PURCHASE/RETAIL LEASE AGREEMENT.”
{¶5} Within the first few months after purchasing the vehicle,
Appellant noticed paint chipping and/or peeling off of the vehicle in several
different locations. After contacting both Herrnstein Chrysler and Chrysler
Group and being unable to obtain an offer to remedy the problem that was
acceptable to Appellant, Appellant initiated a complaint in the Pike County
Court of Common Pleas, naming Appellee, Herrnstein Chrysler Inc., Todd
A. Montgomery, Bart Herrnstein, Chrysler Group, LLC, Capital One Auto
Finance, Inc. as well as the John Doe finance agents and representatives of
Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc. The named defendants all filed answers to the
complaint, asserting as a defense the fact that Appellant’s claims were
required to be resolved through arbitration. After filing their answers, on
October 24, 2011, Appellees filed a joint motion to stay and compel
arbitration, citing the court to the arbitration clause contained within the
Retail Installment Sales Contract, as well as the separately executed
Agreement to Arbitrate.
{¶6} On November 10, 2011, Appellant filed a memorandum contra
the motion to stay and compel arbitration. In his motion, Appellant argued,
in part, that because the parties signed two different arbitration agreements,
Pike App. No. 12CA827 6
which contained differing terms, that there could have been no meeting of
the minds. Appellant also argued that Herrnstein Chrysler was the only
signatory to the agreement. Appellees responded by arguing that the non-
signatories to the arbitration agreement could enforce the agreement due to
the “close relationship” between the entities involved and because the claims
were “intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract
obligations.”
{¶7} An oral hearing regarding the matter was held on January 4,
2012, and the record contains a certification by the court reporter that the
hearing was recorded. However, Appellant failed to request that any
transcripts be transmitted to this Court on appeal. Thus, the transcript of that
hearing is not currently before us on appeal. In Appellant’s bench brief, he
stated that “Counsel for Defendants admitted during the January 4, 2012
hearing that the Defendant HCI’s (Herrnstein Chrysler’s) Agreement to
Arbitrate trumps the arbitration clause in the Retail Installment Sales
Agreement.” As such, Appellant noted that “[t]he “Parties” to the
Agreement to Arbitrate are specifically narrower than the parties as defined
in the arbitration clause in the Retail Installment Sales Agreement,” and
argued that only the claims against Herrnstein Chrysler, a signatory, and
Capital One, which was Herrnstein’s assignee, should be sent to arbitration.
Pike App. No. 12CA827 7
{¶8} After considering bench briefs submitted by the parties, the trial
court issued a decision and journal entry on February 21, 2012. In its
decision, the trial court found that the Agreement to Arbitrate was a “valid,
subsisting, and enforceable agreement[,]” and further ordered as follows:
“1. That all claims pending in this action against Defendants
Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Todd A. Montgomery, Bart
Herrnstein and Capital One Auto Finance are referable to
arbitration under the “Agreement To Arbitrate;” and
2. That any and all claims pending in this action against
Defendant Chrysler Group, LLC and that are also pending
against Defendant Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Todd A.
Montgomery, Bart Herrnstein, and/or Capital One Auto
Finance, are referable to arbitration under the “Agreement To
Arbitrate;” and
3. That any and all claims pending in this action against
Chrysler Group, LLC that are not also pending against either
Defendant Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Todd A. Montgomery,
Bart Herrnstein, or Capital One Auto Finance, are not referable
to arbitration under the “Agreement To Arbitrate.”
Pike App. No. 12CA827 8
The trial court further ordered “that trial in this action is hereby stayed
pending arbitration as to all claims referred to in paragraphs “1” and “2,”
above; but is not stayed as to any claims to which paragraph number “3”
may apply, and this action shall proceed upon any such claims referred to in
paragraph number “3.”
{¶9} It is from this decision and journal entry that Appellant now
brings his timely appeal, assigning the following errors for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
REWRITING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES AND ORDERING TO ARBITRATION PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE PARTIES, TODD A.
MONTGOMERY AND BART HERRNSTEIN, WHO WERE
NEITHER PARTIES TO THE SUPERSEDING ARBITRATION
CLAUSE, NOR SIGNATORIES TO THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT OR CONTRACTS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
ORDERING TO ARBITRATION PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S
CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC,
WHEN CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC IS NEITHER A SIGNATORY,
NOR A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT OR ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT.”
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I AND II
{¶10} As Appellant’s assignments of error are interrelated, we will
address them in conjunction with one another. In his first assignment of
error, Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
Pike App. No. 12CA827 9
“rewriting” the arbitration agreement and ordering to arbitration his claims
against parties, Todd A. Montgomery and Bart Herrnstein, who he claims
were neither parties to the superseding arbitration clause, nor signatories to
the arbitration agreement or contracts. In his second assignment of error,
Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by also
ordering to arbitration his claims against Chrysler Group, LLC, when
Chrysler Group, LLC is neither a signatory, nor a party to the contract or
arbitration agreement. Appellant contends that the second arbitration
agreement that he signed, which did not include Montgomery, Herrnstein
(individually), or Chrysler Group, LLC, superseded the first agreement he
signed, which did include these individuals and/or entities. A review of the
record reveals that the trial court agreed, and specifically stated in its
decision that the second agreement was valid and enforceable. Appellant
argues, however, that the trial court essentially rewrote the arbitration
agreement between the parties when it included other parties who were
neither signatories, nor parties to the arbitration agreement, simply because
similar facts or claims existed as between them.
{¶11} Appellees contend that the trial court did not “rewrite” the
arbitration agreement, but instead relied upon the doctrine of estoppel in
reaching its decision. As such, Appellee contends that the only issue on
Pike App. No. 12CA827 10
appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying an
alternative estoppel theory to compel this result. Appellant, in his reply
brief, seems to agree that this is the proper issue to be determined on appeal,
and argues that application of this doctrine by the trial court was not
warranted, as the claims brought were not intertwined.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶12} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or to
deny a motion to compel arbitration or stay the proceedings under the abuse
of discretion standard. K.M.P., Inc. v. Ohio Historical Society, 4th Dist. No.
03CA2, 2003-Ohio-4443, ¶ 14; see, also, Strickler v. First Ohio Banc &
Lending, Inc., 9th Dist. Nos. 08CA009416 & 08CA009460, 2009-Ohio-
1422, ¶ 7; River Oaks v. Krann, 11th Dist. No.2008-L-166, 2009-Ohio-5208,
¶ 41; Grady v. Winchester Place Nursing and Rehabilitation Ctr., 5th Dist.
No. 08CA59, 2009-Ohio-3660, ¶ 15; Medallion Northeast Ohio, Inc. v. SCO
Medallion Healthy Homes, Ltd., 9th Dist. No. 23214, 2006-Ohio-6965, ¶ 6.
But, see, Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., LLC, Cuyahoga App.
No. 95921, 2011-Ohio-3390, ¶¶ 12 and 13 (noting divergent authority
regarding whether an abuse-of-discretion or de novo standard is the
appropriate standard of review applicable to a trial court's decision regarding
a motion to stay or compel arbitration and declining to explicitly adopt either
Pike App. No. 12CA827 11
standard). We further note that an abuse of discretion connotes more than
simply an error in judgment; rather, the court must act in an unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. See, e.g., Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Furthermore, when an
appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard, it may not simply
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. See, e.g., Berk v. Matthews,
53 Ohio St. 3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990).
{¶13} R.C. 2711.02 embodies Ohio's public policy to favor arbitration
and requires courts to stay an action if the issue involved falls under an
arbitration agreement. See ABM Farms v. Woods, 81 Ohio St. 3d 498, 500,
692 N.E.2d 574 (1998); Gerig v. Kahn, 95 Ohio St. 3d 478, 482, 2002-Ohio-
2581, 769 N.E.2d 381; Tomovich v. USA Waterproofing & Foundation
Services, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 07CA9150, 2007-Ohio-6214, ¶ 8; citing Schaefer
v. Allstate Co., 63 Ohio St. 3d 708, 711, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (1992). R.C.
2711.02(B) provides:
“If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration
under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which
the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one
Pike App. No. 12CA827 12
of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of
the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement,
provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with arbitration.”
{¶14} Thus, R.C. 2711.02 requires a court to stay the trial of an action
“on application of one of the parties” if (1) the action is brought upon any
issue referable to arbitration under a written agreement for arbitration, (2)
the court is satisfied the issue is referable to arbitration under the written
agreement, and (3) the applicant is not in default in proceeding with
arbitration. See Wishnosky v. Star-Lite Bldg. & Dev. Co., 8TH Dist. No.
77245, 2000 WL 1281830 (Sept. 7, 2000); MGM Landscaping Contrs., Inc.
v. Berry, 9th Dist. No. 19426 (Mar. 22, 2000).
{¶15} “A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve
‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.’ ” Kellogg v. Griffiths
Health Care Group, 3rd Dist. No. 9-10-59, 2011-Ohio-1733, ¶ 23, quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). “Arbitration is favored because it provides the
parties thereto with a relatively expeditious and economical means of
resolving a dispute.” Schaefer at 712; see, also, Hayes v. Oakridge Home,
122 Ohio St. 3d 63, 2009-Ohio-54, 908 N.E.2d 408. Thus, “if a dispute even
Pike App. No. 12CA827 13
arguably falls within the [parties'] arbitration provision, the trial court must
stay the proceedings until arbitration has been completed.” Tomovich at ¶ 8;
citing Featherstone at ¶ 5.
{¶16} Generally, “ ‘ parties who have not agreed to arbitrate their
disputes cannot be forced to forego judicial remedies.’ ” Short v. Resource
Title Agency, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 95839, 2011-Ohio-1577, ¶ 13; quoting
Cleveland-Akron-Canton Adverstising Coop. v. Physicians Weight Loss
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 184 Ohio App. 3d 805, 2009-Ohio-5699, 922 N.E.2d 1012,
¶ 14; citing Moore v. Houses on the Move, Inc., 177 Ohio App. 3d 585, 2008-
Ohio-3552, 895 N.E.2d 579. However, there are certain instances when
equity demands that parties who have not agreed to arbitration may be
forced to do so when “ordinary principles of contract and agency” require.
Id. at ¶ 14; citing McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519,
524 (C.A.2, 1980).
{¶17} Under an equitable estoppel theory, “a nonsignatory who
knowingly accepts the benefits of an agreement is estopped from denying a
corresponding obligation to arbitrate.” I Sports v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., 157
Ohio App. 3d 593, 2004-Ohio-3113, 813 N.E.2d 4, ¶ 13. While that scenario
is not applicable sub judice, as noted in Sports I, several federal circuits
have also recognized an “alternate estoppel theory” whereby “arbitration
Pike App. No. 12CA827 14
may be compelled by a nonsignatory against a signatory due to the ‘close
relationship between the entities involved, as well as the relationship of the
alleged wrongs to the nonsignatory's obligations and duties in the contract *
* * and [the fact that] the claims were “intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, 813
N.E.2d 4, quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Assn., 64 F.3d 773,
779, (C.A.2, 1995); quoting Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, 10
F.3d 753, 757, (C.A.11, 1993). For instance, under this theory, because an
individual defendants' allegedly wrongful acts relate to their actions as
agents of a company that was a party to an arbitration agreement, the
nonsignatory agents should also have the benefit of the arbitration agreement
made by their principal. See, e.g., Genaw v. Lieb, 2d Dist. No. Civ.A. 20593,
2005-Ohio-807.
{¶18} As set forth in I Sports, supra, at ¶ ¶ 16, 17 and 20:
“Where estoppel has been extended to ‘intertwined claims,’ it is generally
applied in two circumstances: (1) where a signatory must rely on the terms
of the written agreement in asserting claims against a nonsignatory and (2)
where the signatory alleges substantially interdependent misconduct by both
the nonsignatory and one or more signatories to the contract. Grigson v.
Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C. (C.A.5, 2000), 210 F.3d 524, 527, quoting
Pike App. No. 12CA827 15
MS Dealer Serv. Corp v. Franklin (C.A.11, 1999), 177 F.3d 942, 947.
Whether equitable estoppel should be applied will turn on the facts of each
case. Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527.”
{¶19} Under the first circumstance for “intertwined claims,” equitable
estoppel binds a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause only when the
signatory to the written agreement “must rely on the terms of the written
agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.” Hill v. G.E.
Power Sys., Inc. (C.A.5, 2002), 282 F.3d 343. It is not sufficient that the
plaintiff's claims “touch matters” concerning the agreement or that the
claims are “dependent upon” the agreement. Id. at 348–349.
***
The second circumstance under which equitable estoppel is applied arises
when the signatory to the contract alleges “substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the
signatories to the contract.” Hill, 282 F.3d at 348.”
LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶20} As set forth above, this matter stems from Appellant’s purchase
of a new vehicle from Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., which developed a paint
problem within a few months after purchase. Specifically, the paint on the
vehicle began to chip and peel from several different locations. When
Pike App. No. 12CA827 16
Appellant was unable to reach a satisfactory resolution to this problem with
either the dealer or the manufacturer, Appellant filed a lawsuit, naming
Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Todd A. Montgomery, Bart Herrnstein, Chrysler
Group, LLC, Capital One Auto Finance, Inc., and other John Doe finance
agents and representatives of Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc. as defendants in the
complaint.
{¶21} In his complaint, Appellant initially set forth a twenty-eight
paragraph section entitled “Common Facts,” which alleged that defendants
Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., Chrysler Group, Bart Herrnstein as well as the
John Doe financing agents and employees were all “Defendants Suppliers”
for purposes of the agreement between the parties. Appellant further alleged
that at all times, “Defendants Suppliers” were acting as “dealers” while
dealing with him and further that Chrysler Group and Herrnstein Chrysler
were both in the business of supplying automobiles in the State of Ohio and
providing warranties for new automobiles. Appellant further alleged in the
common facts section that he was forced to hire legal counsel to seek redress
as a result of “Defendants Suppliers’ misconduct.”
{¶22} Appellant’s complaint went on to allege claims based upon the
Consumer Sales Practices Act, deceptive trade practices, breach of express
warranties, breach of implied warranties, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
Pike App. No. 12CA827 17
negligence, and unjust enrichment. In his first claim for relief based upon
the Consumer Sales Practices Act, Appellant alleged that all defendants,
with the exception of Capital One, knowingly committed unfair and
deceptive acts by misrepresenting the quality of the vehicle and the
warranty, and by failing to honor the term of the warranty. Likewise,
Appellant alleged concerted actions by the “Defendants Suppliers” in his
deceptive trade practices claim (second claim), his breach of express
warranties claim (third claim), and also his negligence claim (sixth claim).
The remaining claims were more specific, basing the breach of implied
warranty claim (claim four) on the conduct of Chrysler Group, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act claim (claim five) on the conduct of Herrnstein
Chrysler, and the unjust enrichment claim (seventh claim) on the conduct of
both Herrnstein Chrysler and Chrysler Group.
{¶23} Appellant does not dispute that the first, second, third, fifth,
sixth and seventh claims in his complaint were properly referred to
arbitration as against Herrnstein Chrysler, which was a signatory to the
agreement.2 He claims instead that it was improper to refer these claims to
arbitration as against the other parties, which were not signatories to the
agreement. However, as set forth above, Appellant alleges common facts
2
The trial court did not refer Appellant’s fourth claim, which involved breach of implied warranty as
against Chrysler Group only, to arbitration. As such, that claim is not at issue on appeal.
Pike App. No. 12CA827 18
that describe each of these defendants, except Todd Montgomery and
Capital One, as “Defendants Suppliers” whose misconduct led to this
lawsuit.3 Thus, although Appellant claims that these claims are not
“intertwined” for purposes of application of the alternative estoppel theory
and do not allege concerted misconduct, we disagree.
{¶24} Further, we conclude that the claims alleged by Appellant fell
within the purview of the arbitration agreement, which covered the purchase
of the vehicle, the financing of the vehicle, the scope and validity of the
arbitration agreement, any alleged promises, representations and/or
warranties made to or relied upon by the parties, as well as any alleged
unfair, deceptive or unconscionable acts or practices. We reach our decision
in part based upon Appellant’s own categorization of Appellees as
“Defendants Suppliers” whose common actions led to the filing of the
underlying lawsuit. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that all
of Appellant’s claims arise out of a single transaction, which was the
purchase of a new vehicle from Herrnstein Chrysler.
{¶25} Thus, we conclude that this is one of those limited situations in
which a nonsignatory may bind a signatory to an arbitration agreement. As
3
Todd Montgomery is not expressly mentioned at all in the complaint, other than in the case caption.
However, it appears from the record he was an employee and/or agent of Herrnstein Chrysler who was
involved in the sale of the vehicle to Appellant. Thus, he would properly be grouped into the “Defendants
Suppliers” category in Appellant’s complaint. Further, Appellant does not object to the trial court’s referral
of claims to arbitration as against Capital One, which was an assignee of Herrnstein Chrysler.
Pike App. No. 12CA827 19
such, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering
a stay and referring the claims to arbitration as against these particular
nonsignatories to the agreement. Accordingly, we find no merit to the
assignments of error raised by Appellant and the decision of the trial is
affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pike App. No. 12CA827 20
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the
Appellees recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Pike County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Abele, J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.