Woody v. Woody

[Cite as Woody v. Woody, 2010-Ohio-6049.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
RICHARD R. WOODY, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 09CA34
:
vs. : Released: December 6, 2010
:
CAROL A. WOODY, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Beth B. Ferrier, Athens, Ohio, for Appellant.
Susan L. Gwinn, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, P.J.:
{¶1} Appellant Richard R. Woody appeals the trial court’s decision
granting the parties a divorce. He first argues that the trial court wrongly
determined that it could not award him personal property that he left in the
former marital residence when, at the final hearing, appellant failed to
specifically request the magistrate to award him these items of property.
Even though appellant, by failing to raise this issue at the final hearing,
waived the issue, the trial court nonetheless possesses an independent duty
to review the magistrate’s decision. Appellant brought this issue to the trial
court’s attention at a time when the trial court could correct any error.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 2
Moreover, the trial court has a duty to enter an order that disposes of all
items of the parties’ property. Accordingly, we agree with appellant that the
trial court erred by concluding that it could not enter any order that would
award appellant these items of property.
{¶2} Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to
award him certain items of property. He observes that the trial court
sustained his objections to the magistrate’s failure to include certain items as
his separate property but then inexplicably neglected to include them in its
property division order. Because the trial court appears to have omitted
these items from its property division order, we remand to the trial court for
clarification.
{¶3} Appellant lastly asserts that the trial court erred by adopting the
magistrate’s spousal support recommendation. The record does not support
any finding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellee
spousal support. The court considered the spousal support statute and
determined that spousal support was appropriate and reasonable.
{¶4} Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s first and second assignments
of error and remand these issues to the trial court. We overrule appellant’s
third assignment of error.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 3
I.
FACTS
{¶5} On March 19, 1994, the parties married. On October 25, 2007,
appellant filed a complaint for divorce against appellee, and appellee
counterclaimed for divorce.
{¶6} On March 10, 2008, appellant filed a motion that requested the
magistrate permit him to retrieve “his personal property, including his farm
equipment and his white tail deer,” from the marital residence. At a June 25,
2008 hearing, appellant’s counsel agreed to reserve his motion regarding the
retrieval of his personal property for the final hearing.
{¶7} At the final hearing, the parties presented a six-page personal
property appraisal that listed property found in the former marital residence,
including items found in the kitchen, living room, family room, main
bedroom, hallway, bathroom, guest bedroom, den, basement, back porch,
canning kitchen, detached garage, and hunting trailer. The appraisal also
listed a value for appellee’s vehicle, a tractor, and various farm machinery.
The parties did not fully agree on how the court should divide the property,
but each presented evidence as to whether a certain item constituted his or
her separate property or whether the property constituted marital property.
At the hearing, appellant did not specifically reiterate his request to retrieve
Athens App. No. 09CA34 4
his personal property as alleged in his March 10, 2008 motion, but some
testimony was presented regarding the deer, and the farm machinery was
included on the personal property appraisal.
{¶8} On March 6, 2009, the magistrate entered a decision. The
magistrate awarded each party his or her separate property. The magistrate
awarded appellant the following items of personal property as his separate
property: (1) an electric light; (2) a shop vac; (3) a metal cabinet; (4) a 15
million candle power road pro light; (5) two metal 24-inch squares; (6) a
Cummins 8-piece air ratchet socket set; (7) two mitre boxes; (8) several
metal and plastic gas cans; (9) a circular saw; (10) plumber kits; (11) a sabre
saw; (12) a hammer drill; (13) a highboy chest; (14) a coat closet; (15) a
wood captain’s chair; (16) a core welder; (17) a welder’s helmet; (18) an air
tool; (19) a chainsaw; and (20) a 12-gauge rifle. The magistrate found that
all property not awarded to appellee or appellant as separate property
constituted marital property. The magistrate directed the parties to equally
divide the marital property by alternating turns choosing $5,000 worth of
property and then selling and equally dividing the remaining property.
{¶9} The magistrate also determined that appellee is entitled to
spousal support. In reaching her decision, the magistrate first considered the
factors specified in R.C. 3105.18 and stated:
Athens App. No. 09CA34 5
“In the present matter, the duration of the parties’
marriage was fourteen years four months. At the time of final
hearing, [appellant] was 54 years old and, after a designated
period of rehabilitation from recent ankle surgery, capable of
working a 3/2 driving position with Wal-Mart with anticipated
gross annual earnings of approximately $58,000.00 [Appellee]
was 64 years old, unemployed (and had been since 1996), and
suffering from multiple medical conditions which, in her
treating physicians’ opinions, significantly impaired her ability
to have gainful employment. [Appellee] testified that at most
she may be able to work a part-time job which, at minimum
wage, may earn her a gross annual income of approximately
$7,800.00. Despite her education, minimum wage may be
[appellee’s] maximum earning ability given that she has not
worked in many years and she has not been employed in the
field of her Master’s Degree since receiving it. Her only actual
source of income was $382.00 per month from Social Security.
The parties had no retirement benefits other than [Appellant’s]
profit sharing plan and 401(k) with Wal-Mart which is a marital
asset and which this Magistrate has recommended dividing
equally but which the parties will not begin receiving for
several years.
In regards to the parties’ relative assets and liabilities,
[Appellant] will receive real property which is unencumbered
and [appellee] will receive a distributive award in the
approximate amount of $33,725.43. In addition, all of the
marital debt has been assigned to [appellant] for which he
receives an offset against the distributive award.
The standard of living that the parties established during
the marriage was fairly modest—they did not live an
extravagant lifestyle by any means. They also did not have any
children of the marriage and neither party has minor children.
It appears from the testimony that [appellant] contributed
to [appellant’s] education in that [appellant] resided with
[appellee’s] family during the week while attending school out
of town. However, this has not increased the earning ability of
[appellee] as her earning ability has been significantly
compromised due to her medical conditions. Along those same
lines it does not appear that additional education and/or training
for [appellee] would be of benefit since that is not what
Athens App. No. 09CA34 6
hampers her earning ability. No amount of education and/or
training makes up for the debilitating medical conditions from
which she suffers and the impact they have on her ability to
work.
Based on the above factors, it is the conclusion of the
Magistrate that an award of some amount of spousal support to
[appellee] is reasonable and appropriate. In determining the
amount and duration, the Ohio Supreme Court’s proposed
guidelines are taken into consideration. Under such guidelines
the average amount and duration of support would be in the
approximate amount of $15,965.60, annually, for a duration of
5.7 years. The ‘low’ end under such guidelines would result in
an approximate annual amount of support of $13,684.80 and a
duration of 5 years. An award at the ‘low’ end of the guidelines
results in decreasing [appellant’s] annual income from
$58,000.00 to $44,316.00 and increasing [appellee’s] annual
income from $12,384.00 (minimum wage, part-time work plus
social security) to $26,068.00. An award of spousal support in
the amount of $13,84.80, annually, or $1,140.40 [monthly], is
the approximate cost of [appellee’s] required medications and
health insurance through COBRA. Also, in reviewing
[appellant’s] list of monthly expenses set forth in [appellant’s]
Exhibit 7 several of these expenses will cease thereby allowing
[appellant] sufficient income to pay a spousal support award in
the amount of $1,140.40
In regards to the tax implication of such an award, both
parties, in 2009, will have a standard deduction of $5,700.00
(assuming neither remarries). [Appellant’s] income of
approximately $44,000.00 will result in him being in the 25%
tax bracket. [Appellee’s] income of approximately $26,068.00
will result in her also being in the 25% tax bracket. Such an
award of spousal support does not change either party’s tax
bracket. In addition, spousal support of $13,684.80 only costs
[appellant] $10,263.60 due to the tax savings.
Regarding the duration of the spousal support award, the
parties, at the time of final hearing, had been married for
fourteen years and four months. Based upon the testimony
there was some marital discord in 2004 that was significant
enough to cause [appellee] to fear that [appellant] would ‘kick
her out of the marital home.’ It is the Magistrate’s
Athens App. No. 09CA34 7
recommendation that spousal support be for a period of 4.7
years, or 1/3 the duration of the marriage.”
{¶10} Appellant subsequently objected to the magistrate’s decision.
Specifically, he objected to the magistrate’s failure to award appellant the
“personal items, records, mementos and clothing” that remain at the marital
residence and that were not listed on the personal property appraisal.
Appellant lists these items as: (1) diploma; (2) pictures; (3) awards; (4)
pocket watch; (5) clothing; (6) kitchen items; (7) personal papers and
records; and (8) any other personal items left at marital home. Appellant
noted that he did not request the magistrate at the final hearing to award
these items to him, but he asserted that the court is required to enter an order
that disposes of all of the parties’ personal property. He thus contended that
the magistrate should have included the items when dividing the parties’
property and that the failure to do so was improper.
{¶11} Appellant also objected to the magistrate’s property division.
He asserted that the magistrate should have awarded him the following items
as his separate property: (1) round glass table top and four cane chairs; (2)
GE tube radio; (3) love seat; (4) glass top coffee table; (5) oval wood picture
frame; (6) hanging macramé; (7) deer head; (8) end tables; (9) round
mahogany table; (10) 3-drawer dresser; (11) waterbed dresser; (12) 4-shelf
bookcase; (13) 3 gallon 1.5 horsepower air compressor; (14) one gallon
Athens App. No. 09CA34 8
plastic sprayer; (15) 2 gallon shop vac; (16) ax; (17) true-temper maul; (18)
air tool; (19) grinder; (20) plastic gas cans; (21) tool box and tools; (22)
fishing tackle box; (23) steel wedges; (24) 6-inch vice; (25) bolt cutters; (26)
damaged old metal tool box and tools; (27) drill; (28) router; (29) men’s
diamond ring; (30) gold pocket watch; (31) target pistol; (32) 16-gauge rifle;
and (33) Winchester rifle.
{¶12} Appellant additionally objected to the magistrate’s spousal
support recommendation. He argued that the magistrate failed to consider
relevant statutory factors and instead improperly relied upon an invalid
mathematical formula.
{¶13} On September 1, 2009, the trial court partially sustained
appellant’s objections. Regarding appellant’s complaint that the magistrate
did not enter an order that would permit him to retrieve items from the
former marital residence, the court stated that appellant did not “file a
motion to retrieve personal property and other items from the residence”
after he was ordered to vacate the marital residence on October 18, 2007.
The court further stated that appellant “mistakenly failed to raise this issue
prior to or at the final hearing. If he had, [appellee] could have approved or
objected. The Court then could have decided [appellant’s] motion.” The
court determined that it could not “now order as [appellant] requests.”
Athens App. No. 09CA34 9
{¶14} The court agreed with appellant’s objection that the
magistrate’s decision failed to award appellant certain items of separate
property as indicated on his Exhibit 18A. The court thus awarded appellant
all of the items he listed in his objections, except the following: (1) 3 gallon
1.5 horsepower air compressor; (2) ax; (3) two plastic one gallon cans; (4)
tool box and tools; (5) 6” vice; (6) ½” drill; (7) men’s diamond ring; (8) gold
pocket watch; (9) target pistol; (10) 16-guage rifle; and (11) Winchester
rifle. Although the court appeared to sustain this particular objection in
total, the court did not provide an explanation as to why it did not award
appellant the above items of property.
{¶15} The court also overruled appellant’s objections regarding
spousal support. The court determined that the magistrate properly applied
the law and the facts in recommending spousal support.
{¶16} The court thus granted the parties a divorce and adopted the
magistrate’s decision with modifications.
II.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Appellant raises the following assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error:
Athens App. No. 09CA34 10
“The trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding it
could not order that appellant be permitted to retrieve personal
belongings from the former marital residence.”
Second Assignment of Error:
“The trial court erred by adopting the magistrate’s decision
which failed to make a determination on appellant’s claims that
certain personal property was separate property either owned by
appellant prior to the marriage or gifted to appellant.”
Third Assignment of Error:
“The trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible
error by approving the magistrate’s utilization of a guideline
calculation not adopted by law for spousal support.”
III.
ANALYSIS
A
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶17} The same basic standard of review governs our disposition of
appellant’s three assignments of error. An appellate court generally reviews
a trial court’s judgment under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
standard.1 We will not reverse a trial court’s judgment in a civil action
1
We recognize that some courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s
judgment that adopts a magistrate’s decision. See In re T.A.F., Medina App. No. 09CA46-M, 2010-Ohio-
3000, at ¶11; Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & Correction, Franklin App. No. 09AP-541, 2010-
Ohio-2774, at ¶15; In re A.B., Cuyahoga App. No. 93693, 2010-Ohio-2227, at ¶12; Howard v. Wilson, 186
Ohio App. 3d 521, 2010-Ohio-1125, 928 N.E.2d 1180, at ¶8; . However, we believe that the proper
standard for reviewing the trial court’s judgment, whether it originates with a magistrate or not, should
ordinarily be reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Applying an abuse of
Athens App. No. 09CA34 11
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court’s
judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence so long as some
competent and credible evidence supports it. See, e.g., C.E. Morris Co. v.
Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578,
syllabus. In determining whether a trial court’s judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must not re-weigh the
evidence. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 79-80,
461 N.E.2d 1273. Under this highly deferential standard of review, we do
not decide whether we would have come to the same conclusion as the trial
court. Amsbary v. Brumfield, 177 Ohio App. 3d 121, 2008-Ohio-3183, 894
N.E.2d 71, at ¶11. Instead, we must uphold the judgment so long as the
record contains “some evidence from which the trier of fact could have
reached its ultimate factual conclusions.” Id., citing Bugg v. Fancher,
Highland App. No. 06CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, at ¶9. Moreover, we
presume the trial court’s findings are correct because the trial court is best
able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections and to use those observations in weighing the credibility of the
discretion standard of review simply because the case originated with a magistrate seems illogical when we
would not apply this same standard of review had the case originated with the trial judge, rather than the
magistrate. Furthermore, we note that it is the trial court’s decision, not the magistrate’s, that an appellate
court reviews. We are thus confounded as to why two different standards should apply when reviewing a
trial court’s judgment depending upon whether it originates with a magistrate or a trial judge. Moreover,
although the previously-cited cases may state that they apply an abuse of discretion standard, a review of
Athens App. No. 09CA34 12
testimony. See, e.g., Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St. 3d at 80; Jones v. Jones,
Athens App. 07CA25, 2008-Ohio-2476, at ¶18. This means that the trier of
fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness who
appears before it. Rogers v. Hill (1998), 124 Ohio App. 3d 468, 470, 706
N.E.2d 438; Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 35, 42,
623 N.E.2d 591. Furthermore, an appellate court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court when the record contains competent,
credible evidence going to all of the essential elements of the case. Seasons
Coal, supra. However, to the extent that the judgment involves a question of
law, we review the question of law independently and without any
deference. See Cooper v. Smith, 155 Ohio App. 3d 218, 2003-Ohio-6083,
800 N.E.2d 372, at ¶10.
{¶18} In contrast to the appellate standard of review, when a trial
court reviews a magistrate’s decision, it must independently review the
magistrate’s decision. Upon review, it may adopt or reject the magistrate’s
decision in whole or in part and with or without modification. See Civ.R.
53(D)(4)(b). The court also may hear a previously-referred matter, take
additional evidence, or return the matter to the magistrate. Id. “In essence,
the rule is based on the principle that a trial court should have a chance to
those cases seems to suggest that they actually review the evidence to see if the evidence supports the
court’s judgment—which is more akin to a manifest weight of the evidence standard.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 13
correct or avoid a mistake before its decision is subject to scrutiny by a
reviewing court.” Barnett v. Barnett, Highland App. No. 04CA13, 2008-
Ohio-3415, at ¶16, quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, Scioto 01 CA2810,
2002-Ohio-4094, at ¶8; see, also, Liming v. Damos, Athens App. No.
08CA34, 2009-Ohio-6490.
{¶19} When a party files timely objections to a magistrate’s decision,
the trial court must independently review the objections to determine
whether the magistrate properly determined the factual issues and
appropriately applied the law. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). Under this de novo
standard of review, the trial court may not merely “rubber stamp” the
magistrate’s decision. Knauer v. Keener (2001), 143 Ohio App. 3d 789, 793,
758 N.E.2d 1234; Roach v. Roach (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 194, 207, 607
N.E.2d 35. “Thus, ‘[t]he trial court should not adopt challenged
[magistrate’s] findings of fact unless the trial court fully agrees with them--
that is, the trial court, in weighing the evidence itself and fully substituting
its judgment for that of the [magistrate], independently reaches the same
conclusion.’” McCarty v. Hayner, Jackson App. No. 08CA8, 2009-Ohio-
4540, at ¶17, quoting DeSantis v. Soller (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 226, 233,
590 N.E.2d 886.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 14
{¶20} With the foregoing principles in mind, we consider appellant’s
three assignments of error.
B
PROPERTY DIVISION
{¶21} Appellant’s first two assignments of error relate to the trial
court’s division of the parties’ property. In his first assignment of error,
appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the
magistrate’s failure to rule on his motion to retrieve his personal belongings
from the former marital residence or to otherwise award the items to him as
part of the property division. Appellant asserts that the trial court
improperly determined that because appellant failed to specifically raise this
issue at the final hearing, then he waived the right to raise the issue before
the trial court when objecting to the magistrate’s decision. Appellant
contends that the trial court’s ruling is contrary to the trial court’s duty to
independently review the magistrate’s decision and is also contrary to the
trial court’s mandatory duty under R.C. 3105.171 to classify all of the
parties’ property as either marital or separate. He basically claims that by
failing to enter any order regarding these items, the trial court failed to enter
a property division order that disposed of all of the parties’ property.
Appellant thus asserts that he is entitled to the following items of his
Athens App. No. 09CA34 15
separate property that are located in the former marital residence: (1)
diploma; (2) pictures; (3) awards; (4) pocket watch; (5) clothing; (6) kitchen
items; and (7) personal papers and records.
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial
court erred by adopting the magistrate’s decision when the magistrate failed
to classify certain personal property as his separate property.
{¶23} A trial court generally possesses a great degree of discretion
when fashioning an equitable property division in a divorce action.
However, the court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the
governing statutes. “A failure to do so amounts to per se abuse of
discretion.”2 Liming, at ¶25.
{¶24} We have stated on several occasions that in a divorce action, a
trial court possesses a mandatory duty to classify property as either marital
or separate. See Knight v. Knight (Apr. 12, 2000), Washington App. No.
99CA27, citing, e.g., Pawlowski v. Pawlowski (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 794,
799, 615 N.E.2d 1071; Goode v. Goode (1991), 70 Ohio App. 3d 125, 132,
590 N.E.2d 439. Once the court classifies the property, it then must award
each spouse his or her separate property. See Peck v. Peck (1994), 96 Ohio
App.3d 731, 734; R.C. 3105.171(B); Knight; Wright v. Wright (Nov. 10,
2
One might also suggest that a trial court’s failure to follow the governing statutes constitutes an error of
law, subject to de novo review, that merits a reversal.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 16
1994), Hocking App. No. 94CA02, overruled on other grounds Liming v.
Liming, Athens App. No. 05CA3, 2005-Ohio-2228. Moreover, the trial
court must make findings under R.C. 3105.171(G) “in sufficient detail to
allow for meaningful appellate review of its decision.” Knight; see, also,
Liming at ¶30.
{¶25} In the case at bar, appellant correctly observes that the trial
court’s divorce decree omits any reference to the separate property items
appellant claims remain in the former marital residence. However, as the
trial court noted, appellant did not present any evidence at the final hearing
regarding the distribution of these items. Due to this failure, the trial court
essentially determined that appellant invited any error regarding the
magistrate’s failure to award him these items and that he could not request
the trial court to award him the property.3
{¶26} The “invited error” doctrine prohibits a party who induces error
in the trial court from taking advantage of the error on appeal. State ex rel.
Fowler v. Smith (1994), 68 Ohio St. 3d 357, 359, 626 N.E.2d 950; Hal Artz
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 20, 502
N.E.2d 590, paragraph one of the syllabus; Woolridge v. Newman (June 8,
3
To the extent appellant claims that the trial court erred by finding that he failed to file a motion to retrieve
property, we observe that appellant’s March 2008 motion to retrieve personal property referenced only the
deer and farm equipment. The parties subsequently included the farm equipment on the personal property
appraisal, and some evidence was presented at the hearing regarding the deer. Thus, it appears that the
Athens App. No. 09CA34 17
2000), Pike App. No. 99CA635. It is a cardinal rule of appellate procedure
that “an appellate court will not consider any error which could have been
brought to the trial court’s attention, and hence avoided or otherwise
corrected.” Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 207, 210,
436 N.E.2d 1001; see, also, State ex rel. V. Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio
St.3d 467, 471, 692 N.E.2d 198. A party waives and may not raise on
appeal any error that arises during the trial court proceedings if that party
fails to bring the error to the court’s attention, by objection or otherwise, at a
time when the trial court could avoid or correct the error. Goldfuss v.
Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099; Stores Realty
Co. v. City of Cleveland Bd. of Bldg. Standards and Bldg. Appeals (1975),
41 Ohio St. 2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629. In the absence of a proper objection,
the party waives all but plain error. State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St. 3d 335, 2001-
Ohio-57, 744 N.E.2d 1163. In the civil context, the plain error doctrine
applies only when an error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St. 3d at 122-
123.
{¶27} Our court has typically held that the invited error doctrine
applies when a party fails to present evidence before a magistrate and then
magistrate considered and ruled upon the property specified in the March 2008 motion. When appellant
objected to the trial court, he objected to items that he did not reference in his March 2008 motion.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 18
files objections to the magistrate’s decision asserting that the magistrate
failed to consider such evidence. We have reasoned that allowing a party to
waive the presentation of evidence before a magistrate “’and, after receiving
an adverse decision from the magistrate, ask to present evidence would
frustrate the orderly administration of justice. See State v.1981 Dodge Ram
Van (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 168, 171, 522 N.E.2d 524, 527.’” Melvin v.
Martin, Lawrence App. No. 05CA44, 2006-Ohio-5473, at ¶12, quoting
Nezhad v. Kilgore (Dec. 18, 1998), Lawrence App. No. 98CA3.
{¶28} In the case at bar, however, appellant’s failure to request the
magistrate to award him the separate property he left at the marital residence
appears to be more of an oversight than an invited error. While we would
ordinarily find that a party who fails to bring a matter to the magistrate’s
attention at the final hearing waives the right to raise the issue on appeal,
under the circumstances present in the case at bar, we do not find that
appellant’s conduct merits application of the invited error doctrine. Once
appellant realized that the magistrate’s decision omitted any reference to the
items, he timely filed an objection that requested the court award him the
separate property he left in the marital residence.
{¶29} Moreover, the trial court has an independent duty to review the
magistrate’s decision, and the trial court’s divorce decree must dispose of all
Athens App. No. 09CA34 19
items of property. In the present case, the trial court’s divorce decree fails to
dispose of the items of property appellant claims constitute his separate
property that he left in the former marital residence. Additionally, it appears
that at least some of the items appellant claims he left at the former marital
residence are of a personal nature which appellee should have no legitimate
interest in keeping. Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s first assignment of
error and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to determine
whether the items constitute marital or separate property and to enter an
appropriate order disposing of these items.4 See Girton v. Girton, Athens
App. No. 08CA30, 2009-Ohio-4458.
{¶30} Appellant’s second assignment of error raises a similar issue.
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court failed
to award him the following items as his separate property: (1) men’s
diamond ring; (2) pocket watch; (3) target pistol; (4) 16-gauge rifle; and (5)
Winchester rifle. Appellant asserts that the trial court sustained his objection
relating to these items, but for some reason, did not specifically mention
these items when issuing its decree.
4
We also point out that to the extent the trial court determined that it had no legal authority to consider
evidence that appellant failed to present to the magistrate, Civ.R. 53 expressly authorizes the court to hear
additional evidence. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) (stating that “[a] court may * * * take additional evidence, or
return a matter to a magistrate”). This rule thus provides the court with discretion as to whether to take
additional evidence or refer a matter to the magistrate. In the case at bar, it is unclear whether the trial
court understood its discretionary abilities under Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b).
Athens App. No. 09CA34 20
{¶31} Our review of the trial court’s entry regarding appellant’s
objections and its divorce decree reveals that the trial court sustained
appellant’s objection to the magistrate’s findings of fact regarding
appellant’s separate property. The court found that the magistrate’s decision
did not dispose of all of the property appellant claimed to be his separate
property. The court stated:
“While all the items in findings of fact 14 & 15 are found
on Plaintiff’s exhibit 18A and Defendant’s exhibit FF, there are
some items listed on these exhibits which are not included in
findings of fact 14 & 15.
The Court finds that some items were not listed in the
correct finding of fact and has made the adjustment in its
orders.”
{¶32} However, the court did not dispose of all of the property
appellant listed on exhibit C, which he submitted as an attachment to his
objections, namely: (1) men’s diamond ring; (2) pocket watch; (3) target
pistol; (4) 16-gauge rifle; and (5) Winchester rifle. It appears that the court
sustained appellant’s objection regarding the magistrate’s failure to include
these items, but the court inexplicably did not dispose of these items in its
order. We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for clarification.
{¶33} Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s second assignment of error.
C
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Athens App. No. 09CA34 21
{¶34} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by adopting the magistrate’s spousal support
calculation. He asserts that the magistrate improperly employed proposed
guidelines that were never adopted and, thus, did not employ the proper
standard when awarding spousal support.
{¶35} “’It is well-settled that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in
awarding spousal support.’” Breedlove v. Breedlove, Washington App. No.
08CA10, 2008-Ohio-4887, at ¶9, quoting White v. White, Gallia App. No.
03CA11, 2003-Ohio-6316, at ¶21, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio
St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83. Trial courts are given “wide latitude in
determining the appropriateness, as well as the amount,” of spousal support.
Bolinger v. Bolinger (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 120, 122, 551 N.E.2d 157. A
court’s decision to award spousal support will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. See Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d
21, 24, 550 N.E.2d 178. Under the abuse of discretion standard of review,
we must affirm the decision of the trial court unless it is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 140. Under this highly deferential standard of review,
we may not simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In re
Jane Doe I (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 135, 137-138, 566 N.E.2d 1181. Rather,
Athens App. No. 09CA34 22
we are limited to determining whether considering the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or
unconscionably. Briganti v. Briganti (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 220, 222, 459
N.E.2d 896, citing Blakemore at 218-20, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
{¶36} R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) provides that, in determining whether
spousal support is “appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the
nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support,” the
court must consider the following factors:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including,
but not limited to, income derived from property divided,
disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised
Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions of the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a
party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of
the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established
during the marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties,
including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the
parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education,
training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not
limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a
professional degree of the other party;
(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is
seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job
Athens App. No. 09CA34 23
experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain
appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or
job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of
spousal support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party
that resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be
relevant and equitable.
See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).
{¶37} When making a spousal support award, a trial court must
consider all statutory factors, and not base its determination upon any one of
those factors taken in isolation. Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St. 3d
93, 518 N.E.2d 1197, paragraph one of the syllabus. While the trial court is
given broad discretion regarding the determination of the appropriateness
and reasonableness of an award of spousal support, it must consider the
statutory factors enumerated above and must indicate the basis for a spousal
support award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine
that the award complies with the law. Kaechele at paragraph two of the
syllabus. But, in the absence of a request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, Kaechele does not require the trial court to list and
comment on each factor. Brown v. Brown, Pike App. No. 02CA689, 2003-
Ohio-304, at ¶10. Kaechele and R.C. 3105.18(C) only require the trial court
to reveal the basis for its award in either its judgment entry or the record.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 24
Id.; see, also, Carman v. Carman (1996), 109 Ohio App. 3d 698, 704, 672
N.E.2d 1093.
{¶38} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s spousal support
recommendation. He asserted that the magistrate failed to consider
appellee’s Medicare eligibility and his ability to pay. The trial court
overruled this objection. The court observed that the magistrate initially
reviewed the proposed guidelines to determine a starting point for the
amount of spousal support. The trial court then observed that appellee
testified that she obtained COBRA coverage for approximately $350 per
month and stated that she attempted to obtain insurance but was advised that
she was not coverable due to a pre-existing condition. Appellee further
testified that she had not determined the impact, if any, her divorce would
have upon her social security benefits. The court summarily determined that
the magistrate’s spousal support recommendation was proper.
{¶39} On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider
(1) appellee’s age (approximately 64 at the time of the hearing), (2) her
eligibility for Medicare and prescription coverage once appellee turned age
65; (3) the costs of appellee’s medications if insurance covered them; and
(4) appellee’s eligibility for survivor social security benefits, upon divorce,
due the death of a former spouse. Based upon our review of the record, we
Athens App. No. 09CA34 25
are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when
ordering appellant to pay appellee spousal support. The record shows that
the court was well-aware of the parties’ relative ages and earning capacities,
of the length of the parties’ marriage (approximately fourteen years), and of
appellee’s health issues. The evidence shows that appellee has little, if any,
job prospects and that appellee has monthly medical expenses that she is
unable to meet based upon her social security income. Based upon these
factors, the trial court was well within its discretion to award spousal support
for 4.7 years. Although the court did not comment on each and every R.C.
3105.18 factor, in the absence of a Civ.R. 52 request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it had no obligation to do so.
{¶40} Furthermore, even if the magistrate improperly relied upon
proposed, but never adopted, spousal support guidelines, the trial court
independently reviewed the magistrate’s decision and nonetheless
determined that it was proper. As we stated above, we find no abuse of
discretion with the trial court’s decision to award spousal support. Both the
magistrate and the trial court considered R.C. 3105.18, and we see no danger
that the court’s decision is based upon an improper application of the law.
{¶41} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART AND THE CAUSE REMANDED.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 26
Kline, J., concurring.
{¶42} I concur in judgment and opinion as to the second and third
assignments of error. But I concur in judgment only as to the first
assignment of error. While I also would sustain the first assignment of error,
I would do so for a different reason.
{¶43} In my view, the trial court’s entry never suggests that the
invited error doctrine was the basis for its refusal to consider the appellant’s
evidence. But we need not resolve that question. Unquestionably, waiver
may apply to prevent appellant from presenting evidence before the trial
court after failing to present any evidence before the magistrate. The civil
rules grant the trial court the discretion to consider evidence not considered
by the magistrate. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) (“A court may hear a previously-
referred matter, take additional evidence, or return a matter to a
magistrate.”); see, also, Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline, 74 Ohio St. 3d
402, 408, 1996-Ohio-174 (“Use of the word ‘may’ in the statute implies that
the decision * * * lies entirely within the trial court’s discretion.”), citing
State ex rel. Hirshler v. Frazier (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 333, 335.
{¶44} Here, the issue presented is whether the trial court was obliged
to hear evidence that a party failed to present to the magistrate. The civil
rules afford a court of common pleas the discretion to decide whether to hear
Athens App. No. 09CA34 27
new evidence or not. Therefore, in the present case, we review the trial
court’s decision on this ground for an abuse of discretion.
{¶45} The trial court’s judgment entry in this case stated: “The
Plaintiff mistakenly failed to raise this issue prior to or at the final hearing.
If he had, the Defendant could have approved or objected. The Court then
could have decided the Plaintiff’s motion. The Court cannot now order as
the Plaintiff requests.” (Emphasis added.) As such, the trial court failed to
appreciate that it had the discretion to consider new evidence. “[T]he failure
to exercise discretion in the mistaken belief it does not exist almost always
amounts to reversible error.” State v. Zukowski, Franklin App. No. 06AP-
46, 2006-Ohio-5299, at ¶9, citing Wolfe v. Wolfe (Nov. 22, 1989), Pickaway
App. No. 88-CA-18.
{¶46} Accordingly, I would sustain the first assignment of error. And
I would instruct the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion
to receive new evidence on remand.
Athens App. No. 09CA34 28
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART AND THE CAUSE REMANDED and that the
Appellee and the Appellant split the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignments of Error II
and III, and Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignment of Error I with
Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.