State v. Bartlett

[Cite as State v. Bartlett, 2014-Ohio-4379.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100769
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DONALD BARTLETT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-13-571194-A and CR-13-576920-A
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Blackmon, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 2, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Mary Catherine O’Neill
Jordan & Sidoti, L.L.P.
50 Public Square
Terminal Tower, Suite 1900
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Glen Ramdhan
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 9th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Donald Bartlett pleaded guilty to escape. That plea
made him a probation violator in two other cases in which he had been placed on
community control. The court imposed concurrent, 18-month sentences on the
community control violations, to be served consecutively to a 10-month sentence on the
escape count. In this appeal, Bartlett claims that the court erred by imposing consecutive
sentences without making the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and that defense
counsel was ineffective for wrongly advising him that he would be not be sentenced for
his community control violations.
I
{¶2} Bartlett first raises issues relating to the court’s order that he serve his
sentences consecutively.
A
{¶3} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits a court to impose consecutive sentences if it
determines that: (1) consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future
crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public;
and (3) one or more of the following three findings are satisfied:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
{¶4} The court made the requisite findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
precisely stating:
Now, the ten months in this case is to run consecutively to the time that was
just imposed, the 18 months in the other two cases, and that is because the
Court finds that the consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public
from future crime and to punish the offender and consecutive sentences are
not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the
danger the offender poses to the public. And the Court finds specifically
the offender in this case, Mr. Bartlett, committed the crime in 576920 when
he was under sanctions, specifically under community control sanctions in
the prior two cases, and also, the offender’s history of criminal conduct
demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
from future crime by the offender.
Tr. 18-19.
{¶5} The court’s findings were completely faithful to the text of R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). The imposition of consecutive sentences is, therefore, not contrary to
law. However, we remand this case to the trial court to put the findings for consecutive
sentences in the sentencing entry, nunc pro tunc, pursuant to State v. Bonnell, Slip
Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3177.
B
{¶6} Bartlett next argues that the record does not support imposing consecutive
sentences. He states that consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of
his offenses. He concedes that he has three convictions for escape, but argues that these
crimes were victimless and not serious enough to warrant the imposition of consecutive
sentences.
{¶7} The trial court has discretion to order consecutive sentences. See State v.
Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99628, 2014-Ohio-202, ¶ 23. As an appellate court,
we cannot reverse a trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences as being an
abuse of discretion; we can only reverse consecutive sentences if we clearly and
convincingly find that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶8} Bartlett has such a lengthy history of failing to abide by the terms of his
community control that we cannot clearly and convincingly find that the court’s findings
are not supported by the record. The court described the following history of Bartlett’s
failure to comply with the terms of community control:
On 7/13/12 the defendant was sentenced in Case No. 558743 to two years
of community control with the following conditions: Supervised by group
D; report weekly for three months and every two weeks thereafter; attend
programming as indicated in the case plan; and the defendant was ordered
to pay a monthly supervision fee of $20 and would be eligible for early
termination request when all conditions were met. He was to submit to
random drug testing. And the conditions and terms of the probation were
subject to modification by the probation officer and approval of the Court.
And he was required to pay court costs.
On August 23rd, 2012, a capias was issued for the defendant due to his
failure to report to the probation department after sentencing.
On September 20th, 2012, the defendant was before the Court for his first
violation hearing and the defendant was found to be in violation, continued
with prior conditions, and ordered to successfully complete an inpatient
treatment program at the Keating Center. And it was on January 7th, 2013,
that Officer Jessica Alverado actually assumed the defendant’s supervision.
The previous officer’s records reflect that the defendant completed
treatment at the Keating Center on 11/26/12, but records indicated that the
previous officer received a phone call from a caseworker at the Keating
Center, specifically on November 27, 2012, stating that the, quote,
defendant had a bad attitude and was contaminating the house, end quote.
On February 1st, 2013, the Court issued a capias due to the defendant
failing to report to probation department since 12/18/12, and the defendant
also failed to report to the Adult Parole Authority as well.
On February 19th, 2013, the defendant was indicted for escape in Case No.
571194.
And on June 19th, 2013, the defendant was before the Court for a second
violation hearing in Case No. 558743 and sentenced in Case No. 571194.
The defendant was continued under supervision in Case No. 558743 and
sentenced to two years of community control with conditions associated
with group D supervision in the second case, 571194.
However, the defendant failed to report to the probation officer after the
violation hearing sentencing on June 19th, 2013, and the Court was then
notified and another capias was issued on July 24th, 2013. And of course
then the defendant was indicted for escape in Case No. 576920 and pled
guilty thereto, and we’re here for sentencing on that as well.
Tr. 4-7.
{¶9} Bartlett’s conduct went well beyond what he rather casually describes as an
“apathy towards reporting to the Adult Parole Authority” — it was contempt for the
seriousness of community control even in the face of the court showing him lenity in past
situations where it could have found him to be a community control violator. On the
record before us, we cannot say that the consecutive sentence ordered was
disproportionate to Bartlett’s admitted history of ignoring the terms of community
control.
II
{¶10} Bartlett next claims that defense counsel told him prior to trial that he would
not be sentenced for his community control violations. He argues that defense counsel
was ineffective for so representing, thus rendering his guilty plea involuntary.
{¶11} We summarily overrule this assignment of error because the record does not
show that defense counsel made any representations regarding whether Bartlett would be
sentenced for his community control violations. Bartlett concedes this point, stating:
“this point of emphasis was not made on the record, before the court, and holds no weight
as to his appeal but it does serve to reinforces [sic] the lack of voluntariness associated
with his plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. It is a fundamental principle of appellate review
that a reviewing court is limited to the record of proceedings at trial. Morgan v. Eads,
104 Ohio St. 3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 13. By Bartlett’s own
admission, defense counsel’s statements are not in the record on appeal, so he cannot
exemplify his claimed error. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶12} Judgment affirmed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded
to the trial court for correction of sentencing entry and execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR