State v. Aldridge

[Cite as State v. Aldridge, 2014-Ohio-4537.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-13-54
v.
ANASARIA ALDRIDGE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRC-13-1745
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 14, 2014
APPEARANCES:
Brian G. Jones for Appellant
Steven E. Chaffin for Appellee
Case No. 9-13-54
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Anasaria Aldridge (“Aldridge”) brings this
appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court in Marion County, Ohio,
denying her motion to suppress and finding her guilty of OVI (operation of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 13, 2013, Aldridge was observed by Trooper Keith Smith
(“Trooper Smith”), operating her vehicle in Marion Township, Ohio. Trooper
Smith noticed that when Aldridge’s vehicle “stopped, it changed lanes
momentarily. It was halfway past the stop bar.” (Mot. Suppress Hr’g Tr. (“Tr.”)
at 55.) Trooper Smith followed the vehicle and observed it as it failed to stop at a
stop sign. (Id.) Trooper Smith initiated a traffic stop as Aldridge was pulling into
a residential parking lot. (Id. at 56, 96.) According to Trooper Smith, Aldridge
pulled into a parking space “without any trouble” and exited the vehicle without
any problems. (Id. at 96, 109.)
{¶3} Upon initial contact with Aldridge’s vehicle, Trooper Smith noticed “a
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle itself.” (Id. at 57.)
There were passengers in the car and Trooper Smith asked Aldridge to exit the
vehicle in order to determine whether the odor of an alcoholic beverage was
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coming from her. (Id. at 58.) Trooper Smith noticed that although Aldridge’s
speech was “relatively normal,” her eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Id. at 58-
59.) He asked Aldridge to exit the vehicle and noticed that Aldridge did not have
any problems exiting the car. (Id. at 60.) Trooper Smith then asked Aldridge to
accompany him to the patrol vehicle, where he again detected an odor of alcoholic
beverage, this time coming from Aldridge herself. (Id. at 61-62.) Aldridge
admitted to consuming “two Bud Lights at home.” (Id. at 62.)
{¶4} Trooper Smith asked Aldridge to perform field sobriety tests,
including the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”), walk and turn, and one leg
stand. After observing Aldridge’s performance on the tests, Trooper Smith “made
a determination to place [Aldridge] under arrest for operating a vehicle under the
influence.” (Id. at 84.) Later, at Multi-County Jail, Trooper Smith asked Aldridge
to provide a breath sample for testing with the BAC DataMaster. (Id. at 85) The
test disclosed that Aldridge had a concentration of alcohol content of .106. (Id. at
88.)
{¶5} Aldridge was charged with two counts of operation of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). (R. at 1.) She was additionally charged with a
failure to stop at a stop sign, in violation of R.C. 4511.43. (Id.) On March 18,
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2013, Aldridge, by her attorney, entered a plea of not guilty, waived her speedy
trial rights, and demanded a trial by a jury. (R. at 5.)
{¶6} After requesting discovery of numerous documents and other items
from the State, Aldridge filed her “Motion to Suppress Evidence, Statements,
Observations, Tests and Test Results,” and requested an oral hearing on the issue.
(R. at 17.) The hearing on the motion took place on August 29, 2013. On
September 17, 2013, the trial court issued its ruling, denying Aldridge’s motion to
suppress. (R. at 49.) Subsequently, on September 18, 2013, Aldridge entered a
plea of no contest to OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and was found
guilty of this charge only. (R. at 4.) The remaining two charges have been
dismissed.
{¶7} Aldridge filed this timely appeal, in which she alleges four
assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I - THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WERE CONDUCTED IN
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARDIZED
TESTING PROCEDURES OF R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND THEREFORE
CONTRARY TO LAW. (TR., PASSIM)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II - THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO
SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF CHEMICAL TESTING THAT
WAS NOT PERFORMED IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE SECTION 3701-53.
(TR., PASSIM)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III - THE TRIAL COURT FAILED
TO APPLY THE BURNSIDE BURDEN-SHIFTING TEST ONCE
THE DEFENDANT SHOWED WITH PARTICULARITY
THROUGH A PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND LIVE
CROSS-EXAMINATION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
PREJUDICED BY THE FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF O.A.C. 3701-53.
(TR., TR., P. 36-43; 136-137.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FINDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS AND PROBABLE CAUSE
TO STOP, DETAIN, AND ARREST THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I SECTIONS TEN AND
FOURTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. (TR., PASSIM)
{¶8} All of the assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decision to
deny Aldridge’s motion to suppress. Therefore, before addressing the assignments
of error we note the applicable standard of review. An appellate review of the trial
court’s decision on a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and
fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8;
State v. Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 51, 735 N.E.2d 953 (3d Dist.). We will
accept the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence because the “evaluation of evidence and the credibility of
witnesses” at the suppression hearing are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Mills,
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992); Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8;
Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d at 51. But we must independently determine, without
deference to the trial court, whether these factual findings satisfy the legal
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standard as a matter of law because “the application of the law to the trial court’s
findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review.” Norman, 136 Ohio
App.3d at 52; Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶9} With this standard in mind, we proceed to review the issues raised by
Aldridge as they pertain to the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Because the questions presented by the assignments of error are interrelated, we
address the issues before addressing the assignments of error, out of order.
1. Trooper Smith’s Justification to Stop and Detain Aldridge
{¶10} Aldridge argues that Trooper Smith had no sufficient basis to stop
and detain her for a suspected traffic violation. “[A] traffic stop is constitutionally
valid if an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Mays, 119
Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7. Trooper Smith observed
that Aldridge violated traffic laws by failing to stop at a stop sign and failing to
stop before a marked stop line. Therefore, Trooper Smith’s act of stopping
Aldridge was justified based on personally witnessing the traffic violations. See
State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 21,
quoting Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus
(“Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic
violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the
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Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); State v. Robinette, 80
Ohio St.3d 234, 239, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997) (holding that stopping the defendant
who was speeding was justified).
{¶11} Aldridge submits that while Trooper Smith observed the alleged
traffic violations, at the time of the stop Aldridge “had already pulled into a
residential parking lot and begun parking.” (App’t Br. at 21.) She further states
that she “had no issues exiting the vehicle.” (Id.) Aldridge argues that in view of
these circumstances, Trooper Smith’s ordering her to sit in the back of the patrol
car and questioning her about that evening’s activities “exceeded the constitutional
scope of the initial stop to issue a minor traffic violation citation.” Id.{¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “the detention of a
stopped driver may continue beyond the normal time frame when additional facts
are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.” Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204,
at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Howard, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-02-002, 2006-
Ohio-5656, ¶ 16. Upon stopping Aldridge, Trooper Smith noticed an odor of
alcoholic beverage emanating from her car and also noticed that Aldridge had
bloodshot and glassy eyes. These additional facts gave rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of operating under the influence. Because of these additional
facts that Trooper Smith learned upon stopping Aldridge, he was justified in
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ordering Aldridge to step out of the car and asking her to sit in the back of the
patrol car.
{¶13} In her brief, Aldridge cites State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 463
N.E.2d 1237 (1984) in support of her argument that the stop exceeded the
constitutionally permissible scope. In Chatton, a police officer stopped the
defendant for a suspected failure to display license plates. Id. at 59. Upon
approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed that a license plate was displayed. Id.
Therefore, “the police officer no longer maintained a reasonable suspicion that
appellee’s vehicle was not properly licensed or registered, to further detain
appellee,” and further detention and search were not reasonable. Id. at 63. This
Ohio Supreme Court case holds that where a police officer’s reasonable suspicion
is dissipated upon an initial stop of a suspect, the officer has no justification to
proceed further with detaining and questioning the suspect.
{¶14} Aldridge seems to imply that her act of proper parking and failure to
display any “issues” exiting the vehicle should have caused Trooper Smith to have
no contact with her. Aldridge’s situation does not mandate a Chatton analysis.
She was being pulled over for traffic violations, which had in fact occurred. The
facts that she “had already pulled into a residential parking lot and begun parking,”
and exited the vehicle without “issues,” do not affect the officer’s justification to
stop her for her traffic violations. Unlike in Chatton, upon approaching her car,
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Trooper Smith did not discover that his suspicions of traffic violations were not
justified.
{¶15} Therefore, Trooper Smith’s actions of stopping and detaining
Aldridge were justified and did not exceed the constitutional scope of a traffic
stop.
2. State’s Failure to Provide the NHTSA Standards
for Field Sobriety Tests
{¶16} This assignment of error challenges the trial court’s refusal to
suppress the results of the three field sobriety tests that Trooper Smith conducted
upon Aldridge. In order for the testimony and evidence of the field sobriety tests
results to be admissible in an OVI prosecution, the tests must be administered “in
substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and
generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were
administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that
were set by the national highway traffic safety administration.” R.C.
4511.19(D)(4)(b); see also State v. Boczar, 113 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-1251,
863 N.E.2d 155, ¶ 28. “[T]he results of the field sobriety tests are not admissible
at trial unless the state shows by clear and convincing evidence that the officer
administered the test in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines.” State v.
Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 11.
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{¶17} Aldridge asserts that the State did not satisfy its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that Trooper Smith substantially complied with the
NHTSA standards for performing field sobriety tests because the State never
explained or provided evidence as to what the NHTSA standards were. Aldridge
alleges that since no NHTSA standards were provided, the trial court could not
have found that the field sobriety tests were conducted in substantial compliance
with those standards and its ruling is therefore, unsupported by the record.
{¶18} We have previously noted that “if no evidence of a reliable field
sobriety testing standard is introduced by the state at the suppression hearing,
either via testimony or through the introduction of the applicable manual, the state
has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating compliance.” State v. Kitzler, 3d
Dist. Wyandot No. 16-11-03, 2011-Ohio-5444, ¶ 13.
It is only logical that in order to prove substantial compliance with a
given standard, there must be at minimum some evidence of the
applicable standard for comparative purposes. Accordingly, where
the suppression motion raises specific challenges to the field sobriety
tests, the state must produce some evidence of the testing standards,
be it through testimony or via introduction of the NHTSA or other
similar manual or both.
Id., quoting State v. Bish, 191 Ohio App.3d 661, 2010-Ohio-6604, 947 N.E.2d
257, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). “Testimony about how the trooper performed the field
sobriety tests presents only half the picture.” Id., quoting Bish, 2010-Ohio-6604,
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at ¶ 28. Without any standards to which to compare the trooper’s procedure, it is
impossible to determine whether those tests are admissible. Id.{¶19} In the instant case, Trooper Smith testified in detail as to the
procedure that he followed in conducting the field sobriety tests upon Aldridge.
(Tr. at 64-94.) This testimony presented half of the picture necessary for a finding
of “substantial compliance with the testing standards * * *.” R.C.
4511.19(D)(4)(b). The second half of the picture required evidence of the testing
standards. Kitzler, 2011-Ohio-5444, at ¶ 13.
{¶20} The State did not offer the NHTSA manual into evidence. Although
“the introduction of the NHTSA manual is [not] a necessary predicate to this
issue,” in order to satisfy the state’s burden, there must be “some evidence of the
testing standards” for comparative purposes. See State v. Ryan, 5th Dist. Licking
No. 02-CA-00095, 2003-Ohio-2803, ¶ 18; Kitzler, 2011-Ohio-5444, at ¶ 13,
quoting Bish, 2010-Ohio-6604, at ¶ 27. Here, Trooper Smith testified about some
of the standards for field sobriety tests, but not about all of them. (See, e.g., Tr. at
73; 75-76.) We note that during his testimony, Trooper Smith admitted that he
was “trained in the administration of the field sobriety tests as set forth in the
manual that is published by The National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration.” (Id. at 62.) He testified that he was familiar with all the
requirements of the NHTSA manual and that he complied with the requirements in
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the manual “in every case.” (Id. at 63.) Toward the conclusion of his testimony
on direct examination, Trooper Smith was asked: “Have you been instructed to
perform these field—standardized field sobriety tests?” He answered “Yes.”
Trooper Smith was then asked “Did you do that this evening, that morning in the
stop?” He again answered “Yes.” (Id. 83-84.)
{¶21} We need not determine whether Trooper Smith’s testimony
established by clear and convincing evidence that the field sobriety testing
substantially complied with accepted testing standards because, irrespective of
whether the field sobriety test results were properly admitted in this case, “ample
evidence exists” to otherwise support Aldridge’s arrest and conviction, as further
discussed below. See Kitzler, 2011-Ohio-5444, at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Matus,
6th Dist. Wood No. WD-06-072, 2008-Ohio-377, ¶ 27 (holding that even “[w]hen
a trial court erroneously fails to suppress the results of field sobriety tests, if ample
evidence exists to support the arrest and conviction, this error is harmless”).
Therefore, any error allegedly committed by the trial court by failing to suppress
the results of field sobriety tests would be harmless.
3. Probable Cause for Arrest
{¶22} Aldridge alleges that her arrest was unconstitutional. If Aldridge’s
arrest was in fact unconstitutional, all evidence derived from the arrest must be
suppressed as illegally obtained. See State v. Flanagan, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.
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03CA11, 2003-Ohio-6512, ¶ 7, citing State v. Daily, 4th Dist. Athens No.
97CA25, 1998 WL 18139, *2 (Jan. 15, 1998), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
{¶23} We begin by recognizing that the arrest at issue was conducted
without a warrant and as such, it required Trooper Smith to have probable cause to
believe that a criminal offense had been committed or was being committed by
Aldridge. See State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d
858, ¶ 66, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43
L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). “In determining whether the police had probable cause to
arrest an individual for [OVI], we must consider whether, at the moment of arrest,
the police had information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts
and circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect
was driving under the influence.” State v. Dillehay, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-12-07,
2013-Ohio-327, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Thompson, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-04-34,
2005-Ohio-2053, ¶ 18; State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427, 732 N.E.2d 952(2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Boczar, 113
Ohio St.3d 148, 863 N.E.2d 155, 2007-Ohio-1251, ¶ 10. We will evaluate the
existence of probable cause in this case under the totality of the circumstances
approach. Id., citing State v. Cromes, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-06-07, 2006-Ohio-
6924, ¶ 38. Under this approach, an arresting officer may “draw on their own
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experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained
person.’ ” Cromes, 2006-Ohio-6924, at ¶ 38, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), and United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
{¶24} Aldridge argues that Trooper Smith lacked probable cause to arrest
her because, due to the unreliability of the field sobriety tests, there was no
sufficient basis for her arrest. We have previously held that factors that may be
taken into account in probable cause determination are not limited to the field
sobriety tests:
While field sobriety tests must be administered in [substantial1]
compliance with standardized procedures, probable cause to arrest
does not necessarily have to be based, in whole or in part, upon a
suspect’s poor performance on one or more of these tests. The
totality of the facts and circumstances can support a finding of
probable cause to arrest even where no field sobriety tests were
administered or where, as here, the test results must be excluded for
lack of strict compliance.
State v. Ferguson, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-01-34, 2002 WL 596115, *3, citing
Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d at 427. Furthermore, even when the test results are
excluded, the testimony about the defendant’s performance during the
1
Although the above quote uses “strict compliance,” later cases clarified that strict compliance is no longer
required and substantial compliance with the testing procedures is sufficient. See State v. Plummer, 22
Ohio St.3d 292, 490 N.E.2d 902 (1986), syllabus.
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administration of the excluded tests is admissible for the purpose of determining
probable cause under the totality of the circumstances approach:
We see no reason to treat an officer’s testimony regarding the
defendant’s performance on a nonscientific field sobriety test any
differently from his testimony addressing other indicia of
intoxication, such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and odor of
alcohol. In all of these cases, the officer is testifying about his
perceptions of the witness, and such testimony helps resolve the
issue of whether the defendant was driving while intoxicated.
Unlike the actual test results, which may be tainted, the officer’s
testimony is based upon his or her firsthand observation of the
defendant’s conduct and appearance.
State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37, 801 N.E.2d 446, ¶¶ 14-15;
State v. Griffin, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-05-118, 2006-Ohio-2399, ¶ 11
(“Regardless of a challenge to field sobriety tests, a police officer may testify
regarding his observations made during administration of the tests.”). Therefore,
Trooper Smith’s observations about Aldridge’s behavior during administering
field sobriety tests are admissible for the purpose of determining whether the trial
court erred when it found that there was probable cause to arrest Aldridge, even if
the test results should have been excluded.
{¶25} Under the totality of the circumstances we cannot conclude that the
trial court erred in its finding that it was reasonable for Trooper Smith to believe
that Aldridge was under the influence of alcohol, based on his experience and
specialized training. At the moment of the arrest, Trooper Smith had reasonably
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trustworthy information indicating that Aldridge had consumed “two Bud Lights”
prior to driving. He noticed Aldridge’s bloodshot and glassy eyes, as well as an
odor of alcoholic beverage coming from her breath. Trooper Smith testified that,
during the instruction phase of the walk and turn test, Aldridge could not maintain
balance with her feet, and that she failed to touch heel to toe on some of the steps,
raised arms to balance herself, and did an incorrect turn when performing the test.
(Tr. at 77.) Trooper Smith further observed that, at one leg stand test, Aldridge
“swayed during the test while balancing, raised her arms more than 6 inches and
put her foot down three times.” (Id. at 82.) Additionally, Aldridge failed to
follow Trooper Smith’s instructions as to the manner of counting when performing
the test. (Id. 82.)
{¶26} All these observations could sufficiently cause a prudent person to
believe that Aldridge was operating a vehicle under the influence. Therefore, the
finding of probable cause was correct and Aldridge’s arrest was not
unconstitutional.
4. Compliance with Breath Testing Procedures
{¶27} Aldridge alleges that the breath test results should have been
suppressed due to noncompliance with Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3701.53. We
have previously set forth the standard for reviewing a challenge to the breath test
analysis in State v. Blair, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-14, 2013-Ohio-646.
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In seeking to suppress the results of a breath analysis test, the
defendant must set forth an adequate basis for the motion. State v.
Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, [636 N.E.2d 319 (1994)]. The
motion must state the “ * * * legal and factual bases with sufficient
particularity to place the prosecutor and court on notice as to the
issues contested.” Id.; Crim.R. 47. Once an adequate basis for the
motion has been established, the prosecution then bears the burden
of proof to demonstrate substantial compliance with the Ohio
Department of Health regulations. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d
216, 220, [524 N.E.2d 889] (1988). If the prosecution demonstrates
substantial compliance, the burden of proof then shifts to the
defendant to overcome the presumption of admissibility and
demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced by anything less than
strict compliance. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, [2003-
Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 24].
The extent of the prosecution’s burden to show substantial
compliance varies with the degree of specificity of the violation
alleged by the defendant. “When a defendant’s motion to suppress
raises only general claims, along with the Ohio Administrative Code
sections, the burden imposed on the state is fairly slight.” State v.
Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 851, [739 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (12th
Dist.2000)]. Specifically, when a motion fails to allege a fact-
specific way in which a violation has occurred, the state need only
offer basic testimony evidencing compliance with the code section.
State v. Bissaillon, 2d Dist. No. 06–CA–130, 2007–Ohio–2349, ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.
{¶28} In the instant case, Aldridge’s motion to suppress listed eight reasons
for why the breath analysis test should have been suppressed, including failure to
properly test and calibrate the BAC DataMaster, which was used for Aldridge’s
breath test. (R. at 17 at 2.) During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State
offered testimony of several officers, who testified that the BAC DataMaster was
operating correctly on the day of Aldridge’s test. (See. E.g., Tr. at 85-86, 126-
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127.) There was testimony that, in accordance with the regulations, proper
instrument checks of the BAC DataMaster were performed on March 10, 2013,
and March 17, 2013, to calibrate the effectiveness of the machine. (Id. at 126-127,
130-131.) The instrument checks disclosed satisfactory target value for the
instrument tests. (Id. at 130-131.) This testimony was sufficient to satisfy the
State’s burden of proving substantial compliance. (See R. at 49 at 2.)
{¶29} To overcome the presumption of admissibility, Aldridge offered
photographs of, what she claimed to be, the simulator used at Multi-County
Correction Center, which depicted water condensation on the simulator jar. (Tr. at
20, 132.) Aldridge argued that the condensation proves noncompliance with the
regulations of the Ohio Administrative Code. The photographs submitted into
evidence were not dated and no evidence was provided to conclude that the water
condensation was present on the simulator jar on the day or days in question. (Id.
at 26-27.) Aldridge offered no testimony or evidence that the condensation would
affect the tests, while Trooper Benjamin Addy (“Trooper Addy”) testified “it still
gonna have the same amount of alcohol and everything in it.” (Id. at 28, 31-32.)
Trooper Marty Ferguson (“Trooper Ferguson”) testified that the amount of
moisture from the condensation would be “minute in nature” and it would not
throw the test out of balance. (Id. at 135-136.) Without any evidence that there
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was water condensation on the simulator jar, which was used in relation to
Aldridge’s breath test, we cannot hold that Aldridge was prejudiced.
{¶30} Aldridge claims prejudice from the fact that Trooper Addy, who
performed the instruments check on the BAC Data Master at issue on March 10,
2013, failed to check the machine’s seals prior to beginning the instruments check,
“even though the operator’s manual requires it.” (Id. at 16.) We have previously
addressed a similar argument and held that
adherence to [breath machine’s operator guide] is not a requirement
for admissibility of the breath test, as the ODH has neither adopted
the operator guide as part of its regulations, nor has it issued a
directive [that follows the manual]. Merely requiring that the
operational manual be kept at the site where breath tests are being
performed does not give rise to an implicit requirement that the
operator must substantially comply with every provision in the
manual.
State v. Isbell, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-08-08, 2008-Ohio-6753, ¶ 22; see also State
v. Browning, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2007-10-118, 2008-Ohio-2905, ¶ 9 (“The
plain language of the ODH regulations does not require strict compliance with the
operator’s manual.”); State v. Stout, 5th Dist. Licking No. 07-CA-51, 2008-Ohio-
2397, ¶ 120 (“We find any other ancillary manuals, including the manufacturer’s
manual, are advisory only and not required unless and until adopted by the Ohio
Department of Health.”). Aldridge does not assert that Ohio Administrative Code
requires compliance with the operator’s manual. Therefore, the State was not
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required to prove that Trooper Addy checked the machine’s seals in order to
satisfy its burden of proving substantial compliance.
{¶31} Aldridge next alleges that Trooper Smith failed to continuously
observe her for twenty minutes prior to administering the test. (Id.) This
challenge is based on the regulation that breath samples “shall be analyzed
according to the operational checklist for the instrument being used.” Ohio
Adm.Code 3701-53-02(D); R.C. 4511.19(D)(1). It has been recognized that one
of the elements on the checklist is “that the person being tested be observed for
twenty minutes before the test to prevent the oral intake of any material.” State v.
Siegel, 138 Ohio App.3d 562, 566-567, 741 N.E.2d 938 (3d Dist. 2000). This
requirement operates “to eliminate the possibility that the test result is a product of
anything other than the subject’s deep lung breath.” State v. McAuley, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 76720, 2000 WL 1038186, *4 (July 27, 2000); accord State v.
Steele, 52 Ohio St.2d 187, 191, 370 N.E.2d 740 (1977); State v. Camden, 7th Dist.
Monroe No. 04 MO 12, 2005-Ohio-2718, ¶ 13, quoting Bolivar v. Dick, 76 Ohio
St.3d 216, 218, 667 N.E.2d 18 (1996).
{¶32} Strict compliance with the twenty-minute observation period is not
required, however, as the courts require substantial compliance. See Bolivar, 76
Ohio St.3d at 218; Camden, 2005-Ohio-2718, at ¶ 14; McAuley, 2000 WL
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Case No. 9-13-54
1038186, at *4; State v. Holly, 135 Ohio App.3d 512, 515, 734 N.E.2d 869 (12th
Dist.1999). Therefore, the State need not demonstrate that
the subject was constantly within [the witnessing officer’s] gaze, but
only that during the relevant period the subject was kept in such a
location or condition or under such circumstances that one may
reasonably infer that his ingestion of any material without the
knowledge of the witness is unlikely or improbable. To overcome
that inference, the accused must show that he or she did, in fact,
ingest some material during the twenty-minute period. The ‘mere
assertion that ingestion was hypothetically possible ought not to
vitiate the observation period foundational fact so as to render the
breathalyzer test results inadmissible.
(Emphasis sic.) Siegel, 138 Ohio App.3d at 569, 741 N.E.2d 938, quoting State v.
Adams, 73 Ohio App.3d 735, 740, 598 N.E.2d 176 (2d Dist.1992), and Steele, 52
Ohio St.2d at 192; see also Isbell, 3d Dist. No. 17-08-08, 2008-Ohio-6753, at ¶ 34.
{¶33} Trooper Smith testified that Aldridge did not ingest anything during
the twenty-minute observation period prior to the breath test. (Tr. at 124.) The
trial court acknowledged Trooper Smith’s testimony admitting that part of the
twenty-minute observation period was when Aldridge was seated behind Trooper
Smith as he drove the car. (R. at 49 at 3.) The trial court further acknowledged
that Trooper Smith did not directly stare at Aldridge when he was filling out
paperwork. (Id.) The trial court viewed the videotape of the booking area, to
which the parties stipulated, and found that “[n]othing on the videotape shows
Defendant place anything in her mouth.” (Id.)
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Case No. 9-13-54
{¶34} Aldridge did not offer any evidence that she had placed anything in
her mouth, as to overcome the inference that “her ingestion of any material
without the knowledge of the witness is unlikely or improbable.” See Siegel, 138
Ohio App.3d at 569. Although Aldridge attempted to argue that she might have
burped or regurgitated during the twenty-minute observation period, she provided
no evidence that actual burp or regurgitation had occurred. Accordingly, her
unsupported allegations are insufficient to invalidate the test result that was
performed in substantial compliance with the Ohio Administrative Code
regulations. See Isbell, 2008-Ohio-6753, at ¶ 36; State v. Booth, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-070184, 2008-Ohio-1274, ¶¶ 14-15.
{¶35} Aldridge’s final argument concerns the trial court’s statement that the
testimony at the suppression hearing should be limited “to issues of admissibility.”
(Tr. at 41.) She argues that following this statement she was denied “the
opportunity to expose the prejudicial effect” of the State’s failure to strictly
comply with requirements of the Ohio Administrative Code. (App’t Br. at 19.)
She particularly alleges that she was unable to cross examine and impeach the
testimony of Trooper Addy and Trooper Ferguson regarding the effects that water
condensation had on her breath test analysis. (App’t Br. at 19-20.)
{¶36} Contrary to Aldridge’s assertions in her brief, the trial court did not
find that her questions regarding calibration and instrument checks on pages 38-39
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Case No. 9-13-54
of the transcript “went to ‘weight rather than admissibility.’ ” (See App’t Br. at
19-20.) The trial court merely noted, “some of the things that you are now getting
into go more to—to weight rather than admissibility. So we’re gonna limit the
testimony to issues of admissibility.” (Tr. at 41.) We note that the trial court gave
Aldridge a lot of “leeway,” overruling multiple objections by the State to her
questioning. (See, e.g., Tr. at 27, 31, 33, 36.) In spite of multiple objections by
the State, Aldridge was not denied the opportunity to question the witnesses on the
challenged issues.
{¶37} Furthermore, as we already held above, there was no evidence that
the condensation was present on the machine’s simulator jar on the days in
question or that it was present when Aldridge’s breath test was conducted.
Therefore, the trial court’s limiting of Aldridge’s questioning on the effect of
water condensation on her breath test is immaterial.
Conclusion
{¶38} Accordingly, based on our discussion in parts 1-3 of this opinion, the
first and fourth assignments of error are overruled. Furthermore, based on our
discussion in part 4 of this opinion, the second and third assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶39} Having reviewed the arguments, the briefs, and the record in this
case, we find no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned and
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argued. The judgment of the Municipal Court in Marion County, Ohio, is
therefore affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, J., concurs.
PRESTON, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
/jlr
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