State ex rel. Edler v. Camplese

[Cite as State ex rel. Edler v. Camplese, 2014-Ohio-4547.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO ex rel. : PER CURIAM OPINION
EMMANUEL ELDER,
:
Relator, CASE NO. 2014-A-0041
:
- vs -
:
HON. JUDGE ALBERT CAMPLESE,
ASHTABULA MUNICIPAL COURT, :
Respondent. :
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petition dismissed.
Emmanuel Elder, pro se, PID# A644-514, Richland Correctional Institution, P.O. Box
8107, 1001 Olivesburg Road, Mansfield, OH 44905 (Relator).
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25
West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Respondent).
PER CURIAM
{¶1} Before this court is relator, Emmanuel Elder’s, Petition for a Writ of
Prohibition. Respondent, Judge Albert Camplese, has not filed a response to the
Petition. For the following reasons, Elder’s Petition is dismissed.
{¶2} On June 27, 2014, Elder filed his Petition for a Writ of Prohibition. In his
Petition, he requests that this court vacate his conviction in Ashtabula Municipal Court,
Case No. 12CRB02035, and “expunge” DNA collected from him as a result of that
conviction. In that case, he entered a plea of no contest and was found guilty of
Unauthorized Use of Property. He argues that Judge Camplese should be prohibited
from exercising authority over him, by enforcing the sentence and fine, since the court
did not have jurisdiction to issue a judgment.
{¶3} Specifically, Elder asserts that the case against him was initiated “without
any sworn affidavit being filed * * * from the true party of interest, i.e., the alleged
victim.” He argues that this alleged failure constituted an invalid complaint, which
deprived the court of jurisdiction.
{¶4} Elder filed a Relator’s Motion to Dismiss Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
on August 1, 2014.1 In it, he again argued that the trial court did not have the authority
to exercise power over him and that his rights were violated.
{¶5} “The conditions which must exist to support the issuance of a writ of
prohibition are: (1) The court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be
unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in
injury for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”
State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 320 N.E.2d 286 (1974), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “[T]he function of a writ of prohibition is very limited; i.e., the sole
purpose of such a writ is to stop an inferior court or judicial officer from engaging in any
action which exceeds the general scope of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Feathers v.
Gansheimer, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0038, 2007-Ohio-2858, ¶ 2. Prohibition
generally “will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy
1. Judge Camplese did not file a response to Elder’s Petition in this action, although he did file one in a
separate case, State ex rel. Elder v. Honorable Judge Albert Camplese, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-A-
0039.
2
in the ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307,
2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 9.
{¶6} Dismissal of an original action is “appropriate if after presuming the truth of
all material factual allegations of [relators’] petition and making all reasonable inferences
in their favor, it appear[s] beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling
them to the requested extraordinary relief.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio
St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. “Sua sponte dismissal without
notice is warranted when a complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot
prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id.{¶7} While writs of prohibition are generally granted to prohibit an action from
occurring, “[w]here there is a total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of
prohibition will be allowed to arrest the continuing effect of an order previously issued by
such court.” State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285 N.E.2d 22(1972), paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin, 64 Ohio
St.3d 245, 248, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992) (where relator asserted that the respondents
“were completely without jurisdiction to act,” the Ohio Supreme Court proceeded to
review the jurisdictional issues, even though respondents had already exercised the
jurisdiction being challenged). When there is a patent lack of jurisdiction for the lower
court to act, the remedy of appeal is “immaterial,” i.e., the relator can maintain an action
in prohibition regardless of his alternative remedy of appeal. State ex rel. Willacy v.
Smith, 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109 (1997). While Elder is not challenging an
act about to be taken by the lower court, we must consider whether the court patently
3
and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction in this case, given that Elder raises challenges
related to its jurisdiction.
{¶8} Elder’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is based on his
contention that there was not a valid affidavit of “the alleged victim” to support the
complaint. Based on the arguments made in the Petition, it does not appear that Elder
is alleging that there is no complaint under Crim.R. 3 or even that no affidavit was filed.
It merely alleged that there was no affidavit filed “from the true party of interest” or the
“alleged victim.” The filing of a complaint, which states the essential facts and is made
under oath, is sufficient to charge a defendant. Crim.R. 3. Elder cites to no case law to
support a conclusion that the lack of an affidavit from the victim invalidates the
complaint.
{¶9} Moreover, it has been held that there is not a patent lack of jurisdiction
when, under R.C. 2901.11 and 2931.03, the statutes vesting authority to courts to hear
criminal cases, the court has been granted jurisdiction. State ex rel. Smith v. Lewis, 5th
Dist. Perry No. 2012-CA-9, 2012-Ohio-4257, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95518, 2011-Ohio-1252, ¶ 13 (“[p]rohibition will not lie, if the court
has basic statutory jurisdiction and an appeal in the ordinary course of law is
available”). See R.C. 2901.11(A)(1) (“[a] person is subject to criminal prosecution and
punishment in this state if * * * [t]he person commits an offense under the laws of this
state”) and R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) (“[t]he municipal court has jurisdiction * * * of the
violation of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of its territory”).
{¶10} To the extent that Elder alleges the complaint itself is defective, which he
only appears to do through citations to law that a complaint must contain sufficient
4
information, such an argument lacks merit. Since there is no dispute that a criminal act
was at issue and the question is whether the complaint properly advised Elder of certain
facts, lacking authority to the contrary, the issue of jurisdiction could properly be
determined on appeal. “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of
jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own
jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”
State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485,
¶ 5; State ex rel. Leatherworks Partnership v. Stuard, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-
0017, 2002-Ohio-6477, ¶ 19 (“if the court or judge generally has subject matter
jurisdiction over the type of case in question and his authority to hear that specific action
will depend on the specific facts before him, the jurisdictional defect is not obvious and
the court/judge should be allowed to decide the jurisdictional issue”).
{¶11} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss, sua sponte, Elder’s Petition for a
Writ of Prohibition.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.,
concur.
5