Morgan v. Salyers

[Cite as Morgan v. Salyers, 2014-Ohio-4554.]
COURT OF APPEALS
KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
KELLY M. MORGAN : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 14CA12
KATHY SALYERS :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Knox County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 12OT10-0542
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 10, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KELLY MORGAN KATHY SALYERS PRO SE
380 South Fifth Street 1450 Whispering Hills Road
Columbus, OH 43215 Loris, SC 29569
[Cite as Morgan v. Salyers, 2014-Ohio-4554.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the April 22, 2014 judgment entry of the Knox County
Court of Common Pleas overruling her Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} In June of 2010, appellant Kathy Salyers filed a pro se complaint in Knox
County Probate Court. In August of 2010, appellant hired appellee Kelly Morgan to
represent her in the pending litigation. After extensive litigation in the Knox County
Probate Court and an appeal to this Court, appellant, on July 27, 2012, prevailed and
received a distribution of her entire interest in the trust that was the subject of the
litigation.
{¶3} On October 31, 2012, appellee filed a complaint against appellant for
breach of contract and failure to pay account. Appellee stated that appellant refused
and failed to pay the balance of attorney fees owed to appellee. The summons and
complaint was sent to appellant via certified mail at 5213 Durham Road, Raleigh, North
Carolina. On December 5, 2012, the summons and complaint were returned to the
Knox County Clerk of Court as “unclaimed” and “unable to forward.” Appellee then filed
a praecipe for service requesting ordinary mail of the complaint and summons to
appellant at the 5213 Durham Road address. A certificate of mailing was filed on
December 10, 2012. The ordinary mail envelope was not returned by the postal
authorities with an endorsement showing failure of delivery.
{¶4} On January 14, 2013, appellee filed a motion for default judgment. On
January 30, 2013, default judgment was entered against appellant for $20,787.00 plus
court costs and interest. Appellant filed a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment,
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 3
stating that the judgment is void due to lack of service on appellant. Appellee filed a
memorandum contra to appellant’s motion on March 10, 2014 and appellant filed a reply
on March 17, 2014. The trial court denied appellant’s motion on April 22, 2014, finding
that appellant did not establish a meritorious defense or that she is entitled to relief
under any one of the grounds stated in Rule 60(B)(1) – (5).
{¶5} Appellant appeals the April 22, 2014 judgment entry of the Knox County
Common Pleas Court and assigns the following as error:
{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-
APPELL[ANT] BY VIOLATING HER RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY
ALLOWING FAULTY SERVICE OF PROCESS TO STAND (SEE CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURNED RECEIPT, DEFENDANT’S 60(B) MOTION AND REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S
MEMORANDUM CONTRA.)
{¶7} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED TO
THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELL[ANT] WHEN IT DID NOT UTILIZE ITS
INHERENT POWER TO VACATE A JUDGMENT THAT WAS VOID AB INITIO.”
I.
{¶8} Appellant first argues the trial court erred in denying her Rule 60(B)
motion. A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the trial court’s
sound discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987). In order
to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court’s decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 4
{¶9} A party seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 60(B) must
show: (1) a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) entitlement to
relief under one of the grounds set forth in Civil Rule 60(B)(1)-(5), and (3) the motion
must be timely filed. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d
146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). A failure to establish any of these three requirements will
cause the motion to be overruled. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17,
520 N.E.2d 564 (1988). Appellant claims she never received notice of the action and
that the default judgment is voidable under Civil Rule 60(B)(5). Upon review of the
record, we find the trial court did not err in determining that appellant did not establish a
meritorious defense. Appellant’s motion for relief made no mention of any specific facts
which would constitute a meritorious defense to the complaint. Accordingly, appellant’s
first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶10} Appellant also argues that the trial court should have vacated the
judgment due to its inherent authority to vacate a judgment void ab initio and thus she
did not need to satisfy the requirements of Civil Rule 60(B). Appellant alleges she made
an uncontradicted sworn statement that she never received service of the complaint and
thus she is entitled to have the judgment against her vacated.
{¶11} A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void
ab initio rather than voidable. State ex rel. Fairfield County CSEA v. Landis, 5th Dist.
Fairfield No. 2002 CA 00014, 2002-Ohio-5432. The authority to vacate a void judgment
is an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68,
518 N.E.2d 941 (1988). A party seeking to vacate a void judgment must file a motion to
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 5
vacate or set aside the same. CompuServe, Inc. v. Trionfo, 91 Ohio App.3d 157, 631
N.E.2d 1120 (10th Dist. 1993).
{¶12} “Courts will presume service to be proper in cases where the civil rules are
followed unless the defendant rebuts the presumption by sufficient evidence.” In re
Estate of Popp, 94 Ohio App.3d 640, 641 N.E.2d 739 (8th Dist. 1994). Pursuant to Civil
Rule 4.1(A), service of process via certified mail is evidenced by a return receipt signed
by any person. In the event that a “certified or express mail envelope is returned
showing that the envelope was unclaimed,” upon a “written request” from the serving
party, “the clerk shall send by ordinary mail a copy of the summons and complaint or
other document to be served” to the defendant’s address in the caption or other address
designed in the written request. Civil Rule 4.6(D). “Service shall be deemed complete
when the fact of mailing is entered of record, provided that the ordinary mail envelope is
not returned by the postal authorities with an endorsement showing failure of delivery.”
Civil Rule 4.6(D). When the mandates of Civil Rule 4.6(D) are followed, a presumption
of proper service is created that can rebutted only with sufficient evidence. State ex rel.
Fairfield County CSEA v. Landis, 5th Dist. No. 2002 CA 00014, 2002-Ohio-5432. In this
case, the record indicates that service was attempted via certified mail but returned
unclaimed. Pursuant to Civil Rule 4.6(D), the clerk of courts next attempted service by
ordinary mail, which was not returned. As such, a rebuttable presumption of valid
service was created.
{¶13} In order to set aside a judgment on the basis of improper service, the trial
court must first consider the facts of the case and determine whether service of process
was perfected. Thomas v. Corrigan, 135 Ohio App.3d 340, 733 N.E.2d 1213 (11th Dist.
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 6
1999). A determination of whether or not service of process was sufficient in a
particular case rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. King v. Enron Capital & Trade
Res. Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-761, 2002-Ohio-1620. The term abuse of
discretion connotes more than a mere error of judgment; it implies that the trial court
acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶14} In her motion for relief from judgment which appellant also styled as an
affidavit, she states that she had no knowledge of this action until she went to the clerk
of courts in South Carolina to inquire about another matter and thus she never received
the summons and complaint which was sent pursuant to Civil Rule 4.6(D). Appellant
avers that appellee knew her address was in South Carolina at the time he filed the
action.
{¶15} However, unlike the cases cited by appellant, her sworn statement was
not uncontradicted and the Civil Rule 4.6(D) presumption of proper service was not
rebutted by sufficient evidence. In an affidavit by appellee that specifically contradicts
some of the essential points in appellant’s affidavit, appellee states that during the
course of his representation of appellant, she periodically reported she was temporarily
staying with relatives and sometimes with a former husband, but she specifically
provided her residence address to him on three occasions, the last being in April of
2012 when she indicated her residence was located at 5213 Durham Road, Raleigh,
North Carolina. Additionally, that there were no further changes to her residence
information. Appellee further stated that between May 1, 2012 and October of 2012, six
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 7
statements for services and statements of appellant’s past due account were mailed to
her at 5213 Durham Road and no statements were returned indicating that the wrong
address was used or the mail was undeliverable. Appellee avers in his affidavit that as
soon as appellant was informed that the settlement in the probate case was completed
and the trustee was instructed to make a final distribution of assets from the trust, she
abruptly cut off all communication with him despite the fact that in the three months
leading up to the conclusion of the settlement she called him on numerous occasions on
his office and cell phone and sent him 78 emails and 199 text messages to him
regarding the details of the settlement. Appellee further avers that once the settlement
was completed appellant refused to accept further phone calls and refused to respond
to text message, emails, and ordinary mail sent by appellee. Accordingly, we find the
trial court did not err in failing to utilize its inherent power to vacate the default judgment.
Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Knox County, Case No. 14CA12 8
{¶16} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.
The April 22, 2014 judgment entry of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Farmer, J., and
Wise, J., concur