M.H. v. J.H.

[Cite as M.H. v. J.H., 2017-Ohio-8679.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
M.H. C.A. No. 16CA0055-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
J.H. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 14DV0107
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: November 27, 2017
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} J.H. appeals from an order of the Medina County Common Pleas Court, Domestic
Relations Division. This Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶2} J.H.’s estranged wife sought and obtained a domestic violence civil protection
order against him. M.H. v. J.H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0031-M, 2015-Ohio-5178, ¶ 2-3.
J.H. appealed, and this Court reversed based on M.H.’s failure to present sufficient evidence that
she reasonably feared imminent serious physical harm as a result of the incident on the date in
question. Id. at ¶ 14, 16. On remand, the trial court vacated the domestic violence civil
protection order.
{¶3} Thereafter, J.H. moved the trial court to seal the record. A magistrate held a
hearing during which J.H.’s attorney presented an argument on his behalf. The magistrate issued
a decision denying the motion to seal. On the second page of that entry, the trial court adopted
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the magistrate’s decision and made it the order of the trial court. J.H. did not object to the
magistrate’s decision.
{¶4} J.H. appeals raising one assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
SEALING OF THE VACATED CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER RECORD.
{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, J.H. argues that this Court’s reversal presented an
“‘unusual and exceptional’” circumstance warranting the sealing of the underlying case. This
Court is unable to reach the merits of this argument at this time.
{¶6} Preliminarily, this Court must examine the nature of the entry appealed in this
matter. The hearing on the motion to seal took place in front of the magistrate. The entry was
signed by the magistrate on the first page and by the judge on the second page. On the first page,
the magistrate stated that the matter was referred to her “pursuant to Civil Rules 53 and 65.1.”
{¶7} Civ.R. 53(D) generally governs when a proceeding is referred to a magistrate, but
Civ.R. 65.1(F) contains additional provisions when a petition for a civil protection order is
referred to a magistrate. In particular, a magistrate’s denial or grant of a protection order is
excepted from the requirements of Civ.R. 53(D)(3). Civ.R. 65.1(F)(2)(b)(ii) and (F)(3)(b).
Although the underlying case in this matter originated with a petition for a civil protection order,
the matter currently on appeal is the denial of a motion to seal the record. Because that decision
is not the denial or grant of a protection order, Civ.R. 53(D)(3) is applicable.
{¶8} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) specifies:
A magistrate’s decision shall be in writing, identified as a magistrate’s decision in
the caption, signed by the magistrate, * * *. A magistrate’s decision shall
indicate conspicuously that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s
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adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party timely
and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
(Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) addresses the filing of objections to a magistrate’s
decision. The rule specifies that the failure to file objections generally results in a forfeiture of
those issues on appeal. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) states: “Except for a claim of plain error, a party
shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion
* * * unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b).”
{¶9} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) uses the mandatory “shall” to impose an obligation on
magistrates to identify their decisions and to notify the parties of the necessity to file objections
in order to avoid forfeiting the parties’ arguments on appeal. “‘The clear import of [Civ.R.
53(D)] is to provide litigants with a meaningful opportunity to register objections to the
[magistrate’s decision] and the failure to provide such an opportunity to object is prejudicial
error.’” (Additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23550, 2007-Ohio-5034, ¶ 13, quoting Ford v. Gooden, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 22764, 2006-Ohio-1907, ¶ 13.
{¶10} The decision in the present matter does not comply with the rule in two ways.
First, it is not identified as a magistrate’s decision in the caption. Second, it does not contain any
notification that the parties must file timely objections in order to preserve issues for appellate
review.
{¶11} The failure to caption a magistrate’s decision as such can cause confusion among
the parties regarding whether they must follow the mandates of Civ.R. 53(D) in order to preserve
issues for appellate review. See Williams v. Ormsby, 9th Dist. Medina No. 09CA0080-M, 2010-
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Ohio-3666, ¶ 12. In the present case, the decision was captioned, “DECISION AND ORDER
ON APPLICATION TO SEAL.” The magistrate signed the decision, but did not indicate in the
caption that it was a “magistrate’s decision.” Adding to the potential for confusion, the caption
lists the trial judge’s name and the second page of the decision contains the trial judge’s
signature.
{¶12} In addition to not being properly captioned, the magistrate’s decision failed to
mention that parties were required to file timely objections under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) to properly
preserve issues for appellate review. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) requires a “conspicuous[]” warning
of the need to file objections pursuant to the rule.
{¶13} While a trial court is permitted to enter a judgment during the fourteen day period
in which a party may file objections to a magistrate’s decision, the parties must still be afforded
the opportunity to file objections. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). In the present case, the trial court
indicated that it had made a “careful and independent analysis of the [m]agistrate’s [d]ecision”
and applied the test set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Schussheim v. Schussheim, 137 Ohio
St.3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529 and Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374 (1981). Nonetheless,
there is no indication that J.H. was ever notified of his obligation under the rule to file objections
or risk forfeiture of his issues on appeal.
{¶14} Consequently, this Court reverses and remands this matter for the magistrate to
prepare a decision that complies with the rule and provides the parties an opportunity to file
objections. See Ulrich, 2007-Ohio-5034, at ¶ 16; Williams, 2010-Ohio-3666, at ¶ 13; A.L. v.
Stephens, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26345, 2014-Ohio-677, ¶ 5. In light of this disposition, J.H.’s
assigned error is premature.
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III.
{¶15} The judgment of the Medina County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations
Division, is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
No costs are taxed in this appeal.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
DAVID V. GEDROCK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
M.H., pro se, Appellee.