In re A.V.

[Cite as In re A.V., 2022-Ohio-4719.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
IN RE: :
A.V., et al. : CASE NOS. CA2022-06-046
CA2022-06-047
: CA2022-06-048
CA2022-06-049
:
OPINION
: 12/28/2022
:
APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
JUVENILE DIVISION
Case Nos. 22 -D000019, 22- D000020, 22-D000021; 22-D000022
Father, pro se.
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten Brandt, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Andrea G. Ostrowski, guardian ad litem.
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the biological father of the four children at issue in this case, A.V.,
E.V., I.V., and O.V., appeals the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division, adjudicating the children as dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). For the
reasons outlined below, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On August 26, 2020, Warren County Children Services ("WCCS") filed a
complaint alleging the four above-named children, who were then between the ages of eight
and 14 years old, were dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) and moved for temporary
custody. An adjudication hearing was held before a juvenile court magistrate on October
21 and 28, 2020. During this hearing, both Father and the children's mother admitted to
using drugs in the time leading up to when WCCS filed its complaint. Father and Mother
claimed, however, that they were no longer using drugs and were now in active recovery.
A WCCS caseworker also testified that the children were doing well in school, that the
children's basic and medical needs were being met, that the children's housing was
appropriate, and that the children had denied any knowledge of their parents' drug use.
{¶ 3} On November 2, 2020, the magistrate issued a decision finding by clear and
convincing evidence that the children were dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) and awarded
temporary custody of the children to WCCS. In so holding, the magistrate noted that both
Father and Mother admitted drug use in the time leading up to when WCCS filed its
complaint. Father filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In support of his objections,
Father argued that the state had failed to show his and Mother's drug use had an adverse
impact on the children that would allow for state intervention under R.C. 2151.04(C). The
juvenile court overruled Father's objections and affirmed and adopted the magistrate's
decision in its entirety. Father subsequently appealed the juvenile court's decision to this
court.
{¶ 4} In a unanimous decision, this court reversed the juvenile court's decision upon
finding the state had failed to prove Father's and Mother's drug use had an adverse impact
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upon the children to warrant state intervention under R.C. 2151.04(C). In re A.V., 12th Dist.
Warren Nos. CA2021-04-030 thru CA2021-04-033, 2021-Ohio-3873. In so holding, this
court stated:
We recognize that a parent's drug use may or can result in
environmental risks to his or her children. However, to warrant
state intervention under R.C. 2151.04(C), a negative
consequence must be shown "to have an adverse impact upon
the child[.] That impact cannot be simply inferred in general, but
must be specifically demonstrated in clear and convincing
manner." In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St.2d [37, 39 (1979)]. Such was
not the case here as the record is devoid of any evidence
demonstrating that Mother's and Father's drug use had an
adverse impact on their children. Without some evidence that
the children's environment has been affected in some negative
way by Mother's and Father's drug use, there is no clear and
convincing evidence of dependency.
Id. at ¶ 28. This court did note, however, that our decision could have been different had
the state established "some other predicate showing dependency" beyond just Father's and
Mother's past drug use. Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 5} On March 8, 2022, WCCS filed a new complaint that again alleged the
children, who were now between the ages of ten and 16 years old, were dependent under
R.C. 2151.04(C) and moved for temporary custody.1 To support its newly filed complaint,
WCCS argued that it was in the children's best interest to remain in foster care given the
ongoing concerns regarding Mother's "protective capacities," extensive history with drugs,
and positive drug screen. WCCS argued this was also because of the "numerous concerns"
regarding Father that had since come to light after it filed its original complaint in the summer
of 2020. For instance, although Father had previously reported that his drug use was only
1. We note that because each of the four children were given different case numbers, WCCS had in actuality
filed four complaints rather than just one. However, for ease of discussion and because the filings are nearly
identical in all four cases, we will treat each of the four children as if they all fell under the same case number
throughout this opinion.
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"social, not in front of the children, that they did not know about it, and it had no impact on
the children," WCCS alleged that it now knew "the children were aware of the parents' drug
use, it occurred more than the few times Father claimed, and one child was engaging in
cutting (self-harming behaviors)."
{¶ 6} WCCS also alleged that the children had "disclosed many troubling situations
that they experienced while living with their parents that negatively affected them." This
included the children reporting to WCCS that "money was a concern" for the family and that
"there were times no food was in the house." WCCS alleged that this was in addition to its
concerns that Father had twice exercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination when "questioned under oath by a probate court" about "how his business
operates" and about "one particular case/claim" brought against him that ultimately resulted
in Father personally paying the victim a sum totaling $40,000.
{¶ 7} WCCS further alleged that it had concerns regarding Father's ongoing and
untreated mental health issues. WCCS noted that these concerns stemmed from Father
having not satisfactorily completed mental health counseling to address his "personality
characteristics." WCCS also noted that Father had not completed a domestic violence
assessment, outpatient substance abuse treatment, or an intensive parenting education
program as recommended following Father's psychological evaluation conducted by CDC
Behavioral Health Services ("CDC").
{¶ 8} WCCS additionally noted that Father had refused to submit to any drug
screens in nearly a year and that Father's parenting time with the children had been
suspended due to his "non-compliance" and "unwillingness" to address these concerns, "all
of which affect the minor child[ren] (and have in the past)."
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{¶ 9} On March 25, 2022, the juvenile court held an emergency shelter care
hearing.2 Neither Father nor Mother appeared at this hearing despite both receiving notice
of the hearing in multiple different forms. This included, in addition to the standard forms of
notice, the juvenile court leaving a voicemail for Father in the voicemail inbox associated
with Father's telephone number and by sending Father an e-mail to Father's e-mail address.
Following this hearing, the juvenile court issued a decision finding it was in the children's
best interest to remain in foster care. In so holding, the magistrate determined that returning
the children to Father's and Mother's custody would be contrary to the children's general
welfare and that continued removal of the children from their parents' care was necessary.
{¶ 10} On May 24, 2022, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing for each of
the four children. During this hearing, Mother stipulated that the children were dependent
under R.C. 2151.04(C). Father, however, did not so stipulate. Father also refused the
juvenile court's request to submit to a drug screen unless he would "get [his] kids back"
immediately thereafter. Father further objected to the hearing going forward claiming it was
"violation of a lot of procedural due process." Despite Father's objection, the hearing
proceeded as scheduled with testimony from three witnesses: CDC psychology assistant
Timothy Brannigan, Sr.; Father, as if on cross-examination; and WCCS caseworker Kyla
New. The following is a summary of the testimony offered by these three witnesses in the
order in that they testified.
2. The emergency shelter care hearing held on March 25, 2022 was, in fact, a rehearing in accordance with
Juv.R. 7(G) given Father's motion filed on March 23, 2022 alleging he had not received notice of the original
March 8, 2022 hearing. Pursuant to Juv.R. 7(G), "[i]f a parent, guardian, or custodian did not receive notice
of the initial hearing and did not appear or waive appearance at the hearing, the court shall rehear the matter
promptly." Juv.R. 7(G) also provides that, "[a]fter a child is placed in shelter care or detention care, any party
and the guardian ad litem of the child may file a motion with the court requesting that the child be released
from detention or shelter care. Upon the filing of the motion, the court shall hold a hearing within seventy-two
hours."
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Brannigan's Testimony
{¶ 11} Brannigan, an expert witness who has been trained to perform psychological,
substance abuse, and mental health evaluations, testified that he received a referral to do
a psychological evaluation of Father. Brannigan testified that as part of that evaluation
process Father signed various releases of information—releases that Father subsequently
rescinded after he received the results of his psychological evaluation—that were generally
kept in a paper file located in CDC's office area. Brannigan testified this paper file would
have also included the original signed copy of Father's psychological evaluation.
{¶ 12} Brannigan testified, however, that he no longer had that paper file because
Father stole the file from CDC's office. Brannigan testified that, based on his review of
CDC's security camera footage, Father did this by reaching through CDC office's
receptionist's area, grabbing the file, turning, and then exiting from the CDC office with the
file in hand. When asked if Father was entitled to take that file from CDC's office, Brannigan
testified, "No, he was not." Brannigan also testified that a police report detailing the theft
had been made.3
{¶ 13} Brannigan testified that although the original signed copy of Father's
psychological evaluation was no longer available, CDC was still able to send an unsigned
copy of that evaluation to WCCS prior to Father rescinding the releases of information that
Father had signed previously. Brannigan was then provided with a document that he
identified as a true and accurate copy of Father's unsigned psychological evaluation that
3. We note that Brannigan later clarified his testimony by noting that Father was entitled to copies of certain
documents contained within that file, but not to the entire physical paper file itself. Brannigan testified that the
decision of what documents a requesting individual is entitled to receive copies of is a decision that is left to
the primary clinician who determines what records are "appropriate to be given."
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CDC had sent to WCCS.4 Without any objection from Father, Brannigan testified about the
findings set forth within Father's psychological evaluation. As part of those findings,
Brannigan testified that Father had exhibited a "limited understanding" of how his use of
drugs, anger issues, and incidents of domestic violence "have led to ongoing concerns and
his functioning," as well as the impact that his conduct may have on the children.
{¶ 14} Brannigan also testified that he had concerns Father may not have been
forthright during the evaluation, that Father appeared to be reluctant to admit most common
shortcomings that most other individuals would freely acknowledge, and that Father may
be suffering from a personality disorder, which if left untreated could result in Father having
"difficulty in all forms of interpersonal relationships." Brannigan further testified that Father
believed he had no difficulty with his anger, which means Father "does not find it a problem."
Brannigan testified this was a concern because "typically when individuals don't believe that
they have a problem, they don't believe that it's an area that needs to be addressed."
{¶ 15} Brannigan additionally testified that standardized testing revealed that Father
was a moderate risk for future abuse or neglect of the children, thereby indicating Father
could benefit from an intensive parenting education program. Brannigan testified that this
was in addition to Father completing a domestic violence assessment, outpatient substance
abuse treatment, mental health counseling, and submitting to random drug screens.
Father's Cross-Examination Testimony
{¶ 16} Father testified that, although he was aware of the recommendations set forth
within his psychological evaluation, he had intentionally not completed an intensive
4. Brannigan was eventually able to retrieve a scanned .pdf copy of the signed version of Father's
psychological evaluation by searching through his old e-mails. Except for the inclusion of a signature and
correction of small typographical errors, the signed and unsigned versions of Father's psychological evaluation
are identical to the diagnostic impressions, the diagnosis provided, and the recommendations made therein.
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parenting education program, domestic violence assessment, outpatient substance abuse
treatment, or mental health counseling. Father also testified that he had not agreed to
submit to any random drug screens requested by WCCS in over a year. Father testified
the same was true as it relates to any random drug screen offered by the juvenile court.
Father testified that this was because of this court's prior decision in In re A.V., 2021-Ohio-
3873 that Father claimed "reversed and vacated everything."
{¶ 17} Father then testified and admitted that the juvenile court had ordered him not
to have any contact with the children, but that he had nonetheless knowingly violated that
order by visiting with the children while the children were with Mother.5 Father additionally
testified and admitted to both calling and text messaging with the children in violation of the
juvenile court's no contact order, claiming that it was "in accordance to [his] liberty of being
a parent." Father also admitted that he had knowingly violated a protection order that
Mother had taken out against him and that he had previously gone to Mother's work
unannounced and, once there, took Mother's car without permission.
{¶ 18} Father further testified that he did not believe the juvenile court had jurisdiction
over him. Explaining why this was, Father testified, "I have not entered into any kind of
contract with this. I've revoked all contracts." Father additionally testified that he had asked
both WCCS and the juvenile court "to kindly disclose to me how I'm under this jurisdiction,
and I haven't gotten an answer, so…"6 Father also testified that "it depends" on whether
5. Father also admitted to contacting A.V. by sending A.V. flowers and more recently to contacting A.V. to
return A.V.'s computer that he had agreed to fix.
6. We note that Father's testimony, as well as several of Father's filings, make claims substantially similar to
those "sovereign citizen" arguments that have been roundly rejected as lacking any merit and patently
frivolous. For a general overview of such arguments, see University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School
of Government, A Quick Guide to Sovereign Citizens (Rev. Nov. 2013),
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he believes the juvenile court's orders should apply to him. Father instead testified that he
would follow the juvenile court's orders only to "an extent" so long as juvenile court's orders
are "not repugnant to the Constitution, yeah."
New's Testimony
{¶ 19} New testified that she had developed a relationship with the children during
the two years she had worked on Father's and Mother's case. New testified that this
relationship had grown to the point where the children were now more open with her and
more willing to share information about what their lives were like when living with Father
and Mother. New testified that this included learning additional information from the children
regarding Father's drug use, anger management, and "overall demeanor with the children,"
as well as with "money issues" that they faced while living with Mother and Father.
{¶ 20} New also explained that although Father was initially permitted to call and text
message with the children, those privileges were later suspended due to Father's
inappropriate conversations with the children. This included Father "sharing information
about the case," which resulted in the children "always be[ing] really upset after the phone
calls." New testified that there were also concerns Father was "trying to control the narrative
through the children" by telling the children what to say. New testified that when confronted
about these issues, Father ceased cooperating with WCCS, refused to submit to any more
random drug screens, and violated the juvenile court's no contact order with the children.
{¶ 21} New further testified that the children had expressed concerns about their
emotional well-being while living with Father and Mother. New testified that this included
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Sov%20citizens%20quick%20guide%20Nov%2013.pd
f (last accessed Dec. 9, 2022).
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one of the children engaging in self-harming behavior while in Father's and Mother's care.
New testified that this also included the children reporting that Father would "get angry
quickly" when dealing with "situations between him and their mom." New testified, however,
that the children are now in therapy and have been engaged in some type of counseling
since they were first placed in foster care. New also testified that, while making it known
that they "definitely" want to maintain a relationship with Mother, the children have not
expressed the same desire as it relates to Father.
{¶ 22} New testified that the children had also expressed "that they do not want to
return home," that they "feel more safe and more comfortable in their foster home at this
time," and that they "would prefer to stay with their foster parents." New testified that this
was because the children knew of Father's and Mother's drug use, had seen drugs and
drug paraphernalia, including needles, in the home, and witnessed "altercations" and
"violence" between their parents. New testified that this was also because the children were
concerned that Father would find a journal they used to document their lives while living
with Father and Mother, a journal the children believed Father would not be happy about if
its contents were ever disclosed to him or Mother.
{¶ 23} New additionally testified that "all the concerns that were at the beginning of
the case are still a concern to [WCCS] because they haven't been addressed." New, in
fact, testified that there were now even more concerns than were present at the beginning
of the case given what had since come to light regarding Father. New also testified that,
from WCCS' perspective, before any visitation time between Father and the children could
resume "it would like him to submit to a drug screen, um, to show that he is currently sober.
And we would like for him to start engaging in his services, um, which are the
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recommendations of the psychological evaluation." Thereafter, when asked whether she
had seen any change in Father's behavior in the preceding two years that would make her
feel comfortable putting the children back with Father, New testified, no, "[n]ot at this time."
The Juvenile Court's Decision and Dependency Adjudication
{¶ 24} On May 27, 2022, the juvenile court issued a decision again finding the
children were dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). In so holding, the juvenile court noted
that Father's psychological evaluation had returned recommendations concerning Father's
substance abuse and anger management issues, Father's relationship troubles with both
Mother and the children, as well as the negative impact that Father's behavior has had, and
continues to have, on the children. The juvenile court also noted that Father had been
recommended to undergo mental health counseling, complete a domestic violence
assessment, attend outpatient substance abuse treatment, submit to random drug screens,
and enroll in an intensive parenting education program. However, rather than following
through with these recommendations, the juvenile court noted that, unfortunately, "Father's
denial of any of these issues led to his decision not to engage in the recommendations for
treatment and additional evaluations made by the CDC."
{¶ 25} In reaching this decision, the juvenile court initially noted:
In turn this left Father unable to recognize a need for treatment
and the need to address issues occurring in the home leaving
the children vulnerable to instances of domestic abuse and illicit
drug use. Additionally, the surmisable inattentive parenting
style of both parents caused the eldest child to assume the role
as the responsible caregiver for her siblings.
{¶ 26} Continuing, the juvenile court noted:
Further, Father has continuously failed to abide by orders from
this Court, in particular, Father's no contact order with the
Children. Father admits to several violations of the no contact
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order in which he would talk with the Children about the case
and coach them on what to say. These contacts would leave
the children upset and confused. The Children have made it
clear that they do not want to live with their Father and fear
returning to his care. The Children also fear they will become
the subject of Father's abuse if he were to ever find out their true
feelings authored in their private journal.
{¶ 27} Concluding, the juvenile court noted:
As summarized above, the condition and environment of the
family home are affecting the children negatively and are
detrimental to what otherwise should be a healthy childhood
development. If these children were returned to Father's home,
his untreated mental health issues, parenting problems,
unrecognized domestic abuse, and untreated drug habit, would
leave [these] children unprotected and vulnerable to harmful
consequences of a pugnacious parent.
{¶ 28} On June 28, 2022, Father filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court's
decision adjudicating the children dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). Father's appeal was
submitted to this court for review on November 16, 2022. Father's appeal now properly
before this court for decision, Father has raised five assignments of error for review.
Father's Status as a Pro Se Litigant
{¶ 29} Prior to addressing Father's five assignments of error, we find it necessary to
note that litigants who appear pro se "are held to the same standard as litigants who are
represented by counsel." Jones v. Nichols, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-02-009, 2012-
Ohio-4344, ¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Leon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 123
Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-4688, ¶ 1. This means that pro se litigants, like Father, are
presumed to have knowledge of the law and correct legal procedures so that he or she
remains subject to the same rules and procedures to which represented litigants are bound.
Fikri v. Best Buy, Inc., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-06-051, 2013-Ohio-4869, ¶ 12. Pro
se litigants are also "not to be accorded greater rights and must accept the results of their
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own mistakes and errors, including those related to correct legal procedure." Cox v.
Zimmerman, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-03-022, 2012-Ohio-226, ¶ 21. This is
because pro se litigants "are expected, as attorneys are, to abide by the relevant rules of
procedure and substantive laws, regardless of their familiarity with the law." Fontain v. H&R
Cincy Props., LLC, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-02-015, 2022-Ohio-1000, ¶ 26.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 30} THE COURT ERRED WHEN THE FACTS PRESENTED CONSTITUTE NO
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT, THE CHILDREN WERE DEPENDENT
PURSUANT TO R.C. §2151.04(C) WHICH CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR. [sic].
{¶ 31} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred by finding
the state presented clear and convincing evidence that the children were dependent under
R.C. 2151.04(C).7 We disagree.
{¶ 32} "The state bears the burden of proof of establishing that a child is abused,
neglected, or dependent." In re L.H., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2018-09-106 and CA2018-
09-109 thru CA2018-09-111, 2019-Ohio-2383, ¶ 20. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.35(A), a
juvenile court's adjudication of a child as abused, neglected, or dependent must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2014-09-
019, 2015-Ohio-2580, ¶ 12. "The Ohio Supreme Court has defined 'clear and convincing
evidence' as '[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of
7. Father also argues within his first assignment of error that the juvenile court erred by granting temporary
custody of the children to WCCS because it was not in the children's best interest. Father's appeal, however,
is taken from the juvenile court's adjudication of the children as dependent, not from a dispositional order
granting temporary custody of the children to WCCS. "[A] consideration of the 'best interests' of the child
should not enter into the initial factual determination of dependency. It becomes a proper focus only when
the emphasis has shifted to a consideration of the statutorily permissible dispositional alternatives." In re
Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 107 (1979).
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fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.'" In re J.B.,
5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2022CA00086 thru 2022CA00088, 2022-Ohio-3895, ¶ 22, quoting In
re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 104 (1986).
{¶ 33} "'Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and
convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts
had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.'" In re C.Y., 12th
Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-11-231 and CA2014-11-236 thru CA2014-11-238, 2015-Ohio-
1343, ¶ 21, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). "An appellate court's
review of a juvenile court's decision finding clear and convincing evidence is limited to
whether there is sufficient, credible evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court's
decision." In re J.Q., 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2020-02-003, 2020-Ohio-4507, ¶ 8.
Therefore, given such limited review, this court will not reverse a juvenile court decision
finding the existence of clear and convincing evidence "unless there is a sufficient conflict
in the evidence presented."8 In re M.W., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-01-011, 2017-Ohio-
7358, ¶ 12.
{¶ 34} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C), a "dependent child" means any child "[w]hose
condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of the child, in
assuming the child’s guardianship[.]" "R.C. 2151.04(C) is to be applied broadly to protect
a child's health, safety, and welfare." In re M.W., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2020-03-018
and CA2020-03-019, 2021-Ohio-1129, ¶ 13. "'The determination that a child is dependent
8. We note that Father claims a plain error analysis applies when reviewing a juvenile court's adjudication of
a child as dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). Father is incorrect. Father is also incorrect in his assertion that
Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(ii) applies to this case. Juv.R 40(D)(3)(b)(ii) requires an objection to a magistrate's decision
be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection. There was no magistrate decision issued in
this case. The decision on appeal was issued by the juvenile court judge.
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requires no showing of fault on the parent's part.'" In re S.W., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-
12-028, 2012-Ohio-3199, ¶ 12, quoting In re Bolser, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA99-02-038
and CA99-03-048, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 260, *10-*11 (Jan. 31, 2000). "Rather, the focus
is on the child's condition or environment and whether the child was without adequate care
or support." In re Y.R., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-09-057, 2021-Ohio-1858, ¶ 46.
{¶ 35} "Thus, dependency under R.C. 2151.04(C) requires 'evidence of conditions
or environmental elements that were adverse to the normal development of the child.'" In
re N.J, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2016-10-086, CA2016-10-090, and CA2016-10-091,
2017-Ohio-7466 ¶ 19, quoting In re E.R., 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0108-M, 2006-Ohio-
4816, ¶ 13. "However, a court may consider a parent's conduct insofar as it forms part of
the child's environment." In re A.P., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-10-425, 2006-Ohio-2717,
¶ 27. "A parent's conduct is significant if it has an adverse impact on the child sufficient to
warrant state intervention." Id., citing In re Ohm, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 05CA1, 2005-Ohio-
3500, ¶ 21, "'That impact cannot be simply inferred in general, but must be specifically
demonstrated in a clear and convincing manner.'" In re A.P., 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2022-01-002, 2022-Ohio-3181, ¶ 13, quoting In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St.2d 37, 39 (1979).
{¶ 36} Father initially argues the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children as
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because "the state failed to prove the substance abuse
issues had an adverse impact on the children to warrant state intervention." However,
although we agree with Father that the state is not warranted in assuming guardianship of
a child based upon a parent's use of an illegal substance or the abuse of a legal substance
without clear and convincing evidence that a parent's drug use has an actual adverse
impact on the child, the facts underlying the juvenile court's decision to adjudicate the
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children as dependent extends well beyond just Father's and Mother's past (and potentially
still present) substance abuse issues. The juvenile court's decision was also predicated
on, among other things, concerns regarding Father's untreated mental health issues,
inattentive parenting style, unrecognized domestic violence, and unresolved anger
management issues. The juvenile court found that returning the children to Father's care
under these circumstances without Father first addressing these issues "would leave [these]
children unprotected and vulnerable to harmful consequences of a pugnacious parent."
There is sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's decision.
Father's claim otherwise lacks merit.
{¶ 37} Father also argues the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children as
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because the testimony and evidence offered by WCCS
caseworker New was "not trustworthy." To support this claim, Father argues New's
testimony conflicts with the "prior evidence" that she offered at the original adjudication
hearing held on October 21 and 28, 2020 and "does not constitute a clear and convincing
evidenced (sic)." However, although couched in slightly different terms, Father's argument
is nothing more than a challenge to the juvenile court's decision finding New's testimony
credible.
{¶ 38} We defer to the juvenile court on issues of credibility, which we will not
second-guess on appeal. In re L.S., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2017-11-157 and CA2017-
11-160, 2018-Ohio-1981, ¶ 29; In re G.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110936, 2022-Ohio-1406,
¶ 25. This is because "much may be evident in the parties' demeanor and attitude that does
not translate well to the record." In re L.C., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-08-086, 2020-
Ohio-4629, ¶ 16, citing Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997). This is
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particularly true in matters involving children. In re P.C., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-20-39 thru
8-20-41 and 8-20-45 thru 8-20-47, 2021-Ohio-1238, ¶ 35.
{¶ 39} Father further argues the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children as
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because much of the testimony elicited from New
constituted inadmissible hearsay that should not have been relied upon by the juvenile court
in issuing its decision. Father, however, objected to New's testimony on hearsay grounds
just once, an objection that the juvenile court sustained. Therefore, by failing to raise a
hearsay objection to more than just that one out-of-court statement, Father has waived all
but plain error to any portion of New's testimony that he did not raise an objection. See
State v. Grimm, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-10-071, 2019-Ohio-2961, ¶ 9 (appellant
waived "all but plain error as to those statements to which he did not object" when arguing
the trial court erred by admitting alleged hearsay statements from a police officer and two
nurses for which appellant objected to only "some" of those challenged statements).
{¶ 40} "Plain error in the civil context is 'extremely rare' and this court must find that
the error involves 'exceptional circumstances' where the error 'rises to the level of
challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.'" In re J.W., 12th Dist.
Butler Nos. CA2017-12-183 and CA2017-12-184, 2018-Ohio-1781, ¶ 13, quoting Goldfuss
v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122 (1997). "The doctrine implicates errors that are
'obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived which, if
permitted, would have a material adverse affect on the character and public confidence in
judicial proceedings.'" In re J.M., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2018-06-124 and CA2018-06-
125, 2019-Ohio-3716, ¶ 14, quoting Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209
(1982). "[W]here a party fails to expressly raise a claim of plain error on appeal, we need
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not consider whether plain error exists." In re A.V., 2021-Ohio-3878 at ¶ 35, citing In re
K.P.R., 197 Ohio App.3d 193, 2011-Ohio-6114, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). Such is the case here.
{¶ 41} Although Father did argue that a plain error analysis applies when reviewing
a juvenile court's adjudication of a child as dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C), Father did
not argue that it was plain error for the juvenile court to admit otherwise inadmissible
hearsay statements that may have been elicited from New in this case. Father is therefore
precluded from raising this issue on appeal. This would hold true even if Father had raised
a plain error argument in either of the two reply briefs he filed in this case. This is because
"[t]he reply brief is merely an opportunity to reply to the brief of the appellee, and is not to
be used by an appellant to raise new assignments of error or new issues for review." See
State v. Leach, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2000-05-033, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 584, *30,
fn. 3 (Feb. 20, 2001); and App.R. 16(C) ("[t]he appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief
of the appellee * * *"). Accordingly, Father has forfeited this issue on appeal.
{¶ 42} Father additionally argues the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because "the children" indicated in a text message that
they wanted to live with Father and would prefer living with Father rather than in a foster
home. However, even if we were to assume the record supported Father's claim that it was
all four of the children who had written this text message, which it does not, where the
children would prefer to live is immaterial to the question of whether there was clear and
convincing evidence that the children were dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). The
children's wishes would only become relevant at disposition when the juvenile court is
tasked with determining which of the six dispositional alternatives enumerated in R.C.
2151.353(A)(1) through (A)(6) would be in the children's best interest. See In re Y.R., 2021-
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Ohio-1858 at ¶ 67; and R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (listing "the child's wishes and concerns" as one
of the factors the juvenile court is to consider when determining the best interest of a child).
To the extent Father claims otherwise, Father's argument lacks merit.
{¶ 43} Father finally argues the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because the copy of his psychological evaluation
admitted into evidence was not the original signed copy. However, as the record indicates,
the only reason the original signed copy was not available was because Father stole that
copy from CDC's office. Father cannot benefit from his own criminal conduct. Any
suggestion Father makes to the contrary lacks merit. So too does Father's claim that his
psychological evaluation has no "legal backing" following the release of this court's decision
in In re A.V., 2021-Ohio-3878. The same holds true as it relates to Father's claim that all
juvenile court's orders made prior to the release of In re A.V. are "null and void," lacking any
legal or "practical effect," and "barred by mootness." Such a claim lacks support in both the
facts and the law. Therefore, because we find no merit to any of the arguments raised by
Father herein, Father's first assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 44} THE COURT ERRED BECAUSE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SERVICE OF
PROCESS GOES TO THE JUVENILE COURT'S JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, AND IT
AFFECTS THE POWER OF THE COURT.
{¶ 45} In his second assignment of error, Father argues the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the children dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) because he was
not properly served with WCCS' complaint filed with the juvenile court on March 8, 2022.
Father also argues it was not proper for the juvenile court to adjudicate the children as
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dependent because he was not properly notified of the juvenile court's emergency shelter
care hearing held on March 25, 2022. The record in this case, however, does not support
Father's claims. The record instead firmly establishes that Father was served with both
WCCS' complaint, as well as notice of the juvenile court's emergency shelter care hearing,
in accordance with the law. The record indicates the juvenile court, in fact, went above and
beyond what the law required to notify Father of the emergency shelter care hearing via
telephone and e-mail prior to that hearing taking place. Therefore, despite Father's claims,
the fact that Father failed to appear at the juvenile court's emergency shelter care hearing
was not the result of any lack of notice from the juvenile court as to when and where that
hearing would take place. Accordingly, finding no merit to any of Father's arguments raised
herein, Father's second assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 46} THE MARCH 8, 2022, COMPLAINT IS NOT VALID, AND THE COURT HAS
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHICH CONSTITUTED A CLEAR AND PLAIN ERROR.
[sic].
{¶ 47} In his third assignment of error, Father argues the juvenile court erred by
failing to hold an adjudicatory hearing no later than 60 days after the date on which WCCS'
complaint as required by R.C. 2151.28(A)(2). However, although we agree with Father's
claim that the adjudicatory hearing in this case was held more than 60 days after the date
on which WCCS' filed its complaint, given the language set forth in R.C. 2151.28(K), "it is
well established that a failure to conduct an adjudicatory hearing within the 60 day time limit
prescribed in R.C. 2151.28(A)(2) does not deprive the juvenile court of the right to enter an
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adjudication."9 In re J.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86276, 2007-Ohio-535, ¶ 26; In re Bailey
D., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-96-363, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1571, *5 (Apr. 17, 1998) ("the
failure to comply with the sixty day time limit for holding an adjudicatory hearing does not
deprive the juvenile court of the right to enter an adjudication"). This holds true even though
WCCS had filed an earlier complaint on November 21, 2021, a complaint that WCCS
subsequently dismissed, that also alleged the children were dependent under R.C.
2151.04(C) based on similar facts to the case at bar. Father's claim otherwise lacks merit.
Therefore, finding no merit to any of Father's arguments raised herein, Father's third
assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 48} THE NOVEMBER 21, 2021, AND MARCH 8, 2022, COMPLAINTS ARE
BARRED DUE TO STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND CONSTITUTE CLEAR AND PLAIN
ERRORS. [sic].
{¶ 49} In his fourth assignment of error, Father makes a confusing argument
seemingly alleging the juvenile court could not adjudicate the children as dependent under
R.C. 2151.04(C) due to a violation of some unknown, unidentified "statute of limitation"
regarding both the complaint WCCS filed with the juvenile on March 8, 2022, as well as the
earlier complaint WCCS filed with the juvenile court on November 21, 2021 and
subsequently dismissed. To support this claim, Father again cites R.C. 2151.28(A)(2) and
the requirement set forth within subsection (A)(2)(b) that mandates a juvenile court hold an
adjudicatory hearing no later than 60 days after the date on which a dependency complaint
9. Pursuant to R.C 2151.28(K), a juvenile court's failure to hold an adjudicatory hearing within the applicable
60-day timeframe prescribed by R.C. 2151.28(A)(2) "does not affect the ability of the court to issue any order
under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of
any order of the court."
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has been filed. However, given our resolution of Father's third assignment of error, Father's
arguments raised within his fourth assignment of error also lack merit. Therefore, finding
no merit to any of the arguments raised by Father herein, Father's fourth assignment of
error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 5:
{¶ 50} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPLYING DUE PROCESS TO
FATHER/APPELLANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND
CONTROL OF HIS CHILDREN AFTER THE 12TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT VACATING THE JUVENILE COURT DECISION AND THEREFORE,
CONSTITUTES A CLEAR AND PLAIN ERROR. [sic].
{¶ 51} In his fifth assignment of error, Father argues he was denied due process
when the children were not immediately returned to his custody after this court issued its
decision in In re A.V., 2021-Ohio-3873. However, upon review, we can find nothing within
In re A.V. that would indicate Father was entitled to have the children immediately returned
to his care and custody upon the release of that opinion. This court's decision in In re A.V.
merely reversed and vacated the juvenile court's decision adjudicating the children
dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) upon finding the record in that case "devoid of any
evidence demonstrating that Mother's and Father's drug use had an adverse impact on their
children, and "[w]ithout some evidence that the children's environment has been affected in
some negative way by Mother's and Father's drug use, there is no clear and convincing
evidence of dependency." Id. at ¶ 28. Therefore, because we find no merit to any of the
arguments raised by Father herein, Father's fifth assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶ 52} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of the arguments
advanced by Father herein in support of any of his assignments of error, Father's five
assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 53} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
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