DocketNumber: No. 22586.
Citation Numbers: 2009 Ohio 420
Judges: DONOVAN, P.J.
Filed Date: 1/30/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} On July 6, 2007, Stape was charged by indictment with two counts of rape *Page 2
(victim under 13 years of age), in violation of R.C. §
{¶ 3} On December 3, 2007, Stape pled guilty to four counts of gross sexual imposition in exchange for the dismissal of both counts of rape, as well as a guarantee of concurrent terms of imprisonment. On January 2, 2008, the trial court sentenced Stape to five years on each of the four counts of gross sexual imposition, to be served concurrently pursuant to the plea agreement with the State. Stape filed a timely appeal with this Court on January 18, 2008.
{¶ 5} "THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS ADVICE TO APPELLANT AT THE PLEA HEARING RENDERED HIS PLEA INVOLUNTARY."
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment, Stape contends that the trial court provided him misleading and erroneous information regarding the length of time he is required to register as a sex offender under a Tier II designation at the plea hearing on December 3, 2007. Specifically, Stape asserts that the trial court misinformed him that he would be required to register as a sex offender for 20 years. As a Tier II offender, Stape is, in fact, required to register for 25 years. Stape argues that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Additionally, Stape asserts that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to request and move forward with a sex offender classification hearing at the time of sentencing.
{¶ 7} Crim. R. 11(C) addresses guilty pleas in felony cases and states in pertinent part: *Page 3
{¶ 8} "(2) In felony cases, a court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty * * * and shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 9} "(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 10} "(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty * * *, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 11} "(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself."
{¶ 12} In the instant appeal, Stape does not argue that the trial court failed to properly apprise him of the constitutional implications of his guilty plea pursuant to Crim. R. 11. Rather, Stape asserts that his guilty plea was rendered unknowing and involuntary by the fact that the trial court supplied him with incorrect information concerning the length of time he would be required to register as a sex offender at the plea hearing. In support of his assertion, Stape directs our attention to the following exchange:
{¶ 13} "The Court: Now, you have to comply with the registration requirement in the *Page 4 statute in — it's a tier two. Again, the tiers are new. They don't come into effect until January 1st. I believe it's for 20 years.
{¶ 14} "The Defendant: Okay.
{¶ 15} "The Court: Yearly. I could be wrong about that. Whatever it is, it's by statute. I don't have any more discretion in that.
{¶ 16} "The Defendant: All right.
{¶ 17} "The Court: So, we can go over that at the time of sentencing, okay. * * *."
{¶ 18} It is undisputed that the trial court was incorrect when it informed Stape that he would have to register as a sex offender for 20 years, when he would, in fact, be required to register for 25 years under a tier two designation. In State v. Cupp, Montgomery App. Nos. 21176, 21348,
{¶ 19} "It is well settled, however, that a trial court need not inform a sex offender of the registration and notification requirements of R.C. Chapter
{¶ 20} The trial court explained to Stape at the plea hearing that it was unsure of the registration period, but that it would have the correct information at the time of sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court provided Stape with the correct registration and notification requirements as required pursuant to his guilty plea to the charged offenses. Thus, Stape received accurate information regarding the registration period for a tier two offender at his sentencing hearing. *Page 6
{¶ 21} As previously stated, a trial court must strictly comply with Crim. R. 11 as it pertains to the waiver of federal constitutional rights. These include the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination.Id. at 243-44. However, substantial compliance with Crim. R. 11(C) is sufficient when waiving non-constitutional rights. State v. Nero (1990),
{¶ 22} A defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. State v, Stewart (1977),
{¶ 23} Stape fails to establish how the trial court's misinformation at the plea hearing regarding the registration term has prejudiced him in any way. Moreover, Stape does not even argue in his merit brief that he would have refused to enter a guilty plea had he been made aware of the 25 year registration at the plea hearing.1 *Page 7
Pursuant to our holding in Cupp, the trial court provided Stape with all of the accurate information regarding his status as a tier two sex offender at the sentencing hearing. Thus, Stape has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the trial court's actions.
{¶ 24} Lastly, Stape argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to request and move forward with a sex offender classification hearing at the time of sentencing. The record reflects that Stape's attorney stated that his client was entitled to a classification hearing prior to being sentenced; however, defense counsel informed the court that he was not prepared to proceed with the hearing at that time. The court directed defense counsel to file a motion for a classification hearing after the sentencing hearing, and it would consider the motion. The record reveals that defense counsel never filed the motion for a classification hearing.
{¶ 25} "When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is usually employed. First, there must be a determination as to whether there has been a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate from the question of whether defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness."State v. Bradley (1989),
{¶ 26} The above standard contains essentially the same requirements as the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court inStrickland v. Washington (1984),
{¶ 27} For a defendant to demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Bradley, supra, at 143. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, supra, at 694.
{¶ 28} Given the strong presumption that counsel's performance constituted reasonable assistance, Stape's counsel was not required to perform a futile act. State v. Lodge, Greene App. No. 2004 CA 43,
{¶ 29} Stape's sole assignment of error is overruled.
WOLFF, J. and GRADY, J., concur. Copies mailed to:
Copies mailed to:
Johnna M. Shia Michael L. Wright Hon. Barbara P. Gorman
"The Court: And I believe they just changed the sexual predator law as far as reporting. This doesn't say which one he would be.
"The State: He would be a tier two, Your Honor, 25-year registration requirement.
*Page 1"Defense Counsel: And that's what I informed him of, Your Honor."