Sherman v. Sherman

[Cite as Sherman v. Sherman, 2013-Ohio-3501.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
JACK SHERMAN, JR., : APPEAL NO. C-120691
TRIAL NO. DR-1101969
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
SCARLETT A. SHERMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 14, 2013
Buechner Haffer Meyers & Koenig Co., LPA, Gloria S. Haffer and Robert J. Meyers,
for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Cohen Todd Kite & Stanford, LLC, and Jeffrey Rollman, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FISCHER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Scarlett Sherman appeals from the decree of
divorce entered by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, terminating her marriage to plaintiff-appellee Jack Sherman, awarding
Scarlett spousal support and dividing the parties’ assets and debts. Because we
determine that her five assignments of error lack merit, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
History of the Parties
{¶2} The parties married on March 1, 2004; however, their romantic
relationship preceded that date. According to Scarlett, she and Jack were engaged to
be married twice—once in 1982 and once in 1988. With regard to the 1982
engagement, Scarlett and Jack lived together during that period of time, but Jack
ended their relationship abruptly. The two reunited in 1988 while Jack was running
for a judgeship on the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, and they became
engaged again. Scarlett spent a great deal of time assisting Jack in his election
efforts, including attending parades and campaign events. Although Jack lost the
election, he was appointed to a federal magistrate position, and Scarlett assisted the
FBI in its investigation of Jack in connection with that appointment. Scarlett claims
that Jack abruptly ended their relationship again after his appointment. Jack did not
have the same recollection of their past. He downplayed the seriousness of their
romantic involvement, and he denied that they were ever formally engaged at either
time.
{¶3} After 16 years without communicating, Jack contacted Scarlett “out of
the blue.” He had recently retired from the federal judiciary, and he wanted to
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rekindle their romance. The two married shortly thereafter. The parties had no
children and enjoyed a nice standard of living, which included three vacations per
year, and theater and symphony tickets. Scarlett worked part-time for LensCrafters
when she married Jack, but she retired early in 2009 at Jack’s request so that she
could be home in the evenings and on weekends and so they could travel more.
{¶4} In July 2011, Jack asked Scarlett to lunch, and when they finished
eating, he handed her a type-written letter stating that he wanted a divorce. Jack’s
request for a divorce came as a surprise to Scarlett. The parties remained together in
the marital household for several days, until an incident occurred that frightened
Jack, and he left the home. Eventually, a domestic violence order was issued, at
which point Scarlett moved to Charlottesville, Virginia, to live with her sister.
The Divorce Action
{¶5} Jack filed a complaint for divorce in September 2011. At the time of
trial on the merits of the divorce action, Jack was 74 years old and Scarlett was 58
years old. Jack testified at length regarding his assets. He testified that he had
approximately $480,000 in assets when he married Scarlett. Part of that included
an IRA funded with money that he had earned from working prior to the marriage,
and he had not added to the IRA since the marriage. The other assets were held at
various credit unions and banks. All of the funds that had been deposited into those
accounts, and which remained in the accounts at the time of trial, were derived from
Jack’s premarital employment, his retirement benefits, or a certificate of deposit that
he had inherited upon his parents’ deaths. At all times during the marriage, Jack
and Scarlett had kept separate accounts and did not comingle funds.
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{¶6} As to Jack’s debt, he testified that he had bought a condominium after
he and Scarlett had separated. He had withdrawn $200,000 from his savings
account to buy the property and had borrowed $20,000 to fund the balance of the
purchase price. Jack also owed close to $51,000 on a boat that he had purchased
prior to the marriage.
{¶7} At the time of trial, Jack also received approximately $200,000 per
year in retirement benefits. This included his pensions from the Judicial Retirees
System, the Ohio Public Employee Retirement System, and TIAA-CREF, as well as
Social Security benefits.
{¶8} Jack also testified that Scarlett had defaced 200 pieces of his personal
memorabilia, including books, photographs, and newspaper clippings, by writing
hateful comments on them with black marker. Jack testified that he would like to
restore at least 100 of the items, and he presented the testimony of Jennifer Burt
from Wiebold Studio, which specializes in antique restoration. Burt testified that
Jack had brought a box full of the damaged personal items to the studio and that
some of the items could not be restored. Some of the others could be restored, but at
a minimum cost of $250 per item. Burt was unable to recall specifically which items
she had seen, except for a photograph of John Glenn.
{¶9} Scarlett filed a counterclaim and also requested spousal support.
Scarlett testified that she had not been working since she had left LensCrafters in
2009, and that she was no longer able to work. She testified that she had a
neurological degenerative disease that had preceded the marriage, and that she had
been seeing a psychologist for depression and had been taking sleeping pills. She
testified that she was looking for an apartment in Charlottesville, and that she would
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expect that to cost her $1,500 per month. As to her assets, she had approximately
$28,500 in two separate accounts. Upon reaching age 65, she would receive a
pension as a result of her six-year employment with U.S. Shoe. The only debt that
Scarlett had was a credit-card account, which she acknowledged was her separate
obligation.
The Trial Court’s Decision
{¶10} The magistrate found that the funds in each party’s accounts were to
remain separate and that neither party had any interest in the other’s retirement
benefits. The magistrate also found that spousal support for Scarlett was necessary
because of the disparity in the parties’ income flow. In determining spousal support,
the magistrate found that the parties’ marriage was one of relatively short duration,
from March 1, 2004, the ceremonial marriage date, until March 5, 2012, the day of
trial. The magistrate then awarded spousal support in the amount of $5,000 per
month for 30 consecutive months beginning in May 2012. However, the magistrate
offset $25,000 from the total spousal-support award, prorated at $833.33 per
month, to reimburse Jack for the cost to repair his damaged memorabilia. The
magistrate also awarded Scarlett $50 per month from Jack’s Judicial Retirement
System for the rest of Jack’s natural life, so that Scarlett would remain eligible for
health insurance.
{¶11} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial
court sustained one of Jack’s objections regarding the purchase date of his boat,
which had no bearing on the division of property or spousal support. The remainder
of the objections were overruled, and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s
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decision as modified. The trial court then entered a final decree of divorce, from
which Scarlett now appeals.
Spousal Support
{¶12} In her first assignment of error, Scarlett argues that the trial court
erred in determining the duration of the marriage for purposes of spousal support.
R.C. 3105.171(A)(2) provides that the duration of a marriage is from the date of the
marriage through the date of the final hearing in the divorce action, unless the court
determines that these dates would be inequitable. Generally, a trial court’s
determination as to the duration of marriage under R.C. 3105.171(A)(2) is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Lemarr v. Lemarr, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100706,
2011-Ohio-3682, ¶ 4. An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶13} Scarlett argues that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting the
parties’ ceremonial marriage date as the beginning date of the marriage because the
trial court should have given “some consideration” to the long history of the parties,
which spanned 31 years. In support of her argument, Scarlett relies on Abernathy v.
Abernathy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80406, 2002-Ohio-4193, for the proposition that
a trial court may use a de facto commencement date prior to the actual marriage
date, even if the parties were married to other people at the time of the de facto
commencement. In Abernathy, the trial court selected 1977 as the parties’ de facto
marriage date, even though they had not actually married until 1983. In that case,
however, the parties started living together in 1977, they purchased a home in 1980
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jointly as husband and wife, they maintained a joint bank account in 1980, and they
filed a joint federal tax return for 1979 as husband and wife. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶14} Unlike in Abernathy where the parties held themselves out as husband
and wife for six years prior to their actual marriage, Scarlett and Jack had “little to no
contact” for 16 years prior to their marriage. Moreover, their testimony conflicted on
the seriousness of their prior relationship. Therefore, the trial court in this case did
not abuse its discretion in selecting the parties’ ceremonial marriage date as the
beginning date of the marriage, as provided by R.C. 3105.171(A)(2). We overrule
Scarlett’s first assignment of error.
{¶15} In her second assignment of error, Scarlett argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding her spousal support for 30 months, as opposed to
seven years. R.C. 3105.18(B) provides that the court may award reasonable spousal
support to either party upon request. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) then sets forth the factors
that the trial court must consider in making a spousal-support determination,
including, but not limited to, the parties’ income, earning abilities, ages and
conditions, retirement benefits, duration of the marriage, marital standard of living,
and assets and liabilities. The trial court has broad discretion in determining an
award of spousal support under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Zerbe v. Zerbe, 1st Dist.
Hamilton Nos. C-040035 and C-040036, 2005-Ohio-1180, ¶ 26, citing Kunkle v.
Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990).
{¶16} The record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the
relevant factors. Most notably, the trial court found in Scarlett’s favor that the
parties had a huge disparity in incomes, and that Scarlett had retired in 2009 at
Jack’s urging. The trial court also determined that the parties had enjoyed an upper
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class standard of living while married. However, the trial court also found that
Scarlett had failed to present any expert medical testimony to substantiate her own
testimony that she was no longer able to work at age 58, and that Scarlett had failed
to contribute to Jack’s income-earning abilities. We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in setting the award of support for 30 months instead of seven
years for an eight-year marriage. We overrule Scarlett’s second assignment of error.
Retirement Income as Separate Property
{¶17} In her third assignment of error, Scarlett argues that the trial court
erred in determining that Jack’s retirement income was his separate property. A trial
court must divide marital property equitably between the spouses. R.C. 3105.171(B).
Marital property is defined, in part, as “all income and appreciation on separate
property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either or both of the
spouses that occurred during the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii). Similarly,
separate property means “[p]assive income and appreciation acquired from separate
property by one spouse during the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii). Thus, “[i]f
the evidence indicates that the appreciation of the separate property is not due to the
input of [one spouse’s] labor, money, or in-kind contributions, the increase in the
value * * * is passive appreciation and remains separate property.” Middendorf v.
Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 401, 696 N.E.2d 575 (1998). We review a trial
court’s division of property for an abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 1st Dist.
Hamilton Nos. C-010282 and C-010292, 2002-Ohio-6247, ¶ 12.
{¶18} Scarlett does not dispute that Jack’s retirement assets were acquired
prior to the marriage, and that any income earned during the marriage was passive
income or appreciation acquired from those assets. Nor does she argue that any
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labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution occurred during the marriage. Instead,
Scarlett argues that the trial court should have considered Jack’s retirement income
as marital property despite the statute because it was Jack’s only source of income
during the marriage and because Scarlett’s income from LensCrafters was marital.
Alternatively, Scarlett argues that the trial court should have made an equitable
distributive award of Jack’s property under R.C. 3105.171(A)(1) or (E)(2).
{¶19} The trial court followed the plain language of the statute in
determining that Jack’s retirement income was separate property, but the trial court
awarded Scarlett all of her assets from her job with LensCrafters, even though some
of those assets were marital property. Moreover, the trial court considered the
parties’ income disparity when calculating Scarlett’s spousal support. Therefore, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the parties’ property.
We overrule Scarlett’s third assignment of error.
Offsetting the Cost of Damaged Property
{¶20} In her fourth assignment of error, Scarlett argues that the trial court
erred by offsetting the cost of restoring of Jack’s memorabilia against her spousal-
support award. Scarlett does not challenge the trial court’s ability to offset the
award, but instead, Scarlett argues that Jack failed to present sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could have valued the damaged memorabilia at $25,000.
Scarlett contends that because Burt did not actually value each item for restoration,
the valuation was speculative.
{¶21} A party moving for damages in a divorce case has the burden of
proving those damages, and a court cannot speculate as to damages. Witmer-Lewis
v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23262, 2007-Ohio-240, ¶ 35. This court will not
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reverse a trial court’s valuation of property if it is based on some competent, credible
evidence. See Hoskins v. Hoskins, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120130 and C-120213,
2013-Ohio-1126, ¶ 3.
{¶22} Burt testified that Jack brought a box full of damaged personal items
to the restoration studio, and that some of those items could not be restored,
although some could. She testified that a conservative estimate to repair an item was
$250. Jack then testified that Scarlett had damaged 200 items, and that he wanted
to repair at least 100 of those items. On this record, we determine that sufficient
competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination as to
the cost of restoration. We overrule Scarlett’s fourth assignment of error.
Judicial Notice of Civil Protection Order
{¶23} In Scarlett’s fifth assignment of error, she argues that the trial court
erred in taking judicial notice of the civil protection order entered against her in
another case. The magistrate found that, on September 23, 2011, Jack had returned
to the marital home to get some of his belongings and that Scarlett had threatened to
kill him while brandishing a knife. The magistrate then found that this incident had
led to a civil protection order against Scarlett.
{¶24} The civil protection order was not issued in conjunction with this case,
nor was it admitted into evidence. Thus, it appears that the magistrate took judicial
notice of the proceedings in another case, which he or she is not permitted to do.
See, e.g., Helfrich v. Madison, 5th Dist. Licking No. 11 CA 26, 2012-Ohio-551, ¶ 41.
Nevertheless, we determine that the error did not affect Scarlett’s substantial rights.
See Civ.R. 61. Multiple references were made on the record with regard to a
domestic-violence case and to a civil protection order issued against Scarlett. The
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record belies any assertion that the trial court was affected by the civil protection
order when dividing property or calculating spousal support. Therefore, we overrule
Scarlett’s fifth assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶25} Because we overrule Scarlett’s assignments of error, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DINKELACKER, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
ROBIN PIPER, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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