Mohat v. Horvath

[Cite as Mohat v. Horvath, 2013-Ohio-4290.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
WILLIAM MOHAT, ON HIS OWN : OPINION
BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE
ESTATE OF ERIC MOHAT, et al., :
Plaintiffs-Appellees, :
CASE NO. 2013-L-009
- vs - :
THOMAS M. HORVATH, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES. :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12CV001481.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Kenneth D. Myers, 6100 Oak Tree Boulevard, #200, Cleveland, OH 44131 (For
Plaintiffs-Appellees).
David Kane Smith, Lindsay Ferg Gingo, and Krista K. Kleim, Britton, Smith, Peters &
Kalail Co., L.P.A., 3 Summit Park Drive, Suite 400, Cleveland, OH 44131 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Thomas M. Horvath, appeals the judgment of the Lake County
Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to dismiss the complaint of appellees,
William Mohat and Janis Mohat. The Mohats’ complaint asserted claims for damages
resulting from their minor son, E.M.’s, commission of suicide as a result of the failure of
Horvath, E.M.’s high school teacher, to protect E.M. from bullying and harassment in
Horvath’s class by other students. At issue is whether the complaint stated claims on
which relief could be granted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} The following statement of facts is based on the allegations in the Mohats’
complaint. They alleged that E.M. was 17 years old and a student at Mentor High
School in 2007, when he committed suicide. For several months before E.M.’s death,
he was constantly bullied and harassed by several other students. They engaged in
unrelenting name-calling, teasing, and verbal harassment. They called E.M. vile and
degrading names that were sexual in nature, such as “fag,” “queer,” and “homo.” These
students also repeatedly pushed, shoved, and hit E.M.
{¶3} The Mohats alleged that Horvath knew about this bullying and harassment
directed against E.M. because most of it took place in Horvath’s classroom during class
and also because E.M. complained to Horvath about it.
{¶4} The complaint alleged that on the day E.M. committed suicide, another
student taunted E.M., telling him in front of other students and also in front of Horvath,
“Why don’t you go home and shoot yourself? No one would miss you.”
{¶5} Further, the complaint alleged that, prior to E.M.’s suicide, Horvath knew
or should have known that another student at the high school had committed suicide as
a result of bullying.
{¶6} The Mohats alleged that, despite Horvath’s knowledge that E.M. was
being regularly bullied and harassed, Horvath did nothing to stop it. He never
intervened and never reported the bullying to school officials. The Mohats alleged that
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Horvath repeatedly failed to take any action over a period of time and that, due to his
inaction, E.M. became so depressed that he committed suicide on March 27, 2007.
{¶7} The Mohats alleged that Horvath’s conduct constituted negligence and/or
gross negligence (Count I) and that his conduct was committed with malice, in bad faith,
and was wanton and reckless (Count II). As a result, they suffered and continue to
suffer extreme emotional distress and loss of the companionship of their son for which
they prayed for an unspecified amount of damages.
{¶8} The Mohats filed the complaint on their own behalf and also on behalf of
their son’s estate. The complaint constituted a timely re-filing of a prior action they had
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, as Mohat v.
Mentor Exempted Village School District, et al., Case No. 1:09 CV 688. The district
court dismissed the claims filed by the Mohats on behalf of their son’s estate with
prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations. The district court also dismissed the
federal claims asserted by the Mohats on their own behalf. However, declining to
maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the Mohats’ state law claims filed on their own
behalf, which were the same as the claims they asserted against Horvath in the instant
action, the district court dismissed the Mohats’ state law claims without prejudice.
{¶9} Returning to the procedural history of the instant case, Horvath
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. He argued that the Mohats’ claims filed on
behalf of E.M.’s estate were time-barred and that, as to the claims filed on behalf of the
Mohats, he was immune from liability under Ohio’s political subdivision immunity law.
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{¶10} The trial court granted Horvath’s motion to dismiss the Mohats’ claims filed
on behalf of E.M.’s estate as barred by res judicata in light of the federal court’s ruling
that these claims were time-barred. However, as to the claims filed on the Mohats’
behalf, the trial court denied Horvath’s motion to dismiss, concluding the trial court could
not find that the Mohats could prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would
entitle them to relief.
{¶11} Horvath appeals the trial court’s judgment, asserting the following for his
sole assignment of error:
{¶12} “The Trial Court erred in overruling Appellant Thomas Horvath’s Motion To
Dismiss Appellees’ Complaint to the extent it denied appellant statutory immunity from
liability under Ohio Revised Code Section 2744.”
{¶13} As a preliminary matter, we note that an appellate court can review only
final orders, and without a final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction. Hubbell v.
Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, ¶ 9. Generally, an order denying a motion
to dismiss is not a final, appealable order. Polikoff v. Adam, 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 103
(1993). However, under R.C. 2744.02(C), “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision
or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability
* * * is a final order.” This court has held that the denial of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss based on sovereign immunity is immediately appealable. Am. Site Contrs., Inc.
v. Willowick, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-088, 2005-Ohio-4768, ¶2. Because the trial
court’s judgment denied Horvath’s motion to dismiss, which was based on political
subdivision immunity, the court’s judgment was a final order and the instant appeal is
properly before this court.
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{¶14} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v.
Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 547 (1992). This court has held that
an appellate court reviews a ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss de novo.
Goss v. Kmart Corp., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2006-T-0117, 2007-Ohio-3200, ¶17. In
construing the complaint, we must presume that all factual allegations are true and
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk
Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the principles
of notice pleading apply and “a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the
pleading stage.” York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145 (1991).
Rather, a plaintiff is only required to allege a set of facts, which, if proven, would
plausibly allow for recovery. Howard v. Girard, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0096,
2011-Ohio-2331, ¶14. The plausibility standard does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence in support of a claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). While the complaint does not need detailed factual
allegations, it requires more than mere conclusions or a recitation of the elements of the
claim. Hoffman v. Fraser, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2010-G-2975, 2011-Ohio-2200, ¶21.
{¶15} A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts entitling him to recover. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. PUCO, 76 Ohio
St.3d 521, 524 (1996). “As long as there is a set of facts consistent with the plaintiff’s
complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a
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defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Huffman v. Willoughby, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-
040, 2007-Ohio-7120, ¶18, citing Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416,
2002-Ohio-2480, ¶5.
{¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that the immunity enjoyed by a
political subdivision, such as a school district, is extended, with three exceptions, to
employees of political subdivisions under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). O’Toole v. Denihan, 118
Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, ¶47. However, for an employee of a political
subdivision, the immunity analysis differs from the analysis that applies to the
subdivision itself. The Supreme Court has stated that, instead of the three-tiered
analysis that applies to whether a political subdivision is immune from liability, whether
an employee of a political subdivision is immune from liability is determined by R.C.
2744.03(A)(6). Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, ¶17.
That section provides that an employee of a political subdivision is immune from liability,
unless one of the following applies:
{¶17} (a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside of
the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities;
{¶18} (b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose,
in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;
{¶19} (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a
section of the Revised Code. (Emphasis added.)
{¶20} The Mohats’ complaint alleged that Horvath was acting within the course
and scope of his employment at the time of his acts or omissions. Further, the
complaint did not predicate Horvath’s liability on any section of the Ohio Revised Code.
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Thus, neither subsection (a) or (c) applies to the complaint, and, in order for Horvath to
be found liable under any theory, it must be shown that his acts or omissions were
committed with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
Smith v. McCarty, 9th Dist. Summit No. 15670, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 55, *4-*5 (Jan.
13, 1993); R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Since it is undisputed Horvath’s acts or omissions
were committed in the scope of his duties, and civil liability is not expressly imposed
upon him by another section of the Revised Code, he is immune from liability for simple
negligence.
{¶21} “Malice” includes a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others
that has a great probability of causing substantial harm. Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d
334, 336 (1987). “Bad faith” connotes conscious wrongdoing. Jackson v. McDonald,
144 Ohio App.3d 301, 309 (5th Dist.2001). “Wanton” misconduct is the failure to
exercise any care whatsoever. Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 117-118 (1977).
“Recklessness” is a perverse disregard of a known risk where the actor is conscious
that his conduct will probably result in injury. O’Toole, supra, at ¶73-74.
{¶22} Distilled to their essence, these mental states “‘impl[y] a willful and
intentional design to do injury without just cause * * * or a failure to exercise any care
when the probability of harm is great, and that probability of harm is known to the actor *
* *.’” (Emphasis added.) Piispanen v. Carter, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-133, 2006-
Ohio-2382, ¶28, quoting McCarty, supra, at *5. Whether an actor’s conduct was
committed with malice, in bad faith, or was wanton or reckless are generally jury
questions. Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356 (1994).
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{¶23} Horvath asserts three arguments under his sole assignment of error. First,
he argues he is immune from liability with respect to the Mohats’ claim for ordinary
negligence in Count I of the complaint. However, as part of their claim for negligence in
Count l, the Mohats additionally alleged that Horvath was grossly negligent. Horvath
argues that this allegation does not save this claim because, he contends, a claim for
gross negligence does not require a showing of malice, bad faith, or wanton or reckless
conduct. However, to the contrary, Ohio Appellate Districts have held that “gross
negligence is evidenced by willful and wanton conduct.” (Emphasis added.) Harsh v.
Lorain Cty. Speedway, Inc., 111 Ohio App.3d 113, 118 (8th Dist.1996); accord Steward
v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APG 12-1567, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4185, *14
(Sep. 10, 1998). Further, the Third District in Tellez v. Bank One, N.A., 3d Dist. Allen
No. 1-92-63, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 250, defined gross negligence as “[t]he intentional
failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting
the life or property of another.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at *10, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1033. Thus, gross negligence is defined in terms of wanton or
reckless conduct.
{¶24} Further, the complaint also alleged that Horvath’s actions were malicious,
in bad faith, and were wanton and reckless.
{¶25} This court in Piispanen, supra, found a similar claim to be sufficient to
avoid a motion to dismiss. In that case, the plaintiff-student, T.P., was assaulted by
another student on school property. T.P. and his parents filed a complaint against the
school’s principal, alleging she was negligent in failing to provide a safe environment.
The principal filed a motion to dismiss, arguing she was entitled to immunity. The trial
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court denied the principal’s motion. The principal appealed. This court affirmed, noting
that the count in the complaint alleging negligence against the principal also alleged
willful and wanton misconduct, which led to T.P.’s injuries. Id. at ¶29.
{¶26} Further, in Shively v. Green Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2013 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 37581 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012), a case involving the bullying of a student
in a public school, the student and her father filed an action asserting one count of
negligence/gross negligence and a separate count for malice, bad faith, wanton, and
reckless conduct against various employees of the school. The district court found that
the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to avoid dismissal at the pleading stage. Id. at
*29-*30.
{¶27} Here, because the Mohats also alleged that Horvath was grossly
negligent, they impliedly alleged that his conduct was wanton or reckless. Harsh, supra;
Tellez, supra. In addition, the instant complaint alleged that Horvath’s actions
constituted malicious purpose, bad faith, and wanton and reckless conduct. Thus,
contrary to Horvath’s argument, the Mohats’ claim in Count I was not based solely on
ordinary negligence.
{¶28} Second, Horvath argues that Count II of the complaint does not properly
assert a separate claim. In Count II, the Mohats incorporated their negligence/gross
negligence claim in Count I and also alleged that Horvath acted with malice, in bad faith,
and that his conduct was wanton and reckless “in violation of [R.C.] 2744.03(A)(6).”
(Emphasis added.) Horvath argues this statute does not impose liability for its violation,
but, rather, provides an exception to immunity if the defendant’s acts or omissions were
committed with one of the listed mental states. Thus, he argues it was incorrect for the
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Mohats to allege he acted with the listed mental states “in violation” of the statute.
However, this terminology was mere surplusage. By incorporating Count I into Count II
and alleging that Horvath acted with malice, in bad faith, and was wanton and reckless,
the Mohats alleged a separate claim, namely, that Horvath was negligent/grossly
negligent with the heightened culpability provided by the listed mental states. This is no
different from the routine practice in a negligence-personal injury case to also include a
count for recklessness or in an assault case to also include a count for acting with
malice.
{¶29} Third, Horvath argues that the Mohats failed to allege any facts
demonstrating that he acted with malice or in bad faith, or that his conduct was wanton
or reckless. This court has held that a plaintiff is not required to affirmatively
demonstrate an exception to immunity at the pleading stage because that would require
the plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment in his complaint. Howard,
supra. Instead, a plaintiff is only required to allege a set of facts, which, if proven, would
plausibly allow him to recover. Id.
{¶30} Before addressing the sufficiency of the allegations in the Mohats’
complaint, we note that in Piispanen, supra, this court considered the sufficiency of the
factual allegations in a case involving an assault on a student by another student in a
public school. There, the plaintiff-student, T.P., had committed an act of vandalism,
which resulted in another student assaulting him. Based on the principal’s failure to
notify T.P.’s parents of the assault after the fact and the principal’s failure to seek
medical attention for T.P., he and his parents alleged the principal negligently failed to
aid or protect him. This court held the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to avoid a motion to
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dismiss, although there was no allegation that T.P. had been the victim of any prior
assaults on school property or that the principal was aware of any prior attacks or
threats against him.
{¶31} Further, in Shively, supra, the student-plaintiff and her father alleged in
their complaint that the defendants, who were employees of the school district, failed to
stop the constant bullying to which the student was subjected over a period of time.
They alleged the defendants’ inaction resulted in emotional and physical injury, and
eventually caused her to withdraw from the school. The district court found that the
plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to avoid dismissal and that the defendants’
immunity defense was more properly raised on summary judgment or in a jury trial. Id.
{¶32} Here, the Mohats alleged that Horvath was E.M.’s teacher and that E.M.
was in Horvath’s class when E.M. was subjected to repeated verbal and physical
bullying and harassment by other students. The complaint alleged that Horvath knew
E.M. was the victim of constant bullying because much of it took place in Horvath’s
classroom during class and also because E.M. complained to him about it. The
complaint also alleged that Horvath did nothing to stop the bullying over a period of
time. He never intervened and never notified school officials about the bullying.
{¶33} In light of the facts provided in the Mohats’ complaint regarding Horvath’s
prior knowledge of the ongoing bullying to which E.M. was subjected and Horvath’s
failure to do anything to stop it or to help E.M. over a period of time, the allegations in
the instant complaint are even more detailed than those which this court found to be
sufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss in Piispanen.
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{¶34} Based on our review of the complaint, with the exception of the claim for
simple negligence, the Mohats provided sufficient factual allegations, which, accepted
as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Since we are bound to
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, it does not appear beyond doubt
that the Mohats can prove no set of facts entitling them to recover. We thus hold the trial
court did not err in denying Horvath’s motion to dismiss.
{¶35} For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment
of error is overruled. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.,
concur.
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