Hill v. Ferguson

[Cite as Hill v. Ferguson, 2022-Ohio-13.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
MARLON HILL, SR., : APPEAL NO. C-210278
TRIAL NO. DV-2100121
Petitioner-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
TIESHIA FERGUSON, :
Respondent-Appellant. :
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 5, 2022
Jeffrey J. Cutcher, for Petitioner-Appellee,
Tibbs Law Office, LLC, and Sierra D. Causey, for Respondent-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} Respondent-appellant Tieshia Ferguson appeals from the trial court’s
adoption of a one-year domestic-violence-civil-protection order (“DVCPO”).
Ferguson failed to file written objections to the trial court’s adoption of the DVCPO
as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G). As a result of Ferguson’s noncompliance with Civ.R.
65.1(G), we affirm the DVCPO.
I. Facts and Procedure
{¶2} Ferguson is the mother of five-year-old T.F. Petitioner-appellee
Marlon Hill, Sr., is T.F.’s father and has full custody of T.F. Hill and Ferguson shared
parenting time under a Hamilton County Juvenile Court order.
{¶3} After T.F. told Hill, his stepmother, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital
staff, and a social worker that Ferguson hit him in the face with a red toy bat, Hill
petitioned the Hamilton County Domestic Relations Court for a DVCPO against
Ferguson under R.C. 3113.31. Following an ex parte hearing, the magistrate issued a
temporary protection order against Ferguson under R.C. 3113.31(D)(1) and
scheduled a full hearing. At the hearing, both Hill and Ferguson were represented by
counsel and both presented evidence.
{¶4} The magistrate issued a one-year DVCPO against Ferguson. The
DVCPO prohibited Ferguson from contacting T.F. The trial court adopted the
magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(iii).
{¶5} Fourteen days later, Ferguson filed a “Motion to Set Aside Magistrate’s
Decision.” In her motion, Ferguson asked the trial court to set aside the DVCPO
issued by the magistrate and argued that “[t]he facts and circumstances of this case
do not support the finding of granting a final protection order.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶6} While that motion was pending, Ferguson filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court’s adoption of the DVCPO.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶7} In her three assignments of error, Ferguson challenges the jurisdiction
of the domestic relations court, the scope of the DVCPO, and the issuance of DVCPO
as against the manifest weight of the evidence. In response, Hill argues that
Ferguson failed to object to the DVCPO as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G). According to
Hill, failing to follow Civ.R. 65.1(G) requires dismissal.
{¶8} Civ.R. 65.1 governs the procedural mechanisms for civil protection
orders, including DVCPOs under R.C. 3113.31. Civ.R. 65.1(A). Under Civ.R. 65.1(G),
a trial court’s denial or adoption of a magistrate’s decision to issue a civil protection
order is a “final, appealable order.” The 2016 amendment to Civ.R.65.1(G) created an
additional procedural requirement before filing an appeal. Before filing a notice of
appeal, “a party must timely file objections to such an order.” Civ.R. 65.1(G). The
objections must be in writing and challenge “a court’s adoption, modification, or
rejection of a magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after a full
hearing.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i).
{¶9} Ferguson failed to comply with Civ.R. 65.1(G). Thus, the issue is the
effect of that failure. Ohio’s appellate districts are split over the effect of a party’s
noncompliance with Civ.R. 65.1(G). See Florenz v. Omalley, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 28780, 2020-Ohio-4487, ¶ 9-10.
{¶10} The majority of Ohio appellate districts treat objections under Civ.R.
65.1(G) as a jurisdictional requirement. See Florenz at ¶ 9; Daniels v. Daniels, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3910, 2021-Ohio-2076, ¶ 18; K.U. v. M.S., 7th Dist. Mahoning
No. 16 MA 0165, 2017-Ohio-8029, ¶ 18. In contrast, the Second and Third Districts
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
consider Civ.R. 65.1(G)’s objection requirements as a nonjurisdictional rule. Florenz
at ¶ 10; see Danison v. Blinco, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-18-19, 2019-Ohio-2767, ¶ 7-8.
{¶11} R.C. 2505.02 gives this court jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or
reverse final orders. Because a trial court’s denial or adoption of a magistrate’s
decision to issue a civil protection order is a “final, appealable order” under Civ.R.
65.1(G), once the trial court adopts or denies that decision, this court has jurisdiction
to review, affirm, modify, or reverse that order. Accordingly, we hold that the
objection requirement stated in Civ.R. 65.1(G) is a nonjurisdictional requirement.
{¶12} Although we have jurisdiction over this case, Ferguson’s failure to
object as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G) waived any argument challenging the trial
court’s adoption of the magistrate’s DVCPO. See Danison at ¶ 8. This is consistent
with the principle that the fair administration of justice requires an appealing party
to afford the trial court an opportunity to review and address any issue that would
render the order unjust. 2016 Staff Note, Civ.R. 65.1(G).
{¶13} As a result of Ferguson’s noncompliance with Civ.R. 65.1(G), she
cannot challenge the trial court’s decision to adopt the DVCPO. We decline to reach
the merits of her arguments.
III. Conclusion
{¶14} Before filing a notice of appeal, Civ.R. 65(G)(1) requires a party
challenging the trial court’s denial or acceptance of a civil protection order to file
objections to that denial or acceptance. Ferguson failed to file those objections and
therefore cannot challenge the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion
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