State v. Wright

[Cite as State v. Wright, 2014-Ohio-985.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2012-08-152
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
OPINION
: 3/17/2014
- vs -
:
RANDALLA C. WRIGHT, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2011-10-1705
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael A. Oster, Jr., Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Marshall G. Lachman, 75 North Pioneer Boulevard, Springboro, Ohio 45066, for defendant-
appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Randalla C. Wright, appeals from her conviction in the
Butler County Court of Common Pleas for one count of aggravated vehicular homicide. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On the afternoon of September 2, 2011, appellant took her mother's vehicle
and drove to meet her daughter's school bus. The bus had not yet arrived, so appellant
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parked on Michelle Drive near the stop sign at the intersection with Merry Day Drive.
Appellant did not have permission to be driving her mother's vehicle, and her driver's license
had been suspended since February of that year.
{¶ 3} While appellant was waiting she observed the arrival of Mary Long and her
three small children, who played nearby while also waiting for the bus. When the bus arrived,
it turned right onto Michelle Drive from Merry Way Drive and made a full stop directly across
the street from where appellant had parked. Once the bus stopped, appellant exited her
vehicle and went across the street to retrieve her daughter. When she returned, appellant
placed her daughter in the back seat of her vehicle and noticed that Long's children
continued to play nearby. Appellant then got back into her vehicle and, while the bus was still
stopped directly across the street with its warning signals activated, proceeded to turn right
onto Merry Day Drive. In so doing, it is undisputed that appellant struck Long's youngest
child, B.B., causing a critical cranial injury that led to B.B.'s death.
{¶ 4} On October 19, 2011, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2), a second-degree felony. Appellant
waived a jury trial, and a bench trial began on June 27, 2012. At the close of the state's
case, appellant moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) on the grounds that the state's
evidence was insufficient to show the element of recklessness. The motion was overruled.
Thereafter, at the conclusion of all evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty, and
sentenced her to four years in prison. Appellant now appeals from her conviction, raising the
following two assignments of error for review.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
ACQUITTAL SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO SUPPLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS TO ALL
THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED
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VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
{¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT'S VERDICT OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF
AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 9} Under her first and second assignments of error, appellant argues the state
failed to supply sufficient evidence to support the charge of aggravated vehicular homicide,
and that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 10} At the outset, we note that "[t]he legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence
and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different." State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52. On one hand, a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence requires an appellate court to determine whether the state has
presented evidence that would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Saunders, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2012-03-006, 2013-Ohio-2052, ¶ 23, citing State v. Stringer, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-04-095, 2013-Ohio-988, ¶ 27. On the other hand, a manifest weight challenge
examines the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to
support one side of the issue rather than the other. Id. at ¶ 24, citing Stringer at ¶ 28.
{¶ 11} Yet, though the two concepts are different, they are nonetheless related. It is
well established that finding a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence
is also dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-
03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19, citing State v. Church, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-04-070,
2012-Ohio-3877, ¶ 10. Therefore, in examining her two assignments of error, we first
examine whether appellant's conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C.
2903.06(A)(2) is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶ 12} To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Allison, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2011-03-025, 2012-Ohio-1126, ¶ 8, citing State v. Cummings, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2006-09-224, 2007-Ohio-4970, ¶ 12. When reviewing a bench trial, an
appellate court will not reverse a conviction "where the trial court could reasonably conclude
from substantial evidence that the state has proven the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jones at ¶ 18, citing State v. Godby, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-03-056, 2006-Ohio-205, ¶
4; State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 59 (1988).
{¶ 13} Evidentiary issues "are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide since the
trier of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given the evidence." Allison at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hernandez, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2010-10-098, 2011-Ohio-3765, ¶ 26. Thus, an appellate court may overturn a conviction
due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in extraordinary circumstances to correct a
manifest miscarriage of justice, and only when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily
in favor of acquittal. Id., citing Thompkins at 387.
{¶ 14} In order to prove aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C.
2903.06(A)(2), the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that while
appellant was operating a motor vehicle, she recklessly caused the death of another. As
noted above, appellant does not dispute the fact that while she was operating a motor vehicle
she caused the death of another. Rather, appellant's exclusive challenge is to the trial court's
finding of recklessness.
{¶ 15} According to R.C. 2901.22(C):
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[a] person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, [s]he perversely disregards a known risk that
[her] conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of
a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, [s]he perversely disregards a known risk that
such circumstances are likely to exist.
A "risk" is "a significant possibility, as contrasted with a remote possibility, that a certain result
may occur or that certain circumstances may exist." R.C. 2901.01(A)(7).
{¶ 16} At trial, the state presented several eye witnesses who observed appellant's
vehicle parked on Michelle Drive just short of the intersection with Merry Day Drive, directly
across the street from where the school bus was stopped. The state also introduced video
footage from the surveillance cameras in a nearby trailer park that showed the bus had its
warning signals activated at the time of the incident. Although the footage does not include
an image of appellant's vehicle striking B.B., the cameras did capture the reactions of the
children on the bus, which make clear that the incident occurred directly across the street
from where the bus was stopped. This was corroborated by additional video footage from
cameras on the bus that captured images of Long frantically seeking help for her critically
injured child. Based upon this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that
appellant's decision to drive through this "zone of safety" was a perverse disregard of a
known risk. See, e.g., State v. Wolffram, 62 Ohio App.3d 749, 751-52 (12th Dist.1989)
(noting that R.C. 4511.75 requires vehicles to maintain a "zone of safety" when a school bus
is receiving or discharging students mainly because children are unpredictable).
{¶ 17} In addition, appellant testified she had a brief conversation with Long prior to
the arrival of the school bus, and that she witnessed Long's daughter and B.B. in a tug-of-war
over a doll near the street. She also admitted that she told a police officer after the incident
that she had previously seen Long grab B.B. to prevent him from stepping into the road in
front of a moving vehicle. Furthermore, appellant testified that just before the incident she
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had seen Long cross the street to talk to the bus driver, she knew Long's small children were
unattended, and that she had seen the children near her vehicle just before pulling away.
Here, too, the trial court could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that appellant's
decision to drive away despite the proximity of small, unattended children was a perverse
disregard of a known risk.
{¶ 18} Finally, to the extent that appellant may have attempted to rebut evidence
pointing to a mental state of recklessness, we cannot say that the trial court lost its way in
finding her testimony to be self-serving and inconsistent. See, e.g., State v. Dipman, 6th
Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1327, 2007-Ohio-2143, ¶ 19 (noting the fact-finder could have
discounted appellant's testimony, credited the testimony of others, and concluded that
appellant acted recklessly where she struck and killed a child crossing in front of a stopped
school bus). The state presented valid impeachment evidence, including testimony regarding
inconsistent statements given to police officers who interviewed her at various times after the
incident, as well as a recent felony conviction for an offense involving dishonesty.
{¶ 19} After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the trier of fact lost its
way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in determining that appellant acted
recklessly. See generally State v. Allison, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-03-025, 2012-
Ohio-1126 (overruling a manifest weight challenge to recklessness as an element of
aggravated vehicular homicide); State v. Gorham, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-08-195,
2007-Ohio-6028 (overruling a manifest weight challenge to recklessness as an element of
vehicular assault). Therefore, we find that appellant's conviction for aggravated vehicular
homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. As noted above, this finding necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.
Accordingly, appellant's two assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 20} Judgment affirmed.
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HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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