State v. Strietelmeier

[Cite as State v. Strietelmeier, 2022-Ohio-2370.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210409
TRIAL NO. C-20CRB-18275
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
: O P I N I O N.
VS.
:
BRYAN STRIETELMEIER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 8, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Judge.
{¶1} A jury convicted defendant-appellant Bryan Strietelmeier of criminal
trespass after he startled the neighborhood by aggressively ringing doorbells and
lurking about people’s yards in the middle of the night. Not once, but twice. He now
appeals that conviction on the ground that it runs counter to the manifest weight of
the evidence. With credibility decisions entrusted to the jury, we cannot say on this
record that the jury clearly lost its way in finding Mr. Strietelmeier guilty, and we
accordingly affirm the judgment below.
I.
{¶2} Well past midnight on September 23, 2020, Rhonda Mapes’ doorbell
began ringing. Not expecting company at such a late hour, Ms. Mapes peered out the
door and saw a man she did not recognize. When the man continued to ring the bell
for five minutes or so, Ms. Mapes called her daughter in a frazzled state, concerned
that he might attempt to break in. She relayed real-time updates to her daughter on
the unwanted visitor’s movements: he searched under the flowerpots on the porch; he
wandered around Ms. Mapes’ car, pulling the door handle to see if it would open; he
stared into the windows of her car; he came back and rang the doorbell several more
times; and finally, he returned to his own car (parked in Ms. Mapes’ driveway) and
drove across the street into a neighbor’s driveway. At some point during this phone
conversation, Ms. Mapes’ daughter received a third call via call-waiting, informing
them that another neighbor had called the police, who were en route to investigate.
{¶3} Officers from the Colerain Township Police Department arrived and
found Mr. Strietelmeier sitting in his car, still parked in the neighbor’s driveway. Mr.
Strietelmeier told the officers that he was looking for “Brandy’s” house, because his
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
girlfriend Donna directed him to go to Brandy’s and pick up a surprise. The officers
advised him that no one named Brandy lived there, and that he should not to return
to the property. Mr. Strietelmeier apparently inquired about whether Brandy might
live across the street at the Mapes’ address, and the officers responded that they did
not know who lived there but it was not Brandy. The officers did not speak with Ms.
Mapes before or after sending Mr. Strietelmeier home, and this initial interaction was
not captured on the body-worn video camera.
{¶4} Around 2:15 a.m., the same man returned to Ms. Mapes’ home and
again started ringing the doorbell. This time, Ms. Mapes immediately called 9-1-1 and
rushed downstairs to wake up her husband. Ms. Mapes asked the 9-1-1 operator to
send officers quickly because the stranger—now identified as Mr. Strietelmeier—was
back, and he was peering through the glass, beating on the frame of the door, and
jerking the door handle. The Mapeses watched out the window as Mr. Strietelmeier
walked towards the rear of their home and disappeared behind a Penske box truck
parked in their driveway. Officers arrived shortly thereafter and arrested Mr.
Strietelmeier near the truck.
{¶5} This second incident was captured on the officer’s body-worn camera.
On the video, Mr. Strietelmeier told the officers that Donna became upset when he
returned home earlier without the surprise from Brandy. Donna never gave Mr.
Strietelmeier an exact address, but told him that Brandy supposedly lived just a few
streets over from them in a house resembling his father’s house. In an attempt to
appease Donna, Mr. Strietelmeier made a second attempt at locating the elusive
Brandy, and again zeroed in on the Mapes residence because it featured Spanish-type
arches on the porch reminiscent of his father’s house. He claimed to have walked
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
around back to see if Brandy might be having a party outside (despite the absence of
party-related noise or fanfare), which might explain why she neglected to answer the
door. Mr. Strietelmeier also told the officers that Donna kicked him out, and that he
thought his father might have bought him the Mapeses house so he “could get my act
cleaned up and get away from that loon.”
{¶6} A jury found Mr. Strietelmeier guilty of criminal trespass, a fourth-
degree misdemeanor under R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). The trial court sentenced him to 30
days in jail stayed, two years of probation, 200 hours of community service, and a $250
fine. On appeal, Mr. Strietelmeier contends in his sole assignment of error that the
state failed to prove he committed the offense of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable
doubt. We disagree and accordingly affirm the judgment.
II.
{¶7} R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person, without privilege to do
so, shall * * * [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another.” Mr.
Strietelmeier asserts that the state failed to prove all the essential elements of criminal
trespass, and as a result, the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. “A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence.” State v. Staley, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200270, C-200271 and C-
200272, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 10. Only in exceptional cases will we reverse a jury verdict
as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, “because ‘the weight to be given
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.’
” State v. Hudson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170681, 2019-Ohio-3497, ¶ 16, quoting
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). The jury “is free to
believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony.” Id.4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶8} Mr. Strietelmeier does not dispute that he entered onto the Mapeses
land. But he challenges whether he did so “knowingly” and “without privilege.” “A
person acts ‘knowingly,’ regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Mr. Strietelmeier’s knowledge “ ‘may
be reasonably inferred from a combination of the victim’s demeanor and others’
interactions with the victim.’ ” State v. Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-210198 and
C-210199, 2022-Ohio-1512, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Foster, 2020-Ohio-1379, 153 N.E.3d
728, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.). The state maintained that Mr. Strietelmeier knowingly entered
the property without permission from the Mapeses, especially in light of the officers
telling him during the first interaction that Brandy did not live there, thereby satisfying
the statutory elements.
{¶9} Mr. Strietelmeier refutes the notion that he knowingly arrived at the
Mapeses house without permission because the police told him they didn’t know who
lived there (leaving open the possibility that it could be Brandy’s house, which, in his
view, would have accorded implied permission for him to enter the property), and
because the police told him not to return to the neighbor’s house but did not mention
the Mapeses house. This largely mirrors the rationale advanced by defense counsel
during trial, with the added justification that Mr. Strietelmeier could not possibly
know he was at the Mapeses home without permission because Ms. Mapes never
instructed him to leave.
{¶10} We are not persuaded. To begin with, as to the “knowingly” element,
“[n]o requirement exists that ‘no trespassing’ signs be posted on property, or that the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
person in control or possession of property notify everyone in the world that they are
not welcome to come onto the property.” State v. Janson, 183 Ohio App.3d 377, 2009-
Ohio-3256, 917 N.E.2d 296, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). Because “trespass is an invasion of the
possessory interest in the property,” the state was only required to prove that Mr.
Strietelmeier knowingly entered land that was controlled by or in the custody of the
Mapeses without their permission. Id. at ¶ 12; see R.C. 2911.21(F)(2) (“ ‘Land or
premises’ includes any land, building, structure, or place belonging to, controlled by,
or in custody of another, and any separate enclosure or room, or portion thereof.”).
The law does not grant Mr. Strietelmeier an inherent right to be on land controlled by
the Mapeses until or unless they affirmatively revoke that right. To find otherwise
would be an open invitation for anyone to enter any parcel of real property simply
because the owner has not communicated a lack of privilege.
{¶11} Likewise, Mr. Strietelmeier’s contention that he believed himself
privileged to enter the property is without merit. “ ‘Privilege’ means an immunity,
license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of
status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.” R.C.
2901.01(A)(12). On this point, the best defense mustered by Mr. Strietelmeier was
that Brandy invited Donna to come over, and that Donna transferred that permission
to him. But neither Donna nor Brandy showed up to testify about the source of
confusion that night, and to this day, Mr. Strietelmeier remains unsure whether
“Brandy” is an actual person. Although some conflicting testimony emerged about
whether officers told Mr. Strietelmeier not to return to the Mapeses specific address,
the jury was free to believe or disbelieve either witness.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} After the initial unsuccessful entreaty to find Brandy at the Mapes’
house in the middle of the night, a reasonable person should infer that no one named
Brandy was awake in the vicinity and awaiting his arrival. “People are presumed to
understand the reasonable and probable consequences of their actions.” State v. Lack,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200334, 2021-Ohio-2956, ¶ 20. Having been warned by the
police that he was mistaken regarding Brandy’s domicile, the natural and probable
consequence of Mr. Strietelmeier’s decision to return was his eventual arrest. The
state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr.
Strietelmeier lacked privilege to be on the Mapeses property, and we see nothing on
this record to draw into question its decision. We are constrained to construe the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict, and on this record, we defer to its determination
that a greater amount of credible evidence supported the state’s position. See
Houlihan v. Morrison, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200379 and C-200382, 2021-Ohio-
3087, ¶ 23.
{¶13} Mr. Strietelmeier also testified that he may have been suffering from an
untreated mental illness at the time which prevented him from fully comprehending
the situation and realizing his mistake. While we are sympathetic to this possibility
(which certainly seems plausible under the circumstances), his counsel did not request
a competency evaluation prior to trial or present a defense based on mental illness.
Because the defense never substantiated the point at trial or presented it to the jury,
we decline to address it on appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Strietelmeier’s conviction was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
* * *
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶14} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Strietelmeier’s
assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P. J., and WINKLER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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