Pruitt v. Strong Style Fitness

[Cite as Pruitt v. Strong Style Fitness, 2011-Ohio-5272.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96332
ANTHONY PRUITT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
STRONG STYLE FITNESS, ETC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-717666
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, P.J., Keough, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 13, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Michael D. Goldstein
Ladi Williams
Goldstein & Goldstein Co., L.P.A.
55 Public Square
Suite 1575
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For Strong Style Fitness
Shawn W. Schlesinger
Koeth, Rice & Leo Co., LPA
1280 West Third Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Magnum Fitness Systems
Daniel R. Haude
Reminger Co., LPA
1400 Midland Building
101 Prospect Avenue, West
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Anthony Pruitt appeals the decision of the trial court granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by appellee Juggernaut Enterprises, LLC, d.b.a.
Strong Style Fitness and Training Center (“Strong Style”). For the following reasons,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 2} In January 2009, Pruitt joined Strong Style, paying for two months of gym
membership and ten personal training sessions with Charles Lyons. Upon joining, Pruitt
signed two documents, one for the general membership and another titled “Strong Style
Rules and Regulations.” The rules and regulations document contained an exculpatory
clause on the first page of a two-page, double-sided document. An underlined clause in
that document provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Release. * * * On behalf of yourself and your minor children, you hereby
agree to voluntarily release and discharge Strong Style Fitness and Training
Center (and all its affiliates, employees, representatives, agents, successors,
and assigns) from any and all claims, causes of action, and other liabilities of
any kind whatsoever ([sic] whether known or unknown, which may occur as a
result of your or your minor children engaging in any bodybuilding or fitness
activity, or any activity incidental thereto, upon or within the Facilities,
whether arising from the negligence of Strong Style Fitness and Training
Center or otherwise, and whether or not related to exercise, including,
without limitation, any bodily injury or death caused by any present or future
medical condition of yours or your minor children whether known or
unknown. * * * You acknowledge that you carefully read this Waiver and
Release and fully understand that it is a release of liability. You are waiving
any right that you may have to bring a legal action to assert a claim against
Strong Style Fitness and Training Center for our negligence.”
{¶ 3} Immediately preceding the signature line containing Pruitt’s signature, the document
contains a paragraph certifying that Pruitt read and understood the terms of the rules and
regulations.
{¶ 4} Pruitt participated in four personal training sessions prior to the ill-fated session.
During this fifth session, Pruitt was using the incline leg press machine under Lyons’s
supervision. The machine required Pruitt to sit at a 45-degree angle with his legs extending
upwards. The weights were hung on a 90-pound platform that Pruitt pushed with his legs.
Lyons showed Pruitt how to operate the machine and the safety catch that holds the platform in
place. To use the machine, the user extends his legs and disengages the safety catch. Before
finishing, the user holds the platform with his legs, engages the safety catch, and lowers the
platform onto the safety catch.
{¶ 5} During the fifth session, Pruitt pressed 350 pounds. After finishing his sets,
Pruitt engaged the safety catch and rested momentarily. Pruitt was unable to visually
verify whether the catch was fully engaged from his seated position. Likewise, Lyons,
who was standing next to the weight platform to “spot” Pruitt, was unable to visually
verify whether the safety catch was fully engaged. Lyons heard the catch engage as if it
was properly activated. Pruitt then attempted to exit the machine by grabbing the foot
platform. Inexplicably, the platform disengaged from the safety catch and fell on
Pruitt’s knee, causing severe injuries. The parties speculated that either the safety catch
was not fully engaged or Pruitt somehow lifted the platform enough to raise it off the
safety catch as he was getting up, which would cause the catch to disengage. Both
theories are based on conjecture. Pruitt’s claims are based on Lyons’s failure to ensure
the machine was secured prior to Pruitt’s attempt to exit the machine.
{¶ 6} Strong Style filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted
its motion and held that Pruitt failed to demonstrate that Strong Style, through Lyons, was
negligent and that the release contained in the rules and regulations document was
enforceable, thereby prohibiting Pruitt from maintaining his action. Pruitt timely
appealed, raising one assignment of error that provides as follows: “The trial court erred
in granting defendant-appellee’s motion for summary judgment because the release
language within Strong Style gym’s membership agreement was unenforceable as a
matter of law and plaintiff-appellant presented sufficient evidence for jury consideration
of his negligence claim.” The crux of Pruitt’s argument is that the exculpatory clause is
unenforceable because it is unconscionable, ambiguous, or against public policy. For
the following reasons, Pruitt’s sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 7} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, governed by the standard
set forth in Civ.R. 56. Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833
N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision and
independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Hollins v. Shaffer, 182 Ohio App.3d 282, 2009-Ohio-2136, 912 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 12.
Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when the moving party establishes that
“(1) no genuine issue of any material fact remains, (2) the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for
summary judgment is made.” State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 105 Ohio
St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163, 826 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 9, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc.
(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267.
{¶ 8} Generally in Ohio, exculpatory clauses, which relieve a party from its own
negligence, are not against public policy despite being disfavored in the law. Lamb v.
Univ. Hosp. Health Care Ent., Inc. (Aug. 13, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 73144. Valid
exculpatory clauses or releases constitute express assumptions of risk. Anderson v.
Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 110, 114, 451 N.E.2d 780. As with contracts in general,
these clauses are to be strictly construed against the drafter unless the language is clear
and unambiguous. When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the
interpretation is a matter of law. Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio
St.2d 241, 246, 374 N.E.2d 146.
{¶ 9} A party waiving his right to recover for another’s negligent acts must make a
conscious choice to accept the consequences of the other party’s negligence. Lamb,
Cuyahoga App. No. 73144, citing Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Ctr. (1983), 9
Ohio App.3d 27, 28, 457 N.E.2d 1185. If the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the
intention of the parties is a factual inquiry for the trier of fact. Id. Recovery for willful
or wanton misconduct cannot be waived. Id.{¶ 10} Moreover, as with all contracts, the party against whom the contract is being
enforced may seek rescission of the contract if the terms are unconscionable.
“Unconscionability is generally recognized as the absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties to a contract, combined with contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
Short v. Resource Title Agency, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 95839, 2011-Ohio-1577, ¶ 21.
Whether a clause is unconscionable is a question of law. Id. The party challenging the
enforceability of the contract has the burden to establish both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. Id at ¶ 22.
“Substantive unconscionability involves those factors which relate to
the contract terms themselves, and whether they are commercially
reasonable. Procedural unconscionability involves those factors
bearing on the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties.
These factors may include age, education, intelligence, business acumen
and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract,
and whether the terms were explained to the weaker party.”
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 11} Pruitt raises several arguments attacking the validity of the exculpatory
clause. He argues that the agreement is ambiguous, inconspicious, against public policy,
and unconscionable.
{¶ 12} Although Pruitt claims the release is against public policy, Ohio courts have
consistently held to the contrary. See Lamb, Cuyahoga App. No. 73144.
“Additionally, we note that, although an exculpatory clause to limit one’s liability due to
negligence may be valid and enforceable, Ohio law finds that such a clause is ineffective
where the party seeking protection failed to exercise any care whatsoever, where there
was willful or wanton misconduct, or where the clause is against important public policy
concerns, unconscionable, or vague and ambiguous.” Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. D & J
Distrib. & Mfg. Inc., Lucas App. No. L-08-1104, 2009-Ohio-3806, ¶ 36. Pruitt’s sole
claim advanced is one for negligence; therefore, our review is limited to whether the
exculpatory clause is unconscionable, vague, or ambiguous.
{¶ 13} Pruitt first argues that the exculpatory clause is unconscionable because the
parties were of unequal bargaining power, Pruitt had no opportunity to bargain for or
negotiate the terms of the release, and no representative from Strong Style explained the
terms of the clause. Pruitt relies on Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Siefert, Cuyahoga App. No.
93291, 2010-Ohio-2346, for the proposition of law that a release is unenforceable if the
party against whom the enforcement is sought has unequal bargaining power or has not
been provided the opportunity for nonexculpatory contract options that could be
purchased for greater consideration. Pruitt’s reliance is misplaced.
{¶ 14} In Siefert, the defendant rented a skid steer, a piece of heavy equipment.
The defendant wrecked the engine on the skid steer, and the insurance company asserted
its subrogation right against him. The defendant claimed that the rental company was
negligent in failing to ensure that he was an acceptable operator of the machine and to
properly demonstrate safe handling techniques. This court, albeit after finding that the
release was unenforceable, found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the rental
company was negligent. This alone distinguishes Siefert from the facts of this case.
Whether the contract in Siefert was enforceable was moot because of the lack of
negligence. However, in deciding that the release was not enforceable, this court relied
on Orlett v. Suburban Propane (1989), 54 Ohio App.3d 127, 561 N.E.2d 1066, which
cites Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones (1966), 9 Ohio Misc. 113, 223 N.E.2d 381.
{¶ 15} The Motorists court teaches that “[g]enerally, a contractual provision which
exempts a party from liability for his negligence will be enforced when: [(1)] [t]he
contracting parties stand in roughly equal bargaining positions, or [(2)] [w]hen the
positions are somewhat unequal but the inferior party is given an option of excluding the
exemption for additional consideration.” Id. at 115. In other words, the analysis
advanced in Motorists determined under what conditions a release of liability would be
enforced. Motorists does not stand for the proposition that both of the conditions must
be met to have an enforceable exculpatory provision. Thus, the negation of either of the
two above conditions does not necessarily void the release provision of the contract.
{¶ 16} For that determination, we rely on the doctrine of unconscionability. In
order to rescind an unconscionable contract, the party seeking rescission must show both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. Short, 2011-Ohio-1577, ¶ 21. Simply
relying on the unequal bargaining position of the parties, part of the procedural
unconscionability analysis, is insufficient. Id.{¶ 17} Pruitt simply argues that Strong Style drafted the contract and had unequal
bargaining power. The facts of this case do not support his argument. Pruitt served in
the military, attended college, and was employed. Moreover, even though he argues that
he did not understand the terms of the release, Pruitt claims to have not read the terms
because the release was “buried within the small print of a separate document.”
{¶ 18} In reviewing the exculpatory clause, we agree with the trial court that the
terms and conditions are clearly set forth. The release is on the front page of a
double-sided document, and the entire clause is underlined to ensure it stood out from the
rest of the non-underlined text. The last sentence specifically notifies Pruitt that he is
waiving any claim for negligence against Strong Style. Finally, immediately preceding
Pruitt’s signature is a paragraph in bold type stating that Pruitt read and understood the
terms of the rules and regulations prior to signing. At that point, Pruitt was free to walk
away from the contract if he did not like the terms proposed by Strong Style. See
Wallace v. Ganley Auto Group, Cuyahoga App. No. 95081, 2011-Ohio-2909 (finding no
merit to the argument that an arbitration provision is unconscionable when the terms are
clearly laid out for the parties and the contract contained a clause that the signor read and
understood the terms of the contract). We accordingly find that Pruitt has not met his
burden to show that the release is procedurally unconscionable, much less procedurally
and substantively unconscionable.1
{¶ 19} Finally, the terms of the release are clear and unambiguous. The release
provides the following: “You acknowledge that you carefully read this Waiver and
Release and fully understand that it is a release of liability. You are waiving any right
that you may have to bring a legal action to assert a claim against Strong Style Fitness and
Training Center for our negligence.”
{¶ 20} The terms of the contract are clear.2 Pruitt released Strong Style and its
employees, representatives, and agents from all claims of negligence, and the contract
1
We note, although not argued, that properly drafted releases from liability within fitness
club contracts have been deemed to not be unconscionable. See Lamb, Cuyahoga App. No. 73144
(finding that exculpatory clauses in fitness club contracts are not unconscionable). Such a finding
necessarily means that those releases are substantively conscionable and therefore commercially
reasonable.
2
Pruitt’s reliance on Holmes v. Health & Tennis Corp. of Am. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d
further informed him that he relinquished some of his legal rights. Pruitt claims that the
release clause is silent as to personal trainers. However, the clause he referenced
provides that all personal training “shall be conducted solely by [Strong Style] and its
staff.” It is therefore undisputed that Lyons, as a personal trainer, was employed by
Strong Style, and the terms of the release relieve Strong Style and Lyons of liability for
Lyons’s negligent actions. Pruitt’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} Because the release provision of the agreement is enforceable, we need not
determine whether Pruitt established a prima facie claim of negligence. Even if he did,
the release prohibits recovery.
{¶ 22} Pruitt released Strong Style from liability for any negligent act. The facts
of this case are unfortunate, but the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment
in favor of Strong Style based on the release. The terms of the agreement were not
inconspicious, unconscionable, ambiguous, or against public policy. There being no
genuine issue of material fact, Strong Style was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It appears from the undisputed evidence, construed most strongly in Pruitt’s favor, that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion adverse to Pruitt. The terms of the
364, 659 N.E.2d 812, to establish an ambiguity is misplaced. The agreement in Holmes involved an
express assumption of the risk that provided: “Use of our facilities is at your own risk, and we shall
not be liable for any injury or damages resulting from your use of our services and facilities.” The
Holmes court determined that such language was ambiguous with respect to the parties’ intent to
waive future claims of negligence. This is distinguishable from the current case. The clause in
question specifically notifies Pruitt that he is waiving all future claims of negligence.
agreement prohibited Pruitt from advancing a claim of negligence against Strong Style.
There being no other claims in the complaint, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR