Hurst v. Hurst

[Cite as Hurst v. Hurst, 2013-Ohio-2674.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
WENDY M. HURST (RAMSEY) : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 12-CA-70
MARK E. HURST :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Licking County Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, Case No. 07-DR-00993 RPW
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 24, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MARK E. HURST WENDY M. HURST (RAMSEY)
A-586245, D-5
o/o CCI
Box 5500
Chillicothe, OH 45601
[Cite as Hurst v. Hurst, 2013-Ohio-2674.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Mark E. Hurst appeals the decision of the Licking County Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division that denied his motion to modify child
visitation regarding his two minor children and denied his motion for contempt.1
Appellee Wendy M. Ramsey [fna “Hurst”] [“Mother”] is appellant's former spouse and
the mother of these two children.2
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On August 11, 2009, Mother and Appellant were granted a divorce. The
parties have two children born of the marriage, D.H. (06/27/2001) and W.H.
(05/21/2003). Mother was named the sole custodian and residential parent of the
parties’ children. The divorce decree further provided,
3. PARENTING TIMES, VACATIONS, AND HOLIDAYS. The
Defendant [Appellant] shall have no parenting time with the minor children
until further order of this Court. Further, there shall be no phone contact
with the minor children pending further order of this Court.
{¶3} Appellant did not appeal the decision. On August 6, 2008, Appellant was
found guilty of pandering obscenity involving a minor, in violation of R.C.
2907.321(A)(5); pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor, in violation of
R.C. 2907.322(A)(5); and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or
performance, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3). The offenses were alleged to have
taken place in March and April 2007. See, State v. Hurst, 5th Dist. No. 2008-CA-0104,
1
Appellant has abandoned his complaint to determine parentage of a third child J.M.R.
(07/15/2008]. Appellant concedes he is not the father and filed a motion on May 20, 2013 to remove that
issue from this appeal, which this Court has granted.
2
Appellee did not file a brief in this matter.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 3
2009-Ohio-983. Appellant served his full term, and was released under the supervision
of the Adult Parole Authority in November of 2011. See, State v. Hurst, 5th Dist. No. 12-
CA-20, 2012-Ohio-6074, ¶4 (vacating Appellants classification as a sexually oriented
offender pursuant to State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011–Ohio–3374 because
none of the offenses for which Appellant was convicted were considered a sexually
oriented offense under the previous version of R.C. 2950.01(D)).
{¶4} On September 13, 2011, Mother filed her notice of intent to relocate with
the children. Pursuant to the issuance of a Civil Protection Order, Mother’s address was
not released to Appellant and has been sealed. (T. at 52).
{¶5} On January 19, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se motion, which the trial court
characterized as a motion to modify parenting times, and a motion for contempt against
Mother. The trial court advised Appellant to re-file the contempt motion because he had
not followed the required procedures for the filing of a motion for contempt. On January
23, 2012, Appellant filed a verified motion for contempt. Both motions were set for an
evidentiary hearing before a magistrate on April 12, 2012.
{¶6} Appellant and Mother appeared pro se at the hearing. Each testified and
was cross-examined by the other. Relevant to this appeal, Mother additionally called
two witnesses.
{¶7} On May 10, 2012, the magistrate filed her findings of fact and conclusions
of law denying Appellant’s motions. On May 14, 2012, Appellant filed his objections to
the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections noting that
Appellant failed to request a transcript of the April 12, 2012 hearing before the
magistrate by judgment entry filed July 17, 2012.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 4
{¶8} On July 18, 2012, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider his objections
together with an affidavit of indigency. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion by
Judgment Entry filed August 6, 2012, noting that Appellant never requested a transcript
or an extension of time to obtain one.
{¶9} The trial court affirmed the magistrate’s decision and denied each of
Appellant’s motions by Judgment Entry filed August 6, 2012.
Assignments of Error
{¶10} Appellant raises seven pro se assignments of error,
{¶11} “I. HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY.
{¶12} “II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
{¶13} “III. SUFFICIENT AND COMPELLING EVIDENCE.
{¶14} “IV. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.
{¶15} “V. BIAS AND PREJUDICE.
{¶16} “VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
{¶17} “VII. THE MAGISTRATE VIOLATED THE APPELLANTS
CONSTITUTIONAL, 14tth AMMENDMENT [sic.] RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
AND TREATMENT.”
Pro se Appellants
{¶18} We understand that Appellant has filed this appeal pro se. Nevertheless,
“like members of the bar, pro se litigants are required to comply with rules of practice
and procedure.” Hardy v. Belmont Correctional Inst., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-116, 2006-
Ohio-3316, ¶ 9. See, also, State v. Hall, 11th Dist. No. 2007-T-0022, 2008-Ohio-2128,
¶11. We also understand that “an appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 5
where there is some semblance of compliance with the appellate rules.” State v.
Richard, 8th Dist. No. 86154, 2005-Ohio-6494, ¶4 (internal quotation omitted).
{¶19} In State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83, 2001-Ohio-150, 748 N.E.2d
528(2001), the Supreme Court noted, “a reviewing court cannot add matter to the
record before it that was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the
appeal on the basis of the new matter. See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377
N.E.2d 500(1978).” It is also a longstanding rule "that the record cannot be enlarged by
factual assertions in the brief." Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist.No. 411, 1980 WL
350992 (Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio
App. 55, 59, 201 N.E.2d 227(1963). New material and factual assertions contained in
any brief in this court may not be considered. See, North v. Beightler, 112 Ohio St.3d
122, 2006-Ohio-6515, 858 N.E.2d 386, ¶7, quoting Dzina v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d
385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶16. Therefore, we have disregarded facts and
documents in Appellant’s brief that are outside of the record.
{¶20} In the interests of justice, we shall attempt to consider Appellant’s
assignments of error.
Failure to File transcript with the Trial Court
{¶21} We first must address Appellant’s failure to present a transcript to the trial
court for its review of Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. Appellant filed
the transcript of the full hearing in this court with his appeal. The trial court never had
the opportunity to review the transcript when considering Appellant’s objections to the
magistrate’s decision.
{¶22} Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) provides:
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 6
(iii) Objection to magistrate's factual finding; transcript or affidavit.
An objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically designated as
a finding of fact under Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supported by a
transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that
finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available. With
leave of court, alternative technology or manner of reviewing the relevant
evidence may be considered. The objecting party shall file the transcript or
affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections unless the
court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or other
good cause. If a party files timely objections prior to the date on which a
transcript is prepared, the party may seek leave of court to supplement the
objections.
{¶23} Where an appellant fails to provide a transcript of the original hearing
before the magistrate for the trial court's review, the magistrate's findings of fact are
considered established and may not be attacked on appeal. Stark v. Haser, 5th Dist.
No. 03CAF11057, 2004–Ohio–4641, ¶15; Lamp v. Linton, 5th Dist. No. 2011-CA-06,
2011-Ohio-6111; State v. Leite, 5th Dist. No.1999AP090054, 2000 WL 502819(April 11,
2000); Fogress v. McKee 5th Dist. No. 99CA15, 1999 WL 668580(Aug. 11, 1999. If an
objecting party fails to provide the trial court with the transcript of the proceedings
before the magistrate, the appellate court is precluded from considering the transcript of
the magistrate's hearing. State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio
St.3d 728, 730, 654 N.E.2d 1254, 1995–Ohio–272.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 7
{¶24} Appellant could have, but did not seek to file an affidavit of the evidence
under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). See e.g., State ex rel. Motley v. Capers, 23 Ohio St.3d 56,
491 N.E. 2d 311(1986).(Holding that a transcript is “unavailable” for purposes of App.R.
9(C) which allows the use of narrative statements when indigent appellant is unable to
bear cost of providing transcript); Lamp v. Linton, supra.
{¶25} In Robinson v. Custom Sports Cycle, this Court noted,
While significant case law exists which would allow for a free
transcript for an indigent criminal defendant, (see, e.g., State v. Arrington
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 114, 326 N.E.2d 667; Mayer v. City of Chicago
(1971), 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372), or a party involved in
certain parental rights proceedings (see, e.g., State ex rel. Heller v. Miller
(1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66), we would concur with the
wording of the Tenth District Court of Appeals: “While in criminal appeals a
single copy of the transcript must be prepared at government expense and
filed with the court for those who are demonstrated to be indigent, no
similar responsibility must be borne by the government in the appeal of
civil cases.” Duff v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction (June 30,
1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-146, unreported, at 1
{¶26} In addition, we have no reason to question the magistrate's credibility
determination. The magistrate, having observed the live testimony, was in a superior
position when compared to this court to judge the credibility of Mother and Appellant.
State v. Gordon, 10th Dist. No. 10AP–1174, 2011–Ohio–4208, ¶14 (triers of fact were in
a much better position to adjudge the credibility of the witnesses given their ability to
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 8
view the witnesses' live testimony). Our inability to even review the transcript testimony
makes it nearly impossible for us to overturn the magistrate's credibility determination.
See, e.g., Elyria v. Rowe, 121 Ohio App.3d 342, 344, 700 N.E.2d 36(9th Dist. 1997)
(because of appellant's failure to provide a transcript of the proceedings below, the
appellate court could not review the credibility of the witnesses who testified and
presumed the trial court's findings were correct); Murray v. Murray, 5th Dist. No. 01–
CA00084, 2002–Ohio–2505 (with no transcript of the evidentiary hearing having been
filed, we must assume that the trial court properly considered the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses).
{¶27} Further, Appellant's failure to provide the trial court with a transcript of the
magistrate trial precludes him from challenging the decision or judgment as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Coultier, 11th Dist.
No.2005–L–071, 2006–Ohio–1263, ¶ 26.
{¶28} Because Appellant did not file a transcript of the proceedings before the
magistrate with his objections, the factual findings of the magistrate are deemed
established and may not be attacked on appeal. Accordingly, we review Appellant’s
assignments of error only to analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in
reaching specific legal conclusions based upon the established facts. We find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court's approval and adoption of the magistrate's decision not to
grant Appellant parenting time with the two minor children and not finding Mother in
contempt.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 9
I.
{¶29} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s first assignment of error in the following manner: the trial court
erred in allowing Mother to testify that the children had told her Appellant showered
nude with them.
{¶30} During the evidentiary hearing, the following exchange occurred,
[Appellant]: Do you have any evidence that –that the defendant
was naked when he took a shower with these children?
[Mother]: They said you were.
(T. at 45). Appellant did not move to strike the response.
{¶31} “The general rule is that ‘an appellate court will not consider any error
which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but
did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been
avoided or corrected by the trial court.’ State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St. 2d 56 [ 43
O.O. 2d 119], 236 N.E. 2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960),
170 Ohio St. 471 [11 O.O.2d 215], 166 N.E.2d 379, paragraph one of the syllabus;
State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 [54 O.O.2d 222], 267 N.E.2d 291,
paragraph one of the syllabus.” State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 364 N.E.2d
1364 (1977), superseded on other grounds by State v. Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533
N.E.2d 272 (1988).
{¶32} Civ.R. 61 sets forth the harmless error rule in civil cases, providing that no
error or defect in any ruling is, “ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a
verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 10
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.”
Generally, in order to find that substantial justice has been done to an appellant so as to
prevent reversal of a judgment for errors occurring at the trial, the reviewing court must
not only weigh the prejudicial effect of those errors but also determine that, if those
errors had not occurred, the jury or other trier of the facts would probably have made
the same decision.” Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d
690(1950), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶33} In the case at bar, the case was tried to a magistrate not a jury. In
examining the record to determine this issue, we may give weight to the fact that the
error occurred in a trial to the court, rather than in a jury trial. State v. White, 15 Ohio
St.2d 146, 151, 239 N.E.2d 65(1968); State v. Austin, 52 Ohio App.2d 59, 70, 368
N.E.2d 59(10th Dist. 1976). Indeed, a judge is presumed to consider only the relevant,
material and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary
affirmatively appears from the record. State v. White, supra, 15 Ohio St.2d at 151, 239
N.E.2d 65; State v. Eubank, 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 187, 398 N.E.2d 567, 569-570(1979);
Columbus v. Guthmann, 175 Ohio St. 282, 194 N.E.2d 143(1963), paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶34} Based upon the entire record before us, we conclude that any error in the
admission of the statement was harmless and if that error had not occurred, the trier of
the facts would have made the same decision. Hallworth, supra.{¶35} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 11
II & III
{¶36} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s second and third, assignments of error in the following manner:
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant parenting time with the children.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the magistrate’s opinion is based upon insufficient
evidence.
Visitation
{¶37} A trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding matters regarding the
visitation rights of nonresidential parents, and its decision is subject to reversal only
where there is an abuse of discretion. Appleby v. Appleby, 24 Ohio St.3d 39, 41, 492
N.E.2d 831(1986). Thus, the standard of review for matters concerning visitation rights
is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio
St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028(1989); Corple v. Corple, 123 Ohio App.3d 31, 36, 702
N.E.2d 1234(1997). An abuse of discretion implies that “the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶38} In his motion, Appellant requested supervised visitation time with his adult
son Brian Hurst as the supervisor.
{¶39} Contemporaneously with the filing of the initial divorce action, Mother and
Appellant entered into a consent agreement granting Mother a Permanent Civil
Protection Order. (Motion to Amend Civil Protection Order, filed, Sept. 19, 2007, in Case
No. 07 DR 817, attached as Exhibit 5 to Appellant’s Brief). That order gave Appellant
visitation with his children under the supervision of Timothy Crowley, Brian Hurst, who is
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 12
the adult son of Appellant and Becky Hurst, who is the Appellant’s sister. The motion to
amend that order alleged that Appellant had showered with his then six-year-old
daughter. The motion further noted that Appellant had been indicted for pandering
obscenity involving a minor, illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or
performance.
{¶40} Appellant did not deny the showering incident that occurred during his
supervised time; rather he claimed that he was not naked while in the shower with both
the six-year-old daughter and his four-year-old son. He further contended that his sister,
Becky Hurst was present the entire time. (Appellant’s Brief at 3). Following that incident,
Appellant’s parenting time was modified so it took place at the Woodlands, a private
non-profit organization that provided supervised parenting time facilities. The
Woodlands no longer offers supervised parenting time facilities. At the hearing,
Appellant cited the report of the Guardian ad Litem filed April 24, 2008, which
recommended additional midweek visitation supervised at The Woodland and
unverified, unauthenticated documents titled “The Woodlands Family Connections
Center Visitation Observation Report” to support his request for visitation.3
{¶41} In reaching her conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of the
minor children to allow Appellant any parenting time with them at this point, the
magistrate made specific factual findings. As previously noted, however, in the case at
bar our review is limited to whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts
as set forth in the magistrate's decision.
3
The visitation observation reports were not admitted into evidence during the magistrate’s
hearing.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 13
The standard of review for matters concerning visitation rights is
whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth
(1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028; Corple v. Corple
(1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 31, 36, 702 N.E.2d 1234. An abuse of discretion
connotes that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5
OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140. In order to further the child's best interest, the
trial court has the discretion to limit or restrict visitation rights. Jannetti v.
Nichol (May 12, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 97 CA239, 2000 WL 652540.
“This includes the power to restrict the time and place of visitation, to
determine the conditions under which visitation will take place and to deny
visitation rights altogether if visitation would not be in the best interests of
the child.” Id.Anderson v. Anderson, 147 Ohio App.3d 513, 2002-Ohio-1156, 771 N.E.2d 303(7th
Dist.), ¶18.
{¶42} When ordering a modification of parenting time or visitation, the trial court
must consider the enumerated factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) as well as any other factor in
the child's best interest. Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218(1999).
{¶43} In her decision, the magistrate found,
The Magistrate finds Plaintiff's concerns about the Defendant's son
as a supervisor are reasonable. The Magistrate further finds that the
children's safety if left with the Defendant could not be ensured at this
time. This is in light of the fact that the Defendant's proposed supervisor is
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 14
his own son, an individual who the Magistrate finds would fail to provide
adequate supervision.
Aside from the Magistrate's concerns as to the Defendant's
proposed supervisor, the Magistrate finds it would not be in the best
interests of the minor children to allow the Defendant any time with them
at this point. The Magistrate finds that the Defendant does not seem to
appreciate the severity of his crimes or the very reasonable concerns the
Plaintiff has for the children's well being if subjected to the Defendant.
For example, the Plaintiff testified that during the Defendant's past
supervised parenting times, the Defendant would offer their six-year-old
daughter presents in exchange for her sucking her thumb in his presence.
The Magistrate finds that the Defendant did not deny having offered their
daughter gifts in exchange for the thumb sucking. The Magistrate finds
that it is completely inappropriate and downright creepy for a father to offer
his prepubescent daughter gifts in exchange for her allowing him to watch
her suck her thumb. The Magistrate finds this information to be incredibly
disturbing, especially in light of the Defendant's history of viewing child
pornography.
Further, the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant searched for
"incest" websites prior to his arrest.
Additionally, Terri Blankenship nka Engelman, a former girlfriend of
the Defendant, testified that the Defendant groomed her for sexual
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 15
exploits from the time she was very young. The Magistrate finds Ms.
Engelman's testimony on all issues to be credible.
Ms. Engelman testified that the Defendant took a special interest in
her from the time she was 9 or 10 years old. By the time she was 13 or 14,
the Defendant was complimenting [her] body, telling her she was a "true
woman" and "more mature" than other girls her age. By the time she was
15, the Defendant openly discussed his sexual attraction to her. The
Defendant purchased various adult toys for Ms. Engelman beginning
when she was 16. Such inappropriate behavior escalated until the
Defendant took Ms. Engelman's virginity.
Again, the Defendant did not contest the majority of Ms.
Engelman's testimony. Instead, he stated that he was attracted to younger
woman "just like most men are.”
The Magistrate finds that the Defendant does not seem to
understand how inappropriate and disturbing his behaviors are regarding
his own daughter and Ms. Engelman when she was a minor.
Pursuant to the parties' divorce decree, the Defendant was
prohibited from having any parenting time, and was further prohibited from
contacting the children via telephone. In consideration of the relevant and
credible evidence admitted into the record, coupled with the fact that the
Woodlands no longer offers supervised parenting facilities and the
supervisor suggested by the Defendant is inappropriate, the Magistrate
recommends the Court deny Defendant's request for parenting time.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 16
The Magistrate makes this recommendation in consideration of the
Defendant's past with child pornography, the fact that the Defendant
apparently feels no guilt or remorse for the child pornography, or the
showering with his young daughter during his supposedly supervised time,
and/or his offer of gifts in exchange for the girl sucking her thumb. The
Magistrate does not find any compelling reason to allow the Defendant
time with the children, but many, many reasons to deny his request.
{¶44} In reaching her conclusion to deny Appellant parenting time with the two
minor children at this point in time, the magistrate specifically noted, “ORC 3109.051(D)
has guided the Magistrate.”
{¶45} The magistrate’s decision was based upon competent credible evidence.
The magistrate reviewed the appropriate statutes and articulated the basis for her
decision. As previously noted, the factual findings of the magistrate are deemed
established and may not be attacked on appeal because Appellant did not provide a
transcript for the trial court in support of his objections to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶46} Upon review, we find that Appellant has failed to prove the trial court
abuse its discretion by adoption of the magistrate's decision not to grant Appellant
parenting time with the two minor children.
Contempt
{¶47} R.C. 2705.02 provides in pertinent part, “A person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished as for a contempt: (A) Disobedience of, or resistance to,
a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or an officer [.]”
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 17
{¶48} “The purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to secure the dignity of the
courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of justice...the purpose of
sanctions in a case of civil contempt is to coerce the contemnor in order to obtain
compliance with the lawful orders of the court.” Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio
St.2d 55, 58, 271 N.E.2d 815, 817(1971). (Citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
{¶49} The basis for the contempt action was the removal of property from the
marital residence by the Mother. The parties' divorce decree states that "the parties"
own the marital residence. The parties were awarded whatever personal property or
household goods were in their respective possession.
{¶50} At the hearing, Mother testified that she understood these terms of the
divorce decree to mean that since the house was jointly owned, they had equal right to
whatever was inside of the residence. At the time she removed the property from the
residence, Mother did not live in the residence, but neither did Appellant because he
was incarcerated.
{¶51} The magistrate found the Mother's interpretation of the divorce decree to
be a reasonable one. As such, the Magistrate found the Mother did not violate the terms
of the decree by removing items from the jointly titled marital home.
{¶52} Based upon consideration of the competent, credible and relevant
evidence adduced at hearing, the Magistrate found that the Appellant failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence a prima facie case of civil contempt against the Mother.
{¶53} If the contempt charge is premised on a party's failure to obey an order of
the court, then the order must be clear and definite, unambiguous and not subject to
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 18
dual interpretations, and the contemnor must have knowledge of the order. Chilcote v.
Gleason Constr. Co., 5th Dist. No. 01 COA01397, 2002–Ohio–746. An order that is
indefinite and uncertain cannot be enforced in contempt. In re Ayer, 119 Ohio App.3d
571,576, 695 N.E.2d 1180, 1183–1184(1st Dist. 1997). Because the language utilized in
the Final Decree of Divorce with regard to property left inside the residence is
ambiguous, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mother was not in
contempt of court.
{¶54} Appellant's assignment of error and the arguments made with respect to
the contempt action are based entirely on factual determinations, which may not be
challenged on appeal as no transcript was provided to the trial court.
{¶55} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled in their
entirety.
IV.
{¶56} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s fourth assignments of error in the following manner: the
magistrate violated Appellant’s fifth and fourteenth amendment right to parent his child.
{¶57} Initially we note a deficiency in Appellant’s appellate brief; it does not
comply with App.R.16 (A)(7), which provides,
The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and in
the order indicated, all of the following: * * * An argument containing the
contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error
presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 19
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.
{¶58} “If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not
this court's duty to root it out.” Thomas v. Harmon, 4th Dist. No. 08CA1 7, 2009-Ohio-
3299, ¶14, quoting State v. Carman, 8th Dist. No. 90512, 2008-Ohio-4368, ¶31. “It is not
the function of this court to construct a foundation for [an appellant's] claims; failure to
comply with the rules governing practice in the appellate courts is a tactic which is
ordinarily fatal.” Catanzarite v. Boswell, 9th Dist. No. 24184, 2009-Ohio-1211, ¶16,
quoting Kremer v. Cox, 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 60, 682 N.E.2d 1006 9th Dist. 1996).
Therefore, “[w]e may disregard any assignment of error that fails to present any
citations to case law or statutes in support of its assertions.” Frye v. Holzer Clinic, Inc.,
4th Dist. No. 07CA4, 2008-Ohio-2194, ¶12. See, also, App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2);
Albright v. Albright, 4th Dist. No. 06CA35, 2007-Ohio-3709, ¶16; Tally v. Patrick, 11th
Dist. No. 2008-T-0072, 2009-Ohio-1831, ¶¶ 21-22; Jarvis v. Stone, 9th Dist. No. 23904,
2008-Ohio-3313, ¶23; State v. Paulsen, 4th Dist. Nos. 09CA15, 09CA16, 2010-Ohio-
806, ¶6; State v. Norman, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-22, 2011-Ohio-596, ¶29; State v.
Untied, 5th Dist. No. CT20060005, 2007 WL 1122731, ¶141.
{¶59} According to App. R. 12(A)(2), "The court may disregard an assignment of
error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on
which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the
brief, as required under App. R. 16(A).” An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A)
in overruling or disregarding an assignment of error because of "the lack of briefing" on
the assignment of error. Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 519 N.E.2d 390, 392-
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 20
393(1988); Abon, Ltd. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 5th Dist. No. 2004-CA-0029, 2005
WL 1414486, ¶100; State v. Miller, 5th Dist. No. 04-COA-003, 2004-Ohio-4636, ¶41.
"Errors not treated in the brief will be regarded as having been abandoned by the party
who gave them birth.” Uncapher v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 351, 356,
188 N.E. 553, 555(1933).
{¶60} In the case at bar, Appellant has wholly failed to provide any explanation
concerning the legal reasons in support of his argument that the actions of the
magistrate have violated his constitutional rights.
{¶61} Upon divorce, the court is called upon to intervene and to mediate
because of the breakdown in relationships that has occurred. The objective of R.C.
3109.051 is to promote familial relationships by acknowledging and protecting the
parents' rights and also the rights of the children. Andrews v. Andrews, 12th Dist. No.
88-03-035, 1988 WL 125697(Nov. 28, 1988). In Andrews, the court observed,
This legislation represents an attempt to promote harmony and to
maintain relationships as they would have been had the divorce not
occurred. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to consider the rights
of children equally as important as those of the parents. Children are
entitled to protection from the law just as parents are. Boyer v. Boyer
(1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 83. Thus, there will be times when the rights of the
two are in competition such as when the issue of visitation arises.
***
The distinction made by R.C. 3109.05(B) is justifiable and proper as
it is necessary to allow children of divorced parents to have the same
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 21
chance at maintaining loving, nurturing relationships as those children
whose parents remain married. The state has a compelling interest in
assuring that the children of a broken marriage receive the attention and
care they would have received if the marriage and family had not been
drastically altered by the divorce action. See Hollingsworth v.
Hollingsworth (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 13, 16.
Therefore, we hold that R.C. 3109.05(B) is a constitutional statutory
means by which the state asserts a compelling governmental interest.
Id. at *2.
{¶62} The Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct.
2054,147 L.Ed.2d 49(2000), recognized that a parent's right to the care, custody, and
control of their children is perhaps the oldest fundamental right recognized by the
Court. Troxel at 65. It did not, however, hold such rights to be absolute and paramount
to all other rights. In fact, the plurality opinion in Troxel expressly refused to find specific
nonparent visitation statutes that infringe upon the parent's fundamental rights to be per
se unconstitutional. A parent's rights are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the
child. In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034(1979); In re B.L.,
supra, at ¶7. The record demonstrates that it is not in the children’s best interest for
Appellant to have visitation at this time. He was given a full evidentiary hearing before
his right to visitation was restricted.
{¶63} The state, by virtue of its police powers and the doctrine of parens patriae,
is invested with authority to regulate certain aspects of the family. In the instant case,
the state does not seek to compel Appellant to raise the children in a certain manner or
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 22
to divest him of his parental rights entirely; rather, the state has determined, after a
hearing and in accordance with specific statutory obligations, that it is in the best
interests of the child to have no visitation with Appellant at this time. Nothing prevents
Appellant from filing a motion to modify his rights in the trial court in the future.
{¶64} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.
V.
{¶65} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s fifth assignments of error in the following manner: the magistrate
was biased against him.
{¶66} Civ.R. 53(D)(6) provides that disqualification of a magistrate for bias or
other cause is within the discretion of the court. See also In re Disqualification of Wilson,
77 Ohio St.3d 1250, 1251, 674 N.E.2d 360 (1996). Accordingly, we will not reverse the
trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id.{¶67} The terms “bias” or “prejudice” refer to “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will
on the one hand, or undue friendship or favoritism on the other, toward one of the
litigants or his or her attorneys, with a formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the
part of a judge as distinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by
the law and the facts.” 22 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d 203, Courts and Judges, Section
126.(1988).
{¶68} We note that Appellant does not contend that the trial court was also
biased, nor does he argue that the trial court failed to independently review the
magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We therefore presume that the trial
court independently reviewed the magistrate's decision and found no bias or prejudice
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 23
because it overruled Appellant's objections, adopted the magistrate's decision as its
own, and ordered it into law.
{¶69} In his appellate brief, Appellant cites to portions of the transcript of the
hearing before the magistrate. However, Appellant failed to file a copy of that transcript
for review by the trial court. Further, in the case at bar, Appellant did not file a motion
with the court to have the magistrate removed. As Appellant failed to follow the proper
procedures for disqualification, he has waived any error. Hawk v. Hawk, 5th Dist. No.
2002AP040024, 2002-Ohio-4384, ¶23.
{¶70} In this case, the magistrate made apparent efforts to act in all fairness
towards both parties. After reviewing the record, we find that no bias against Appellant
by the magistrate. Our review of the record establishes that the magistrate did allow
both sides to fully present testimony, and showed no evidence of bias.
{¶71} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.
VI.
{¶72} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s sixth assignments of error in the following manner: the decision
to deny Appellant visitation with the minor children violated double jeopardy principles.
{¶73} Appellant did not raise this argument in his Objections to the Magistrate’s
Decision.
{¶74} It is well established that “if a party fails to object to a conclusion of law or
finding of fact issued by a magistrate, pursuant to Civ.R. 53, the party is precluded from
raising the issues on appeal.” Koeller v. Koeller, 12th Dist. No. CA2006–04–009, 2007–
Ohio–2998, ¶15; Heath v. Heath, 3rd Dist. No. 14-99-44, 2000-Ohio-1653. Accordingly,
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 24
because he did not raise an objection based upon double jeopardy principals, Appellant
has waived that argument on appeal. Appellant would fair no better even if he had
raised a double jeopardy argument.
{¶75} The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions
prohibit, among other things, multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. State
v. Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d 593, 595, 597, 709 N.E.2d 1200 (1999); Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). Double jeopardy can
be implicated by a prior civil sanction that is so punitive, in either purpose or effect, as to
negate its statutory remedial denomination. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–
249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). See also State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d
398, 2002–Ohio–6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 20.
In Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the two-part test for determining
whether a particular penalty is a “criminal punishment” for double jeopardy
purposes that was set forth in United States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242,
248–249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742. Under this test, the first
question to be answered is “whether the legislature, ‘in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference
for one label or the other.’” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139
L.Ed.2d 450, quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d
742. Second, even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, the United States Supreme Court has
inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in purpose
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 25
or effect as to transform what was clearly intended to be a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139
L.Ed.2d 450; State v. Uskert (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 593, 597, 709 N.E.2d
1200.
***
Because the answer under the first part of the Hudson test is that
the penalty in question is civil, we must proceed to the second prong of
the test, which requires us to ask whether [the statute] is so punitive in
purpose or effect that it amounts to a criminal penalty. “‘[O]nly the clearest
proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at
100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, 100
S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742.
In analyzing this second part of the test, the Hudson court stated
that it is helpful to refer to the seven guidelines set forth in Kennedy v.
Mendoza–Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9
L.Ed.2d 644, which include questions such as “[w]hether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint” and “whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100,
118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450. In this case however, there is no need to
resort to the Mendoza–Martinez factors.
State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, ¶18, 20, 21.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 26
{¶76} In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant visitation
does not extinguish Appellant’s parental rights. Nor does the decision prohibit Appellant
from seeking a modification of the order in the future. Double jeopardy principles are not
offended by the denial of a motion to modify parenting or visitation time. A decision
cornering whether to modify parenting time and is not regarded as a criminal
punishment.
{¶77} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.
VII.
{¶78} After reviewing Appellant’s brief including his contentions, we have
interpreted Appellant’s seventh assignment of error in the following manner: Appellant
was denied equal protection because the magistrate decided a similar case in a
different manner.
{¶79} It is well established that “if a party fails to object to a conclusion of law or
finding of fact issued by a magistrate, pursuant to Civ.R. 53, the party is precluded from
raising the issues on appeal.” Koeller v. Koeller, 12th Dist. No. CA2006–04–009, 2007–
Ohio–2998, ¶15; Heath v. Heath, 3rd Dist. No. 14-99-44, 2000-Ohio-1653. Accordingly,
because he did not raise an objection based upon equal protection principals, Appellant
has waived that argument on appeal. Appellant would fair no better even if he had
raised an equal protection argument.
{¶80} Appellant has submitted an unverified, unauthenticated decision of the
magistrate from a separate case. Appellant argues that the magistrate granted visitation
rights to the Father in that case even though the Father was convicted of importuning
and unlawful sexual contact with a minor.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 27
{¶81} A trial court can take judicial notice of the court's docket. Helfrich v.
Madison, 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-150, 2009-Ohio-5140, ¶49, citing State v. Washington,
8th Dist Nos. 52676, 52677, 52678, 1997 WL 16180(Aug. 27, 1987). However, a court
does not have the authority to take judicial notice of the proceedings in another case,
including its own judgment entries. Id., citing State v. LaFever, 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 71,
2003-Ohio-6545, ¶27; State v. Blaine, 4th Dist. No. 03CA9, 2004-Ohio-1241, ¶17;
Diversified Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Revision, 7 Ohio App.3d 157,
454 N.E.2d 1330(4th Dist. 1982); NorthPoint Properties, Inc. v. Petticord, 179 Ohio
App.3d 342, 2008-Ohio-5996, 901 N.E.2d 869(8th Dist.), ¶16. The rationale for this
holding is that if a trial court takes notice of a prior proceeding, the appellate court
cannot review whether the trial court correctly interpreted the prior case because the
record of the prior case is not before the appellate court. Id., citing Blaine, supra, ¶17;
LaFever, supra, ¶27; Buoscio, supra, ¶34.
{¶82} In State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van, 36 Ohio St.3d 168, 522 N.E.2d 524(1988), the Supreme Court noted,
The general rule is that “an appellate court will not consider any
error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment
could have called but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time
when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.”
State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56 [236 N.E.2d 545] [43 O.O.2d
119], paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St.
471 [166 N.E.2d 379] [11 O.O.2d 215], paragraph one of the syllabus;
State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 [267 N.E.2d 291] [54 O.O.2d
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 28
222], paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio
St.2d 112, 117 [364 N.E.2d 1364] [5 O.O.3d 98]. Likewise, “[c]onstitutional
rights may be lost as finally as any others by a failure to assert them at the
proper time.” State v. Childs, supra, [14 Ohio St.2d], at 62 [236 N.E.2d
545], citing State v. Davis (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 28 [203 N.E.2d 357] [30
O.O.2d 16]; State, ex rel. Specht, v. Bd. of Edn. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d
178, 182 [420 N.E.2d 1004] [20 O.O.3d 191], citing Clarington v. Althar
(1930), 122 Ohio St. 608 [174 N.E. 251], and Toledo v. Gfell (1958), 107
Ohio App. 93, 95 [156 N.E.2d 752] [7 O.O.2d 437]. [Footnote omitted.]
36 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 522 N.E.2d 524; See also, State v. Chandler, 157 Ohio App.3d
672, 813 N.E.2d 65, 2004-Ohio-3436, ¶72; State v. Hughett, 5th Dist. No. 04 CAA
06051, 2004-Ohio-6207, ¶58.
{¶83} As the United States Supreme Court observed in Puckett v. United States,
526 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266, (2009),
If an error is not properly preserved, appellate-court authority to
remedy the error (by reversing the judgment, for example, or ordering a
new trial) is strictly circumscribed. There is good reason for this; “anyone
familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a constant in
the trial process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive
inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error
would be fatal.”
556 U.S. at 134. (Citation omitted).
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 29
{¶84} Appellant made no equal protection argument in his objections to the
magistrate’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court had no opportunity to address this
argument. Nor was the record of the case to which Appellant alludes submitted to the
trial court with Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s opinion. Accordingly, the trial
court in this case had no admissible evidence before it concerning the proceedings to
which the Appellant alludes. Appellant would fair no better had he raised an equal
protection argument in the trial court.
{¶85} “The Equal Protection Clauses require that all similarly situated individuals
be treated in a similar manner.” Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d
122, 882 N.E.2d 400, 2008–Ohio–511, ¶ 90, citing McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107
Ohio St.3d 272, 839 N.E.2d 1, 2005–Ohio–6505, ¶ 6. See, also, City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313(1985) (stating
that the Equal Protection clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike”). In other words, “‘[t]he equal protection of law implies
that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for both relief and defense under
like conditions, with like protection, and without discrimination.’” Conley v. Shearer, 64
Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 595 N.E.2d 862, 1992–Ohio–133, quoting Sexton v. Barry, 233
F.2d 220, 224(6th Cir 1956).
{¶86} However,
“[t]he equal protection clause does not reject the government's
ability to classify persons or ‘draw lines’ in the creation and application of
laws, but it does guarantee that those classifications will not be based
upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 30
individuals. If the government classification relates to a proper
governmental purpose, then the classification will be upheld. Such a
classification does not violate the guarantee when it distinguishes persons
as ‘dissimilar’ upon some permissible basis in order to advance the
legitimate interests of society. Those who are treated less favorably by the
legislation are not denied equal protection of the law because they are not
similarly situated to those who receive the benefit of the legislative
classification.”
Clark v. Joseph, 95 Ohio App.3d 207, 211, 692 N.E.2d 36, quoting Nowak & Rotunda,
Constitutional Law, 570, Section 14.2(4th Ed. 1991).
{¶87} Thus, an equal protection claim arises only in the context of an
unconstitutional classification made by a state, i.e., when similarly situated individuals
are treated differently. Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288–289, 595 N.E.2d
862(1992). A law that operates identically on all people under like circumstances will not
give rise to an equal protection violation. Conley at 289, 595 N.E.2d 862.
{¶88} The fact that trial courts may come to different conclusions in different
cases based upon different facts is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In re
B.L., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1108, 2005-Ohio-1151, ¶17. The Supreme Court in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147, 147 L.Ed.2d 49(2000), recognized that a
parent's right to the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest
fundamental right recognized by the Court. Troxel at 65. It did not, however, hold such
rights to be absolute and paramount to all other rights. In fact, the plurality opinion
in Troxel expressly refused to find specific nonparent visitation statutes that infringe
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 31
upon the parent's fundamental rights to be per se unconstitutional. A parent's rights are
always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child. In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d
100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034(1979); In re B.L., supra, at ¶7. The record demonstrates that
it is not in the children’s best interest for Appellant to have visitation at this time.
{¶89} The state, by virtue of its police powers and the doctrine of parens patriae,
is invested with authority to regulate certain aspects of the family. In the instant case,
the state does not seek to compel Appellant to raise the children in a certain manner;
rather, the state has determined, after a hearing and in accordance with specific
statutory obligations, that it is in the best interests of the child to have no visitation with
Appellant at this time. Appellant has not been divested of his parental rights. Nothing
prevents Appellant from filing a motion to modify his rights in the trial court in the future.
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-70 32
{¶90} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.
{¶91} For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Hoffman, J., and
Farmer, J., concur
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
_________________________________
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
WSG:clw 0614
[Cite as Hurst v. Hurst, 2013-Ohio-2674.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WENDY M. HURST (RAMSEY) :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
MARK E. HURST :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 12-CA-70
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division is affirmed.
Costs to appellant.
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
_________________________________
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER