DocketNumber: No. 22304.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 4396
Judges: BROGAN, J.
Filed Date: 8/29/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} The record indicates that Masden was injured during an altercation in October 2005 when he was sent to work at a new Sam's Club construction site in Utica, Michigan at the direction of his employer, CCI. Masden was hired as a carpenter by CCI in early 2005. During his employment with CCI, Masden worked at various work sites, both within and outside of Ohio at the direction of his employer. In October 2005, CCI assigned Masden and his crew to work at a site in Utica, Michigan. The crew was composed of four members: Christopher Masden, his brother, Charles Masden, Jerry Keating, and Chad Demory. Masden was required to lodge at the Best Value Inn, located approximately one mile from the Sam's Club work site. According to Masden, the motel was a less than desirable location where there was a presence of a prostitute living on the premise and excessive drinking among the lodgers. The motel was selected and paid for by CCI, and it was necessary for Masden to lodge there because the Best Inn was the only motel for which CCI would pay.
{¶ 3} On the night of the injury after a full workday, Christopher and Charles Masden heard a commotion outside their door, and Charles Masden got out of bed and opened his door. A man who lived next door was drinking and arguing with another woman outside their door. Charles Masden told them to take it somewhere else so they could get a good night's rest. In response, the man took a swing at Charles Masden with a beer bottle but missed. A fight ensued between the two men and ended up in the man's room. Shortly thereafter, Masden joined in to help pull the man off his brother. During the scuffle, the man became unconscious, and appellee and his brother left the *Page 3 unconscious man under the bed and closed his door. Concerned about the safety of the crew members, Masden told the other crew members, Jerry Keating and Chad Demory about the altercation and that they needed to pack up and leave the motel. While the crew members were packing, the roommate of the unconscious man called appellee at his room and asked about his roommate. Masden told him that he should go check up on his roommate as he was not in good condition. Moments later, Masden encountered the confrontational, knife-wielding roommate at the end of the walkway. When Charles Masden stepped out and saw the knife in the very angry roommate's hand, Charles charged toward the knife-wielding roommate and attempted to take the knife away from him. Appellee, Keating, and Demory joined to help disarm the roommate. During this second altercation, the unconscious man woke up and joined in the scuffle. At some point while Masden was attempting to pull his brother out of the man's room, Charles Masden was hit in the head with a beer bottle, and as Masden tried to throw the bottle back, he noticed he could not move his arm. He then went to his room to get his gun. Once the other two men saw Masden with the gun, both men ran off.
{¶ 4} Police arrived at the motel, but made no charges against the four crew members, and they were all released. However, records indicate that the two unidentified men, one of whom was on parole, were put in jail. No crew member was disciplined or terminated as a result of this incident.
{¶ 5} Appellee filed a claim with the Bureau of Worker's Compensation for the shoulder rotator cuff tear he sustained in the October 2005 incident. After a hearing on March 15, 2006, a district hearing officer found that Appellee did not sustain an injury "in *Page 4
the course of" and "arising out of" employment. Appellee then appealed that determination, and a staff hearing officer confirmed the order. Appellee next appealed the decision to the Industrial Commission which refused the appeal. Appellee filed an appeal, challenging the denial of his worker's compensation claim, to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. After Masden filed his complaint requesting participation in the fund, CCI answered and raised the defense that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to R.C.
*Page 5I. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANT WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS UNDISPUTED THAT APPELLEE'S INJURY LACKED THE REQUISITE NEXUS TO HIS EMPLOYMENT TO BE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT."
II. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON OHIO LAW REGARDING WHEN AND WHETHER ASSAULTS BY THIRD PARTIES ARE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT."
III. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR CHANGE VENUE."
IV. "THE JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶ 7} To be compensable for an injury under Ohio Worker's Compensation Act, both prongs of the test in R.C.
1. "In the Course of"
{¶ 8} As the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in Fisher, in analyzing the first requirement that an injury be sustained "in the course of" employment, the court must consider factors such as time, place, and circumstances of the injury to determine the existence of a nexus between the employment and injurious activity.
{¶ 9} Applying this standard liberally construed in favor of the employee, the Eighth Appellate District in Duncan v. Ohio Blow PipeCo. (1998),
{¶ 10} Ohio also recognizes the traveling employee doctrine.Pascarella v. ABX Air, Inc. (August 10, 1998), Clinton App. No. CA98-01-002,
{¶ 11} CCI contends that because the injury occurred while Masden was off duty and on a premise which the employer had no control over, and the fight had no relationship to the employment with CCI, Masden did not sustain his injury "in the *Page 8
course" of his employment. In support of his argument, CCI citesKemper v. Daugherty (Feb. 11, 1982), Lorain App. No. 3125,
{¶ 12} The nature of Masden's employment with CCI required him to be at different construction sites, therefore making Appellee a traveling employee. As a traveling employee, Masden would be in the course of his employment the entire time he was traveling except when he was on a personal errand. Moreover, Masden was not on a personal errand when he was injured as he was only trying to get the necessary rest he needed for the next workday and protect the safety of his crew members when the incident occurred. Rather, the injury sustained had its origin in a risk created by the necessity of sleeping away from home. As pointed out by the Eighth Appellate District in Duncan,
2. "Arising out of"
{¶ 13} "Whether there is a sufficient `causal connection' between an employee's injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including the (1) proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment; (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident; and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident." Lord v. Daugherty (1981),
{¶ 14} If a claimant cannot satisfy the "arising out of" prong under the totality-of-the-circumstance test, the claimant is not foreclosed from recovery. There are alternate methods such as the "special hazard rule" to prove a causal connection and satisfy the requirement that injury arises out of employment. Luketic v. University Circle, Inc.
(1999),
{¶ 15} In Duncan,
{¶ 16} "Applying these factors to the instant case does not support a causal connection between appellant's injury and his employment with OBP. The accident occurred anywhere from five to six miles from the plant site on a highway over which OBP had no control. Although a semantic argument to the contrary can be made, an equally plausible argument can be made that OBP did not derive any benefit from appellant's presence at the scene of the accident. Nonetheless, theRuckman court found that the inability to satisfy the Lord test did not foreclose recovery if the injured employee could demonstrate that the employment relationship exposed the employee to a risk quantitatively greater than the risks common to the public. Known as the `special *Page 11
hazard rule,' this rule has a purpose similar to that of the coming-and-going rule. Ruckman at 123,
{¶ 17} "The same can be said of appellant in this case. Appellant, at the direction of his employer, traveled to an employment assignment in another state and stayed in a hotel for the duration of the assignment. OBP assumed that appellant would need to eat while there and provided not only a meal allowance for that purpose but also transportation.As a consequence, appellant's exposure to the risks associated withtravel were quantitatively greater than that of the general public, who,most likely, would not be traveling to a restaurant for each of itsdaily meals. Since appellant's injuries were caused by a hazard of his employment, it necessarily follows that his injuries arose out of his employment." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} Applying the three factors of the totality of circumstances test does support a causal connection between Masden's injury and his employment with CCI. First, Best Inn, the place of the incident, was in a convenient location within 10-15 minutes driving distance from the work site, a proximate distance from the work site. Second, although CCI did not have direct control over the ownership or management of the motel, CCI selected and paid for this particular motel among other lodging facilities in the Utica area and required Masden to be in Michigan for the Sam's Club project. Finally, the employer received a benefit by having Masden present at the scene of the accident. The records support that Dave Morris, the supervisory person at CCI, told Masden that he could be reimbursed for lodging only if he stayed at the Best Inn due to CCI's losing money on *Page 12 the Sam's Club project. Accordingly, Masden did not have much of a choice but to stay at this inexpensive lodging facility. Having Masden and his crew stay at the cheaper motel chosen by CCI was a benefit to CCI. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the injury "arose out of" employment.
{¶ 19} CCI contends that the special hazard rule should not apply to the facts of this case because this rule is confined only to traffic injuries. We disagree with this argument. The Eighth Appellate District applied the special hazard rule to compensate for injuries sustained not in a traffic accident but while a university police officer was apprehending a felon during off duty hours out of his jurisdiction.Luketic v. University Circle, Inc. (1999),
{¶ 20} In applying the special hazard rule, Masden would not have been lodging at the Best Inn in Michigan at the time of the incident, but for his employment with CCI, thus satisfying the first prong of the test. Moreover, staying at an inexpensive motel presents a greater risk of being assaulted. Other jurisdictions have held that staying at a *Page 13
motel has an increased risk than that of the general public: "[t]he hazard to which plaintiff in this case was exposed, assault and robbery, was not something to which he would have been equally exposed apart from his employment-required travel, that necessitated plaintiff's stay in an inexpensive motel located in unfamiliar surroundings." Ramsey v. S.Indus. Constructors Inc. (2006),
{¶ 21} Because we find substantial competent evidence that Appellant's injuries occurred "in the course of" and "arising out of "his employment with CCI, the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict for Appellant. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} "The general rule is that no compensation is recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Acts for injuries sustained through horseplay or fooling which was done independently of, and disconnected from, the performance of any duty of the employment, since such injuries do not arise out of the employment within the meaning of the acts." Indus.Comm. of Ohio v. Bankes (1934),
{¶ 24} While it is true that a fight was involved in this case, a mere fight does not automatically invite the application of the general rule that injuries sustained in a fight are not compensable. The records indicate that the "fight" was initiated not out of purely private and personal reasons but only arose as a chain of events when Charles Masden told another lodger to take his argument to another place so that he and his brother *Page 15 could get the necessary rest for their next workday. Because workers' compensation claims are fact specific, instructing the jury on the fighting is likely to confuse the jurors, especially when the general fighting rule does not completely fit to the particular facts of our case.
{¶ 25} Appellant also contends that the trial court erroneously dispensed of the causal relationship requirement when the instruction used the word, "encountered." However, the wording of the jury instruction was sufficient to inform the jury of the proper parameter of the special hazard exception to the coming-and-going rule. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 28} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
i. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*Page 1WOLFF, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Jean Barnes Collections v. Elston , 413 So. 2d 797 ( 1982 )
Industrial Comm. v. Bankes , 127 Ohio St. 517 ( 1934 )
Jaworowski v. Med. Radiation Consultants , 71 Ohio App. 3d 320 ( 1991 )
Knox v. Obwc , 125 Ohio App. 3d 313 ( 1998 )
Luketic v. University Circle, Inc. , 134 Ohio App. 3d 217 ( 1999 )
Kerr v. OhioHealth Corp. , 2022 Ohio 2697 ( 2022 )
Woodard v. Cassens Transport Co. , 2012 Ohio 4015 ( 2012 )
Taylor v. Meijer, Inc. , 2009 Ohio 1966 ( 2009 )
Griffith v. Miamisburg, 08ap-557 (12-16-2008) , 2008 Ohio 6611 ( 2008 )
Callahan v. Proctor Gamble Co., 1-08-19 (9-29-2008) , 2008 Ohio 4954 ( 2008 )