State v. Brown

[Cite as State v. Brown, 2010-Ohio-4546.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-10-12
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
JEFFREY E. BROWN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRD 0910285
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 27, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Jeffrey E. Brown, Appellant
Jason D. Warner, for Appellee
Case No. 9-10-12
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey E. Brown, appeals the judgment of the
Marion Municipal Court convicting him of failure to wear a safety belt pursuant to
R.C. 4513.263, and ordering him to pay a fine of $30 plus costs. On appeal,
Brown argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
citation on the basis that R.C. 4513.263 was unconstitutional; that the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction; that his conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence; and, that the trial court failed to
conduct a “meaningful review” of his motion. Based upon the following, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} In November 2009, a law enforcement officer cited Brown for
failure to wear a safety belt in violation of R.C. 4513.263, a minor misdemeanor,
after executing a traffic stop of his vehicle. Thereafter, Brown entered a not guilty
plea to the citation.
{¶3} In December 2009, Brown, acting pro se, moved the trial court to
dismiss the citation on the basis that R.C. 4513.263 was unconstitutional pursuant
to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the
“comparable” provisions of the Ohio Constitution, because it violated his right to
self-determination and privacy, was wholly arbitrary, and was unsupported by any
rational basis.
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{¶4} In January 2010, following a hearing, the trial court overruled
Brown’s motion to dismiss, found him guilty of failure to wear a safety belt, and
ordered him to pay a $30 fine plus costs.
{¶5} It is from the judgment overruling his motion to dismiss that Brown
appeals, presenting the following pro se assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY DENYING THE DEFENDANTS [SIC]
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AS OPPOSING COUNSEL FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A PROPER LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM
WHICH SUCH A DECISION COULD BE MADE. THAT
[SIC] THE DECISION REACHED BY THE TRIAL COURT
WAS UNSUPPORTED AND CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AS IT FAILED TO CONDUCT A
MEANINGFUL REVIEW.
{¶6} Due to the nature of Brown’s arguments, we elect to discuss his
second and third assignments of error together.
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Brown contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by overruling his motion to dismiss. Specifically, he argues
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that R.C. 4513.263 is unconstitutional pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the “comparable” provisions of
the Ohio Constitution, because it deprives citizens of their rights to make medical
decisions for themselves; because there is no rational basis for the safety belt
requirement; because the statute is arbitrary and selectively enforced; and, because
the statute is overbroad. The State and Amicus Curiae, the Ohio Attorney
General, respond to Brown’s first assignment of error that other courts in Ohio
have found that the safety belt statute is constitutional; that no court in the nation
has found a state’s safety belt statute to be unconstitutional; that driving a car is a
privilege and not a fundamental right; and, that the safety belt statute is
constitutional because it is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose and is a
constitutional exercise of the state’s power.
{¶8} Initially, we note that the State points out that Brown failed to
provide transcripts of the proceedings to this Court and argues that, consequently,
we cannot consider his arguments. App.R. 9 requires an appellant to provide the
appellate court with transcripts of the proceedings that are necessary to review the
merits of his appeal. App.R. 9(B). However, a determination of the
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. See State v. Stallings, 150 Ohio
App.3d 5, 2002-Ohio-5942, ¶6; Akron v. Callaway, 162 Ohio App.3d 781, 2005-
Ohio-4095, ¶23. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, an independent review,
without deference to the lower court’s decision. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util.
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Comm. of Ohio (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147. Because the only issue before us
in Brown’s first assignment of error is a question of law, and because Brown set
forth his legal argument in his motion to dismiss, which is part of the record, we
find that the transcripts of the proceeding are unnecessary for our review of this
argument. Accordingly, we will address Brown’s first assignment of error.
{¶9} “An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be
constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are
clearly incompatible.” State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St.
142, paragraph one of the syllabus. “That presumption of validity of such
legislative enactment cannot be overcome unless it appear[s] that there is a clear
conflict between the legislation in question and some particular provision or
provisions of the Constitution.” Xenia v. Schmidt (1920), 101 Ohio St. 437,
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} A statute may be challenged on constitutional grounds in two ways:
(1) that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, or (2) that it is unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-
5334, ¶37, citing Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329,
paragraph four of the syllabus. To mount a successful facial challenge, the party
challenging the statute must demonstrate that there is no set of facts or
circumstances under which the statute can be upheld. Id., citing United States v.
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Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745. Where it is claimed that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied, the challenger must present clear and convincing
evidence of a presently existing set of facts that make the statute unconstitutional
and void when applied to those facts. Id. at ¶38, citing Belden, 143 Ohio St. 329,
at paragraph six of the syllabus.
{¶11} Here, Brown has argued that R.C. 4513.263 is unconstitutional under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as
the “comparable” provision of the Ohio Constitution. We interpret this language
to mean Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Additionally, it appears that
Brown is arguing that the statute is facially invalid.
{¶12} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
{¶13} Additionally, Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides,
in pertinent part:
All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.
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{¶14} Despite these guarantees, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
recognized that, “‘[u]nder the decisions of the United States, and of this state, it is
held that the inalienable rights given to the citizens of this state in Article I of the
Ohio Constitution, and the equal protection and benefit guaranteed them in that
document as well as in the federal Constitution, do not render the citizens immune
from the operation of the police power.’” State v. Johnson (July 7, 2000), 4th
Dist. No. 99CA29, 2000 WL 1005804, quoting Holsman v. Thomas (1925), 112
Ohio St. 397, 404. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that operating a
vehicle is a privilege, and not a fundamental right. Maumee v. Gabriel (1988), 35
Ohio St.3d 60, 62-63.
{¶15} Multiple courts in Ohio have examined R.C. 4513.263 and have
determined that the statute is a constitutional exercise of the police power and does
not violate the Due Process Clause. See State v. Bigley, 9th Dist. No. 02CA0017-
M, 2002-Ohio-4149, ¶11, fn. 1; Johnson, supra; State v. Bradfield (August 10,
1990), 6th Dist. No. S-89-33; State v. Batsch (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 81, 82. In
Batsch, the Eleventh Appellate District examined an argument similar to Brown’s
and concluded that R.C. 4513.263 was not an unreasonable extension of the police
power or in violation of the Due Process Clause. In reaching its conclusion, the
Eleventh District reasoned that:
the wearing of a seat belt secures a driver in his seat making it
easier for him to retain control of his motor vehicle and thus
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reducing the chances that sudden emergencies on the road may
cause him to lose control of his vehicle and collide with other
vehicles.
Batsch, 44 Ohio App.3d at 82. See, also, State v. Krohn (Oct. 18, 1996), 11th Dist.
No. 96-G-1970, 1996 WL 648735.
{¶16} We concur with the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Appellate
districts and find that R.C. 4513.263 is constitutional for the reasons set forth in
Batsch. In doing so, we find the quotation from the Batsch decision set forth
above to be particularly persuasive in that it demonstrates that the seat-belt law
does not merely implicate the personal freedom and “rights” of the person
choosing not to wear the belt, but also impacts the personal safety and welfare of
other citizens, drivers, and pedestrians who are placed in harm’s way by virtue of
the appellant’s choice not to wear his own safety belt. Consequently, we find that
the trial court did not err in overruling Brown’s motion to dismiss and in
convicting him of failure to wear a safety belt.
{¶17} Accordingly, we overrule Brown’s first assignment of error.
Assignments of Error Nos. II and III
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Brown contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to dismiss because the State
failed to demonstrate the constitutionality of R.C. 4513.263 by use of any legal
authority, making the trial court’s decision unsupported by sufficient evidence and
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In his third assignment of error,
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Brown contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because it failed
to conduct a “meaningful review” of his case, as the only response from the bench
was the statement “motion denied” and the corresponding notation on the
judgment entry.
{¶19} In response to Brown’s second and third assignments of error, the
State again points out that Brown failed to provide transcripts of the proceedings
to this Court, and that, consequently, we cannot consider these assignments of
error. As stated in our analysis of Brown’s first assignment of error, under App.R.
9(B), the appellant bears the burden of furnishing a record to the appellate court
that sufficiently discloses the error of which he complains. See State v. Deal, 3d
Dist. No. 5-08-15, 2008-Ohio-5408, ¶7. In his second and third assignments of
error, Brown has made arguments specifically relating to the hearing on his
motion to dismiss. As he has not provided this Court with a transcript of the
hearing necessary to resolve these assignments of error, we must presume validity
of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm. See App.R. 9(B); Knapp v. Edwards
Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199.
{¶20} Accordingly, we overrule Brown’s second and third assignments of
error.
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
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PRESTON, J., concurs.
/jnc
ROGERS, J., dissents.
{¶22} I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
{¶23} Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Additionally, Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees citizens the
inalienable rights of “enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and
safety.”
{¶24} The term “liberty,” as used in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, has been defined as “‘the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of
the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.’” Preterm Cleveland v.
Voinovich (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 684, 691, quoting Palmer v. Tingle (1896), 55
Ohio St. 423, 441; see, also, State v. Betts (1969), 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 177.
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{¶25} In Betts, supra, to which Brown refers in his appellate brief, the
Franklin County Municipal Court found unconstitutional R.C. 4511.53, which
required motorcyclists travelling on a highway to wear a helmet and protective
eyewear. The court reasoned that the only discernible risk to the public welfare
was that a motorcyclist could be struck on the bare head by an object, lose control
of his motorcycle, and become a hazard to other users of the highway, 21 Ohio
Misc. at 182-83, and that this risk was, at best, remote. As the public risk was
very remote, the Betts court reasoned that the statute bore no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and, consequently, was
beyond the police power and in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶26} I would find that the statute requiring use of safety belts similarly
bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. I do not find that the possibilities that the use of safety belts could save
taxpayer money by preventing long-term care of injured persons at taxpayer
expense, or that it could possibly prevent collisions by making it easier for a driver
to retain control of his vehicle in an emergency are substantial enough reasons to
invoke a proper exercise of the state’s police power at the expense of individual
liberty.
{¶27} There is no constitutional mandate that the state accept responsibility
for the health care of individuals injured by their own actions or inactions.
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Therefore, to impose a limitation on individual freedom of action that has not and
cannot be scientifically justified is unreasonable. Further, to accept the
proposition that the use of safety belts might make it easier for the driver to
maintain control of the vehicle during an emergency requires an incredible amount
of speculation in which the courts should not engage.
{¶28} As quoted in Betts, “‘[t]here is too much nonsensical regulation of
purely personal affairs in to-day’s government. Liberty is almost unknown. You
are permitted to take it in homeopathic doses when administered by some
commission or court, but what that measure of liberty may be you cannot tell until
this court decides. It is high time we were going back to the Constitution, instead
of going back on the Constitution.’” 21 Ohio Misc. at 184, quoting Celina &
Mercer Cty. Telephone Co. v. Union-Center Mut. Telephone Assn. (1921), 102
Ohio St. 487, 523 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Judge Riley in 1969
noted the above quote from 1921. What would our predecessors think of our
United States today?
{¶29} Finally, I would note that the thoughtful and well-written Betts
decision related to the statute mandating use of helmets by the operators of
motorcycles, which was quickly repealed. Surely any danger of physical injury is
much more obvious to motorcyclists than to drivers of automobiles who are
surrounded by tons of metal and safety equipment, which today includes air bags.
This leads me to the conclusion that, if helmets are not required for motorcyclists,
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safety belts should not be required for automobiles; and that such requirements are
politically motivated, not scientifically justified.
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