State v. Arnwine

[Cite as State v. Arnwine, 2022-Ohio-3186.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
WYANDOT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 16-21-04
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
CHERIA J. ARNWINE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 20-CR-0125
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 12, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Erin M. Branham for Appellant
Douglas D. Rowland for Appellee
Case No. 16-21-04
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Cheria J. Arnwine (“Arnwine”) brings this appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot County accepting her
guilty pleas to Aggravated Vehicular Assault, Improperly Handling a Firearm in a
Motor Vehicle and Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, and
sentencing her for those convictions. On appeal, Arnwine claims that 1) the trial
court failed to comply with Criminal Rule 11; 2) the trial court erred accepting the
guilty plea when Arnwine lacked the requisite mens rea for the improper handling
of a firearm in a motor vehicle charge; and 3) the trial court should have permitted
Arnwine to withdraw her guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment
is affirmed.
{¶2} On October 24, 2021, Arnwine was involved in a traffic accident. She
was eventually placed in the patrol car, where the officer noticed the odor of an
alcoholic beverage on her person. The officer then conducted field-sobriety tests
on Arnwine. Additionally, a search of her vehicle produced a firearm secured in a
lockbox and inside a duffel bag. On November 18, 2020, the Wyandot County
Grand Jury indicted Arnwine on five counts: 1) Aggravated Vehicular Assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third degree; 2) Aggravated
Vehicular Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third
degree; 3) Improper Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C.
2923.16(B), a felony of the fourth degree; 4) Improper Handling Firearms in a
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Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), a felony of the fifth degree; and
5) Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drug of Abuse
in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Doc. 1.
On July 13, 2021, Arnwine entered pleas of guilty to Count One, Aggravated
Vehicular Assault, Count Four, Improper Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle,
and Count Five, Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or
Drug of Abuse, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Doc. 30. In exchange for the
guilty pleas, the State agreed to dismiss Counts Two and Three. Doc. 30.
{¶3} A change of plea hearing was held on July 13, 2021. Doc. 31.
Following the Criminal Rule 11 dialogue, the trial court accepted Arnwine’s guilty
pleas and, after a presentation of facts by the State found Arnwine guilty of Counts
One, Four, and Five, and dismissed Counts Two and Three. July 13, 2021 Tr. 17.
The trial court then found Arnwine guilty of Counts One, Four, and Five. Doc. 31
at 5.
{¶4} The sentencing hearing was held on September 22, 2021. Doc. 34. The
judgment entry noted that Counts Two and Three were previously dismissed. Doc.
34 at 2. The trial court sentenced Arnwine to 36 months in prison as to Count One,
11 months in prison as to Count Four, and 160 days in the Wyandot County Jail as
to Count Five, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Doc. 34 at 5. Arnwine
filed a notice of appeal. On January 7, 2022, Arnwine filed a motion to withdraw
her plea. Doc. 46. The trial court overruled the motion on March 15, 2022. Doc.
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54. On March 29, 2022, Arnwine filed a motion to amend her notice of appeal to
include the judgment on her motion to withdraw her plea. This Court granted that
motion on April 6, 2022. On appeal, Arnwine raises the following assignments of
error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it accepted [Arnwine’s] guilty plea
after failing to notify [Arnwine] of the maximum penalties and
ineligibility for probation during the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in accepting [Arnwine’s] plea agreement
where she lacked the requisite mens rea for the for improper
handling charge.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in denying [Arnwine’s] motion to withdraw
[her] plea where [Arnwine] was denied her rights to the effective
assistance of counsel and due process as guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Acceptance of Plea
{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Arnwine alleges that the trial court
failed to inform her of the maximum penalties and her ineligibility for probation
before accepting her guilty plea.
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
contests without first addressing the defendant personally and
doing all of the following:
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(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the
maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant
is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community
control sanctions.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
Crim.R. 11(C)(2).
{¶6} A review of the record in this case shows the following dialogue
occurred between the trial court and Arnwine prior to her entering her guilty plea.
The Court: * * * you understand for the felony of the third degree
there is a mandatory prison sentence –
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: -- of 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54, or 60 months?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And there is a fine of up to $10,000?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: The Court would also be required to suspend your
operator’s license, uh, from two to ten years.
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The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And that six points would be assessed on your driving
record.
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Do you understand the penalty for the improper
handling of the firearm?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: That would be a maximum of 12 months in prison
and a maximum $2,500 fine.
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And as to the misdemeanor of the first degree, the
DUI, that would be a $1,000 fine maximum and 180 days in jail.
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: You understand?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Also, as to that DUI, there would be six points total
from the first charge to the misdemeanor DUI, six points total
would be assessed on your driving record.
There is also, um, a maximum fine, I’m sorry, of $1,075 of which
at least $350 is mandatory, and the Court under that charge could
suspend your driver’s license for one to three years.
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
***
The Court: You understand that prison terms for multiple
charges, even if consecutive sentences are not mandatory, may be
imposed consecutively by the Court?
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The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Could you?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Thank you. Do you understand that court costs,
restitution, and other financial sanctions including fines, day
fines, and the reimbursement for the cost of any sanction may also
be imposed?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
***
The Court: Do you understand a period of supervision by the
Adult Parole Authority . . . after you’re released from prison is
mandatory for the first offense?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And optionalable [sic], optional for the second
offense?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And would be for a period of three years?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: And do you understand that a violation of any post-
release control rule or condition can result in a more restrictive
sanction while under post-release control and may result in
increased duration of supervision or control up to the maximum
term and reimprisonment even though you served the entire
stated prison term imposed upon you by the Court for the
offense?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
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The Court: Do you understand that if you violate conditions of
supervision while under post-release control, the parole board
could return you to prison for up to nine months for each violation
for a total of one-half of your originally stated prison term?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Do you understand that the Court is not required by
law to impose a prison sanction in any of your cases, they may
impose community control or non prison sanctions on you? Do
you understand if you violate the terms or conditions of a
community control sanction, this Court may extend the time for
which you were subject to this sanction up to a maximum of five
years, impose a more restrictive sanction, or imprison you for up
to the maximum stated term allowed for the offense?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Do you understand the nature of these charges and
the possible defenses that you may have to them?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Are you entering these pleas voluntarily and of your
own free will?
The Defendant: Voluntarily, own free will, yes. Yes, ma’am.
Tr. 4-9. The trial court then read the plea agreement, which included the sentencing
recommendation. Tr. 10. The agreement read by the trial court indicated that the
State was recommending Arwine serve a mandatory prison sentence of 36 months
as to Count One, a basic prison sentence of nine months as to Count Four, and 90
days as to Count Five, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Tr. 10. The
trial court did not discuss the possibility of judicial release, though the plea
agreement, which was read into the record by the trial court, did indicate that the
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State would defer to the wishes of the victim and the trial court regarding judicial
release. Tr. 11 and Doc. 30 at 4. The plea agreement signed by Arnwine stated as
follows.
I understand that the penalties for a felony of the third degree as
charged in Count One of this case include a mandatory prison
sentence of twelve (12) months, eighteen (18) months, twenty-four
(24) months, thirty (30) months, thirty-six (36) months, forty-two
(42) months, forty-eight (48) months, fifty-four (54) months, or
sixty (60) months. The maximum fine possible is $10,000.00, none
of which fine is mandatory.
***
I understand that the penalty for a felony of the fifth degree is six
(6) months, seven (7) months, eight (8) months, nine (9) months,
ten (10) months, eleven (11) months, or twelve (12) months prison,
none of which is mandatory. The maximum fine possible is
$2,500.00, none of which is mandatory
I understand that he penalty for a misdemeanor of the first degree
in this case is a jail sentence of up to one-hundred-eighty (180)
days, three (3) of which are mandatory. The maximum fine for a
misdemeanor of the first degree is $1,075.00, $350.00 of which is
mandatory.
Doc. 30 at 1-2.
{¶7} Arnwine argues that her plea was not voluntarily entered because 1) the
trial court did not advise her of the maximum penalties and 2) because it was
confusing as to whether she was eligible for judicial release or community control.
Crim.R. 11 requires the trial court to notify a defendant of the maximum possible
penalties before accepting a guilty plea. A review of the record in this case shows
that the trial court did advise Arnwine of the possible penalties on all counts,
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including that the sentence on Count One would be mandatory. Arnwine does not
dispute that she was so advised, but claims that the trial court’s statements were
contradictory and confusing leading her plea to be involuntarily given.
{¶8} Arnwine argues that based upon this Court’s prior holdings in State v.
Cook, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-01-15, 2002-Ohio-2846, and State v. Bush, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-2000-44, 2002-Ohio-6146, this Court must find the plea was not
voluntarily given. In Cook, this Court found a plea to be invalid because his counsel
repeatedly stated that the defendant was eligible for judicial release after six months
and the trial court, in its judgment entry, stated that the sentence was not mandatory.
Cook is distinguishable from this case in that here, the trial court correctly, aside
from the one arguably confusing statement, notified Arnwine at the change of plea
hearing that a prison sentence as to Count One was mandatory. The judgment entry
accepting the change of plea noted that Arnwine had been informed of the
mandatory nature of the prison sentence. Doc. 31. Finally, the sentencing entry
noted that the prison term as to Count One was mandatory. The facts of this case
are very different from those in Cook.
{¶9} This Court in Bush also found a plea to be invalid when the trial court,
counsel for the State and for the defendant, and the defendant all mistakenly
believed that he was eligible for judicial release after 30 days as was indicated by
the judgment entry. The judgment entry was signed by the judge, the attorneys and
the defendant despite the fact that under the law, the defendant would not be eligible
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for judicial release until he had served five years. Bush is also distinguishable from
this case. Here, the trial court did not discuss judicial release and no one indicated
that Arnwine would be eligible for judicial release. The only statement regarding it
was made by the State, not the trial court, and it was only to state it had no position
on it. These facts are very different from those in Bush where the defendant was
improperly told that he was eligible to apply for judicial release after 30 days.
{¶10} In conducting a plea colloquy, “the trial judge must convey accurate
information to the defendant so that the defendant can understand the consequences
of his or her decision and enter a valid plea.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 26, 893 N.E.2d 462. Trial courts should attempt to comply with
the requirements of Crim.R. 11 in all respects. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85,
2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19, 814 N.E.2d 51. “If a trial court fails to literally comply with
Crim.R. 11, reviewing courts must engage in a multitiered analysis to determine
whether the trial judge failed to explain the defendant’s constitutional or
nonconstitutional rights and, if there was a failure, to determine the significance of
the failure and the appropriate remedy.” Clark, supra at ¶ 30. If the trial court
imperfectly explains nonconstitutional rights, such as the maximum possible
penalties, a substantial compliance rule applies. Id. at ¶ 31. As long as the totality
of the circumstances indicate that the defendant understood the implication of the
plea, the plea may be upheld. Id. “A trial court fails to substantially comply with
this rule, however, when it gives the defendant inaccurate information about the
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maximum sentence that he is facing.” State v. George, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29292,
2019-Ohio-3871, ¶ 7. If there is not substantial compliance regarding
nonconstitutional rights, a reviewing court must determine whether the trial court
partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. Clark at ¶ 32.
If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning
mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may
be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect.
* * * The test for prejudice is “whether the plea would have
otherwise been made.” * * * If the trial judge completely failed to
comply with the rule, e.g., by not informing the defendant of a
mandatory period of postrelease control, the plea must be
vacated. * * * “A complete failure to comply with the rule does
not implicate an analysis of prejudice.”
Id.{¶11} In this case, Arnwine repeatedly indicated that she understood what
she was told, including that the sentence would be mandatory as to Count One. The
written plea agreement also informed Arnwine of the potential sentences and the
mandatory nature of a prison sentence as to Count One was stated two times and
both times the word “mandatory” was in bold print. Doc. 30 at 1, 4. The record
does show that the trial court misspoke at one point and indicated that none of the
prison sentences were mandatory. Tr. 8. This one statement may arguably be
considered as misinformation that could possibly affect the trial court’s substantial
compliance with Crim.R.11. However, before that statement, the trial court had
indicated that the sentence to Count One was mandatory and then, while reading the
plea agreement, again noted that the sentence as to Count One was mandatory. Tr.
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4, 10. Thus, even if there was not substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11 regarding
the nonconstitutional rights, the record shows there was partial compliance.
{¶12} Because there was at least partial compliance, this Court must review
to see whether there was prejudice to Arnwine. Arnwine was repeatedly notified
that a prison sentence was mandatory as to Count One. At no point did Arnwine
question this even when the trial court misspoke. Arnwine did not raise the issue
prior to sentencing or at the sentencing hearing on September 22, 2021, despite
having over two months to consider it. Doc. 34. The motion to withdraw the plea
of guilty was not filed until January 7, 2022, almost 3 and a half months after
sentencing. Doc. 46. Additionally, the trial court, outside of reading what the State
included in the plea agreement, did not suggest in any manner that Arnwine was
eligible for judicial release or good time credit. Given the record before us, this
Court does not find that Arnwine was prejudiced by the misstatement made by the
trial court. The first assignment of error is overruled.
Improper Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle
{¶13} Arnwine claims in the second assignment of error that she lacked the
required mens rea to be convicted of improper handling of a firearm in violation of
R.C. 2923.16(D)(1). R.C. 2923.16(D)(1) requires that one “knowingly” have a
loaded handgun in a motor vehicle while they are under the influence of alcohol.
Initially this Court notes that Arnwine pled guilty to the offense. A guilty plea is “a
complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1). “In entering a
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guilty plea, a defendant ‘is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described
in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” State v. Morgan,
181 Ohio App.3d 747, 2009-Ohio-1370, ¶ 23, 910 N.E.2d 1075 quoting U.S. v.
Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). A guilty plea
includes an admission to the factual basis for each element of the charged offenses.
State v. Ryan, 6th Dist. Ottawa Nos. OT-21-027, OT-21-028, 2022-Ohio-1888, ¶ 16.
{¶14} Here, Arnwine admitted that there was a firearm in the duffel bag in
the trunk of the vehicle she was driving while under the influence of alcohol. Tr.
15-16. Arnwine did not deny that she was knowingly transporting the firearm after
the State indicated that she had done so. Tr. 16. Arnwine, in her brief, points to
alleged statements she made to the officer, however those statements are not in the
record before this court.1 Since Arnwine did not object to the statement by the State
that she knowingly transported a firearm while driving under the influence of
alcohol and pled guilty, thus admitting to the factual basis for each element
including the mens rea, the trial court did not err in finding her guilty of the offense
as charged. The second assignment of error is overruled.
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
{¶15} In her third assignment of error, Arnwine alleges that the trial court
erred by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. “A motion to withdraw a
1
Arnwine cites Plea Tr. 16 in her brief. A review of the arraignment transcript (12/15/2020) and the change
of plea hearing (7/13/2021) show that the conversation quoted is not in the transcripts provided to this court.
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plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” Crim.R. 32.1. “A
manifest injustice is a clear or openly unjust act; an extraordinary and fundamental
flaw in the plea proceeding.” State v. Yapp, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101247,
101248, 2015-Ohio-1654, ¶ 8, 32 N.E.3d 999. Thus a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea after sentence will only be permitted in extraordinary cases. Id.{¶16} Arnwine’s first argument in support of this assignment of error claims
that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel which prevented her from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily changing her plea to one of guilty, so she
should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea.
In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective
assistance of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether
the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and
substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d
71, 74 O.O.2d 156, 341 N.E.2d 304, paragraph four of the syllabus.
When making that determination, a two-step process is usually
employed. “First, there must be a determination as to whether
there has been a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate from
the question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the
defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.” State v. Lytle
(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396–397, 2 O.O.3d 495, 498, 358 N.E.2d
623, 627, vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct.
3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154.
On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the
burden of proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is
presumably competent. See Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio
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St.2d 299, 31 O.O.2d 567, 209 N.E.2d 164; State v. Jackson, 64
Ohio St.2d [107] at 110–111, 18 O.O.3d [348] at 351, 413 N.E.2d
[819] at 822.
State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 1999-Ohio-102, 714 N.E.2d 905. “The
failure to prove either 1) a substantial violation or 2) prejudice caused by the
violation makes it unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong of the test.”
State v. Walker, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-42, 2016-Ohio-3499, 66 N.E.3d 349, ¶
20. “To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State
v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95. “The
prejudice inquiry, thus, focuses not only on outcome determination, but also on
‘whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’”
State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180 quoting
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
{¶17} Arnwine claims that her counsel was ineffective because counsel 1)
failed to challenge any of the evidence and 2) advised her to enter a plea agreement
from which she received little, if any, benefit. Arnwine argues that counsel should
have challenged the evidence regarding statements made by witnesses, the officer’s
decision to conduct field sobriety tests, the testing procedures used, and the
admissibility of the chemical breath test. In other words, Arnwine appears to be
claiming that her counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.
“Failing to file a motion to suppress does not constitute ineffective assistance of
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counsel per se.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, ¶ 65, 873
N.E.2d 858. For it to be considered ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant
must prove that there was a basis to suppress the evidence in question.” Id. citing
State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 35, 817 N.E.2d 29.
{¶18} Here, Arnwine alleges that the statements by other drivers, the
decision by the officer to conduct field sobriety tests, the results of the field sobriety
tests, and the accuracy of the chemical breath test should all have been challenged.
Although these issues certainly could have been the basis of a motion to suppress,
Arnwine fails to point to anything in the record that would show why the trial court
would likely have ruled in Arnwine’s favor on said motion. Arnwine’s argument is
based solely upon supposition. A review of the record before this court provides no
information about any of these alleged issues. Thus, this Court has nothing from
which to determine that there was a reasonable basis for filing the motion to suppress
or that the result would be any different if the motion had been filed.
{¶19} Arnwine also argues that she obtained very little, if any, benefit from
the plea agreement. This argument is based upon her claim that the State could not
have proven the elements of Counts Two and Three, which would have resulted in
an acquittal on each of those counts, so Arnwine does not believe she benefitted
from agreeing to plead guilty. The Ohio Supreme Court has said that counsel is not
ineffective automatically for advising a client to enter a no contest plea to the
offenses charged without getting a benefit. State v. Spivey, 81 Ohio St.3d 405,
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418,1998-Ohio-437, 692 N.E.2d 151. In Spivey, the trial court noted that whether
to enter a plea agreement is a tactical decision and that the defendant had received
that for which he bargained. The Court also noted that the defendant did receive a
benefit in the sentence and thus trial counsel was not ineffective. Id. Judicial review
of tactical decisions made by counsel must be highly deferential. State v. Bird, 81
Ohio St.3d 582, 585, 1998-Ohio-606, 692 N.E.2d 1013.
{¶20} Trial counsel in this case made a tactical decision to recommend to
Arnwine that she accept the deal. A review of the record shows that the State did
indicate at the change of plea hearing that it was unlikely to prevail on Counts Two
and Three, the two counts which were dismissed. Tr. 13, 16. The dismissal of two
counts was not the only benefit of the plea agreement. In exchange for the guilty
pleas, the State agreed to the following: 1) dismiss Counts Two and Three; 2)
recommend a mandatory prison term of 36 months as to Count One, nine months as
to Count Four, and 90 days as to Count 5 with the sentences to be served
concurrently; 3) recommend a mandatory fine in the amount of $750.00 as to Count
Four; 4) recommend the trial court order six points total be assessed to Arnwine’s
driving record; 5) defer to the trial court as to length of the mandatory license
suspension. Doc. 30. The State fulfilled its side of the agreement. Although the
trial court did impose lengthier sentences as to Counts Four (11 months) and Five
(160 days), the trial court did order the sentences to be served concurrently. As a
result, Arnwine received the benefit of her agreement. Arnwine could have been
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sentenced to a mandatory sentence of 60 months on Count One rather than the 36
months of the agreement. Arnwine’s claim that she received no benefit from the
agreement is not supported by the record. This Court does not find that counsel’s
advice to enter the plea agreement was ineffective.
{¶21} Arnwine also makes two additional arguments in this assignment of
error as to why she should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Arnwine
claims that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11 and
that the trial court should not have accepted her plea to Count Four as she was not
knowingly transporting a weapon. Both of these arguments were addressed above
and found to lack merit. Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot
County is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/hls
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