State v. Wilson

[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2022-Ohio-504.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-20-46
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ERIC D. WILSON, JR., OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 2019 0262
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 22, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Markus L. Moll for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
Case No. 1-20-46
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric D. Wilson, Jr. (“Wilson”) appeals the
judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas, alleging (1) that his
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) that his convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) that he was denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel; (4) that the trial court improperly allowed a witness
to testify as an expert; (5) that the trial court erred in granting a witness immunity;
(6) that the trial court erred in admitting an expert report; and (7) that the trial court
erred in imposing his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 14, 2019, Detective Callie Basinger (“Detective Basinger”) of
the Allen County Sheriff’s Office received a report of a shooting on Lark Avenue
in Lima, Ohio. Tr. 182. Detective Basinger went to the scene where she observed
the victim of the shooting lying face down near the property line between two
residences. Tr. 183, 190. Ex. 4-5. She approached the victim and determined that
he was deceased. Tr. 183. The victim was later identified as Christian Laws
(“Laws”), who was also known by the nickname “Mad Maxx.” Tr. 183.
{¶3} A neighbor informed the police that he followed two individuals
involved in the shooting to an address on St. Clair where a Willie Banks, Sr. (“Willie
Sr.”) and Lakendra Blackman (“Lakendra”) lived. Tr. 188, 190-191. The police
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went to the house at this address and discovered a number of people at the residence
besides Willie Sr. and Lakendra. Tr. 190-193. Several of the individuals who were
at the residence were placed into police cruisers and brought to the police station for
interviews regarding Laws’s death, including Willie Banks, Jr. (“Willie Jr.”);
Dontez Smith (“Smith”); and Jolade Omosikeji (“Omosikeji”). Tr. 192-194. In an
interview with Detective Steven J. Stechschulte (“Detective Stechschulte”),
Omosikeji confessed to having shot and killed Laws. Tr. 197. The police learned
that Smith was with Omosikeji at the time that Laws was shot. Tr. 686.
{¶4} Patrolman Sam Crish (“Patrolman Crish”) was a part of the initial
investigation into the shooting of Laws. Tr. 359-360. He later testified that he
expected retaliation in response to Laws’s death. Tr. 361. Patrolman Crish
explained that he had learned, from his experience as a police officer and by working
with Detective Stechschulte, that Laws had been associated with East Side gangs
(“East Side”). Tr. 362, 364. Smith and Omosikeji were associated with North Side
gangs (“North Side”). Tr. 624, 679. Patrolman Crish testified that East Side and
North Side gangs were rivals. Tr. 363. The police believed that Omosikeji shot
Laws as part of an “ongoing feud” between them. Tr. 641.
{¶5} On June 14, 2019, believing that retaliation was possible, Patrolman
Crish drove his cruiser to McKibben Street in Lima, Ohio and parked about one
block away from where a Romelo Blackman (“Romelo”) lived. Tr. 362, 366-367.
Romelo was Lakendra’s son in addition to being Smith and Willie Jr.’s brother. Tr.
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362, 365, 410, 687. Romelo was also associated with a North Side gang. Tr. 362.
Given these connections, Patrolman Crish believed that Romelo’s address might be
a potential site for retaliatory action. Tr. 362, 365.
{¶6} After he parked his cruiser, Patrolman Crish got out of his car and
walked on foot towards Romelo’s address. Tr. 367. Within about twenty minutes
of his arrival, he observed a vehicle driving past Romelo’s house and heard some
yelling. Tr. 367. He then “heard a couple gunshots go off and then a car quickly
sped away.” Tr. 367. Patrolman Crish saw several people from Romelo’s house
get into a vehicle and drive after the car. Tr. 368. “A couple minutes after that from
farther west of us we could hear more shots go off.” Tr. 368.
{¶7} Patrolman Crish testified that the police continued to “ke[ep] eyes on
[Romelo’s] house” given the continued potential for retaliation. Tr. 369. He also
stated that the police “then kept tabs on when the funeral for Christian [Laws] was
going to be” because, in his experience, retaliatory events have been known to occur
after funerals in similar situations. Tr. 369, 371. The police became aware that
Laws’s funeral was going to occur on June 21, 2019 in the vicinity of the intersection
of Cole Street and Edgewood Drive in Lima, Ohio. Tr. 371, 373.
{¶8} On the afternoon of June 21, 2019, Romelo asked a friend, Jayden
Cartagena (“Cartagena”) to drive him to Wally’s Fillin’ Station (“Wally’s”) in
Lima, Ohio because he wanted to buy some food. Tr. 268-269. Wally’s is located
near the intersection of Cole Street and Edgewood Drive. Tr. 451. Ex. 114.
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Cartagena met Romelo at his address on McKibben and then drove him to Wally’s
in his (Cartagena’s) pickup truck. Tr. 270-271. Cartagena parked his vehicle at
Wally’s, and Romelo went inside. Tr. 271, 273. A few moments later, Romelo
came back from the gas station store with a pizza and got into the passenger side of
Cartagena’s vehicle. Tr. 273, 275.
{¶9} In between 2:45 P.M. and 3:00 P.M., Cartagena began to drive his
vehicle out of Wally’s parking lot and onto the street. Tr. 275, 383. He testified
that,
[w]hen I pulled up to the road I had glanced to my left and the *
* * I didn’t see anything and then all of a sudden I just heard shots
fired and then I * * * just started like yelling at Romelo. I’m like,
‘What—what is going on,’ you know, I end up pressing on the gas
and taking off and * * * that’s when we’re going south * * * on
Cole Street going towards Robb.
Tr. 276. He further testified that he “heard several gunshots. It wasn’t just one. It
just was * * * repeatitive [sic] * * *. Tr. 276.
{¶10} Cartagena then began driving to a nearby relative’s house. Tr. 277.
Cartagena later testified that, during this portion of the drive, he asked Romelo
“what [was] * * * going on” and that Romelo “didn’t say nothing.” Tr. 278. When
he got to his relative’s house, Cartagena called the police. Tr. 277. Romelo
contacted his mother, who picked him up and took him home. Tr. 289. Cartagena
testified that he did not speak to Romelo after this incident because he “was
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obviously upset, you know, that [Romelo] * * * wasn’t telling * * * [him] what
was—what he got himself into.” Tr. 289-290.
{¶11} At the time of the shooting, Cynthia Wall (“Wall”) was doing
yardwork outside of her house across the street from Wally’s on Cole Street. Tr.
230-232. At first, she “thought some fireworks was [sic] going off * * *.” Tr. 231,
232. She testified that she “look[ed] up and there was some young fellow that
stepped out of the third bay [of the carwash next to Wally’s] and was shooting off a
gun.” Tr. 232, 235. Wall said that “[h]e was waiving [sic] the gun * * * and then
he aimed it right at me and I took off running because I was scared to death that the
bullets was going to come flying to me.” Tr. 236. Wall testified that she could only
see one shooter at this carwash and later identified Wilson as the young man who
she had seen firing the gun on June 21, 2019. Tr. 237-238, 241.
{¶12} At this time, Paul Custer (“Custer”) was also outside of his house on
the opposite side of Cole Street as Wally’s. Tr. 246. He was installing a screen
door at his house with his stepson when they “heard what [they] * * * believed to
be shots from a weapon.” Tr. 248. They “looked down the street towards Wally’s
Fillin[’] Station and * * * s[aw] activity down there * * *.” Tr. 248. Custer later
inspected the exterior of his house and “found that a round had went through two of
my windows and lodged in the frame of [the] * * * window to my laundry room.”
Tr. 248. Ex. 11-17.
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{¶13} Charles Kamler (“Kamler”) was also in the vicinity of Wally’s at the
time of this shooting. Tr. 219. He was driving one of two charter buses that were
carrying a total of forty-eight children who were returning to Lima after visiting a
residential camp. Tr. 216. Kamler testified that his bus was at a stoplight at the
intersection of Cole Street and Edgewood Drive when he “heard a couple of quick
pop, pop, pop, pop * * *.” Tr. 217. He turned towards the sound and, from his
vantage point, could see “two guys and they were firing pistols.” Tr. 218. He could
not provide a description of the shooters beyond confirming that they were wearing
black clothing and that one of them was firing his pistol with his left hand. Tr. 220,
228.
{¶14} Kamler “told the kids to get down” and then called 9-1-1. Tr. 221. He
later testified that he was concerned because he saw the shooters go in the same
direction that the buses were headed. Tr. 224. For this reason, when the buses
arrived at the church where the parents were to pick up the children, Kamler
immediately brought the children inside the building and “locked everything down
* * *.” Tr. 225. The buses were equipped with video cameras. Tr. 217. The State
obtained footage from the charter bus cameras and played the recordings at trial.
Ex. 7. Tr. 222-223.
{¶15} Kayaunna Mayer (“Mayer”) testified that she was in a car with her
cousin at a stoplight at the intersection of Cole Street and Edgewood Drive on the
afternoon June 21, 2019. Tr. 203-204. She saw “two people, maybe three,” who
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were “behind the carwash, we seen someone hiding behind a pole, somebody beside
like the carwash.” Tr. 205, 206. Mayer recognized one of these individuals as
Hezekiah Williams (“Hezekiah”), who was a friend of her cousin. Tr. 207. She
testified that Hezekiah “wasn’t doing anything.” Tr. 207. She then heard gunshots
but could not see who was firing the gun. Tr. 208-209.
{¶16} However, Mayer did testify that “it didn’t look like he [Hezekiah] was
shooting at all * * *” and affirmed that she did not observe “anything with Hezekiah
that would indicate he * * * may be a shooter[.]” Tr. 209. She further stated that
Hezekiah was wearing a suit because she “believe[d] there was a funeral that day”
that was for Laws. Tr. 210. Mayer and her cousin subsequently approached a police
officer on the scene and reported that they had seen Hezekiah at the carwash at the
time of the shooting. Tr. 209-210.
{¶17} The police examined the footage from security cameras positioned in
the area around Wally’s. Ex. 18, 22. In this footage, a white car can be seen driving
north on Cole Street and passing Wally’s. Ex. 22. This white car then made a U-
turn and began driving south on Cole Street towards Wally’s. Tr. 325-326, 694.
Ex. 22. The white car stopped on Cole Street in front of Wally’s to let three
individuals get out of the vehicle. Ex. 18. These three individuals walked towards
the carwash. Ex. 18. The white car then pulled off of Cole Street and into the
parking lot of Wally’s. Ex. 18. After the white car stopped next to one of the pumps,
an individual wearing a bright yellow shirt exited from the back seat of the vehicle
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and went into the gas station store. Ex. 18. The driver never left the car or pumped
any gas. Ex. 18. Tr. 328. After the person in the yellow shirt left the gas station
store, he got back into the white car, which then left Wally’s parking lot. Ex. 18.
{¶18} The police investigators also located a total of nineteen shell casings
in the vicinity of the carwash next to Wally’s. Tr. 440. Eleven of these shell casings
were found in an area in front of the third bay of the carwash while eight of these
shell casings were found in an area around the corner of the other end of the carwash.
Tr. 431, 438, 440. Ex. 29, 30. The police were also able to recover one bullet from
a window frame at Custer’s house and one bullet from a headrest in Cartagena’s
pickup truck. Tr. 246, 382, 455, 464.
{¶19} Patrolman Crish received the information that Hezekiah was a possible
suspect and that a white vehicle was involved in the shooting after he responded to
a report of a shooting “in the area of Cole and Edgewood.” Tr. 373, 379-380, 387.
The police obtained Hezekiah’s address, which was on Feeman Avenue in Lima,
Ohio. Tr. 385-386. Patrolman Crish and his partner went to this address and
observed a white Toyota Corolla in the driveway. Tr. 387. He approached this
vehicle and observed a pamphlet for Laws’s funeral inside. Tr. 387.
{¶20} Patrolman Crish then knocked on the front door of the house, and
Hezekiah’s mother, Maria Williams (“Maria”), answered. Tr. 323, 388, 389. She
told the police that she had not seen Hezekiah in weeks. Tr. 390. Patrolman Crish
asked if she had seen Wilson because he believed Wilson to be associated with an
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East Side gang called Manniworld. Tr. 390. Maria stated that Wilson was not in
her house. Tr. 390. She allowed the police to go walk through her house to verify
that Hezekiah and Wilson were not present. Tr. 390.
{¶21} After talking with Maria, Patrolman Crish’s partner noticed that a
nearby business had a security camera directed at Maria’s house. Tr. 390. The
officers went to this business and viewed the footage from that afternoon. Tr. 391-
392. On the video recording, they observed Maria drive the white car into her
driveway and exit the vehicle with another male, who was wearing a bright yellow
shirt. Ex. 25. Tr. 391. This male was later identified as Marcus Manley (“Manley”).
Tr. 392. The recording also captured footage of a person, who the officers believed
to be Hezekiah, visiting Maria’s house that afternoon. Tr. 392.
{¶22} On June 21, 2019, Maria was taken to the police station for an
interview with Detective Stechschulte. Tr. 329, 697. At this time, Maria confirmed
that Wilson, who she knew by the nicknames “O” or “Oaty,” was one of the
individuals in the car with her when she drove to Wally’s earlier that day. Tr. 324,
697. She also told Detective Stechschulte that she witnessed Wilson firing a gun
there while she was in her car next to a gas pump at Wally’s. Tr. 331.
{¶23} On the night of June 21, 2019, the police received information that
Hezekiah was at an address on Penny Lee Drive in Lima, Ohio. Tr. 399, 479.
Lieutenant Gary Hook (“Lt. Hook”), who works for the Allen County Sheriff’s
Office, went to this address to search for Hezekiah. Tr. 473-474. After he arrived,
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Lt. Hook knocked on the front door at the address he received. Tr. 474. When a
woman answered the front door, Lt. Hook smelled “the odor of raw marijuana
coming from the residence.” Tr. 474.
{¶24} Patrolman Crish was also dispatched to this address on Penny Lee
Drive and assisted Lt. Hook that night. Tr. 397-398. Once the officers obtained
entrance into the residence, Patrolman Crish located Hezekiah inside and took him
into custody. Tr. 398. The police also found Wilson in the residence and
apprehended him. Tr. 476, 477. Two Taurus pistols were recovered at this location.
Tr. 492-493, 494-495. Ex. 89, 98, 99, 100. After testing, one of these pistols was
found to match the eleven shell casings from the third bay of the carwash, the bullet
from Custer’s house, and the bullet from Cartagena’s headrest. Ex. 97. Tr. 583,
585. The other pistol was found to match the eight shell casings found at the corner
of the carwash. Ex. 97. Tr. 583, 585.
{¶25} On June 22, 2019, Detective Stechschulte interviewed Wilson at the
police station.1 Ex. 102. By this point, the police had identified four of the five
people who had been in the white car at Wally’s. Tr. 694, 696, 711. During the
interview, Wilson confirmed that he was at Laws’s funeral and that he left with
Maria. Ex. 102. He also gave Detective Stechschulte the name of the “fifth person
in that car, which was Jamaree Allen” (“Allen”). Tr. 711.
1
Detective Stechschulte first sat down with Wilson just before midnight on June 21, 2019. Ex. 102.
However, the actual interview occurred on June 22, 2019. Ex. 102.
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{¶26} On August 15, 2019, Wilson was indicted on one count of
participating in a criminal gang in violation of R.C. 2923.42(A), a felony of the
second degree, with a firearm specification; two counts of felonious assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, each with a criminal
gang activity specification and a firearm specification; one count of discharging a
firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), a felony
of the third degree, with a firearm specification; one count of improperly
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1), a
felony of the second degree, with a criminal gang activity specification and a firearm
specification; carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a
felony of the second degree, with a specification for forfeiture of a weapon; one
count of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C.
2923.16(B), a felony of the fourth degree; and one count of having weapons while
under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree.
Doc. 4.
{¶27} On February 11, 2020, the State filed a supplemental response to
Wilson’s demand for discovery that disclosed that the State intended to call
Detective Stechschulte as an expert witness on gang related activity. Doc. 221, 192.
On March 23, 2020, Wilson filed a motion in limine that argued that Detective
Stechschulte should not be permitted to testify as an expert witness at trial. Doc.
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200. After holding a hearing on this matter on May 29, 2020, the trial court
overruled Wilson’s motion in limine on August 12, 2020. Doc. 221.
{¶28} A jury trial was held in between September 28 and October 2, 2020.
Tr. 1. The State called sixteen witnesses to testify, including Maria and Detective
Stechschulte. Tr. 322, 598. At trial, the State made a motion to grant Maria
transactional immunity. Tr. 293. Over the Defense’s objection, the trial court
granted Maria immunity after she invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Tr. 299-300, 318-319, 322.
{¶29} Maria then testified that she drove Manley, Hezekiah, Wilson, and
Allen to Laws’s funeral on June 21, 2019 in her white car. Tr. 323-324. When they
left the funeral, she was driving while Hezekiah was in the front, passenger seat. Tr.
325. Manley, Allen, and Wilson were in the back seat. Tr. 325. She was driving
north on Cole Street, made a U-turn on the roadway, and began driving towards
Wally’s. Tr. 326, 328. Ex. 18, 22.
{¶30} Before she pulled into Wally’s parking lot, she let Hezekiah, Allen,
and Wilson out of the vehicle. Tr. 326, 328. Ex. 18, 22. She then parked beside a
pumping station where Manley exited the vehicle. Tr. 335. She testified that she
saw Wilson shooting a gun while she was in her car beside the gas pump. Tr. 331,
332-333. When she left Wally’s, Manley and Hezekiah were the only ones who
were in the car with her. Tr. 328-329. She then dropped Hezekiah off at the house
where Wilson’s mother and brother lived. Tr. 333.
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{¶31} When the State called Detective Stechschulte to testify as an expert
witness, the Defense renewed its prior objection. Tr. 604. However, the trial court
“recognize[d] Detective Stechschulte as an expert in gang[s] and gang related
activity * * * in the Lima, Allen County, Ohio area.” Tr. 604-605. The trial court
also overruled the Defense’s objection to the admission of a report authored by
Detective Stechschulte and referenced during his testimony. Tr. 758, 760. Ex. 112.
{¶32} On October 2, 2020, Wilson was found guilty of all of the charges and
specifications presented to the jury. Doc. 357. The trial court immediately
proceeded to sentencing and issued its judgment entry of sentencing on October 14,
2020. Doc. 360. The trial court imposed prison terms for each of Wilson’s
convictions. Doc. 360. The trial court then ordered all of the prison terms that were
imposed to be served consecutively. Doc. 360.
{¶33} Wilson filed his notice of appeal on October 19, 2020. Doc. 363. On
appeal, he raises the following seven assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Wilson as there was
insufficient evidence to convict.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Wilson because the
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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Third Assignment of Error
The cumulative effect of Defense counsel’s errors violated Mr.
Wilson’s right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of
Ohio.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Detective
Stechschulte to testify as an expert witness.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The trial [court] erred and violated Mr. Wilson’s due process
when it granted Maria Williams immunity under R.C. 2945.44.
Sixth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it admitted an expert witness report
into evidence.
Seventh Assignment of Error
Imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law when the
findings made in support of the imposition of the consecutive
sentences are not supported by the record.
For the sake of analytical clarity, we will first examine Wilson’s fourth, fifth, and
sixth assignments of error. We will then consider his first and second assignments
of error together in one analysis before we examine his third and seventh
assignments of error.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶34} Wilson argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective
Stechschulte to testify as an expert witness at trial.
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Legal Standard
{¶35} “Different rules govern the admissibility of opinion testimony from
expert witnesses and lay witnesses.” State v. Duncan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-75,
2020-Ohio-3916, ¶ 8.
The distinction between lay and expert witness opinion testimony
is that lay testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning familiar
in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a process of
reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.’
State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 2001-Ohio-41, 744 N.E.2d 737, fn. 2 (2001),
quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn. 1992), superseded on other
grounds by statute.
{¶36} As an initial matter, “expert testimony must meet the threshold of
being relevant to a trial issue.” State v. York, 2018-Ohio-612, 107 N.E.3d 672, ¶ 46
(2d Dist.), citing Evid.R. 401. If the testimony is relevant, then the expert witness
and his or her testimony must be evaluated under Evid.R. 702, which reads, in its
relevant part, as follows:
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons;
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject
matter of the testimony;
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific,
technical, or other specialized information. * * *.
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Evid.R. 702. “The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly held that police officers may
qualify as expert witnesses where they possess specialized knowledge that will
assist the fact-finder.” State v. Essa, 194 Ohio App.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-2513, 955
N.E.2d 429, ¶ 132 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-
Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 116. Further,
[a] witness who possesses ‘specialized knowledge about gang
symbols, cultures, and traditions beyond that of the trier of fact,’
may be qualified as an expert on gang-related matters. * * *
Drummond * * * [at] ¶ 116. ‘Unlike scientific testimony, expert
testimony about gangs depends heavily on the expert’s knowledge
and experience rather than on the expert’s methodology and
theory.’ Id. at ¶ 119.
State v. White, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-07-118, 2020-Ohio-3313, ¶ 19. See
State v. McCraney, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24750, 25285, 2010-Ohio-6128, ¶ 24.
{¶37} “We are to apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
trial court’s decision regarding an expert witness’ testimony.” State v. McCray, 3d
Dist. Defiance No. 4-99-15, 2000-Ohio-1887, 2000 WL 799092, *4 (June 21, 2000).
“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment.” State v. Costell, 3d
Dist. Union No. 14-21-02, 2021-Ohio-4363, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Sullivan, 2017-
Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.). “Rather, an abuse of discretion is present
where the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.” State v.
Kleman, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-19-01, 2019-Ohio-4404, ¶ 18, quoting State v.
Howton, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-35, 2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 23.
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Legal Analysis
{¶38} At trial, the State called Detective Stechschulte to testify as an expert
in gang-related activities in the Lima, Ohio area. Tr. 604. Information about gangs
in the Lima area was relevant because Wilson was charged with the offense of
participating in a criminal gang. Doc. 4. This offense requires the prosecution to
establish the existence of a criminal gang and a pattern of criminal gang activity.
R.C. 2923.2(A). See R.C. 2923.41(A-C). The trial court recognized Detective
Stechschulte as an expert in gang related activity in the Allen County area over
Wilson’s objection. Tr. 604-605.
{¶39} On appeal, Wilson first argues that the trial court erred in determining
that Detective Stechschulte was an expert in gang-related activity. At trial, the State
questioned Detective Stechschulte on his training and experience. Tr. 599-603. He
testified that, as a detective at the Lima Police Department, he was specifically
involved in investigating gang-related criminal activity. Tr. 599. By the time of the
trial, he had fourteen years of experience as a detective. Tr. 605. He had also
completed eight gang investigation training programs with the National Gang Crime
Research Center, including programs called Gang Homicide Investigation Skills;
Gang Crime Investigative Skills; and The Advanced Gang Training Program. Ex.
101. Tr. 599, 601. See White, supra, at ¶ 31.
{¶40} Further, Detective Stechschulte testified that no other member of law
enforcement in Allen County has completed the level of training that he has been
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able to receive on this subject matter. Tr. 602. He also has consulted members of
law enforcement in Fort Wayne, Columbus, and Detroit on gang-related matters.
Tr. 603. Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we conclude that there is no
indication that the trial court erred in determining that Detective Stechschulte was
qualified to testify as an expert on gang-related activities.
{¶41} Next, Wilson argues that Detective Stechschulte’s testimony did not
contain information that was outside of the knowledge of the jurors. However,
Detective Stechschulte’s testimony contained extensive information about the
history, membership, practices, connections, and criminal activities of the gangs that
were operating in the Lima area. White, supra, at ¶ 12. He also interpreted the
contents of several pictures and videos of Wilson that contained various symbols
and gestures that were indicators of gang affiliations. Tr. 632-633, 636, 638, 639,
737-743. Ex. 103, 106, 107, 109, 113. Having examined Detective Stechschulte’s
testimony, we conclude that the information was clearly “beyond the knowledge or
experience possessed by lay persons * * *.” Evid.R. 702(A). See Tr. 603.
{¶42} Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we do not conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Detective Stechschulte to testify as
an expert witness. His trial testimony was based on his extensive training and
experience as a detective assigned to investigations of gang-related activities in the
Lima area. Further, his testimony regarded information that is well outside of the
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common knowledge and experience of the average juror. See White, supra, at ¶ 33.
For these reasons, Wilson’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Fifth Assignment of Error
{¶43} Wilson argues that the trial court erred in granting Maria Williams
transactional immunity pursuant to R.C. 2945.44.
Legal Standard
{¶44} “Transactional immunity * * * accords full immunity from
prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates * * *.” State
v. Broady, 41 Ohio App.2d 17, 21-22, 321 N.E.2d 890, 894 (10th Dist.). “A court’s
sole authority for granting immunity is regulated by R.C. 2945.44.” State ex rel.
Leis v. Outcalt, 1 Ohio St.3d 147, 148, 438 N.E.2d 443, 445 (1982). This provision
reads, in its relevant part, as follows:
(A) In any criminal proceeding in this state * * *, if a witness
refuses to answer or produce information on the basis of the
witness’s privilege against self-incrimination, the court of
common pleas of the county in which the proceeding is being held,
unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration
of justice, shall compel the witness to answer or produce the
information, if both of the following apply:
(1) The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the
proceedings are being held makes a written request to the court
of common pleas to order the witness to answer or produce the
information, notwithstanding the witness's claim of privilege;
(2) The court of common pleas informs the witness that by
answering, or producing the information the witness will receive
immunity under division (B) of this section.
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(B) If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged
to withhold an answer or any information given in any criminal
proceeding, and the witness complies with an order under division
(A) of this section compelling the witness to give an answer or
produce any information, the witness shall not be prosecuted or
subjected to any criminal penalty in the courts of this state for or
on account of any transaction or matter concerning which, in
compliance with the order, the witness gave an answer or
produced any information.
R.C. 2945.44(A). Thus, unless the court of common pleas determines that a grant
of immunity would not further the administration of justice, it is to compel the
witness to testify provided that
(1) the witness refuses to answer on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, (2) the prosecuting attorney makes a
written request to order the witness to answer, and (3) the court
informs the witness he will receive transactional immunity.
State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 592, 1994-Ohio-327, 629 N.E.2d
446, 448-449 (1994), citing R.C. 2945.44(A).
{¶45} The determination as to whether a grant of immunity would further the
administration of justice is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State
ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914 (1987). Thus, an
appellate court will not disturb such a determination in the absence of an abuse of
discretion. State v. Frye, 2018-Ohio-894, 108 N.E.3d 564, ¶ 92 (3d Dist.). “An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment.” Costell, supra, at ¶ 22,
quoting Sullivan, supra, at ¶ 20. “Rather, an abuse of discretion is present where
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the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.” Kleman,
supra, at ¶ 18, quoting Howton, supra, at ¶ 23.
Legal Analysis
{¶46} Wilson directs our attention to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Landrum to argue that, “when a witness asserts a privilege against self-
incrimination, a court may not rely upon the witness’s claim alone * * * [and] has a
duty to determine if the witness’s refusal to answer is justified.” Appellant’s Brief,
12, citing State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 120, 559 N.E.2d 710, 726 (1990).
He asserts that the trial court failed to determine that Maria had grounds to invoke
her right against self-incrimination before granting her immunity. Id.{¶47} In Landrum, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred
by failing to grant immunity to a witness who had invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Id. at 120. However, the prosecution did not request a grant of
immunity for this witness. Id. In Ohio, “courts do not have inherent authority to
immunize defense witnesses.” Id. Thus, the trial court could not compel the witness
to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity under R.C. 2945.44 and had to scrutinize
whether the “witness’s testimony would be self-incriminating” before excusing the
witness. Id. See also State v. McClellan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-136, 2002-Ohio-
1212, 2002 WL 418967, *2 (Mar. 19, 2002); State v. Perry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
84397, 2005-Ohio-27, ¶ 46.
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{¶48} By contrast, in the case presently before this Court, the prosecution
requested a grant of immunity for Maria pursuant to R.C. 2945.44 and made the trial
court aware of Maria’s grounds for invoking her right against self-incrimination.
Tr. 318. The trial court was made aware that Maria was the alleged driver of the
vehicle that had brought Wilson to Wally’s on June 21, 2019; that Maria had been
indicted for her alleged activities on June 21, 2019; and that the case surrounding
the charges against Maria had not yet been resolved. Tr. 259, 303. The trial court
was also aware that the matters about which Maria was called to testify were related
to her involvement in the incident that gave rise to the charges against Wilson and
were related to the charges against her. Tr. 259-260, 300-303, 306.
{¶49} In conclusion, Wilson has not, with this argument, demonstrated that
the trial court erred in granting Maria immunity at trial. Further, the record does not
contain any indication that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of
R.C. 2945.44 in granting immunity to Maria at trial. For these reasons, Wilson’s
fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Sixth Assignment of Error
{¶50} Wilson argues that the trial court erred in admitting an expert report
that was authored by Detective Stechschulte into evidence, arguing that the expert
report contains inadmissible hearsay.
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Legal Standard
{¶51} Crim.R. 16 governs the discovery and inspection process. Crim.R. 16.
Crim.R. 16(K) states the following about the reports of expert witnesses:
An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report
summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis,
conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a summary of the
expert’s qualifications. The written report and summary of
qualifications shall be subject to disclosure under this rule no
later than twenty-one days prior to trial, which period may be
modified by the court for good cause shown, which does not
prejudice any other party. Failure to disclose the written report
to opposing counsel shall preclude the expert’s testimony at trial.
Crim.R. 16(K). An appellate court “will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on
evidentiary issues absent an abuse of discretion and proof of material prejudice.”
State v. Thompson, 2017-Ohio-792, 85 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State
v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 181. Thus, a
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude the report of an expert witness will not be
disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-9259,
103 N.E.3d 32, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶52} At trial, when the State proffered Detective Stechschulte’s expert
report for admission into evidence, the Defense objected on the grounds that the
report contained hearsay statements. Tr. 761. Ex. 112. The trial court noted that
the report proffered by the State had already been modified to remove the hearsay
statements that were in the original report. Tr. 762, 763. The Defense then objected
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to another statement that remained in the report on the grounds that it implicated
Wilson in an offense that was unrelated to the charges in the present case. Tr. 764.
The trial court informed the State that this statement had to be revised before the
report could be admitted into evidence. Tr. 766. The trial court then examined the
report and ordered the State to make several more revisions. Tr. 772, 774, 777. The
report admitted into evidence reflects the revisions required by the trial court. Ex.
112.
{¶53} On appeal, Wilson asserts that Detective Stechschulte’s expert report
should not have been admitted into evidence because it contained inadmissible
hearsay. Ex. 112. However, Wilson does not identify any hearsay statements in the
report. The record indicates that the trial court was responsive to the objections that
the Defense had at trial and took steps to ensure that no hearsay was in the final
version of the report that was admitted into evidence. Tr. 760-775. Further, having
reviewed the expert report, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting this report into evidence. Accordingly, Wilson’s sixth
assignment of error is overruled.
First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶54} Wilson argues that, if the evidence he has challenged as inadmissible
in this appeal were to be excluded, then his convictions are not supported by
sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s
Brief, 4-5. However, in our analyses of his fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of
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error, we have already concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence that he has challenged in this appeal. Thus, this argument is without merit.
{¶55} Next, Wilson generally asserts that the State failed to establish that
“Wilson committed the crimes that were alleged.” Appellant’s Brief, 4. For this
reason, we will examine his convictions to determine whether they are supported by
sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence. We will begin our
analysis by setting forth the general legal standards for sufficiency of the evidence
and the manifest weight of the evidence. We will then proceed to examine each of
Wilson’s eight convictions under these standards.
Legal Standard for Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶56} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of
production at trial.” In re Swift, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79610, 2002-Ohio-1276, ¶
19, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). This
“analysis addresses the question of whether adequate evidence was produced for the
case to be considered by the trier of fact and, thus, whether the evidence was ‘legally
sufficient to support the verdict * * *.’” State v. Barga, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-
14, 2018-Ohio-2804, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Worthington, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-15-
04, 2016-Ohio-530, ¶ 12.
{¶57} An appellate court is not to examine whether the evidence presented
should be believed but should rather “examine the evidence admitted at trial to
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determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Johnston, 3d Dist. Logan
No. 8-13-10, 2014-Ohio-353, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other
grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997).
On appeal, the applicable standard
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-19, 2018-Ohio-899, ¶ 27, quoting State
v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 62 (3d Dist.).
Legal Standard for Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶58} “In a manifest weight analysis, ‘an appellate court determines whether
the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion.’” State v. Richey, 2021-
Ohio-1461, 170 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Blanton, 121 Ohio
App.3d 162, 169, 699 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1997). “Unlike our review of the
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight
of the evidence is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence
supports the verdict.” Plott, supra, at ¶ 73. Thus, “the appellate court sits as a
‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.” State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-
2916, ¶ 17, quoting Thompkins, supra, at 387. On appeal, courts
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must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
new trial ordered.’ State v. Brentlinger, 2017-Ohio-2588, 90
N.E.3d 200, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387.
State v. Schatzinger, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-20-04, 2021-Ohio-167, ¶ 52.
{¶59} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate
discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.” Sullivan, supra, at ¶ 38, quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No.
1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only in exceptional cases, where the evidence
‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial
court’s judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶
119.
Legal Analysis
{¶60} First Count of Felonious Assault: To establish a conviction for
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the State must prove that the
defendant “[1] knowingly * * * [2] [c]ause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm
to another * * * [3] by means of a deadly weapon * * *.” R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). See
Tr. 870. The first count of felonious assault alleged that Wilson discharged a firearm
at Romelo while he was riding in Cartagena’s pickup truck. Tr. 792.
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{¶61} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, the State introduced the
recording of an interview in which Wilson admitted that he attended Laws’s funeral
and left in Maria’s car. Ex. 102. Tr. 711. Maria testified that Wilson was riding in
her car after Laws’s funeral and that Wilson got out of her car before she pulled into
the parking lot at Wally’s. Tr. 325-326, 328. At trial, Maria and Wall both
identified Wilson as a person who was firing a gun beside Wally’s on June 21, 2019.
Tr. 237-238, 331.
{¶62} Romelo testified that, as Cartagena was driving away from Wally’s,
the “truck was getting hit from shots” and that “bullets was [sic] hitting the car.”
Tr. 405, 406. The police subsequently examined Cartagena’s pickup truck and
found several bullet holes in the vehicle. Tr. 382. The police investigators also
recovered a bullet from the inside of the headrest of the seat in the pickup truck
where Romelo was sitting. Tr. 382, 464. Ex. 87. The State introduced pictures of
several bullet holes in Cartagena’s pickup truck. Tr. 382, 463. Ex. 19-21, 82-86.
{¶63} Further, Wall indicated that Wilson “stepped out of the third bay” of
the carwash next to Wally’s when he was firing a gun.2 Tr. 232. She stated that she
could only see one person shooting during this incident. Tr. 241. Identification
Officer Jerry Cress (“Officer Cress”), who works for the Allen County Sheriff’s
Office, testified that he examined the area around Wally’s after the shooting on June
2
Wall testified that she could only see one shooter at this carwash. Tr. 241. She stated that she observed the
shooter firing his gun from near the third bay of the carwash. Tr. 235. She then identified the only shooter
she could see as Wilson. Tr. 237-238.
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21, 2019. Tr. 420-421. Altogether, Officer Cress recovered nineteen shell casings
from the scene of the shootings. Tr. 432, 440. Eleven of these shell casings came
from the area around the third bay of the carwash next to Wally’s. Tr. 430-431.
Ex. 29, 31, 33-43. Eight of these shell casings were recovered from an area on the
other side of the carwash. Ex. 30, 32, 44-51.
{¶64} Kevin Kramer (“Kramer”), who works as a forensic scientist at the
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, examined the nineteen shell casings that
were discovered at Wally’s. Tr. 562, 579, 582. Ex. 97. Kramer determined that the
grouping of eleven shell casings had been fired by one gun while the other grouping
of eight shell casings had been fired by another gun. Tr. 585-586. Ex. 97. He also
determined that the bullet in Romelo’s headrest came from the same gun that had
fired the eleven shell casings that had been recovered from that area around the third
bay of the carwash. Tr. 587. Ex. 81, 88, 97, 98, 99.
{¶65} Further, the gun that had fired these eleven shell casings was also
recovered in the house where Wilson was apprehended on Penny Lee Lane. Tr.
492-493, 583, 585-586. Ex. 89, 97, 98, 99. Thus, having reviewed the materials in
the record, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could determine that Wilson was guilty of the first count of
felonious assault.
{¶66} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, Romelo testified on cross-
examination that he considered Wilson to be one of his associates; that he had never
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had any problems with Wilson; and that it made no sense for Wilson to be firing a
gun at him. Tr. 411. He also stated that, while his family had some problems with
Hezekiah in the past, he did not believe that he had any problems with Hezekiah.
Tr. 412, 413. He further stated that he did not know Allen. Tr. 412.
{¶67} On cross-examination, Maria testified that she had been charged with
five felonies that were related to her activities on June 21, 2019 and that these
felonies had been dismissed. Tr. 348. Ex. A. She had previously stated that she
did not know Wilson, but she explained on cross-examination that she did not
believe that this was a lie because she meant that she did not know him well. Tr.
338. Maria further stated that she had never seen Wilson with a criminal mindset
before June 21, 2019 and that she was not afraid of Wilson prior to this incident.
Tr. 353-354. Unlike Wall, Maria could not remember if Wilson was standing in one
of the bays at the carwash next to Wally’s when he was firing a gun. Tr. 330-331.
{¶68} Maria also testified that Hezekiah was her son and that he had been
arrested at the same time as Wilson. Tr. 339, 340. She testified that Wilson, Allen,
and Hezekiah got out of her car at the same time but insisted that her son “didn’t get
out [of her car] to shoot nobody[.]” Tr. 339, 345-346. She indicated that she did
not know why her son got out of her car at Wally’s. Tr. 345-346. However, as
Detective Stechschulte noted in his testimony, she can be seen making a U-turn with
her car after passing Wally’s; stopping her car on the side of the road to let Allen,
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Hezekiah, and Wilson out; and then waiting by a gas station pump until the shooting
had ceased and Manley had returned to the car. Ex. 22. Tr. 694-695.
{¶69} Maria testified that neither Manley nor Hezekiah had a firearm when
they got back into her car. Tr. 350. However, she also testified that she did not see
any firearms in the vehicle before or after the shooting. Tr. 350. Patrolman Crish
also testified that Maria had not been truthful with the police when she told them
that she had not seen Hezekiah for weeks before the shooting on June 21, 2019. Tr.
402.
{¶70} Detective Stechschulte was also questioned on cross-examination
about a statement made during his interview with Wilson. Tr. 746. Ex. 102. He
had said to Wilson that Hezekiah and Maria were not going to take a hit for
something that neither of them had done. Tr. 746. He stated that he meant that the
evidence that the police had obtained indicated that Hezekiah and Maria did not fire
a gun during the incident at Wally’s on June 21, 2019. Tr. 746-747. For this reason,
Detective Stechschulte said that he was suggesting to Wilson that Hezekiah and
Maria were likely to tell the truth to the police because they were not likely to let a
family member go to prison for firing a gun on June 21, 2019 if Wilson or Allen
had been the shooters. Tr. 747.
{¶71} On cross-examination, Wall testified that she only saw one person
firing a gun at the carwash she and that she was eighty percent certain that the
shooter she observed was Wilson. Tr. 241, 242. Kramer testified that no DNA
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testing or fingerprint testing was performed on the firearms to determine who had
discharged them. Tr. 589. Officer Cress testified that he did not believe that a
fingerprint analysis was conducted on the shell casings that were recovered at
Wally’s. Tr. 444-445. Having examined the materials presented at trial, we
conclude that the conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶72} Second Count of Felonious Assault: To establish a conviction for
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the State must prove that the
defendant “[1] knowingly * * * [c]ause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause [3] physical harm
to another * * * [4] by means of a deadly weapon * * *.” R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). See
Tr. 873-874. The second count of felonious assault alleged that Wilson discharged
a firearm at Cartagena while he was driving his pickup truck away from Wally’s.
Tr. 792.
{¶73} Cartagena testified that Romelo was in the passenger seat of his
vehicle when he heard multiple gunshots while he was driving away from Wally’s
and that he sped up his truck to get away from the gunfire. Tr. 276. He indicated
that the shots were being fired at his vehicle. Tr. 282, 288. Cartagena testified that
he drove to a nearby relative’s house and called 9-1-1. Tr. 277. He observed a
number of bullet holes in his truck that the police photographed. Tr. 281-282. The
pictures taken of his vehicle by the police were admitted into evidence. Ex. 19-21.
See Tr. 280.
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{¶74} When Cartagena’s statements are considered with the testimony from
Maria, Wall, and Kramer that we reviewed under the first count of felonious assault,
we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could determine that Wilson was guilty of the second count of felonious
assault. Further, we reincorporate our analysis of the manifest weight of the
evidence for the first count of felonious assault and conclude that the conviction on
this charge is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶75} Discharge of a Firearm On or Near Prohibited Premises: To establish
a conviction for a violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) as a felony of the third degree,
the State must prove that the defendant “[1] [d]ischarged a firearm [2] upon or over
a public road or highway” and “[3] created a substantial risk of physical harm to any
person or caused serious physical harm to property * * *.” R.C. 2923.162(A)(3);
R.C. 2923.162(C)(2). See Tr. 875.
{¶76} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Wall and Maria testified that
they observed Wilson firing a gun next to the carwash at Wally’s. Tr. 238, 331.
Wall also testified that she and her husband were doing yardwork on their property
across from Wally’s at the time of the shooting. Tr. 230. She saw Wilson waving
his gun and then point the weapon at her. Tr. 236. Wall stated that she then ran into
her backyard. Tr. 236. Kamler testified that he was in one of two buses that were
on the roadway in front of Wally’s at the time of the shooting. Tr. 217. There were
forty-eight children in these two buses. Tr. 217. From his vantage point, he could
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see two shooters firing guns. Tr. 218. The State introduced videos from the camera
on the bus that showed the children reacting to hearing the gunfire. Tr. 223.
{¶77} Detective Stechshulte testified that, based on the context of this
incident, Romelo “was obviously the target” of this shooting. Tr. 715. Both
Cartagena and Romelo indicated that they were on the roadway when their vehicle
was struck by gunfire. Tr. 276, 282, 405-406. While the police recovered eleven
shell casings in the area from which Wilson was seen firing a gun, one bullet was
found lodged in Cartagena’s pickup truck. Tr. 431, 438, 440, 464. Ex. 29, 30.
{¶78} Identification Officer Michael Carman (“Officer Carman”), who
works for the Lima Police Department, testified that he investigated the area around
Wally’s on June 21, 2019 and found bullet holes in two cars located in a driveway
across the street from Wally’s. Tr. 449-451, 454. Ex. 76-78. He also discovered
several trees on the other side of the street from Wally’s that had been struck by
bullets. Tr. 453, 455. Ex. 79-80. The State introduced the pictures of these two
cars and these trees into evidence at trial. Ex. 76-80. Having reviewed the evidence
presented at trial, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Wilson was guilty of
discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises.
{¶79} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, Kamler testified that he
could not identify either of the two persons he saw firing guns. Tr. 220. He could
only determine that one of the two persons was left-handed. Tr. 228. We also
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reincorporate the statements made by Maria, Wall, and Kramer on cross-
examination that we considered in our analysis of the first charge of felonious
assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial, we conclude that the
conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶80} Improperly Discharging a Firearm at or into a Habitation: To
establish a conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in
violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1), the State must prove that the defendant, “[1]
without privilege to do so, * * * [2] knowingly * * * [d]ischarged a firearm [3] at or
into an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any
individual.” R.C. 2923.161(A)(1). See Tr. 879.
{¶81} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Custer testified that he was
installing a screen door on his house with his stepson when he heard gunfire. Tr.
246. He stated that he observed activity coming from the area of Wally’s down the
street and that he headed in that direction to see what was happening. Tr. 248. After
he returned to his property, he examined the exterior of his house. Tr. 248. He
discovered that two of his windows were broken and found that a bullet was lodged
in one of his window frames. Tr. 248. Ex. 11-17. When asked, Custer stated that
he had not given anyone permission to fire a gun at his house. Tr. 253.
{¶82} The police investigators recovered a bullet from the window frame on
Custer’s house. Tr. 455. Ex. 81. Kramer determined that this bullet and the eleven
shell casings found at the third bay of the carwash had been fired by the same gun.
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Tr. 585-587. Ex. 97. Again, Wall had testified that Wilson had been firing a gun
from the area around the third bay of the carwash next to Wally’s. Tr. 232, 237-
238. Thus, having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the
State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
determine that Wilson was guilty of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a
habitation.
{¶83} On cross-examination, Custer admitted that he did not know who had
fired the gun that damaged his house. Tr. 254. We again reincorporate the manifest
weight analysis conducted under the first count of felonious assault. Having
examined the materials presented at trial, we conclude that the conviction on this
charge is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶84} Carrying a Concealed Weapon: To establish a conviction for carrying
a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) as a felony of the fourth
degree, the State must prove that the defendant “[1] knowingly carr[ied] or ha[d] *
* * [2] a handgun” that was “concealed on [his] * * * person or concealed ready at
hand” and was “loaded or for which the offender ha[d] ammunition ready at hand *
* *.” R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); R.C. 2923.12(F)(1). See Tr. 887.
{¶85} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, the State introduced testimony
from Maria and Wall that indicated that Wilson had a gun at Wally’s. Tr. 232, 237-
238, 331. During his interview with Detective Stechschulte, Wilson admitted that
he was at Laws’s funeral and that he had left the funeral with Maria. Tr. 711. Ex.
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102. Further, Maria testified that she drove Wilson to Laws’s funeral and drove him
from Laws’s funeral to Wally’s. Tr. 323-324. She stated that she did not see Wilson
with a gun while he was in the car but that she did see him firing a gun near to
Wally’s. Tr. 350. Maria further testified that she did not see any guns in her car
“before or after” the shooting. Tr. 350.
{¶86} In the video footage from the security cameras around Wally’s, Wilson
and two others can be seen getting out of Maria’s vehicle on Cole Street. Ex. 22.
These three individuals proceeded immediately to the area around the carwash
where the shots were fired at Cartagena’s vehicle down the street. Ex. 22. Tr. 232,
237-238. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the
State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
determine that Wilson was guilty of carrying a concealed weapon.
{¶87} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, we again reincorporate the
evidence that we considered in the manifest weight analysis conducted under the
first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
{¶88} Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle: To establish a
conviction for improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C.
2923.16(B), the State must prove that the defendant “[1] knowingly transport[ed] or
ha[d] a loaded firearm [2] in a motor vehicle [3] in such a manner that the firearm
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[was] accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the vehicle. R.C.
2923.16(B). See Tr. 890-891.
{¶89} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Maria and Wall saw Wilson
firing a gun at a carwash. Tr. 232, 237-238, 331. The State introduced video footage
from a security camera near Wally’s in which three individuals, including Wilson,
can be seen getting out of the white car on Cole Street and walking towards the
carwash area. Ex. 22. None of these individuals can be seen getting a weapon
outside of the trunk or any other place that was not accessible without leaving the
vehicle. Ex. 22. They immediately proceeded to the area around the carwash and
were readily able to begin firing at Cartagena’s pickup truck. Ex. 22. Having
reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that
Wilson was guilty of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle.
{¶90} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, we again reincorporate the
evidence that we considered in the manifest weight analysis conducted under the
first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
{¶91} Having Weapons While under Disability: To establish a conviction for
having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), the State
must prove that the defendant “[1] knowingly acquire[d], ha[d], carr[ied], or use[d]
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any firearm or dangerous ordinance” [2] even though he had previously “been
adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed
by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.” R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).3
{¶92} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Maria and Wall testified that
they saw Wilson firing a gun at Wally’s on June 21, 2019. Tr. 232, 238, 331.
Further, “the parties stipulated that the defendant knew that he had been adjudicated
a delinquent child for the commission of an offense of violence” in 2008. Tr. 895.
Tr. 150-153, 799. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could determine that Wilson was guilty of having a weapon while under disability.
{¶93} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, we again reincorporate the
evidence that we considered in the manifest weight analysis conducted under the
first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
{¶94} Participating in a Criminal Gang: To establish a conviction for
participating in a criminal gang in violation of R.C. 2923.42(A), the State must
3
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) reads as follows: “Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal
process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if * * *
[t]he person * * * has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed
by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.” (Emphasis added.) However, “proving relief
from a disability is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant.” State v. Gatewood, 2021-
Ohio-3325, 177 N.E.3d 693, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.). Establishing that the defendant has not been relieved from
disability “is not an element of the offense which must be proven by the state * * *.” State v. Gibson, 89
Ohio App.3d 188, 192, 623 N.E.2d 1266, 1269 (3d Dist. 1993).
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prove that the defendant “[1] actively participate[d] in a criminal gang, [2] with
knowledge that the criminal gang engages in or has engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity” and “[3] purposely promote[d], further[ed], or assist[ed] any criminal
conduct * * *, or * * * purposely commit[ted] or engage[d] in any act that constitutes
criminal conduct * * *.” R.C. 2923.42(A).
{¶95} R.C. 2923.41(A) defines a “criminal gang” as “[1] an ongoing formal
or informal organization, association, or group of three or more persons” that “[2]
has as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the offenses
listed in * * *” R.C. 2923.41(B), that “[3] has a common name or one or more
common identifying signs, symbols, or colors,” and [4] in which the associated
“persons * * * individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.” R.C. 2923.41(A). A partial list of the offenses in R.C.
2923.41(B) includes felonies, violent offenses, trafficking offenses in violation of
R.C. 2925.03, and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of
R.C. 2923.16. R.C. 2923.41(B)(1).
{¶96} R.C. 2923.41(B) defines when a “pattern of criminal gang activity”
exists. R.C. 2923.41(B). First, pursuant to R.C. 2923.41(B)(1), the
persons in the criminal gang [must] have committed, attempted
to commit, conspired to commit, been complicitors in the
commission of, or solicited, coerced, or intimidated another to
commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit, or be in
complicity in the commission of two or more of any of the
following offenses:
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(a) A felony or an act committed by a juvenile that would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
(b) An offense of violence or an act committed by a juvenile that
would be an offense of violence if committed by an adult;
(c) A violation of section 2907.04, 2909.06, 2911.211, 2917.04,
2919.23, or 2919.24 of the Revised Code, section 2921.04 or
2923.16 of the Revised Code, section 2925.03 of the Revised Code
if the offense is trafficking in marihuana, or section 2927.12 of the
Revised Code.4
R.C. 2923.41(B)(1). Second, pursuant to R.C. 2923.41(B)(2),
the following [must] apply with respect to the offenses that are
listed in [R.C. 2923.41(B)(1)] * * * and that persons in the criminal
gang committed, attempted to commit, conspired to commit, were
in complicity in committing, or solicited, coerced, or intimidated
another to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit, or be
in complicity in committing:
(a) At least one of the two or more offenses is a felony.
(b) At least one of those two or more offenses occurs on or after
January 1, 1999.
(c) The last of those two or more offenses occurs within five years
after at least one of those offenses.
(d) The two or more offenses are committed on separate occasions
or by two or more persons.
4
The offenses listed in R.C. 2923.41(B)(1)(c) include unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of
R.C. 2907.04; criminal damaging or endangering in violation of R.C. 2909.06; aggravated trespass in
violation of R.C. 2911.211; failure to disperse in violation of R.C. 2917.04; interference with custody in
violation of R.C. 2919.23; contributing to unruliness or delinquency in violation of R.C. 2919.24;
intimidation of an attorney, victim, or witness in a criminal case in violation of R.C. 2921.04; improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16; trafficking offenses in violation of R.C.
2925.03 “if the offense is trafficking in marihuana”; and ethnic intimidation in violation of R.C. 2927.12.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2923.41(B)(1)(c).
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R.C. 2923.41(B)(2). The definition of “criminal conduct” in R.C. 2923.41(C)
includes the following:
the commission of, an attempt to commit, a conspiracy to commit,
complicity in the commission of, or solicitation, coercion, or
intimidation of another to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to
commit, or be in complicity in the commission of an offense listed
in [R.C. 2923.41(B)(1)] * * *.
R.C. 2923.41(C). Again, R.C. 2923.41(B)(1) lists felony offenses, offenses of
violence, and various other offenses that include improperly handling a firearm in a
motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16. R.C. 2923.41(B)(1). See Tr. 864-869.
{¶97} As to sufficiency of the evidence, Detective Stechschulte testified that,
in recent years, gangs have transitioned from being larger associations to being
smaller associations that would form local alliances with each other. Tr. 607-608.
In his testimony, he mentioned that North Side, East Side, and South Side gangs
(“South Side”) are operating in the Lima area. Tr. 618, 624. The North Side
encompasses a gang called the Most Demanded Boys (“MDB”). Tr. 624.
{¶98} Detective Stechschulte said that, in the Lima area, the South Side
gangs have “kind of aligned themselves a lot of times with * * * [the] East Side”
gangs. Tr. 618. The East Side encompasses a gang called “Manniworld.” Tr. 610,
668-669. The name “Manniworld” came “from Damani McMillan who was killed
in a car crash up in Detroit several years ago and a lot of the individuals that began
Manniworld were friends of his and classmates of his.” Tr. 616. Detective
Stechschulte indicated that East Side gangs were in conflict with North Side gangs.
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Tr. 687. Patrolman Crish also affirmed that North Side and East Side were “rival”
gangs. Tr. 363.
{¶99} Detective Stechschulte testified that these gangs were involved in drug
trafficking and that this was “normally one of the[ir] primar[y] activities.” Tr. 610.
He also stated that these gangs were also involved in robberies, burglaries,
prostitution, human trafficking, and other fraudulent activities. Tr. 611. He stated
that the gangs engage in “felonious assaults that may or may not be associated with
one of those primary crimes to gain money * * *.” Tr. 612. However, he also stated
that the gangs sometimes engage in violent crimes “as a retaliatory thing against
another one of those gangs * * *.” Tr. 612. He affirmed that the “primary activities”
of the East Side gang are “to commit * * * felonies[.]” Tr. 642.
{¶100} Detective Stechschulte testified that Laws was a part of East Side and
Manniworld while Omosikeji was part of North Side and MDB. Tr. 616. He
indicated that Laws’s death was the culmination of an “ongoing feud” between
Laws and Omosikeji. Tr. 641. Smith, who was with Omosikeji at the time that
Laws was shot, was also affiliated with North Side and MDB. Tr. 624, 686. Smith’s
brother was Romelo, who was an original member of MDB. Tr. 624-625. Detective
Stechschulte testified that the Laws’s shooting was a “big spark” that “inflamed”
tensions between East Side and North Side gangs. Tr. 688.
{¶101} From his experience, Detective Stechschulte had come to know that
Hezekiah was with the Manniworld and East Side; Allen was with South Side; and
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Manley was with Manniworld and East Side. Tr. 643-644. He also said that
Wilson’s brother, Danarius Wilson (“Danarius”), was affiliated with Manniworld
and East Side. Tr. 644. Danarius was apparently “best friends” with Laws and was
a pallbearer at Laws’s funeral. Tr. 645.
{¶102} The prosecutor asked whether Wilson was “associated with the East
Side gang * * *[.]” Tr. 662. Detective Stechschulte affirmed that Wilson was East
Side but testified that Wilson had more of a “hybrid” affiliation with gangs in in the
Lima area, being associated with the South Side, East Side, and Outlaw gangs in the
Lima area. Tr. 642, 662. The State introduced several videos and pictures of Wilson
making hand gestures that are associated with the Manniworld gang. Tr. 632-633,
636, 638, 639, 735, 742. Ex. 103, 106, 107, 109, 113. In a number of these pictures,
Wilson was alongside Allen. Tr. 639. Ex. 103, 106, 107, 109.
{¶103} Detective Stechschulte also testified that correctional institutions will
often keep records of gang affiliations of inmates because members of rival gangs
generally need to be separated from each other. Tr. 646. In addition to Danarius,
Wilson, Hezekiah, Allen, Manley, and Laws, Detective Stechschulte testified about
at least nine other individuals who were affiliated with East Side. Tr. 643, 645, 646,
648, 649, 650, 651, 653, 656, 658. See Tr. 665. He detailed a number of homicides,
robberies, and shootings that different combinations of these nine individuals had
committed in concert with each other at different times. Tr. 642-660. He stated that
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these individuals had received felony convictions for the multiple offenses of
violence that he listed in his testimony. Tr. 663-664.
{¶104} Detective Stechschulte stated that his testimony regarding these
individuals was based on his investigative experience and his personal knowledge.
Tr. 660, 663. He further testified that “the majority of the shooting homicides that
[he had] * * * dealt with are East Siders * * * committing those.” Tr. 662. Detective
Stechschulte stated that he knows that all of the offenses about which he testified
happened after January 1, 1999 because he was not an investigator until 2007. Tr.
664. He also affirmed that “the latest of th[e]se offenses occurred within five years
of a prior such offense” and that these “offenses occurred on at least two different
occasions or by two or more members of the gang[.]” Tr. 665. Detective
Stechschulte documented his findings in a report that was admitted into evidence.
Tr. 774. Ex. 112.
{¶105} Further, Investigator Aaron Montgomery (“Investigator
Montgomery”), who works for the Lima Police Department, testified about roughly
forty individuals affiliated with East Side. Tr. 512-524. He listed the offenses that
he had uncovered in the process of investigating each of these individuals. Tr. 512-
524. These offenses included homicide, shootings, drug possession, and robberies.
Tr. 514, 515, 516, 517, 519, 520, 521. Investigator Montgomery affirmed that he
detailed “offenses of violence, felonies, and felony drug instances * * * [.]” Tr. 524.
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He also affirmed that the information relayed in his testimony came from his
personal experience. Tr. 524.
{¶106} During his interview with the police, Wilson admitted that he had
been at Laws’s funeral on June 21, 2019. Ex. 102. Tr. 711. Maria testified that she
was driving from Laws’s funeral on Cole Street with Hezekiah, Wilson, Allen, and
Manley. Tr. 325. In footage from security cameras located around Wally’s, Maria’s
white car can be seen driving past the gas station and doing a U-turn to come back
towards Wally’s. Ex. 22. Detective Stechschulte stated the police interpreted this
to mean that “some conversation occurred in that car prior to this * * *.” Tr. 694.
“They just didn’t have a vision or a premonition that Romelo Blackman was sitting
back there * * *. They saw him when they drove past.” Tr. 694.
{¶107} Further, in this footage, Maria’s car can be seen stopped on Cole
Street while Hezekiah, Allen, and Wilson then got out of the car. Ex. 22. As
Hezekiah, Allen, and Wilson walked together towards the carwash area, Maria
pulled into Wally’s parking lot. Ex. 22. Tr. 695. Manley then got out of Maria’s
car; walked into the gas station; and then returned to Maria’s car. Ex. 22. Detective
Stechschulte noted that Manley did not flinch as he was walking back to Maria’s
car when the gunfire began. Tr. 695. For this reason, as he was investigating this
incident, Detective Stechschulte believed that Manley “knew that those shots were
going to be fired * * * and the only way he would know is if they talked about it
before the car parked and let the three individuals out * * *.” Tr. 695.
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{¶108} Detective Stechschulte also pointed to the fact that Romelo’s
testimony “that he didn’t really have any beef, any problems with * * * Eric Wilson,
Jr. at all up to this date [June 21, 2019]” as an indication that this incident on June
21, 2019 was retaliation by the East Side gang against the North Side gang for
Laws’s death. Tr. 687. He testified that he could uncover no other tensions or issues
between Wilson and Romelo or between Wilson and Cartagena. Tr. 716. Further,
the State introduced evidence that Wilson did not act alone in firing at Romelo.
Wilson was one of three individuals who got out of Maria’s car. Ex. 22. Kamler
saw two individuals firing guns from the carwash area. Tr. 218. Mayer testified
that Hezekiah was standing with one or two others when the shots were fired. Tr.
206. Kramer determined that, of the nineteen shell casings found at Wally’s, eleven
came from one gun, and eight came from another gun. Ex. 97. Tr. 585.
{¶109} Finally, felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11 and
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161 are listed
as “[o]ffense[s] of violence” in R.C. 2901.01. R.C. 2901.01. See Tr. 865. See R.C.
2923.41(B)(1)(b), (C). Additionally, Wilson was convicted of improperly handling
a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16. See R.C.
2923.41(B)(1)(c), (C). He was also convicted of three other felony offenses that do
not include the convictions he received for offenses of violence, the offense of
improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, or the offense of participating in
a criminal gang. Doc. 4. Tr. 865. See R.C. 2923.41(B)(1)(a), (C). We previously
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found these other convictions to be supported by sufficient evidence and not against
the manifest weight of the evidence in our analysis of this assignment of error. Thus,
having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that
Wilson was guilty of participating in a criminal gang.
{¶110} As to the manifest weight of the evidence, we again reincorporate the
evidence that we considered in the manifest weight analysis conducted under the
first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the conviction on this charge is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
{¶111} Firearm Specifications: To establish a firearm specification under
R.C. 2941.145(A), the State must prove that the defendant “[1] had a firearm on or
about [his] * * * person or under the offender’s control while committing the offense
[2] and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm * * *, or used it to facilitate
the offense.” R.C. 2941.145(A). See Tr. 882. In this case, there were firearm
specifications for both counts of felonious assault; the count of discharging a firearm
on or near prohibited premises; the count of discharging a firearm at or into a
habitation; and the count of participating in a criminal gang. Doc. 4.
{¶112} As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Wall testified that, on June 21,
2019, she saw Wilson fire a gun from near the third bay of the carwash next to
Wally’s. Tr. 232, 238. Wall also testified that Wilson pointed the firearm directly
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at her; that he was waving the firearm; and that he had been shooting wildly. Tr.
232, 236, 237. Further, Maria also testified that she saw Wilson firing a gun at
Wally’s, though she stated that she could not recall whether he was at one of the
bays at the carwash. Tr. 329-330. Eleven shell casings found in the area around the
third bay of the carwash. Tr. 431, 438. Ex. 31. These casings link the weapon that
Wall saw Wilson firing to the offenses that carried firearm specifications.
{¶113} As to the two charges of felonious assault, Cartagena and Romelo
heard multiple gunshots being fired at them as they pulled out of Wally’s. Tr. 282,
288, 405, 406. The police also discovered multiple bullet holes in the pickup
Cartagena was driving. Tr. 382, 463-464. Ex. 19-21, 82-86. The State introduced
evidence that a bullet had been recovered from Romelo’s headrest in Cartagena’s
pickup truck. Tr. 382, 465. Ex. 87. Kramer testified that he determined that this
bullet had been fired by the same gun from which the eleven shell casings found at
the third bay of the carwash had originated. Tr. 585. Ex. 97.
{¶114} As to the charge of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited
premises, Officer Carman testified that he took pictures of several bullet holes in
two cars that were located in a driveway across the street from Wally’s. Tr. 454.
Ex. 76-78. He also saw several trees on the other side of the street that had bullet
holes in them. Tr. 453, 455. Ex. 79-80. Custer testified that his house had been
struck by gunfire and that he lived on the other side of Cole Street from Wally’s.
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Tr. 248. Ex. 11-17. Further, Cartagena and Romelo testified that their pickup truck
was being fired at while they were on the roadway. Tr. 282, 288, 405, 406.
{¶115} As to the charge of discharging a firearm at or into a habitation,
Custer testified that his house had been hit by gunfire at the time of the shooting on
June 21, 2019. Tr. 248. Kramer determined that a bullet removed from Custer’s
house was fired from the same gun from which the eleven shell casings found
around the third bay of the carwash had originated. Tr. 585. Ex. 97.
{¶116} As to the charge of participating in a criminal gang, the criminal
conduct, as defined by R.C. 2923.41(C), that Wilson undertook to further the
interests of the East Side gang was composed of felonies, offenses of violence, and
a violation of R.C. 2923.16 that each involved the use of a firearm. Tr. 232, 237-
238, 276, 288 331, 405-406, 585-587. Ex. 22. Doc. 4. See Tr. 714-716. See R.C.
2923.41(C). Thus, having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the five firearm specifications
in this case.
{¶117} As to the manifest weight of the evidence for these five firearm
specifications, we again reincorporate the manifest weight analysis conducted under
the first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the convictions for the five firearms specifications are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶118} Criminal Gang Activity Specifications: To establish a criminal gang
activity specification under R.C. 2941.142(A), the State must prove that the
defendant “[1] committed the felony that is an offense of violence [2] while
participating in a criminal gang.” R.C. 2941.142(A). See Tr. 885. In this case,
there were three criminal gang activity specifications for both counts of felonious
assault and for the count of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation. Doc.
4. R.C. 2901.01 classifies felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11 and
improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161 as
“[o]ffense[s] of violence.” R.C. 2901.01. See Doc. 4.
{¶119} We turn now to examining whether the State established that these
felony offenses of violence were committed “while participating in a criminal
gang.” R.C. 2941.142(A). In this case, Detective Basinger testified that Omosikeji
admitted to shooting and killing Laws on June 14, 2019. Tr. 197. Detective
Stechschulte testified that Omosikeji was affiliated with North Side; that Laws was
affiliated with East Side; and that Laws’s death inflamed tensions between these
two gangs. Tr. 616, 679, 688, 691. Patrolman Crish testified that he anticipated
retaliation after hearing of Laws’s death. Tr. 361.
{¶120} Detective Stechschulte testified that Smith, who was with Omosikeji
at the time that Laws was shot, was Romelo’s brother. Tr. 625. He further testified
that Smith and Romelo were affiliated with MDB and North Side. Tr. 625, 686-
687. Hezekiah, Allen, Manley, and Wilson were affiliated with East Side and
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attended Laws’s funeral just before the shooting on June 21, 2019. Tr. 323-324,
362, 364, 390, 617, 618, 623, 624-625, 643-644, 679, 686.
{¶121} The State introduced video footage from the security cameras around
Wally’s. Ex. 22. In this footage, Maria can be seen doing a U-turn on Cole Street
to head back towards Wally’s; letting Hezekiah, Allen, and Wilson out of her
vehicle together; and then pulling into Wally’s parking lot. Ex. 22. Hezekiah,
Allen, and Wilson then headed towards the area around the carwash. Ex. 22.
Shortly after Cartagena pulled his pickup out of Wally’s parking lot and onto Cole
Street, his vehicle was struck by gunfire. Tr. 405, 406.
{¶122} Kamler’s testimony that he saw two shooters present at Wally’s. Tr.
218. Wall and Maria testified that they observed Wilson firing a gun next to the
carwash. Tr. 232, 237-238, 331. Thus, Wilson was one of two people firing at
Cartagena’s pickup truck. Further, the police recovered shell casings that were fired
by two different guns and in two different areas next to the carwash. Tr. 431-432,
585. Ex. 97. This testimony indicates that Wilson acted in concert with other
members of East Side on June 21, 2019.
{¶123} Detective Stechschulte testified that Romelo “was obviously the
target” of this shooting. Tr. 715. However, Romelo testified that he had never had
any issues with Wilson prior to June 21, 2019. Tr. 411. Detective Stechschulte
stated that he could not uncover any tensions between Romelo and Wilson. Tr. 716.
He testified that Wilson’s involvement in this shooting made sense in the context of
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“the Christian Laws homicide, back to North Side/East Side.” Tr. 715. These facts
are what led Detective Stechschulte to a conclusion as to whether the June 21, 2019
shooting * * * furthered the interest of the East Side gang[.]” Tr. 714. This
information provides sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Wilson was
participating in criminal gang activity when he repeatedly discharged a firearm next
to the carwash on June 21, 2019.
{¶124} In concert with Wall’s testimony and the results from Kramer’s tests,
the bullet lodged in Custer’s house connects Wilson’s participation in the criminal
gang activity to his conviction for improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation
in violation of R.C. 2923.161. Tr. 232, 236, 237-238, 585. Ex. 97. Similarly, in
connection with Wall’s testimony and the results from Kramer’s tests, the bullet
recovered from the headrest in Cartagena’s pickup truck links Wilson’s
participation in the criminal gang activity to his convictions for felonious assault.
Tr. 232, 236, 237-238, 585. Ex. 97. Having reviewed the evidence presented at
trial, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for the three criminal
gang activity specifications in this case.
{¶125} As to the manifest weight of the evidence for these three criminal
gang activity specifications, we again reincorporate the manifest weight analysis
conducted under the first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials
presented at trial, we conclude that the convictions for the three criminal gang
activity specifications are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶126} Specification for Forfeiture of a Weapon: To establish a specification
concerning forfeiture of a firearm under R.C. 2941.1417(A), the State must prove
that the defendant “[1] was the owner and/or possessor of a handgun” that “[2] was
an instrumentality that the defendant used or intended to use in the commission or
facilitation of the offense * * *.” Tr. 891. See R.C. 2941.1417(A). In this case, this
specification accompanied the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Doc. 4.
{¶127} In this case, Maria and Wall testified that Wilson was firing a gun
next to the carwash at Wally’s on June 21, 2019. Tr. 237-238, 331. Wall indicated
that Wilson was standing next to the third bay of the carwash when he was firing
his gun. Tr. 232. Kramer testified that the eleven shell casings found by the third
bay of the carwash were fired by the gun that is subject to this forfeiture is
specification. Tr. 585. Ex. 97. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we
conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for this forfeiture of a weapon
specification.
{¶128} As to the manifest weight of the evidence for this forfeiture
specification, we again reincorporate the manifest weight analysis conducted under
the first count of felonious assault. Having examined the materials presented at trial,
we conclude that the conviction on this forfeiture specification is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶129} In conclusion, having examined each of Wilson’s convictions, we
conclude that the State satisfied its burden of production by providing some
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evidence for each of essential elements for the crimes charged. Further, the State
met its burden of persuasion as a review of the record makes clear that these
convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For these reasons,
Wilson’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶130} Wilson asserts that he was denied his right to the effective assistance
of counsel. He argues that defense counsel failed to call an expert witness and
alleges that defense counsel had a conflict of interest.
Legal Standard
{¶131} “Under Ohio law, ‘a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry
out his duties in a competent manner.’” State v. Harvey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-
34, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9, 1993
WL 270995 (July 22, 1993). “For this reason, the appellant has the burden of
proving that he or she was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 39. “In order
to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the
burden of establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and
(2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 3d
Dist. Allen No. 1-17-14, 2018-Ohio-3618, ¶ 24, quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
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{¶132} In order to establish deficient performance, the appellant must
demonstrate that trial “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Howton, supra, ¶ 35, quoting Strickland at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
“[D]ebatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” State
v. Queen, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-41, 2020-Ohio-618, ¶ 14, quoting State v.
Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 101.
{¶133} “In order to establish prejudice, ‘the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.’” State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-05, 2021-
Ohio-1132, ¶ 122, quoting State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, 78 N.E.3d 343, ¶ 13 (3d
Dist.). If the appellant does not establish one of these two prongs, the appellate court
does not need to consider the facts of the case under the other prong of the test. State
v. Baker, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-61, 2018-Ohio-3431, ¶ 19, citing State v. Walker,
2016-Ohio-3499, 66 N.E.3d 349, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶134} Wilson raises two main arguments to establish that his trial counsel
was ineffective. First, he argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
call an expert witness. As an initial matter, we note that “[a] decision by trial
counsel not to call an expert witness generally will not sustain a claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel.” State v. Conaway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815,
848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 118.
In fact, in many criminal cases trial counsel’s decision not to seek
expert testimony ‘is unquestionably tactical because such an
expert might uncover evidence that further inculpates the
defendant.’ State v. Glover, [12th Dist.] Clermont App. No.
CA2001-12-102, 2002-Ohio-6392, 2002 WL 31647905, at ¶ 95.
“Further, even if the wisdom of such an approach is debatable,
‘debatable trial tactics’ do not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id., quoting State v. Clayton (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 45,
49, 16 O.O.3d 35, 402 N.E.2d 1189.
Costell, supra, at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Samatar, 152 Ohio App.3d 311, 2003-Ohio-
1639, 787 N.E.2d 691 (10th Dist.). Trial counsel’s “decision to rely on [the] * * *
cross-examination” of the State’s expert witnesses “should be viewed as a legitimate
‘tactical decision.’” State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299, 2001-Ohio-1580,
754 N.E.2d 1150, 1177 (2001).
{¶135} On appeal, Wilson merely asserts that his trial counsel’s decision not
to call an expert witness constituted deficient performance. This does not establish
the first prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Further, Wilson does
not explain how calling an expert witness would have changed the outcome of his
trial. He merely alleges that the testimony of an expert witness for the Defense
“would have been able to rebut the state’s testimony * * *.” Appellant’s Brief, 7.
However, he offers no evidence in support of this contention, rendering this
argument speculative. Hartman at 299 (finding that evidence of what an expert
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would have testified about would usually be established by materials outside of the
record, generally placing such a challenge outside of the scope of a direct appeal).
{¶136} Second, Wilson alleges that defense counsel previously represented
Omosikeji when he was prosecuted for his involvement in the shooting death of
Laws (“the Laws case”). He then argues that this prior representation created a
conflict of interest that deprived him of his right to the effective assistance of
counsel. “A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel encompasses both the right to competent representation and the right to
representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” State v. Barrow, 2018-Ohio-
1703, 111 N.E.3d 714, ¶ 36 (1st Dist.).
{¶137} A “conflict of interest” refers to a “circumstance[] in which regard
for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another duty * * *.” State v. Hathaway,
2015-Ohio-5488, 55 N.E.3d 634, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
A possible conflict of interest exists where the ‘interests of the
defendants may diverge at some point so as to place the attorney
under inconsistent duties.’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Dillon
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 166, 168, 657 N.E.2d 273, 275-276, quoting
Cuyler[ v. Sullivan], 446 U.S. [355,] 356, 100 S.Ct. [1708,] 1722, 64
L.Ed.2d [333,] 351-352, fn. 3. It follows, then, that an actual
conflict of interest exists if, ‘during the course of the
representation, the defendants’ interests do diverge with respect
to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.’
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 169, 657 N.E.2d at 276, quoting Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 356, 100 S.Ct. at 1722, 64 L.Ed.2d at 351–352, fn. 3;
see, also, Winkler[ v. Keane], 7 F.3d [304,] 307 [(C.A.2 1993)].
Indeed, we have said that a lawyer represents conflicting interests
‘when, on behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
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which duty to another client requires him to oppose.’ [State v.]
Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d [180,] 182, 532 N.E.2d [735,] 738 [(1988)].
(Emphasis sic.) State v. Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 1997-Ohio-183, 679 N.E.2d
276 (1997).
A defendant who claims he was denied the right to conflict-free
counsel must demonstrate that ‘an actual conflict of interest’
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. Wood [v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261,] 273, 101 S.Ct. 1097[, 457 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)]; Moss
[v. United States, 323 F.3d 445,] 459-460 [(6th Cir. 2003)]. ‘A
possible conflict is insufficient.’ State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180,
187, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998).
Barrow at ¶ 37. See Manross at 182. Thus, “a defendant must show that his interests
diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action with
the other represented party in order to show an actual conflict.” State v. McDonald,
4th Dist. Lawrence No. 09CA4, 2009-Ohio-5132, ¶ 16.
Conflicts may arise when an attorney simultaneously represents
clients with different interests (multiple [or simultaneous]
representation), or when an attorney representing a defendant
has previously represented codefendants or trial witnesses
(successive representation).
State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, 100 N.E.3d 118, ¶ 91 (1st Dist.), quoting Moss at
459. “Simultaneous and successive representation differs materially because in the
latter, the attorney is no longer beholden to the former client.” State v. Jones, 5th
Dist. Stark Nos. 2007-CA-00041, 2007-CA-00077, 2008-Ohio-1068, ¶ 77. For this
reason, “[i]t is more difficult for a defendant to show that counsel actively
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represented conflicting interests in cases of successive rather than simultaneous
representation.” Moss at 459.
{¶138} The record does not contain any information that establishes that
defense counsel represented Omosikeji in the Laws case. However, even assuming
that defense counsel was involved in this prior representation, Wilson has not
established an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his arguments do not
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest existed in this case.5 Wilson has not
explained how his interests diverged from or were adverse to Omosikeji’s interests
on any factual or legal issue. Further, the evidence in the record contains no
indication that defense counsel’s prior representation of Omosikeji in the Laws case
and his representation of Wilson would have involved any conflicting duties.
{¶139} Further, in cases involving successive representation, the prior clients
that are typically the basis of an alleged conflict of interest are “codefendants or trial
witnesses * * *.” Buck, supra, at ¶ 91, quoting Moss, supra, at 459. In this case,
Omosikeji was neither one of Wilson’s codefendants nor a witness in Wilson’s trial.
But in his brief, Wilson argues that defense counsel should have called Omosikeji
as a witness and then suggests that Omosikeji was not called because of this alleged
conflict of interest. Appellant’s Brief, 8.
5
In its brief, the State admits that defense counsel had previously represented Omosikeji in the Laws case.
Appellee’s Brief, 16.
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{¶140} However, there is no indication that Omosikeji would have had any
relevant testimony to offer in Wilson’s case. In the absence of any evidence that
would substantiate the allegation that there was an actual conflict of interest, this
argument is ultimately a claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
call Omosikeji as a witness at trial with some added speculation as to why defense
counsel did not call him. A trial counsel’s decision not to call a witness lies within
the realm of debatable trial tactics and does not, therefore, generally provide a basis
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Risner, 3d Dist. Wyandot
No. 16-20-05, 2021-Ohio-342, ¶ 28. Thus, Wilson has not established that an actual
conflict of interest existed in this case or that defense counsel’s performance was
deficient. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
{¶141} In this assignment of error, Wilson concludes by arguing that the
cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors at trial was significant enough to deny
him his right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, Wilson has not
demonstrated that his trial counsel committed any errors that constituted deficient
performance or that affected the outcome of his trial. As such, this argument is
without merit. Since Wilson has not carried the burden of establishing an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, his third assignment of error is overruled.
Seventh Assignment of Error
{¶142} Wilson asserts two main arguments. First, he asserts that the trial
court failed to consider the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
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Second, he also argues that the trial court erred in imposing his sentences
consecutively. We will consider these arguments in separate analyses.
Legal Standard for Sentencing Factors
{¶143} In rendering a sentence, “[t]he trial court has full discretion to impose
any sentence within the authorized statutory range * * *.” State v. Dayton, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-16-05, 2016-Ohio-7178, ¶ 15, quoting State v. King, 2013-Ohio-
2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in this process, trial courts are to
sentence convicted felons in accordance with the overriding purposes of felony
sentencing, which
are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective
rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that
the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing
an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.
To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the
need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and
others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making
restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
R.C. 2929.11. “To effectuate compliance with these overriding purposes, the Ohio
Revised Code requires the trial court to consider a number of factors listed in R.C.
2929.12.” State v. Walton, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-55, 2018-Ohio-1680, ¶ 6. “The
R.C. 2929.12 factors direct the trial court to evaluate the seriousness of the offense
and the likelihood of recidivism.” Berry, supra, at ¶ 137, citing R.C. 2929.12.
{¶144} If the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that his
or her sentence is “(1) contrary to law and/or (2) unsupported by the record,” an
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appellate court has the authority, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “to increase,
reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * *.” State v. McGowan, 147 Ohio St.3d
166, 2016-Ohio-2971, 62 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 1. However, following the Ohio Supreme
Court’s holding in State v. Jones,
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) ‘does not provide a basis for an appellate
court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the
sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12.’ * * * [State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-
6729, 169 N.E.3d 649,] ¶ 39. * * * R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits
an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if the appellate
court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not
support the sentencing court’s findings under certain specified
statutory provisions. Id. at ¶ 28. However, R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a). Id. Instead, only ‘R.C. 2929.13(B) and (D),
2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4), and 2929.20(I) are specified’ in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a). Id. Furthermore, the court explained that ‘an
appellate court’s determination that the record does not support
a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is
‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b).’ Id. at ¶ 32.
State v. Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 13. “Thus, * * * an
appellate court may not modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s
‘findings’ under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Foster, 3d Dist. Union
No. 14-20-26, 2021-Ohio-1454, ¶ 31.
Legal Analysis for Sentencing Factors
{¶145} Wilson argues that the trial court failed to “consider all of the relevant
factors” in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Appellant’s Brief, 17. See Slife at ¶ 8.
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However, in its judgment entry, the trial court expressly stated that it had considered
the principles and purposes of felony sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11. Doc.
360. See Tr. 953. Further, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had
considered a presentence investigation report for Wilson from a 2015 offense. Tr.
951. The trial court asked the State if Wilson had any convictions since that 2015
offense. Tr. 951. The trial court then conducted an extensive discussion of the
statutory factors listed in R.C. 2929.12. Tr. 956-964. Finally, in its judgment entry,
the trial court listed each of the factors from R.C. 2929.12 that it had found to be
applicable in the case. Doc. 360.
{¶146} The materials in the record clearly establish that the trial court
considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 in
addition to the relevant statutory factors listed in R.C. 2929.12 before it imposed
Wilson’s sentence in this case. Tr. 952. Doc. 360. Further, Wilson has not
demonstrated that his sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law or
identified, in his brief, a basis upon which this Court could vacate or modify his
sentence. For this reason, the first argument under this assignment of error is
without merit.
Legal Standard for Consecutive Sentences
{¶147} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs the imposition of consecutive sentences.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). This provision reads, in its relevant part, as follows:
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(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for
convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the
offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds
that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from
future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18
of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or
more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court needs only to find that one of the three factors
listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a-c) is applicable. State v. Robinson, 3d Dist. Hancock
No. 5-16-13, 2017-Ohio-2703, ¶ 12.
{¶148} “[T]he record must contain a basis upon which a reviewing court can
determine that the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
before it imposed consecutive sentences.” State v. Rodriguez, 3d Dist. Hancock
Nos. 5-19-40 and 5-19-41, 2020-Ohio-2987, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio
St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 28. However, “no statute directs a
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sentencing court to give or state reasons supporting imposition of consecutive
sentences.” Bonnell at ¶ 27.
{¶149} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a
sentence ‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does
not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Nienberg, 3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-16-15 and
12-16-16, 2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.
Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but
not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts
sought to be established.
State v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20, 2018-Ohio-456, ¶ 12, quoting Cross
v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus
(1954).
Legal Analysis for Consecutive Sentences
{¶150} At Wilson’s sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following
statements with regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences:
The Court is going to find that consecutive service is necessary,
pursuant to 2929.14(C)(4) because the Court finds that
consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future
crime.
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I don’t know that I’ve had a case before me that is more deserving
of protecting the public from future crime, as well as to punish the
offender.
The Court further finds that consecutive service is not
disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and
particularly to the danger he poses to the public.
The Court also finds that at least two of the multiple offenses
[were] committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and
the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so
committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for
any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of
conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the defendant’s
conduct.
And I would also note when we talk about harm, while Romelo
Blackman and Jayden Cartagena were specifically referenced as
victims, Paul Custer is a victim, Cynthia Wall is a victim. Any
one that was in that area and had to duck or left with the trauma
of those events was harmed by what this defendant and his
cohorts decided to do.
Further, the Court would find that the defendant’s history of
criminal conduct, particularly the weapons cases and his juvenile
adjudications, demonstrate that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
Tr. 967-969. Further, the trial court not only made these required findings at the
sentencing hearing but also reiterated them in writing in its judgment entry of
sentencing. Doc. 360.
{¶151} Prior to making these required findings, the trial court conducted an
extensive examination of the facts of this case. Tr. 956-964. During this
examination, the trial court noted, when the shooting occurred at Wally’s, “there
were just an incredible amount of people” in the vicinity, including a bus with forty-
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eight children on board, “and any one of them * * * with 19 shots could have been
killed. And the people firing those shots didn’t care one bit.” Tr. 962. The trial
court also noted that, when Wilson and his associates
were in attendance at Christian Laws’ funeral that [they] had
guns on them [and] were prepared if they saw anybody they
thought might be remotely tied to the death of Christian Laws
[and] they were going to get their pound of flesh.
Tr. 958. The trial court considered the evidence regarding Wilson’s connections to
local gangs and found that Wilson’s acts had been “committed as part of an
organized criminal activity.” Tr. 957, 961. The trial court also discussed the harm
to the victims of this case; Wilson’s lack of remorse; and Wilson’s failure to respond
favorably to criminal sanctions in his past. Tr. 956-957, 959.
{¶152} Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we conclude that the
trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and conducted an
extensive analysis of various facts from this case that were relevant to these
findings. See also State v. Morgan, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-21-11, 2021-Ohio-3972,
¶ 7. Wilson has not, with these arguments, demonstrated that the imposition of
consecutive sentences in this case was clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
Thus, Wilson’s second argument under this assignment of error is without merit.
Accordingly, his seventh assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶153} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/hls
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