Todd v. Cleveland

[Cite as Todd v. Cleveland, 2013-Ohio-101.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 98333
TAMMY L. TODD, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
CITY OF CLEVELAND
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-758883
BEFORE: Rocco, J., Stewart, A.J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 17, 2013
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Barbara A. Langhenry
Interim Director of Law
By: Jerome A. Payne, Jr.
Assistant Director of Law
City Hall–Room 106
601 Lakeside Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Scott I. Levey
Mondello & Levey
55 Public Square
Suite 1616
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff Tammy Todd was driving on a street in the City of Cleveland when
she hit a pothole, lost control of her vehicle, and struck a utility pole. She brought this
action against the city seeking damages for the injuries she sustained in the accident,
alleging that the city had negligently failed to maintain the road and that the city’s
negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries.
{¶2} The city filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it was
immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and was otherwise entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because the danger presented by the pothole was open and obvious.
The trial court denied the city’s motion, stating that there were genuine issues of material
fact, and the city appealed.
{¶3} The city raises three assignments of error arising out of the denial of its
motion for summary judgment. The city argues that the trial court erred in denying its
motion for summary judgment because the alleged hazardous pothole was not an
“obstruction” under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), the only potentially applicable exception to
statutory immunity. The city also contends that the trial court improperly denied its
motion for summary judgment because it did not have actual or constructive notice of the
alleged hazardous pothole prior to Todd’s accident and the pothole was open and obvious,
such that the city owed no duty to Todd to protect her from any alleged danger presented
by the pothole.
{¶4} Finding no merit to the city’s first and second assignments of error and
concluding that we lack jurisdiction to consider the city’s third assignment of error, we
affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.
{¶5} An appeal of a trial court’s summary judgment ruling is subject to a de novo
standard of review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 1996-Ohio-336,
671 N.E.2d 241. We accord no deference to the trial court’s decision and independently
review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
{¶6} Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine
issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the
nonmoving party.
{¶7} The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth specific facts that
demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d
280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden,
summary judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, summary
judgment is appropriate only if the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 293.
{¶8} The city’s first assignment of error states:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ALLEGED
HAZARD IS NOT AN OBSTRUCTION.
{¶9} A “three-tiered” analysis is applied in determining whether a political
subdivision is entitled to immunity from civil liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744.
Hubbard v. Canton City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 54,
¶ 10. We must first determine whether the entity claiming immunity is a political
subdivision and whether the alleged harm occurred in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function. If the political subdivision is entitled to immunity, we must then
consider whether the plaintiff has shown that any of the exceptions to immunity set forth
in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply. If an exception to sovereign immunity applies, we must
consider whether the political subdivision can assert one of the defenses to liability under
R.C. 2744.03.
{¶10} R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) establishes a general grant of sovereign immunity,
providing that a political subdivision is not liable for damages for injury, death, or loss to
person or property incurred in connection with the performance of a governmental or
proprietary function. The maintenance and repair of roads is a “governmental
function.” R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e).
{¶11} R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), however, provides an exception to the general grant of
sovereign immunity for injuries or losses resulting from the “negligent failure to keep
public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public
roads * * * .”
{¶12} In its first assignment of error, the city argues that a pothole is not an
“obstruction” as contemplated in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), and that, therefore, the public roads
exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) does not apply to Todd’s claim. The city cites Howard
v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792, 891 N.E.2d 311, for the
proposition that “obstruction” as used in the statute means “an obstacle that blocks or
clogs the roadway and not merely a thing or condition that hinders or impeded the use of
the roadway or that may have the potential to do so.” Id. at ¶ 30. The city maintains
that because there was no evidence that the pothole Todd encountered “blocked or
clogged traffic,” the pothole was not an “obstruction.”
{¶13} There is no statutory definition of “obstructions.” The city’s argument that
a pothole does not constitute an obstruction is debatable. See Crabtree v. Cook, 196
Ohio App.3d 546, 2011-Ohio-5612, 964 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (proposition that
potholes “could never as a matter of law” rise to the level of “obstructions” under R.C.
2744.02(B)(3) would constitute “an overly broad exclusion from liability”). However,
we need not decide that issue. R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) creates a separate exception for
injuries or losses caused by the “negligent failure to keep public roads in repair.”
{¶14} If we interpret R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to give effect to all of its words, it is
possible for a road to be in good repair, yet temporarily obstructed by something like a
fallen branch. The terms “in repair” and “obstructions” exist separately under R.C.
2744.02(B)(3) and provide two separate, independent bases for precluding statutory
immunity with respect to public roads. See Bonace v. Springfield Twp., 179 Ohio
App.3d 736, 2008-Ohio-6364, 903 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 29 (7th Dist.); Crabtree at ¶ 27
(“negligent failure to keep public roads in repair” is an alternative basis for liability and
“imposes its own distinct duty of care upon the municipality”).
{¶15} The term “in repair” is likewise not defined by the statute. When
interpreting R.C. 305.12, a statute authorizing suits against a board of county
commissioners for failure to keep roads “in proper repair,” the Ohio Supreme Court held
that “the intent of the General Assembly was to place a duty on the commissioners only in
matters concerning either the deterioration or disassembly of county roads and bridges.”
Heckert v. Patrick, 15 Ohio St.3d 402, 406, 473 N.E.2d 1204 (1984). Consistent with
Heckert, the “in repair” language contained in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) has been interpreted to
include “fixing holes or crumbling pavement,” i.e., repairing potholes, when a road is
deteriorating. Crabtree, 2011-Ohio-5612, ¶ 27, citing Bonace, 179 Ohio App.3d 736,
2008-Ohio-6364, 903 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 29. A city, therefore, has a duty to repair potholes
that deteriorate into a potentially hazardous condition. Gomez v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No.
97179, 2012-Ohio-1642, ¶ 9.
{¶16} Because the city could be liable under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) if the hazardous
pothole that allegedly caused Todd’s injury was the result of the city’s “negligent failure
to keep public roads in repair,” regardless of whether the pothole also constituted an
“obstruction” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), the city’s first assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶17} The city’s second assignment of error states:
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE CITY OF
CLEVELAND’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THE CITY DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
OF THE ALLEGED HAZARD.
{¶18} In its second assignment of error, the city argues that the trial court erred in
denying its motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence the city had
notice of the alleged hazardous pothole prior to Todd’s accident. As such, the city
argues, it had no duty to repair the roadway, the exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) does not
apply, and it “retains its cloak of immunity.”
{¶19} The R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) exception to immunity centers on the “negligent”
failure to maintain public roads. To establish negligence, a duty, a breach of that duty,
proximate cause, and damages must be shown. See, e.g., Menifee v. Ohio Welding
Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 84, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984).
{¶20} The city argues that it had no duty to repair the road where Todd’s accident
occurred because it lacked notice of any hazardous potholes. “Where negligence
revolves around the existence of a hazard or defect, a duty of reasonable care does not
arise unless the defendant has notice, either actual or constructive, of such hazard or
defect.” Davis v. Akron, 9th Dist. No. 19553, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 843, *4 (Mar. 8,
2000), citing Heckert, 15 Ohio St.3d at 405; see also Gomez, 2012-Ohio-1642, at ¶ 7 (“A
municipality’s liability for damages for failing to perform the duty of alleviating faulty
road conditions ‘arises only upon proof that its agents or officers actively created the
faulty condition, or that it was otherwise caused and the municipality has actual or
constructive notice of its existence.’”), quoting Cleveland v. Amato, 123 Ohio St. 575, 9
Ohio Law Abs. 606, 176 N.E. 227 (1931); Wilson v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 98035,
2012-Ohio-4289, ¶ 23 (“A ‘municipal corporation is liable only for negligence * * * in
failing to repair, remove or guard against defects after receiving actual or constructive
notice of their existence.’”), quoting Graves v. E. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 70675, 1997
Ohio App. LEXIS 326, *4 (Jan. 30, 1997). {¶21} Thus, in order to prove the city’s
breach of its duty to maintain public roads, Todd would have to establish that, prior to her
accident, the city had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous road conditions that
allegedly caused the accident.
{¶22} In support of its constructive notice argument, the city submitted an
affidavit, indicating that a search of records maintained by the city’s division of streets
revealed no complaints, incidences, or calls regarding potholes, chuckholes, or other
hazardous conditions near the accident site for the six-and-a-half-month period prior to
Todd’s accident. The city also offered deposition testimony from Todd, in which she
testified that it had been “[m]aybe a year, year-and-a-half” since she had last driven on the
road where she had the accident and admitted that she had no firsthand knowledge
regarding how long the potholes had been in existence prior to her accident. The city
also submitted photographs of the road conditions at the time of Todd’s accident, which
the city argues “do not represent anything unusual for a northeast city” and “bear out that
it is something that could have been avoided.”
{¶23} Todd stipulated that the city lacked actual notice of the potholes, but
maintains that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the city had
constructive notice of the alleged deteriorating and hazardous road conditions prior to her
accident. Todd argues that based on the way in which potholes develop in Northeast
Ohio and the large-truck traffic on the road from a nearby construction project, it could be
reasonably inferred that “the road condition did not occur over night.” She further
contends that the city should have been aware of the deteriorating road conditions
because a busy city vehicle impound lot was located less than four-tenths of a mile from
the site of her accident and because police officers patrolling the streets, sanitation
workers, tow truck drivers, snow plow drivers, and other city workers should have driven
down the road and observed the hazardous road condition at some point prior to her
accident.
{¶24} A person has constructive notice of a defect when the defect existed for
such a period of time that it would have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable
care. Bello v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 100, 138 N.E. 526 (1922). Todd is not
required by Civ.R. 56(C) to prove her case; she is required only to point out evidence in
the record that demonstrates the city is not entitled to summary judgment.
{¶25} When viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable
to Todd, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the city was
negligent in failing to repair the roadway prior to Todd’s accident and, specifically,
whether the city had constructive notice of the hazardous road conditions prior to the
accident.
{¶26} To defeat summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, Todd
needed to point to some evidence in the record
“indicating that (1) the unsafe condition existed in such a
manner that it could or should have been discovered by the
city, (2) the condition existed for such a length of time to have
been discovered by the city, and (3) if it had been discovered,
it would have created a reasonable apprehension of potential
danger or an invasion of private rights.” Gomez,
2012-Ohio-1642, at ¶ 7, quoting Nanak v. Columbus, 121
Ohio App.3d 83, 86, 698 N.E.2d 1061 (10th Dist.1997), citing
Beebe v. Toledo, 168 Ohio St. 203, 151 N.E.2d 738 (1958),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶27} The materials submitted by the parties on summary judgment include several
photographs of the accident scene, including photographs showing multiple potholes and
deteriorating road conditions that were taken by Todd’s husband on the day of the
accident. The copies of the photographs in the record are of poor quality and do not
allow us to see the specific size or depth of the potholes struck by Todd’s vehicle. 1
However, they show the existence and location of multiple potholes and a deteriorating
roadway.2
{¶28} The record also contains testimony from Todd regarding the road conditions
1
In addition to the photographs of the accident scene that were submitted by
the parties with their briefs on summary judgment, Todd appended photographs to
her appellate brief showing a ruler measuring the width and depth of one of the
potholes. These photographs were not offered into evidence below and should not
have been appended to Todd’s brief. “A reviewing court cannot add matter to the
record before it, which was not part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide
the appeal on the basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402,
377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, these
photographs shall not be considered by this court.
2 In an effort to establish the city’s appreciation of the danger “once they [sic]
had ‘actual’ notice of the road conditions,” Todd also attached photographs to her
brief in opposition to summary judgment that show the road after it had been
repaired by the city following Todd’s accident. This violated Evid.R. 407, which
prohibits the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove
negligence or culpable conduct. Accordingly, these photographs have not been
considered in determining whether the city was entitled to summary judgment.
and sequence of events leading up to her accident. Todd testified she “saw that the road
was kind of not good”; she hit one pothole and then another. Todd testified that she did
not know the size or depth of the potholes, but the potholes were of sufficient size and
location that when her vehicle struck them, she lost control of the vehicle and hit a utility
pole. Based on the photographs from the day of the accident showing the potholes and
deteriorating road conditions, Todd’s testimony regarding the accident, and the proximity
of the potholes to a busy city impound lot, a factfinder could reasonably infer that the
roadway was unsafe and that the hazardous road condition had existed for a sufficient
period of time that someone from the city with the appropriate authority or responsibility
to maintain the roadway, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have driven down that
road, noticed the potential danger presented by the potholes, and taken action to remedy
them prior to Todd’s accident. Todd has, therefore, put forth sufficient evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the city had constructive notice
of the hazardous road condition prior to her accident. As such, genuine issues of
material fact exist as to the applicability of the public roads exception to statutory
immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), and the trial court properly denied the city’s
motion for summary judgment.
{¶29} The city’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶30} The city’s third assignment of error states:
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ALLEGED
HAZARD WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS.
{¶31} In its third assignment of error, the city argues that trial court erred in
denying its motion for summary judgment because Todd’s negligence claim is barred by
the open and obvious doctrine. The city argues that because Todd testified that she saw
the pothole (but was just uncertain as to its size or depth), the pothole was open and
obvious, and the city owed no duty to Todd as a matter of law to protect her from any
danger presented by the pothole. This court lacks jurisdiction to address the city’s
argument based on the open and obvious doctrine.
{¶32} R.C. 2744.02(C) grants appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction to
address the merits of a denial of summary judgment based upon immunity. Hubbell v.
Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878. R.C. 2744.02(C) states that
an order denying “a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the
benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other
provision of the law is a final order.” However, appellate review under R.C. 2744.02(C)
is limited to the denial of immunity. See, e.g., Leasure v. Adena Local School Dist., 4th
Dist. No. 11CA3249, 2012-Ohio-3071 (citing cases). When appealing a denial of
immunity under R.C. 2744.02(C), a party may not raise other alleged errors concerning
the denial of summary judgment. Id.{¶33} Because denial of a summary judgment motion based on the open and
obvious doctrine presents an issue of common law negligence, this court does not have
jurisdiction to consider the merits of such an argument until the decision becomes final.
See, e.g., Leasure, supra (trial court’s denial of summary judgment based on open and
obvious doctrine did not deny appellant the benefit of an alleged immunity; therefore,
appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review it under R.C. 2744.02(C)) (citations omitted);
McGuire v. Lorain, 9th Dist. No. 10CA009893, 2011-Ohio-3887, ¶ 2-3 (no jurisdiction to
consider argument based on open and obvious doctrine).
{¶34} Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the city’s third
assignment of error.
{¶35} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS;
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., DISSENTS
(SEE ATTACHED OPINION)
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., DISSENTING:
{¶36} The majority presents a puzzling analysis on the issue of constructive notice.
It correctly notes that the photographs purporting to show the size and depth of the
pothole that Todd’s vehicle allegedly struck cannot be considered because they were
added to the record on appeal. It also correctly says that the photographs that are
properly in the record are of such poor quality that they are useless in establishing the size
and depth of the potholes that Todd struck. Yet despite the poor quality of these
photographs, the majority says that they show “the existence and location of multiple
potholes and a deteriorating roadway.” The existence of other potholes in the road that
Todd’s car did not strike is irrelevant. If the photographs do not show the size and depth
of the pothole that Todd struck, Todd has failed to show that the pothole was of sufficient
size that the city was on constructive notice of its existence.
{¶37} The majority also states that the city had constructive notice of the pothole
that Todd struck because the proximity of the pothole to a city impound lot was enough
that “someone from the city with the appropriate authority or responsibility to maintain
the roadway, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have driven down that road,
noticed the potential danger presented by the potholes, and taken action to remedy them *
* *.” The majority does not identify who this “someone” with responsibility to
maintain the roadway might be. Certainly, impound lot employees and tow truck drivers
(who are independent contractors) would not have any responsibility to maintain a city
street. Perhaps the majority refers to police officers going back and forth from the
impound lot, but Todd offered no evidence that police officers have any responsibility to
maintain city streets, so their knowledge of potholes would not be enough to put the city
on notice. Cleveland v. Payne, 72 Ohio St. 347, 74 N.E. 177, (1905) paragraph two of
the syllabus.
{¶38} Finally, it is unclear why the majority is willing to accept Todd’s assertion
that the potholes develop over time when she presented no expert evidence to support the
assertion that the pothole she struck had been in existence for a long enough period of
time that the city had constructive notice of it. Potholes can develop instantly from
heavy vehicles, and the majority’s acknowledgment that the road was used by snow
plows, tow trucks, and sanitation trucks would just as likely suggest that the pothole that
Todd struck could have formed just prior to her hitting it. While it is true that Todd, as
the nonmoving party, is entitled to all reasonable inferences for purposes of summary
judgment, those inferences must be based on specific facts, not speculation. See Civ.R.
56(E); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988). As the
majority concedes, Todd failed to provide a legible photograph of the pothole, so there is
simply no evidence upon which the majority can reasonably find that Todd offered
evidence from which reasonable minds could believe that the pothole that she struck had
been in existence long enough that the city could be charged with constructive notice. I
respectfully dissent.