State v. Rodriguez

[Cite as State v. Rodriguez, 2014-Ohio-911.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 26858
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
BENJAMIN O. RODRIGUEZ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 12 10 3058
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 12, 2014
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant, Benjamin Rodriguez, appeals from the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On November 6, 2012, the Summit County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Rodriguez on
one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), which was charged as a third
degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(D)(4) based upon the allegation that Mr. Rodriguez had
two or more prior convictions for domestic violence. At his arraignment, Mr. Rodriguez pleaded
not guilty, and the matter was scheduled for jury trial. Prior to trial, Mr. Rodriguez filed a
motion in limine to exclude any mention of his prior convictions to the jury, and he filed a notice
of intent to stipulate to the two prior convictions the State planned to use to enhance his
conviction to a third degree felony. The State agreed to stipulate that Mr. Rodriguez had two
prior convictions, instead of introducing evidence as to three prior convictions. After voir dire,
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defense counsel noted a continuing objection to any reference to Mr. Rodriguez’ prior
convictions and to the State’s Exhibits 6 and 7. During trial, the court informed the jury that Mr.
Rodriguez had two prior convictions for domestic violence, and it admitted the journal entries of
conviction into evidence. The jury found Mr. Rodriguez guilty, and, in a sentencing entry dated
March 5, 2013, the trial court imposed sentence. Mr. Rodriguez timely appealed from the
sentencing entry, and he now presents three assignments of error for our review. We have
consolidated Mr. Rodriguez’ first and second assignments of error to facilitate our discussion.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PRECEDENT OF
OLD CHIEF V. UNITED STATES BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO
INFORM THE JURY OF [MR. RODRIGUEZ’] PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
[MR. RODRIGUEZ] SUFFERED A DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AS THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULED [HIS] OBJECTIONS TO
THE INTRODUCTION OF JOURNAL ENTRIES AND VERDICT FORM
CONCERNING [HIS] STIPULATED PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Rodriguez maintains that the trial court erred
by allowing the prosecutor to inform the jury of his prior convictions. In his second assignment
of error, Mr. Rodriguez maintains that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of journal
entries evidencing his prior convictions when he had offered to stipulate to having had two prior
convictions.
{¶4} This Court has held that “[w]hen a prior conviction is an element of the charged
offense, it may be admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving that element.” State v.
Halsell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24464, 2009-Ohio-4166, ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompson, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 98CA007112, 2000 WL 235535, *4 (Mar. 1, 2000). See also State v. Blonski, 125
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Ohio App.3d 103, 108-109 (9th Dist.1997) (holding that when a prior offense is an element of
the crime charged, the State must prove the prior crime).
{¶5} Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical
harm to a family or household member.” R.C. 2919.25(D)(4) provides that domestic violence is
a felony of the third degree where the defendant “previously has pleaded guilty to or been
convicted of two or more offenses of domestic violence or two or more violations or offenses of
the type described in division (D)(3) of this section involving a person who was a family or
household member at the time of the violations or offenses * * *.” Therefore, here, the State
bore the burden of proving that Mr. Rodriguez had been convicted of two or more (1) domestic
violence offenses or (2) offenses of the type listed in R.C. 2919.25(D)(3).
{¶6} However, Mr. Rodriguez argues that the State should not have been permitted to
reference, or submit evidence in support of, Mr. Rodriguez’ prior convictions. In support of this
argument, Mr. Rodriguez urges this Court to adopt the holding in Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172 (1997), and decisions from the Eleventh, Fifth and First District, which have applied
Old Chief. See State v. Hatfield, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0033, 2007-Ohio-7130, State
v. Riffle, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. 2007-0013, 2007-Ohio-5299, and State v. Simms, 1st Dist.
Hamilton Nos. C 030138 & C 030211, 2004-Ohio-652.
{¶7} In Old Chief at 174-175, the defendant was charged with possessing a firearm
when he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The defendant offered to stipulate to the element of his
offense requiring a prior felony conviction, and moved the district court for an order preventing
the Government from mentioning his prior criminal convictions, except to state that the
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defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
year. Id. at 175. The defendant argued that revealing the name and nature of his prior conviction
would unfairly prejudice him. Id. The Government refused to enter into such a stipulation, and
the district court concluded that it could not require the Government to enter into a stipulation.
Id. At trial, the Government introduced the order of judgment and commitment for the
defendant’s prior conviction. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction. Id. at 177. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that “a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns such
an offer and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior
offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of
the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction.” Id. at 174, 178.
{¶8} In several cases, this Court has declined to adopt the Old Chief holding. See State
v. Horne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25238, 2011-Ohio-1901, ¶ 16, State v. Peasley, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 25062, 2010-Ohio-4333, ¶ 12, citing State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22877, 2006-
Ohio-4720, ¶ 21, State v. Kole, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007116, 2000 WL 840503 (June 28,
2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303 (2001). Mr. Rodriguez
has not presented us with a persuasive argument as to why we should deviate from our
precedent. Therefore, we decline Mr. Rodriguez’ invitation to adopt the Old Chief holding.
{¶9} Even if this court were to follow the holding in Old Chief, the facts of that case
are distinguishable. In Old Chief, the defendant clearly offered to stipulate to his prior
conviction of a crime that was punishable by more than a year in prison. Here, the bounds of Mr.
Rodriguez’ offered stipulation are not easily discernible from the record. In Mr. Rodriguez’
filing entitled “Notice of Intent to * * * Stipulate to Prior Convictions,” he stated that he intended
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to stipulate to “the two prior convictions used to enhance his domestic violence charge to a third-
degree felony.” Prior to trial, a discussion was had on the record between defense counsel, the
State, and the trial court. Defense counsel and the State indicated that they were willing to
stipulate that the Defendant had two prior convictions. The court clarified the stipulation,
stating, “As far as the two stipulations of the priors, you’re stipulating that – that your client was
convicted on these two occasions and that journal entries are an accurate record of the
convictions.” Defense counsel responded, “That’s correct, Your Honor.”
{¶10} However, after voir dire, defense counsel noted an ongoing objection to any
reference to Mr. Rodriguez’ prior convictions and to the State’s Exhibits 6 and 7, which were the
certified journal entries of the convictions. Defense counsel indicated that, although it would
stipulate to the authenticity of the journal entries, it had an “ongoing objection to the jury
knowing about them.”
{¶11} We cannot discern the purpose of a stipulation to the facts satisfying an element
of an offense, where the defendant attempts to prevent submission of the stipulation to the fact-
finder. To prove its case, the State was required to produce proof that Mr. Rodriguez had two
prior convictions for “domestic violence or two or more violations or offenses of the type
described in [R.C. 2919.25(D)(3)] involving a person who was a family or household member at
the time of the violations or offenses[.]” See R.C. 2919.25(D)(4). Unlike Old Chief, the record
does not demonstrate that Mr. Rodriguez offered a jury instruction on his stipulation that his two
prior convictions were of the type required to meet the prior conviction element of the statute.
See Old Chief at 175-176 (discussing defendant’s proposed stipulation and corresponding
instruction). Absent an instruction to the jury as to the stipulation or admission of the journal
entries, the State would not have met its burden of proof that the two convictions were part of the
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class of offenses sufficient to elevate the degree of the domestic violence offense to a third
degree felony, and reliance on Old Chief is misplaced. Compare id. at 175-176, 184 (defendant
offered to stipulate that he was “convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
* * * year” as required for a conviction under the statute and proposed a corresponding
instruction to the jury).
{¶12} Accordingly, as Mr. Rodriguez’ arguments in support of his first and second
assignments of error are premised upon our adoption of the Old Chief holding, these assignments
of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
[MR. RODRIGUEZ’] CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF BECAUSE
THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION AS TO
PHYSICAL HARM.
{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Rodriguez argues that his convictions were
not supported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to present evidence of physical
harm. We disagree.
{¶14} The issue of whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question
of law, which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must determine whether the
prosecution has met its burden of production. Id. at 390 (Cook, J. concurring). In making this
determination, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution:
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
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any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶15} On appeal, Mr. Rodriguez limits his sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the
evidence of physical harm. See R.C. 2919.25(A) (“No person shall knowingly cause or attempt
to cause physical harm to a family or household member.”). We will likewise limit our
discussion.
{¶16} At trial the State produced the testimony of the responding officers from the
Barberton Police Department: Officers Ryan Sauriol and Martin Eberhart. Officer Sauriol
testified that, on October 27, 2012, the officers responded to a call concerning a domestic
violence incident. When they arrived at the scene, the victim was crying and visibly shaken.
Officer Sauriol spoke with the victim, while Officer Eberhart went to speak with Mr. Rodriguez
in another room. The victim explained to Officer Sauriol that she was arguing with Mr.
Rodriguez, who was her boyfriend. While they were arguing, Mr. Rodriguez got behind the
victim and began striking her in the head. She then tried to place her hands above her head to
protect herself, and Mr. Rodriguez hit her hands twice. The officer testified that the victim had
“swollen knuckles” and “swollen lumps on the side of her head.” The officer photographed the
victim’s injuries, and those photographs were admitted into evidence at the trial. The officer
testified that, although it is difficult to see the victim’s injuries in the photos, he did see swelling
on her hand and he felt the lumps on her head.
{¶17} Officer Eberhart testified that when the officers responded to the scene, the victim
was at the door of the house. She was crying and upset, and she told the officers that Mr.
Rodriguez had hurt her. Officer Eberhart observed that the victim’s hand was red and swollen.
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{¶18} Mr. Rodriguez maintains that “[a] review of the evidence shows that the majority
of [the victim’s] injuries were offensive wounds to her knuckles[.]” However, Officer Sauriol
testified that the victim, who was visibly upset and shaken, informed him that Mr. Rodriguez had
hurt her by striking her on the head, and that she covered her head with her hands, resulting in
injury to her hands. The evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
was sufficient to establish that Mr. Rodriguez caused the victim physical harm. Accordingly,
Mr. Rodriguez’ third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶19} Mr. Rodriguez’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DONALD GALLICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Atttorney, for Appellee.