State v. Cervantes

[Cite as State v. Cervantes, 2022-Ohio-2536.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HENRY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 7-21-06
v.
RAYMOND CERVANTES,
OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 20 CR 0094
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: July 25, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Nathan VanDenBerghe for Appellant
Gwen Howe-Gebers for Appellee
Case No. 7-21-06
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Raymond Cervantes, appeals the August 30, 2021
judgment of sentence of the Henry County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court, but remand the matter for the
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to correct a clerical error by issuing a
nunc pro tunc entry.
{¶2} On August 16, 2020, D.L., Cervantes’s estranged wife, drove to
Cervantes’s Wood County residence at Cervantes’s invitation to collect money for
damage he previously inflicted on D.L.’s property and residence. When D.L.
arrived at the residence, Cervantes gave her a sum of money and then requested that
she follow him to the garage where the remainder of the money was supposedly
located. According to the victim, upon entering the garage, Cervantes attacked her
by punching her, hitting her in the head with a c-clamp, and strangling her. At some
point during the struggle, D.L., who was using a knife to protect herself, stabbed
Cervantes in the leg, broke free from his grip, fled the garage, and entered her
vehicle. However, Cervantes forced himself into the driver side of the vehicle and
left the residence with D.L. in the passenger seat.
{¶3} D.L. testified that, as Cervantes was driving out of the driveway, his
sister came out of the residence. D.L. made eye contact with Cervantes’s sister in
an effort to show her the injuries. Shortly thereafter, Cervantes’s sister contacted
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law enforcement to report the incident. However, law enforcement was unable to
immediately locate Cervantes and D.L.
{¶4} Cervantes drove D.L. to multiple locations along the Maumee River
before arriving at a remote location in Henry County where he strangled her and
repeatedly hit her on the head with a piece of driftwood. Eventually, D.L. convinced
Cervantes to take her to the hospital for medical treatment by telling Cervantes that
she would not disclose to the hospital staff who caused her injuries. Shortly after
D.L. arrived at the hospital, law enforcement located and arrested Cervantes.
{¶5} On August 26, 2020, Cervantes was indicted on two counts: Count One
of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a second-degree felony, and
Count Two of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C.
2903.02(A).1 On September 1, 2020, Cervantes appeared for arraignment and
pleaded not guilty to the counts in the indictment. The trial court also appointed
trial counsel for Cervantes.
{¶6} The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 15-16, 2021, at the conclusion
of which the jury found Cervantes guilty of both counts. The trial court ordered the
1
The course of events on August 16-17, 2020 occurred in two counties, Wood County and Henry County.
The first physical altercation between Cervantes and D.L. occurred in the garage of Cervantes’s sister’s
residence in Wood County. The second physical altercation occurred in a remote area in Henry County.
Criminal charges relating to the events occurring in Wood County were filed in a separate action in that
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the instant case pertains exclusively to Cervantes’s actions in Henry County.
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preparation of a presentencing investigation and continued the matter for
sentencing.
{¶7} On August 16, 2021, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The trial court
found the counts merged for purposes of sentencing. Accordingly, the State elected
to sentence Cervantes on Count Two. The trial court sentenced Cervantes to an
indefinite prison term of 10 years minimum to 15 years maximum. On August 30,
2021, the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence.
{¶8} Cervantes timely filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 2021. He
raises six assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we will
address some of his assignments of error out of order.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court committed plain error when it allowed
testimonial out of court statements that were not subject to cross
examination to be played for the jury.
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Cervantes argues that the trial court
committed plain error by allowing the State to play the recording of the 911 call,
made by Cervantes’s sister, to the jury. Specifically, Cervantes argues that the
recording contained testimonial statements that were not subject to cross-
examination and, therefore, ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause. We disagree.
{¶10} “Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s hearsay rulings for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97, citing
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State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128 (1967). See HSBC Bank USA, Natl. Assn.
v. Gill, 1st Dist. Hamilton, No. C-180404, 2019-Ohio-2814, ¶ 6-10 (documenting a
split between courts of appeals concerning the proper standard of review to apply
when reviewing the admission of hearsay but concluding that McKelton and other
Supreme Court decisions dictate abuse-of-discretion review). But, we review
evidentiary rulings implicating the Confrontation Clause de novo. Id.; State v.
Little, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-29, 2016-Ohio-8398, ¶ 16. However, as Cervantes
recognizes, because he failed to object to the admission of the alleged hearsay
embedded in the emergency-dispatch call, we review for plain error. State v.
Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 72, citing State v. Fitzpatrick,
102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2014-Ohio-3176, ¶ 66; State v. Arnold, 147 Ohio St.3d 138,
2016-Ohio-1595, ¶ 65.
{¶11} We recognize plain error “‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v.
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111 (1990), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91(1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. For plain error to apply, the trial court must
have deviated from a legal rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the
proceeding, and the error must have affected a substantial right. State v. Barnes, 94
Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). Under the plain error standard, the appellant must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error,
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the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise. State v. West, ___ Ohio
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35-36. See also State v. McAlpin, ___ Ohio St.3d
___, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 90 (“McAlpin could not establish plain error, because he
cannot show a reasonable probability that but for standby counsel’s actions, the jury
would have acquitted him.”).
{¶12} Hearsay is defined as a “statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Generally, hearsay is not admissible
unless an exception to the rule against hearsay applies. Evid.R. 802.
{¶13} The recording of the 911 call made by Cervantes’s sister to the
Perrysburg Township Police Department on August 16, 2020 was authenticated by
the emergency dispatcher who answered the call. (June 15-16, 2021 Tr. at 118-
120). However, Cervantes’s sister did not testify at trial.
{¶14} In the recording, an individual identifying herself as Rose Cervantes
requests law enforcement respond to her home regarding her brother, Cervantes.
(State’s Ex. 14). Rose states that Cervantes had been drinking all day, was “really,
really drunk,” and was “talking suicide.” (Id.). Rose tells the dispatcher that she
went to the garage, where Cervantes and D.L. had been, and Rose observed blood
“all over the floor” of the garage and a broken phone that she believed belonged to
D.L. (Id.). Rose informed the dispatcher that Cervantes left her home driving D.L.’s
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vehicle with D.L. in the vehicle with him. (Id.). Rose described the vehicle
Cervantes was driving and the direction they were traveling when they left her
house. (Id.). Rose stated that another sister called Cervantes on his cell phone and
that Cervantes told that sister he “was never coming home” and was “having a heart-
to-heart [conversation] with his wife.” (Id.).
{¶15} Additionally, Rose tells the dispatcher that she does not know if the
blood that she observed is D.L.’s blood or Cervantes’s blood but that Cervantes “can
be very violent.” (Id.). Rose states that there is “blood on the mattress [in the
garage]” and then instructs someone in the background, “Don’t step in [the blood.]
Don’t touch nothing [sic]. I shouldn’t have even touched [D.L.’s] phone.” (Id.).
Rose also tells the dispatcher that Cervantes had been in prison for taking his ex-
wife to a cemetery and instructing her to “pick her grave” and that Cervantes was
on “parole” and had cut his ankle monitor off the previous night. (Id.).
{¶16} At trial, the recording of the call was played for the jury in its entirety
during the dispatcher’s testimony. (June 15-16, 2021 Tr. at 119-120). At that time,
Cervantes did not object. (Id.). However, when the State moved for the admission
of its exhibits, Cervantes objected to the admission of State’s Exhibit 14. (Id. at
298). Cervantes’s trial counsel clarified that he did not object to the authenticity of
the recording or that the recording may contain present-sense impressions or excited
utterances. (Id. at 299). Rather, Cervantes’s objection was based on statements
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contained in the recording that were “irrelevant.” (Id.). Specifically, Cervantes
objected to the reference of his being on “parole” and being a violent individual.
(Id.).
{¶17} While discussing Cervantes’s objection, the trial court stated that
although the jury already heard the recording in its entirety, in so doing, the jury
heard things it “probably shouldn’t have heard.” (Id. at 300). The parties agreed to
redact certain portions of the recording in the event the jury requested to review it
during deliberations. (Id. at 300-302). With the parties’ agreement regarding the
redactions, the trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 14. (Id. at 301-302). Cervantes’s
trial counsel later stated that because the trial court agreed to redact certain portions
of State’s Exhibit 14, he was withdrawing his previous objection. (Id. at 396).
{¶18} Cervantes’s appellate brief details an argument that the hearsay
statements embedded in the 911 recording were testimonial in nature and,
accordingly, should have been excluded from evidence on that basis. However, he
fails to argue that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of his trial would
clearly have been different if not for the trial court’s alleged error, a requirement for
him to prevail under the plain error standard of review. West, ___ Ohio St.3d ___,
2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35-36. Rather, Cervantes baldly asserts that because he was
unable to confront Rose regarding her “testimonial” statements on the 911
recording, the trial court committed error which was “obvious and prejudiced the
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outcome of the trial by submitting the jury to [sic] testimonial statements that were
not tested by cross-examination.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). However, such bald
statements of prejudice are not sufficient to establish plain error. “‘[A] defendant
has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the error of the trial court on appeal.’”
State v. Costell, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-15-11, 2016-Ohio-3386, ¶ 86, quoting State
v. Stelzer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23174, 2006-Ohio-6912, ¶ 7. If an argument exists
that can support an assignment of error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out. State
v. Shanklin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-13-23, 2014-Ohio-5624, ¶ 31.
{¶19} Furthermore, Cervantes’s unsupported claims that the admission of the
statements in question constituted prejudice are undermined by Cervantes’s own
testimony wherein he admits that, at the time of the incident, he was on an ankle
monitor for an unnamed offense, “possibly” had a warrant out for his arrest, and had
previously been convicted of attempted kidnapping. (June 15-16, 2021 Tr. at 328,
351-352, 355-356, 372). Cervantes also admitted that he caused damage to D.L.’s
home during a recent prior “violent domestic incident.” (Id. at 357).
{¶20} Moreover, the record supports that the State provided sufficient
evidence suggesting Cervantes’s guilt irrespective of State’s Exhibit 14. D.L.
testified that that Cervantes drove her to a remote location in Henry County where
he beat her repeatedly hit her on the head with a piece of driftwood and strangled
her. Additional evidence, such as a piece of driftwood containing clumps of hair
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and photographs of D.L.’s injuries were admitted without objection. Furthermore,
a sexual assault nurse examiner and a law enforcement officer testified that, in their
experience, D.L.’s injuries were consistent with her version of the events.
Accordingly, we do not find that Cervantes demonstrated that he was prejudiced by
the trial court’s alleged error, as required to meet the plain error standard of review.
{¶21} Cervantes’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court committed reversible error by allowing the State
to amend the indictment after the close of evidence.
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Cervantes argues that the trial court
erred by permitting the State to amend the indictment after the close of evidence.
Cervantes alleges that the amendment was not permissible under Crim.R. 7 because
it changed the identity of the offense.
{¶23} Crim.R. 7(D) governs the amendment of indictments and provides as
follows:
The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the
indictment, information, complaint, or bill of particulars, in respect to
any defect, imperfection, or omission in form or substance, or of any
variance with the evidence, provided no change is made in the name
or identity of the crime charged. If any amendment is made to the
substance of the indictment, information, or complaint, or to cure a
variance between the indictment, information, or complaint and the
proof, the defendant is entitled to a discharge of the jury on the
defendant’s motion, if a jury has been impaneled, and to a reasonable
continuance, unless it clearly appears from the whole proceedings that
the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by the defect or
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variance in respect to which the amendment is made, or that the
defendant’s rights will be fully protected by proceeding with the trial,
or by a postponement thereof to a later day with the same or another
jury. * * *
{¶24} “Crim.R. 7(D) permits most amendments but prohibits amendments
that change the name or identity of the crime charged.” State v. Wilson, 4th Dist.
Lawrence No. 18CA15, 2019-Ohio-2754, ¶ 13. “A trial court commits reversible
error when it permits an amendment that changes the name or identity of the offense
charged, regardless of whether the defendant suffered prejudice,” and because it is
a matter of law, we review de novo whether an amendment changes the name or
identity of the offense charged. Id., citing State v. Kittle, 4th Dist. Athens No.
04CA41, 2005-Ohio-3198, ¶ 10-13, citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
03AP1157, 2004-Ohio-4786, ¶ 10; State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26289,
2015-Ohio-4116, ¶ 125, citing State v. Frazier, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2008 CA 118,
2010-Ohio-1507, ¶ 22.
{¶25} However, where an amendment does not change the name or identity
of the offense charged, we review a trial court’s decision to allow a Crim.R. 7(D)
amendment for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
15AP0016, 2016-Ohio-4689, ¶ 11, citing State v. Gray, 9th Dist. Summit No.
27365, 2015-Ohio-1248, ¶ 7 and Frazier at ¶ 23. Nevertheless, in this case, because
Cervantes failed to object to the amendment of the indictment at trial, he is limited
to a claim of plain error on appeal. See State v. Shockey, 9th Dist. Summit No.
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29170, 2019-Ohio-2417, ¶ 7, citing State v. Guenther, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
05CA008663, 2006-Ohio-767, ¶ 49.
{¶26} With respect to the charge of felonious assault, the indictment stated
as follows:
Count 1: On or about the 16th continuing through the 17th day of
August, 2020, at Henry County the defendant, Raymond Cervantes,
did knowingly cause or attempt to cause serious physical harm to Jane
Doe * * * or to another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordinance, in violation of the Ohio Revised Code Title 29,
Section 2903.11(A)(2) and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Ohio.
(Doc. No. 1).
{¶27} At the trial, following the close of evidence but before the jury
instructions, the State requested that the trial court amend the indictment to delete
the reference to “serious” before the phrase “physical harm” with respect to
felonious assault count. (June 15-16, 2021 Tr. at 395). Cervantes’s trial counsel
stated that he had no objection to the amendment. (Id.).
{¶28} Cervantes argues this amendment changed the identity of the offense
charged. Specifically, he argues that the removal of the word “serious” before the
phrase “physical harm” changed the identity of the offense from alleging no offense
for which there is no penalty to that of an actual offense, felonious assault.
{¶29} Indeed, R.C. 2903.11, which governs felonious assault, states, in
relevant part, that:
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(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;
[or]
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to
another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordinance.
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)-(2). Accordingly, the removal of the word, “serious” before the
phrase “physical harm” resulted in the language of the indictment mirroring the
language of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). However, contrary to Cervantes’s argument, we
do not find that the trial court’s amendment changed the name or identity of the
felonious assault offense.
{¶30} In State v. Frazier, the Second District Court of Appeals, while
reviewing identical amendments to two counts of felonious assault, found that the
removal of the word “serious” from the indictments did not alter the name or identity
of the felonious assault offense because “the original indictment and its amended
version included all the elements required by R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).” State v. Frazier,
2010-Ohio-1507, ¶ 25. The Second District Court of Appeals reasoned that the
inclusion of the word “serious” in the indictment was “surplusage because it is not
relevant to a charge of felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and can be
removed from the indictment while leaving all the essential elements of the crime.”
Id. at ¶ 26. We agree.
{¶31} Moreover, R.C. 2941.25 provides that “[w]here the same conduct by
defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar
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import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but
the defendant may be convicted of only one.” “Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has explicitly stated that a ‘conviction’ requires both a finding of guilt and a
sentence.” State v. Miller, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-02, 2019-Ohio-4121, ¶ 12.
Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Counts One and Two
were allied offense of similar import and sentenced Cervantes on Count Two,
attempted murder. Thus, even if the trial court did err by granting the State’s request
to amend Count One of the indictment, any such error is harmless because Cervantes
was not convicted of that offense.
{¶32} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not commit plain error by
granting the State’s motion to amend the indictment.
{¶33} Cervantes’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. III
The Trial Court erred when it refused to include a jury
instruction on abandonment as proposed by Appellant’s Counsel.
{¶34} In his third assignment of error, Cervantes argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by declining to issue his requested jury instruction regarding
the affirmative defense of abandonment. Cervantes alleges the trial court erred by
refusing to instruct the jury on abandonment and alleges that a jury could have found
that he abandoned his attempt to murder D.L. after he had an opportunity to calm
down. (Appellant’s Brief at 14).
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{¶35} “Trial courts have a responsibility to give all jury instructions that are
relevant and necessary for the jury to properly weigh the evidence and perform its
duty as the factfinder.” State v. Shine-Johnson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-194,
2018-Ohio-3347, ¶ 25. “Requested jury instructions should ordinarily be given if
they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the case, and
if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction.”
State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. Yet, a trial court may
refuse to issue a requested jury instruction if “‘the evidence adduced at trial is
legally insufficient’ to support it.’” State v. Juntunen, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos.
09AP-1108 and 09AP-1109, 2010-Ohio-5625, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Barnd, 85 Ohio
App.3d 254, 259 (3d Dist.1993). “[T]he trial judge is in the best position to gauge
the evidence before the jury and is provided the discretion to determine whether the
evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to require an instruction.” State v. Fulmer,
117 Ohio St.3d 319, 2008-Ohio-936, ¶ 72. Accordingly, “[a] court reviewing a trial
court’s refusal to submit to the jury a requested instruction must determine whether
the trial court’s decision constituted ‘an abuse of discretion under the facts and
circumstances of the case.’” Juntunen at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio
St.3d 64, 68 (1989). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment;
it suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v.
Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
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{¶36} R.C. 2923.02(D) sets forth the affirmative defense of abandonment
and provides: “[i]t is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the
actor abandoned the actor’s effort to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its
commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary
renunciation of the actor’s criminal purpose.”
{¶37} Cervantes argues that an abandonment jury instruction was warranted
in this case based upon the victim’s testimony. Specifically, Cervantes points to
D.L.’s testimony that, at some point, she was able to convince Cervantes to drive
her to the hospital to receive medical attention. According to Cervantes, due to
D.L.’s testimony, the jury could have found that the violent actions D.L. took “while
enraged were abandoned after he had an opportunity to calm down.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 14). We disagree.
{¶38} Abandonment is an affirmative defense that places burden on the
defendant to establish the facts to support the defense. “‘Under Ohio law, an
affirmative defense is justification for admitted conduct, which does not “seek to
negate any of the elements of the offense which the state is required to prove.”’”
State v. Fickenworth, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-826, 2014-Ohio-2502, ¶ 15,
quoting Gahanna v. Cameron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-255, 2002-Ohio-6959,
¶ 28, quoting State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986). At trial, Cervantes did
not acknowledge he attempted to commit murder and abandoned the attempt.
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Rather, with respect to the conduct that occurred in Henry County, his position at
trial was an attempt to negate the elements of the State’s case. Cervantes alleged
that he drove D.L. to Henry County in an attempt to locate his friends who were
night fishing in the area and to convince one of them to drive him to the hospital to
receive medical attention for his leg. Cervantes denied physically assaulting D.L.
at the location in Henry County and, instead, testified the head injuries she sustained
in Henry County were the result of her accidentally hitting her head on a car door.
Cervantes’s denial of the elements of the offense of attempted murder is inconsistent
with a claim of abandonment. State v. Rudasill, 10th Dist. Franklin No. AP19-61,
2021-Ohio-45, ¶ 83; Fickenworth at ¶ 15. Accordingly, we find the trial court did
not err by denying Cervantes’s request for a jury instruction on abandonment.
{¶39} Cervantes’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The Trial Court erred when it stated in its Sentencing Entry that
Appellant’s sentence was mandatory
Assignment of Error No. VI
The Reagan Tokes Act is an Unconstitutional Violation of Due
Process
{¶40} In Cervantes’s fourth and sixth assignments of error, he argues that his
sentence was contrary to law. In his fourth assignment of error, Cervantes argues
the trial court erred by stating in its sentencing entry that his sentence was
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mandatory. In his sixth assignment of error, he argues the indefinite-sentencing
provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law, under which he was sentenced, violate his
right to due process. For ease of discussion, we address Cervantes’s sixth
assignment of error first, followed by his fourth assignment of error.
{¶41} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,
¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
Reagan Tokes Indefinite Sentencing
{¶42} In his sixth assignment of error, Cervantes argues that the indefinite-
sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law,2 under which he was sentenced,
infringe on his right to due process. At the outset, we note that Cervantes failed to
object to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in the trial court. “The
‘[f]ailure to raise at the trial court level the issue of the constitutionality of a statute
2
Because we have thoroughly explained these provisions in previous opinions, we need not do so here. See,
e.g., State v. Barnhart, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-20-08, 2021-Ohio-2872, ¶ 9; State v. Hiles, 3d Dist. Union
No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 11-16.
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or its application, which is apparent at the time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such
issue and a deviation from this state’s orderly procedure, and therefore need not be
heard for the first time on appeal.’” State v. Barnhart, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-20-
08, 2021-Ohio-2874, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120 (1986), syllabus.
“However, we retain the discretion to consider a waived constitutional argument
under a plain-error analysis.” Id. at ¶ 8. “An error qualifies as ‘plain error’ only if
it is obvious and but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have
been otherwise.” Id. In this case, we elect to exercise our discretion to review
Cervantes’s constitutional arguments for plain error. See id. at ¶ 8, 15 (reviewing a
“waived” challenge to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law for plain
error).
{¶43} Cervantes’s challenge does not present a matter of first impression in
this court. Since the indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law
went into effect in March 2019, we have repeatedly been asked to address the
constitutionality of these provisions. We have invariably concluded that the
indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate
the separation of powers doctrine or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.
E.g., State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11; State
v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22; State v. Wolfe, 3d
Dist. Union No. 14-21-16, 2022-Ohio-96, ¶ 21.
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{¶44} In this case, Cervantes asks us to reconsider our earlier decisions. In
recent months, a number of defendants have requested the same of us—requests that
we have uniformly rejected. E.g., State v. Abston, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-04,
2022-Ohio-884, ¶ 33; Wolfe at ¶ 22; Barnhart at ¶ 12-15; State v. Mitchell, 3d Dist.
Allen No. 1-21-02, 2021-Ohio-2802, ¶ 17; State v. Rodriguez, 3d Dist. Seneca No.
13-20-07, 2021-Ohio-2295, ¶ 15. As Cervantes has not presented us with any
compelling reason to depart from our earlier precedent on facial challenges to the
indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law, we once again decline
to do so.
{¶45} Cervantes also challenges the indefinite-sentencing provisions of the
Reagan Tokes Law as applied to him, contending that they violate his constitutional
right to due process. In the past, we have held that certain as-applied challenges to
these provisions were not ripe for review. See, e.g., State v. Kepling, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-20-23, 2020-Ohio-6888, ¶ 11. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio
recently decided State v. Maddox, ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2022-Ohio-764, and
determined that constitutional challenges to the indefinite sentencing provision of
the Reagan Tokes Law are ripe for review. Based on the holding in Maddox, we
address Cervantes’s argument that the indefinite-sentencing provisions of the
Reagan Tokes Law violate his right to a jury trial.
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{¶46} In reviewing the matter, we emphasize that statutes are presumed
constitutional, and it is Cervantes’s burden to demonstrate that the statute at issue is
unconstitutional. State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 1996-Ohio-264.
Cervantes has presented no compelling authority undermining the constitutionality
of the indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law.
{¶47} Notwithstanding this point, numerous Ohio courts of appeals have
already rejected challenges similar to Cervantes’s. State v. Suder, 12th Dist.
Clermont Nos. CA2020-06-034 and CA2020-06-035, 2021-Ohio-465, ¶ 25; State v.
Thompson, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-60, 2021-Ohio-4027, ¶ 23; State v.
Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, ¶ 46 (en banc). We
agree with the reasoning expressed by these courts and determine that Cervantes’s
“as-applied” challenge regarding the jury trial issue is unavailing.
{¶48} In sum, we conclude that the indefiniteness of Cervantes’s sentence
does not render his sentence contrary to law. Therefore, Cervantes’s sixth
assignment of error is overruled.
Discrepancy in Judgment Entry
{¶49} In his fourth assignment of error, Cervantes argues that his sentence is
void because the trial court stated in its judgment entry that his prison sentence was
mandatory.3 We disagree.
3
In its brief the State acquiesces that the offense of attempted murder did not require a mandatory sentence
and suggests any error could be corrected by the trial court issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing order.
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{¶50} At the sentencing hearing on August 16, 2021, the trial court stated as
follows:
You have been convicted of Attempted Murder, a felony of the first
degree and Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree. You will
be sentenced on the more serious offense because the Court finds that
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and merge. The
potential minimum term for violating this section is between three and
eleven years and the potential maximum term is between four- and
one-half years and sixteen-and one-half years. The Court has
considered all of the statutory factors required to be considered and
hereby imposes a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum
sentence of fifteen years in the custody of the Ohio Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. * * *.
(Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 8-9). At no time during the sentencing hearing did the trial
court indicate that any portion of Cervantes’s prison term was mandatory.
{¶51} However, in the judgment entry of sentence filed on August 30, 2021
states:
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the defendant serves a stated
indefinite term of Ten (10) years minimum to a maximum term of
Fifteen (15) years at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and
Corrections under Count Two for Attempted Murder, a violation of
Ohio R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2903.02(A), a felony of the first degree;
which is a mandatory term pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F),
2929.14(D)(3) or 2925 * * *.
(Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 88).
{¶52} Cervantes suggests that the discrepancy between the sentence
announced at the sentencing hearing and the sentence memorialized in the judgment
entry of sentence with respect to the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of his
sentence renders his sentence void. However, a review of the transcript of the
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sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court never indicated to Cervantes at the
sentencing hearing that the sentence was mandatory. In fact, the trial court
discussed his ability to apply for judicial release, which is only available for non-
mandatory prison terms. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 8-9). Accordingly, the reference in
the judgment entry to Cervantes’s sentence being “mandatory” was a clerical error.
{¶53} While we agree with Cervantes’s assertion that the trial court’s error
in journalizing Cervantes’s sentence must be corrected, we disagree with his
contention that the trial court’s error rendered his sentence void. Crim.R. 36 states
that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record * * * may
be corrected by the court at any time.” Crim.R. 36. “A nunc pro tunc entry is
permitted to correct the record to accurately reflect what happened in a hearing when
a judgment entry is inaccurate.” State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-18-25,
2019-Ohio-1696, ¶ 8. “Trial courts in criminal matters ‘retain continuing
jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in judgments by nunc pro tunc entry to reflect
what the court actually decided.’” State ex rel. Arnold v. Gallaher, 153 Ohio St.3d
234, 2018-Ohio-2628, ¶ 17 quoting State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d
303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 13. A review of the record indicates that the trial court
correctly informed Cervantes in open court of the non-mandatory nature of his
prison term at the hearing on August 16, 2021. The judgment entry incorrectly
stated that his prison term was mandatory. Thus, the entry did not accurately reflect
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the sentence imposed at the hearing. Accordingly, the trial court’s error in
journalizing Cervantes’s sentence can be corrected by nunc pro tunc entry. State v.
Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶ 24 (finding that a nunc pro tunc
entry can correct a clerical error in a sentencing entry “as long as the correction is
accomplished prior to the defendant’s completion of his prison term”).
{¶54} Cervantes’s fourth assignment of error is sustained in so far as the trial
court’s sentencing order erroneously describes the prison term as being mandatory.
Assignment of Error No. V
Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when
Counsel failed to object to the playing of a 911 recording, when
Counsel failed to object to the State’s motion to amend the
indictment, when Counsel failed to propose a self-defense jury
instruction and when Counsel failed to object to the constitutional
validity of Reagan Tokes.
{¶55} In his fifth assignment of error, Cervantes argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Cervantes claims his trial counsel performed
deficiently by failing to object to: the playing of a recording of the 911 call, the
State’s motion to amend the indictment, and the constitutional validity of the Reagan
Tokes Law. Cervantes further alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
propose a self-defense jury instruction.
{¶56} “In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to effective
assistance of counsel under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” State
v. Evick, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2019-05-010, 2020-Ohio-3072, ¶ 45. A
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defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish: (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances; and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d
303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052(1984). In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent
representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies
prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland at 689. Counsel is
entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998).
Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991).
Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s
essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142
(1989).
{¶57} Prejudice results when “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694. “‘A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting
Strickland at 694.
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{¶58} First, we note that through our resolution of Cervantes’s other
assignments of error, we have effectively preempted Cervantes’s argument that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to: (1) the playing of the 911 recording,
(2) the State’s motion to amend the indictment, and (3) the constitutional validity of
the Reagan Tokes Law. In our review of Cervantes’s first, second, and sixth
assignments of error, respectively, we concluded that the trial court did not commit
plain error by playing the recording of the 911 call, amending the indictment, and
applying an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. To show plain
error, “[t]he accused is * * * required to demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the error resulted in prejudice—the same deferential standard for reviewing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio
St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. Therefore, as the prejudice standards for plain-
error and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are the same, we have already
determined that Cervantes was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance
with respect to the playing of the 911 call, the amendment of the indictment, and the
application of the Reagan Tokes Law, regardless of whether such performance was
deficient. State v. Nurein, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-18, 2022-Ohio-1711, ¶ 60. For
this reason, we need not further consider these components of Cervantes’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id., citing State v. Jarrell, 4th Dist. Gallia
No. 15CA8, 2017-Ohio-520, ¶ 51.
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{¶59} With respect to Cervantes’s argument that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to propose a self-defense jury instruction, we find that his claim is without
merit. “Generally, the failure to request jury instructions is purely a matter of trial
tactics and will not be disturbed upon review.” State v. Herrington, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 25150, 2010-Ohio-6455, ¶ 11, citing State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d
45, 47-49 (1980). Until recently, Ohio put the onus on the defendant to prove the
elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Messenger,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-879, 2021-Ohio-2044, ¶ 36. However, following
revisions to R.C. 2901.05, the statute now “‘place[s] the burden on the prosecution
to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id., quoting State v. Carey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶
31. Now, the State is required “to disprove self-defense by proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] (1) was at fault in creating the situation giving
rise to the affray, OR (2) did not have a bona fide belief he was in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm for which the use of deadly force was his only means
of escape, OR (3) did violate a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.” Carney at ¶ 31.
{¶60} However, “[u]nder the current version of R.C. 2901.05(B), the state is
not required to prove the defendant did not act in self-defense until the defendant
introduces evidence that tends to support they acted in self-defense.” State v.
Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1047, 2021-Ohio-3860, ¶ 61. In other words, the
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defendant maintains the burden of production on their self-defense claim before the
state inherits the burden of persuasion.” Id., citing State v. Petway, 11th Dist. Lake
No. 2019-L-124, 2020-Ohio-3848, ¶ 55.
{¶61} As discussed in our review of Cervantes’s argument that the trial court
erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on abandonment, Cervantes
testified that he did not have any kind of physical altercation with D.L. at the
location in Henry County and claimed the head injuries she sustained in Henry
County were the result of accidental injury. Although Cervantes did argue that
during the physical altercation at his sister’s residence in Wood County, D.L.
attacked him with a knife, the charges in the instant case relate to the physical
altercation that occurred in Henry County. Thus, Cervantes did not introduce
evidence that he acted in self-defense with respect to the events occurring in Wood
County. Therefore, the State did not inherit the burden of persuasion relating to a
self-defense claim. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to perform a futile
act. State v. Witherspoon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94475, 2011-Ohio-704, ¶ 33. If
Cervantes’s trial counsel had requested a jury instruction on self-defense, his request
would had been denied. “Where, as here, the record contains no evidence that would
support a self-defense instruction, the defendant cannot meet his burden of
establishing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
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failure to request a self-defense instruction. State v. May, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
102482, 2015-Ohio-4275, ¶ 35.
{¶62} Moreover, with respect to his argument that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction relating to self-defense, Cervantes
argues that the jury “could have concluded, given the opportunity, that [he] acted in
self-defense, even though he was also enraged” and that he was prejudiced because
the jury was denied “an opportunity to seek a valid alternative.” (Appellant’s Brief
at 19). To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant is
required to affirmatively establish prejudice. State v. Hill, 4th Dist. Athens No.
16CA3, 2018-Ohio-67, ¶ 43. Bare claims of prejudice of “[c]onclusory statements
that the outcome would have been different, without more, are not enough to carry
a defendant’s burden on the issue of prejudice.” State v. Williams, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-180588, 2020-Ohio-1368, ¶ 22. As Cervantes has done little more
than baldly assert prejudice, he has failed to carry his burden on this issue.
Accordingly, we conclude that Cervantes has not demonstrated that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶63} Cervantes’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶64} In conclusion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand
the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to correct its clerical
error by issuing an appropriate nunc pro tunc entry.
Judgment Affirmed and
Cause Remanded
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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