State v. Blackburn

[Cite as State v. Blackburn, 2022-Ohio-988.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-21-25
v.
JAMES A. BLACKBURN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 20 12 0295
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: March 28, 2022
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
Case No. 8-21-25
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, James A. Blackburn (“Blackburn”), appeals from
the June 4, 2021 judgment entry of sentencing of the Logan County Court of
Common Pleas following a jury trial.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On December 8, 2020, Blackburn was indicted in a four-count
indictment on Count One, having weapons while under disability in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; Count Two, felonious assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, with a firearm
specification; Count Three, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation
in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, with a firearm
specification and a specification for forfeiture of a weapon; and Count Four, using
weapons while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15(A), a misdemeanor of the
first degree. Blackburn entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to a two-
day jury trial on April 19-20, 2021. The jury found Blackburn guilty as charged in
the indictment. The following is a summary of the testimony and evidence that was
presented at trial.
{¶3} During trial, the testimony revealed Blackburn’s charges stemmed from
a shooting incident which occurred on November 23, 2020, involving Blackburn
and his daughter, Sheila Whatley, and his son-in-law, Jeff Whatley. At the time of
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the incident, Blackburn was living in a camper behind the rear of the Whatley’s
house. One of the conditions for him to live there was not drinking whiskey because
he is not able to control himself and there may be violent behavior.
{¶4} Both victims testified for the State. Jeff testified that after he arrived
home from work shortly before 10:00 p.m. on November 23, Blackburn called him
about 10:02 p.m. on the phone and wanted him to come over to his camper to have
a beer with him. When Jeff told Blackburn he sounded drunk on the phone,
Blackburn told him he had drank eight or nine beers. Jeff said he would come over
after he finished his dinner. Jeff testified that, as he stepped into the camper, he saw
Blackburn sitting at the kitchen table with two handguns on the table. Jeff said that
when he asked what the guns were for, Blackburn responded, “we’re going to have
a heart-to-heart talk.” (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 39). Jeff testified that, at that point, he
felt his life was in danger and when he turned to run out the door, Blackburn stood
up, said “come back here,” and pointed the gun at him. (Id. at 41-42, 61-62).
{¶5} Jeff further testified that he heard a gunshot while he was running
toward his house and heard another shot. Jeff then woke up Sheila and told her that
“her father was shooting at [him].” (Id. at 43). He and Sheila were in the dining
room when multiple shots were fired into the house. Jeff testified he believed
Blackburn was intoxicated.
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{¶6} Sheila testified that on the night of the incident, she was sleeping when
Jeff woke her up to tell her that her dad was shooting at him. Sheila, who heard
Blackburn yelling and screaming profanity at Jeff while outside the back kitchen
door, called out for him to please stop. Sheila told Jeff he needed to go out the front
door while she called the Sheriff. Sheila testified that while she was on the phone
with the Sheriff’s office, she heard the glass in the kitchen door shatter and she was
sure then that Blackburn was shooting. She likewise testified that she heard multiple
shots being fired. She testified that she later found an empty bottle of Seagram’s 7
in Blackburn’s camper.
{¶7} Patrol Sergeant John Godwin (“Patrol Sergeant Godwin”) of the Logan
County Sheriff’s Office testified that he and two Sheriff’s Deputies were dispatched
to the Whatley’s residence to respond to a call about Blackburn shooting into that
residence. After their arrival, one of the Deputies looked through the window of
Blackburn’s camper and saw what appeared to be Blackburn reloading a weapon.
Blackburn eventually stepped out onto the porch after being ordered to come out of
the camper, and as they approached to take him into custody, Blackburn attempted
to strike one of the Deputies. According to Patrol Sergeant Godwin, Blackburn had
a very strong odor of alcohol on his person, his language was horrible, and he was
agitated and verbally abusive to them.
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{¶8} Blackburn was then arrested, and because of his intoxicated state, he
was not interviewed until the next night. That interview was conducted by Patrol
Sergeant Godwin and one of the responding Deputies and was recorded. The
recording of the interview was played for the jury.
{¶9} In the interview, Blackburn stated that on the night of the incident, he
started drinking Seagram’s 7 whiskey around 4:30 p.m. and then at 10:00 or 10:15
p.m., he remembered finding himself outside firing his revolver. He stated he gets
“ziggity boo” when drinking whiskey and then explained that means he gets goofy
and has blackouts. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 145, 154). Although Blackburn did not
remember inviting his son-in-law out to his camper to have a beer with him that
night, the call history contained in Blackburn’s cellular telephone indicated that he
made a call to Jeff at 10:02 p.m.
{¶10} Also during the interview, Blackburn admitted owning two guns, and
further admitted to taking his revolver outside and firing it just to see if the bullets
would still fire. He thought he fired all six rounds in the revolver.
{¶11} Detective Shawn McIntire of the Logan County Sheriff’s Office also
testified for the State. The Detective identified multiple photos of inside
Blackburn’s camper, including one that showed the two handguns lying on the
kitchen seat. The Detective also identified four bags containing the spent bullet
projectiles that were recovered from the scene: “One inside the cabinet, one on the
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floor, one inside the dishwasher, and one in the door handle—doorknob.” (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p. 110). The Detective also found over five spent bullet casings from
Blackburn’s revolver. A Logan County Sheriff’s Deputy testified that he test fired
the revolver.
{¶12} As noted earlier, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges.
{¶13} At the subsequent sentencing hearing held on June 3, 2021, the parties
agreed that the offenses of felonious assault and improper discharging a firearm at
or into a habitation would merge, and the prosecution elected to recommend a
sentence on the improper discharge offense. The trial court then sentenced
Blackburn to a non-mandatory indefinite prison term with a minimum term of six
years and a maximum prison term of nine years on Count Three, improperly
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, with three years for the firearm
specification. For having weapons under disability, the trial court sentenced
Blackburn to thirty-six months and to one hundred eighty days for using weapons
while intoxicated, both to be served concurrently to Count Three.
{¶14} Notably, in addition to the foregoing sentence, the trial court also
sentenced Blackburn to a concurrent six-year prison term for Count Two, felonious
assault, “[i]n the alternative.” (June 4, 2021 Judgment Entry/Sentencing Prison at
1-2, Sentencing Tr. at 9). And in relation to this “alternative” sentence, the trial
court also sentenced Blackburn to three years for the firearm specification as to
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Count Two, felonious assault, to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed
on both Count Three and its firearm specification, for an aggregate prison term of
twelve to fifteen years.
{¶15} Blackburn now appeals, asserting the following assignments of error
for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS BECAUSE
COUNSEL FAILED TO PURSUE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE TO
APPELLANT’S FELONY CHARGES.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS BECAUSE
COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST JURY INSTRUCTIONS
DEFINING VOLITIONAL ACTS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY MERGED FELONIOUS
ASSAULT UNDER R.C. 2941.25 BY IMPOSING A
CONCURRENT SENTENCE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A PRISON
TERM FOR THE FIREARM SPECIFICATION THAT WAS
ATTACHED TO THE FELONIOUS ASSAULT COUNT THAT
WAS MERGED PURSUANT TO R.C. 2941.25.
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First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶16} Blackburn’s first and second assignments of error will be addressed
together as both claim that Blackburn was deprived of his constitutional rights to
effective assistance of counsel.
Legal Standard
{¶17} “ ‘Under Ohio law, “a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry
out his duties in a competent manner.” ’ ” State v. Harvey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-
19-34, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 57, quoting [State v.] Beaver, [3d Dist. Marion No. 9-17-
37, 2018-Ohio-2438], ¶ 26, quoting State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9 (July
22, 1993). “For this reason, the appellant has the burden of proving that he or she
was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Crawford, 3d
Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 17, citing State v. Brown, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-17-19, 2018-Ohio-899, ¶ 42.
{¶18} “In order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
appellant must carry the burden of establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.” State v. McWay, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-42, 2018-Ohio-3618, ¶ 24,
citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984). Although the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a two-pronged
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analysis, the appellate court does not need to consider the facts of the case under
both prongs if the appellant makes an insufficient showing on one. Crawford at ¶
18, citing State v. Baker, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-61, 2018-Ohio-3431, ¶ 19, citing
State v. Walker, [3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-42], 2016-Ohio-3499, ¶ 20.
{¶19} To establish deficient performance, Blackburn must show that his trial
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation.
Strickland at 688; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989). Trial “counsel
need not raise meritless issues or even all arguably meritorious issues for that
matter.” State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 354, 2001-Ohio-57.
Analysis
{¶20} Blackburn argues in his first assignment of error that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the trial
court’s jury instruction on R.C. 2901.21(E) and to request an instruction on
voluntary intoxication as a defense to his second-degree felony charges.
{¶21} We begin by noting that Crim.R. 30(A) provides that, on appeal, an
appellant may not assign as error the giving or failure to give any jury instructions
unless the appellant objected before the jury retired to consider its verdict.
However, Crim.R. 52(B) provides that “ ‘a court may take notice of plain errors that
affect substantial rights[.]’ ˮ State v. Wickard, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-05-30, 2006-
Ohio-6088, ¶ 37, quoting Durkin, 66 Ohio St.2d 158, 161 (1981). “Furthermore, an
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erroneously omitted jury instruction ‘ “does not constitute a plain error or defect
under Crim.R. 52(B) unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would
have been otherwise.” ʼ ˮ Wickard, quoting State v. Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d 226,
227 (1983), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the
syllabus.
R.C. 2901.21(E) states that
Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a
criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person
of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense.
Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be
admissible to show whether or not the person was physically
capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
{¶22} At Blackburn’s trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a
criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person
of the duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense.
Intoxication includes intoxication resulting from ingestion of
alcohol. Voluntary intoxication may be admissible to show
whether or not a person was physically capable of performing the
act with which the person is charged.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p. 216).
{¶23} The instruction the trial court gave was an accurate statement of the
law, tracking the statutory language of R.C. 2901.21(E). Accord Intoxication
Comment to Ohio Jury Instructions, CR 421.07. This Court has before approved of
a trial court’s instruction on voluntary intoxication pursuant to the statute, finding
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that it “was given by the trial court to correctly inform the jury that they were
precluded from considering whether [Appellant] was intoxicated when determining
if he had formed the requisite intent and acted purposely and knowingly when the
offenses were committed.” State v. Allsup, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-10-09, 2011-
Ohio-404, ¶ 30. See also State v. Gribben, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-50, 2020-
Ohio-3083, ¶ 30 (stating “R.C. 2901.21(E) prevents voluntary intoxication from
being taken into consideration when considering a culpable mental state”).
{¶24} Notwithstanding the plain statutory language regarding voluntary
intoxication, Blackburn relies on the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ case, State
v. Goad, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA25, 2009-Ohio-580, to support his
argument that trial counsel should have pursued a voluntary-intoxication instruction
to negate the culpable mental state for the charged felony offenses. It has previously
been determined that the Goad decision relied on cases decided before the 2000
amendment to R.C. 2901.21 (now subsection (E)). State v. Doll, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 16CA3731, 2017-Ohio-2894, ¶ 17-18. Further, that same Court subsequently
stated in Doll that since that amendment courts have been nearly unanimous in their
view that the defense of voluntary intoxication no longer exists in Ohio. Id. at ¶ 16-
17, citing see, e.g., State v. Koballa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100664, 2014-Ohio-
3592, ¶ 24, and cases cited there (“ ‘Pursuant to the amended statute, a lack of
capacity to form an intent to commit a crime due to self-induced intoxication is no
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longer a defense to a crime where a mental state is an element of the crime’ ”); State
v. Hiler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25609, 2014-Ohio-137, ¶ 41 (“ ‘voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to any crime in Ohio’ ”); State v. Hill, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 09AP-398, 2010-Ohio-1687, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Melhado, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 02AP-458, 2003-Ohio-4763, ¶ 48 (“ ‘This court has held that, since
the General Assembly amended R.C. 2901.21 in 2000, “voluntary intoxication may
no longer be taken into account in determining the existence of a mental state that
is an element of a criminal offense” ’ ”); Katz, Martin, and Giannelli, Baldwin’s
Ohio Practice Criminal Law, at Section 91:5 (“prior law on voluntary intoxication
as a limited defense ‘is now superseded by the new statute’ ”). Thus, the Fourth
District overruled Goad to the extent that it previously held otherwise. Id. at ¶ 1,
18.
{¶25} Given the foregoing, Blackburn does not identify relevant law trial
counsel should have relied upon, and thus fails to meet his burden to demonstrate
that counsel was deficient. See id. at ¶ 24 (finding trial counsel cannot be deficient
for failing to raise a meritless objection to trial court’s jury instruction on voluntary
intoxication).
{¶26} In the second assignment of error, Blackburn claims that trial counsel
performed ineffectively by failing to request additional jury instructions on
volitional acts. Specifically, he contends that the jury should have been instructed
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on the element of “voluntary act” as a requirement for the offenses (R.C.
2901.21(A)(1)) and on the explanation of what constitutes an involuntary act (R.C.
2901.21(F)(2)).
{¶27} R.C. 2901.21(A)(1) requires a “voluntary act” as an element of every
crime. See State v. Ireland, 155 Ohio St.3d 287, 2018-Ohio-4494, ¶ 31. However,
“[v]oluntariness is not an essential element of the offense such that it must be
charged in the indictment or addressed in the trial court’s jury instructions, even if
the need for the act to be voluntarily committed is stated in the statutory scheme.”
Id. at ¶ 33. Blackburn’s argument of ineffective assistance as it relates to R.C.
2901.21(A)(1) is without merit.
{¶28} Blackburn also directs our attention to R.C. 2901.21(F)(2), which
defines a voluntary act in the negative: “Reflexes, convulsions, body movements
during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a
product of the actor's volition, are involuntary acts,” R.C. 2901.21(F)(2). On appeal,
Blackburn claims there was ample evidence that he was “blackout drunk” on
whiskey on the night in question to have the jury instructed on involuntary acts.
(Appellant’s Brief at 14).
{¶29} The standard jury instruction for blackout states: “Where a person
commits an act while unconscious as in a (coma) (blackout) (convulsion) due to
(heart failure) (disease) (sleep) (injury), such act is not a criminal offense even
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though it would be a crime if such act were the product of a person's (will)
(volition).” Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.07. We have previously
determined, regarding a jury instruction for blackout, that the trial court correctly
held that the instruction was not warranted because there was no evidence that the
defendant was unconscious; rather the defendant testified that he could not
remember anything. State v. Gutierrez, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-95-10, *4 (Sept.
21, 1995). Additionally, this Court has noted the following regarding the issue of
blackout:
The blackout defense is not available in every instance where the
defendant cannot remember what occurred. Blackout or
unconsciousness is a defense only where such condition is
involuntary and such involuntary condition prevented the
defendant from taking action that he or she is legally required to
take under the circumstances or, possibly, in situations where the
unconsciousness or blackout prevents a defendant from forming
a specific intent. In the latter circumstance, the evidence must
establish that the defendant was unconscious and acted
involuntarily. A defendant’s mere failure to remember what
happened does not constitute such evidence. (Citation omitted.)
State v. Allsup, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-10-09, 2011-Ohio-404, at ¶ 22.
{¶30} During the recorded interview at the Sheriff’s Office in this case,
which was played for the jury, Blackburn was asked whether he remembered
inviting his son-in-law out to his camper to have a beer with him the night of the
incident and his answer was: “No. * * * I get to drinking [whiskey] like it’s beer
and get one of them *** blackouts.” (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 144-145). Then, when
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asked how many rounds did he fire, he answered “I thought I fired all six of them.”
(Id. at 146). “I don’t remember if I fired them in the air or into the ground, but I
probably fired five and when I turned around to go back in the house, I turned around
this way and I staggered and it shot the door.” (Id.) He was further asked about
whether at least three rounds went into the house, and Blackburn answered, “It did
* * * I know the window broke. I broke the window. But I was drunk, staggering.”
(Id. at 147). There was no evidence that Blackburn was unconscious or in a
complete blackout. Thus, on this record, Blackburn has not demonstrated, and the
record does not show, that the failure to request the involuntary acts instruction
constitutes plain error or ineffective assistance.
{¶31} Accordingly, Blackburn’s first and second assignments of error are
overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶32} In his assignment of error, Blackburn argues that the trial court erred
by originally purporting to merge the felonious assault conviction under R.C.
2941.25, and then notwithstanding that merger, proceeding to impose an
“alternative” concurrent prison sentence as to that conviction.
Analysis
{¶33} R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple sentences for allied
offenses of similar import. State ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh, 162 Ohio St.3d 501,
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2020-Ohio-6826, ¶ 13, citing State v. Damron, 129 Ohio St.3d 86, 2011-Ohio-2268,
¶ 17. Thus, “the imposition of concurrent sentences is not the equivalent of merging
allied offenses.” State v. Morrissey, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-21-02, 2021-Ohio-4471,
¶ 34. Rather, a trial court must merge allied offenses by imposing a single sentence
that is appropriate for the offense chosen for sentencing. Id.{¶34} Initially, we note the State attempts in its brief to make an argument
for the first time in this Court that we could affirm the trial court’s concurrent
sentences based on the ground its failure to merge the offenses would not constitute
error because they are not allied offenses. However, we need not address this issue,
because the State’s position on appeal is contrary to its position at the sentencing
where it agreed to the merger of the offenses. Pursuant to the “invited error”
doctrine, a party may not “ ‘take advantage of an error which [that party] invited or
induced.’ ˮ State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324 (2000), quoting Hal Artz
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20 (1986), paragraph one
of the syllabus. See also State v. Carter, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2018-0072,
2019-Ohio-3485, ¶ 15 (stating “to allow argument that the trial court erred by not
disallowing the mergers as approved by the parties would violate the invited error
doctrine”). For these reasons, the only issue now before the Court is whether the
trial court committed error in sentencing Blackburn on the allied offenses.
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{¶35} Here, the transcript demonstrates that the State told the trial court at
sentencing it believed that the two offenses of improperly discharging a firearm into
a habitation and felonious assault would merge for sentencing and it elected to
recommend a sentence of eight years in prison for the improperly discharging
offense. Defense counsel also agreed that these offenses were allied offenses
subject to merger.
{¶36} Thereafter, on its own initiative, the trial court explicitly accepted the
parties’ merger agreement, but announced additionally and “in the alternative,” that
if the merger was incorrect, the court would also sentence Blackburn on the
felonious assault to run concurrently with the improperly discharging a firearm into
a habitation and all the other offenses in this case. (Sentencing Tr. at 9-10). The
judgment entry of sentencing reflected this merger by stating:
The State and Defendant, by and through counsel, agreed that the
substance offense on Count Two, felonious assault, felony of the
second degree, and the offense in Count Three, improperly
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, felony of the second
degree, are allied offenses and subject to merger for purposes of
sentencing. Based on the agreement of the parties, the Court finds
Count Two and Count Three are allied offenses and merges the
substantive offenses * * *. In the alternative, the Court imposed
concurrent sentences on the substantive offenses in Count Two
and Count Three[.]
(June 4, 2021 Judgment Entry/Sentencing Prison at 1-2).
{¶37} This is contrary to the statutory and case law pertaining to the merger
of allied offenses under which guilt may be determined of both offenses, but the
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court may only sentence on one, as per the election of the State. See State v.
Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2; R.C. 2941.25(A). As a result, we agree
with Blackburn that the trial court incorrectly sentenced him for two offenses that it
had determined were allied instead of sentencing on only one offense. Thus, the
trial court’s imposition of concurrent sentences on the merged counts was plain
error, affecting Blackburn’s right to be sentenced on only one of the merged
offenses. Accordingly, and to this extent only, Blackburn’s third assignment of
error is sustained.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶38} In this assignment of error, Blackburn asserts that the trial court also
erred by imposing a prison term for the firearm specification that was attached to
the allied and merged offense of felonious assault. Both the firearm specification
attached to the felonious assault and the firearm specification attached to the
improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation were charged as violations of
R.C. 2941.145(A).
{¶39} R.C. 2941.145(A) states that
[i]mposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an
offender under division (B)(1)(a)(ii) of section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code is precluded unless the indictment, count in the
indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that the
offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under
the offender’s control while committing the offense and displayed
the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender
possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.
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{¶40} R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) provides that “if an offender who is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a
specification of the type described in * * * 2941.145 of the Revised Code, the court
shall impose on the offender * * * [a] prison term of three years.”
{¶41} “Generally, a trial court may not impose more than one prison term for
multiple firearm specifications ‘for felonies committed as part of the same act or
transaction.’ ˮ State v. Gervin, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-52, 2016-Ohio-8399, ¶
198, citing R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b). However, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) provides the
following exception to this rule:
If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more
felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder,
murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder,
aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender
is convicted of or pleads guilty to a [firearm] specification * * * in
connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court
shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under
division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious
specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the
offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on
the offender the prison term specified under that division for any
or all of the remaining specifications. (Emphasis added.)
{¶42} We note that the Eighth and Ninth Appellate Districts have addressed
the issue before us and concluded that when an underlying offense is merged as an
allied offense, it is impermissible to sentence an offender for a firearm specification
that was attached to the merged offense. See State v. Doyle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
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107001, 2019-Ohio-979; State v. Roper, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26631 and 26632,
2013-Ohio-2176.
{¶43} We note the Fifth Appellate District has made a contrary
determination on this issue, see State v. Bollar, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2020 CA 00077,
2021-Ohio-1578, and has certified a conflict with these holdings, which is currently
pending in the Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Bollar, 164 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2021-
Ohio-2795. Bollar determined that the firearm specifications accompanying the
merged offenses were not subject to merger pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B). As the
court stated in Bollar:
The legislature has specifically authorized cumulative
punishment by creating the exception to the general rule that the
trial court is forbidden from imposing sentences on multiple
firearm specifications for “felonies committed as part of the same
act or transaction” contained within R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), and
pursuant to that exception, with its command set forth in R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g) that the trial court “shall impose on the offender
the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section
for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender
is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty….” (Emphasis
sic).
In the case at bar, Bollar pled guilty to multiple felonies, to wit:
involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault and having weapons
while under a disability. The determination of guilt based upon
his guilty pleas to each offense survived the trial court[ʼ]s merger
of the felonious assault and involuntary manslaughter offenses.
State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d
182. Therefore, the trial court was required by R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g) to sentence Bollar to the two most serious
firearm specifications that accompanied his felony guilty pleas.
R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).
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We therefore find that the trial court did not err in concluding
that the firearm specifications accompanying the involuntary
manslaughter and felonious assault were not subject to merger
pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B).
The trial court did not err in ordering two of the three firearm
specifications to run consecutively pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g).
Bollar, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2020 CA 00077, 2021-Ohio-1578, at ¶ 27-30.
{¶44} We have carefully considered the reasoning expressed by the above
courts on this issue and find the reasoning of the majority decision in the Fifth
District case, based upon the express language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), to be more
persuasive. Bollar.
{¶45} Accordingly, and notwithstanding the error of the trial court in
purporting to sentence upon the merged offense of felonious assault, we find that
the trial court did not err in concluding that the firearm specifications accompanying
the improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation and felonious assault were
not subject to merger pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B). And accordingly, the trial court
did not err in ordering the two firearm specifications to run consecutively pursuant
to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).
Conclusion
{¶46} Having sustained Blackburn’s third assignment of error, we remand
this matter for a limited resentencing of the merged counts because the trial court
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improperly imposed a concurrent sentence on the felonious assault count. However,
for the reasons as noted above, the trial court’s sentence upon the firearm
specifications do not merge. Thus, the judgment of the Logan County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded to
the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed in Part,
Reversed in Part and
Cause Remanded
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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