State v. Shropshire

[Cite as State v. Shropshire, 2021-Ohio-3848.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 29108
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. CRB2002275
:
JACKIE SHROPSHIRE : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 29th day of October, 2021.
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ERIK R. BLAINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0080726, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, City of
Vandalia Prosecutor’s Office, 245 James E. Bohanan Memorial Drive, Vandalia, Ohio
45377
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
MARY ADELINE R. LEWIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0099711, 712 North King Street, Xenia, Ohio
45385
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jackie Shropshire, appeals from her conviction in the
Vandalia Municipal Court after the trial court found her guilty of one count of assault. In
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support of her appeal, Shropshire contends that the State presented insufficient evidence
at her bench trial to support her conviction. Shropshire also contends that her conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons outlined below, the
judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On November 9, 2020, Shropshire was charged by criminal complaint with
one first-degree-misdemeanor count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). The
charge stemmed from allegations that Shropshire physically attacked the mother of her
two-year-old grandson outside the mother’s Vandalia residence. Shropshire pled not
guilty to the charge, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on April 6, 2021.
{¶ 3} At trial, the State presented testimony from the alleged victim (“B.J.”) and
Officer Andrew Wehner of the Vandalia Police Department. The defense presented
testimony from Shropshire’s adult daughter, Taylor Shropshire. There is no dispute that
Shropshire also has an adult son named JaQuan Shropshire, who is the father of B.J.’s
two-year-old son. Shropshire, therefore, is the paternal grandmother to B.J.’s son.
{¶ 4} B.J. testified that on November 9, 2020, she was watching her children play
in the yard of her Vandalia residence when Shropshire and Taylor pulled up in their
vehicle. B.J., who was sitting in the driver’s seat of her own vehicle with the driver-side
door open, testified that Shropshire approached her vehicle while shouting profanities
and threats at her. B.J. testified that she called 9-1-1 in response to Shropshire’s
conduct, but was unable to speak to the operator. B.J. testified that Shropshire then
physically attacked her inside her vehicle, which led to a fight between her and
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Shropshire. B.J. also testified that Taylor joined the fight, which gave Shropshire the
opportunity to retrieve a metal car jack from the passenger side of B.J.’s vehicle. B.J.
further testified that Shropshire began hitting her with the car jack shortly before the police
arrived and broke up the fight.
{¶ 5} When asked if she had had any prior problems with Shropshire or Taylor,
B.J. testified that she did not associate with either of them and that she did not start the
fight. B.J. testified that JaQuan must have asked Shropshire and Taylor to stop by her
residence, as B.J. noted that JaQuan was inside the residence at the time Shropshire
and Taylor arrived. B.J. also testified that she received medical treatment at the hospital
for injuries she sustained during the altercation, which included swelling on her head,
shoulder, and back.
{¶ 6} Officer Andrew Wehner of the Vandalia Police Department testified that he
was the officer who responded to the altercation in question. Wehner testified that the
dispatcher sent him to the victim’s residence due to a 9-1-1 open line on which females
could be heard yelling in the background. Upon arriving at the scene, Wehner testified
that he observed multiple people standing outside the victim’s residence in a parking lot
yelling at one another. Wehner testified that he had to give multiple commands for the
parties to cease and desist for disorderly behavior. Wehner testified that he was able to
identify Shropshire, Taylor, JaQuan, and B.J. at the scene.
{¶ 7} Continuing, Wehner testified that he took statements from the individuals
involved in the altercation and received different stories from each side. Wehner,
however, testified that there were multiple independent witnesses located at an adjacent
apartment building who saw the altercation and gave statements corroborating B.J.’s
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version of events. According to Wehner, the independent witnesses advised that B.J.
was sitting in the driver’s seat of her vehicle when Shropshire approached B.J. and started
hitting her, which caused B.J. to fight back. Wehner also testified that B.J. had fresh,
visible injuries on her head and shoulder. Wehner further testified that Shropshire’s story
changed a couple of times while he was interviewing her. Based on his investigation,
Wehner testified that he determined Shropshire was the primary aggressor and cited her
with first-degree-misdemeanor assault.
{¶ 8} Shropshire’s daughter, Taylor, testified that on the day in question, JaQuan
called her and asked her to pick him up at B.J.’s residence. Taylor testified that she and
Shropshire thereafter drove to B.J.’s residence in Shropshire’s vehicle. Taylor testified
that when she and Shropshire arrived, JaQuan was outside with his and B.J.’s son.
Taylor testified that B.J. began yelling at them because Shropshire’s vehicle did not have
a car seat for her son to ride in. According to Taylor, B.J. ordered them to get her son
out of Shropshire’s vehicle. Taylor testified that B.J. started swinging at Shropshire when
Shropshire attempted to block B.J. from getting inside her vehicle. Taylor admitted that
she then started to fight with B.J. in order to defend Shropshire. Taylor insisted that
Shropshire was not directly involved in the fight, but was trying to break up the fight and
protect her from B.J. Taylor also denied seeing a car jack during the altercation.
{¶ 9} Following this testimony, the parties made closing arguments during which
Shropshire’s counsel argued that the evidence demonstrated that Shropshire used force
against B.J. for purposes of defending herself and Taylor. Shropshire’s counsel also
argued that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that Shropshire did not act in self-
defense during the altercation. The trial court, however, determined that B.J.’s testimony
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was credible and ultimately found Shropshire guilty of assault. After reaching its verdict,
the trial court sentenced Shropshire to 180 days in jail with all 180 days suspended on
the condition that Shropshire had no contact with B.J. and committed no criminal
violations for one year. The trial court also ordered Shropshire to serve one year of
probation and to pay a $50 fine and court costs.
{¶ 10} Shropshire now appeals from her conviction, raising two assignments of
error for review. Because Shropshire’s assignments of error are interrelated, we will
address them together.
Assignments of Error
{¶ 11} Under her first assignment of error, Shropshire contends that her conviction
for assault was not supported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the force she used against B.J. was not in self-defense.
Under her second assignment of error, Shropshire contends that her conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the weight of the evidence
established that she was acting in self-defense during the altercation. We disagree with
each of Shropshire’s claims.
{¶ 12} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has
presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997). “When reviewing a claim as to sufficiency of evidence, the relevant
inquiry is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
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the state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683
N.E.2d 1096 (1997). “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds
that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.”
(Citations omitted.) Id.{¶ 13} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence
is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12. When evaluating
whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court
must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 14} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must defer
to the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of
particular witnesses. State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL
476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). “However, we may determine which of several competing
inferences suggested by the evidence should be preferred.” State v. Moore, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 26304, 2016-Ohio-5267, ¶ 8, citing Lawson at *4. “The fact that the
evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the
manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams, 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2013-CA-61
and 2013-CA-62, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24, citing Wilson at ¶ 14. A judgment of conviction
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should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in
exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
{¶ 15} As noted above, Shropshire was convicted of first-degree-misdemeanor
assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). That statute prohibits any “person [from]
knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn.” R.C. 2903.13(A). In her appeal, Shropshire does not dispute that she
assaulted B.J. on the day in question, but instead argues that the assault was the result
of her defending herself and her daughter Taylor.
{¶ 16} It is well established that “[t]he defense of self-defense may exonerate an
accused’s admitted use of force.” State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190379,
2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 4, citing R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). Prior to March 28, 2019, self-defense
was an affirmative defense that the defendant had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, the enactment of 2017 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228
realigned that burden of proof by amending R.C. 2901.05 to provide the following:
(A) * * * The burden of going forward with the evidence of an
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the
evidence, for an affirmative defense other than self-defense, defense of
another, or defense of the accused’s residence presented as described in
division (B)(1) of this section, is upon the accused.
(B)(1) A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of another,
or defense of that person’s residence. If, at the trial of a person who is
accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force against
another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused
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person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of
that person’s residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense, defense
of another, or defense of that person's residence, as the case may be.
{¶ 17} “Under R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) there are two burdens. The defendant has the
initial burden of production, which is the burden of producing evidence ‘that tends to
support’ that the defendant used the force in self-defense.” State v. Davidson-Dixon, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109557, 2021-Ohio-1485, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Petway, 2020-Ohio-
3848, 156 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 55 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Carney, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
19AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶ 31. “The burden then shifts to the state under its burden
of persuasion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use the
force in self-defense.” Id. “To satisfy this burden, the state must disprove at least one
of the elements of self-defense.” (Citation omitted.) Id.; State v. Fisk, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 28798, 2021-Ohio-1973, ¶ 49 (Tucker, P.J., concurring). “Thus, in
order to sustain its burden of proof, ‘the state must demonstrate (1) that the defendant
was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; [or] (2) that the defendant
lacked a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
* * *; or (3) that the defendant violated a duty to retreat or avoid danger.’ ” Fisk at ¶ 49,
quoting State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109221, 2021-Ohio-1185, ¶ 21, citing
State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 258.
{¶ 18} In this case, B.J.’s testimony established that Shropshire was at fault in
creating the physical altercation at issue. Specifically, B.J. testified that Shropshire
yelled profanities and threats at her, approached her vehicle, and began striking her while
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she was sitting in the driver’s seat. Officer Wehner’s testimony also established that
multiple independent witnesses corroborated B.J.’s version of events and that Shropshire
was the primary aggressor. When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, this
evidence establishes that Shropshire created the violent situation and thus was not acting
in self-defense. Because there is evidence in the record establishing that Shropshire
was not acting in self-defense, Shropshire’s claim that the State failed to meet its burden
of proof with regard to self-defense lacks merit.
{¶ 19} Shropshire’s manifest weight claim also lacks merit. After weighing all the
evidence and reasonable inferences, we do not find that the trial court clearly lost its way
and created a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found Shropshire guilty of assault.
The believability of the testimony was for the trial court to decide, and the trial court
reasonably determined that B.J.’s testimony about the altercation was more credible than
Taylor’s. We will not disturb this finding on appeal. The fact that the trial court believed
B.J.’s testimony over Taylor’s does not mean that Shropshire’s conviction was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, Shropshire’s conviction for assault was
supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Therefore, Shropshire’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 21} Having overruled both of Shropshire’s assignments of error, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Erik R. Blaine
Mary Adeline R. Lewis
Hon. Cynthia M. Heck