State v. Merritt

[Cite as State v. Merritt, 2021-Ohio-3122.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-200351
TRIAL NO. B-1701287
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
SHANNON MERRITT, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 10, 2021
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Shannon Merritt, pro se.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Shannon Merritt appeals the Hamilton County
Common Pleas Court’s judgment dismissing his “Motion in Support of Petition to
Vacate or Set Aside Void Sentence.” We affirm the court’s judgment.
Procedural Posture
{¶2} In 2017, Merritt was convicted upon guilty pleas to felonious assault,
rape, and kidnapping. The trial court imposed agreed prison terms totaling 11 years.
We affirmed his convictions in the direct appeal because his guilty pleas were
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Merritt, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
170649, 2018-Ohio-4995.
{¶3} Merritt also challenged his convictions in his 2020 “Motion in Support
of Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Void Sentence.” In that motion, he sought relief
from his convictions on two grounds. He asserted that his rape and kidnapping
sentences are void because those offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject
to merger under R.C. 2941.25. He further asserted that his sentences are void and
contrary to law and that he was denied due process because the trial court did not
make statutory sentencing findings or consider the statutory sentencing purposes
and principles or seriousness and recidivism factors, as required by R.C. 2929.11,
2929.12 and 2929.14.
{¶4} In this appeal, Merritt presents a single assignment of error
contending that the trial court erred in reviewing and dismissing the motion under
R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings on a petition for postconviction
relief. We overrule the assignment of error because the trial court had no jurisdiction
to grant the relief sought in the motion.
Jurisdiction
{¶5} In his motion, Merritt did not designate a statute or rule under which
the common pleas court may have afforded the relief sought. Thus, the court was left
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to “recast” the motion “into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the
criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153,
2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12 and syllabus.
Allied-offenses claim
{¶6} Relief from a conviction may be granted under the postconviction
statutes upon proof of a constitutional violation during the proceedings resulting in
that conviction. See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); State v. Powell, 90 Ohio App.3d 260, 264,
629 N.E.2d 13 (1st Dist.1993). The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution
protect against the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. Those
protections are effectuated by R.C. 2941.25, which governs sentencing on multiple
counts charged in the same indictment. State v. Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
790257, 1980 WL 352849 (May 28, 1980). Thus, Merritt’s postconviction allied-
offenses claim sought relief from his convictions based on an alleged constitutional
violation during the proceedings resulting in those convictions. Therefore, the trial
court properly reviewed that claim under the standards provided by the
postconviction statutes.
{¶7} But the allied-offenses claim was presented in a motion filed well after
the time for filing a postconviction petition had expired. See R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). And
Merritt failed to satisfy the R.C. 2953.23 jurisdictional requirements for filing a late
postconviction claim because he did not show either that he had been unavoidably
prevented from discovering the facts upon which his allied-offenses claim depended,
or that that claim was based on a new and retrospectively applicable right recognized
by the United States Supreme Court since the time for filing the claim had expired.
See R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). Therefore, the postconviction statutes did not confer upon
the common pleas court jurisdiction to entertain Merritt’s allied-offenses claim.
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Statutory-violation claims.
{¶8} Merritt, in his motion, also sought relief on the grounds that the trial
court had sentenced him without making statutory findings or considering the
statutory sentencing purposes and principles or seriousness and recidivism factors,
as required by R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12 and 2929.14. Those claims did not allege
constitutional violations and thus were not, as the trial court concluded, reviewable
under the postconviction statutes. See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); State v. Littlepage, 1st
Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170207 and C-170157, 2018-Ohio-2959, ¶ 5.
{¶9} Nor did the trial court have jurisdiction to entertain those claims
under any other postconviction procedure provided by statute or rule. The claims
were not reviewable under Crim.R. 33, which governs motions for a new trial. The
claims were not reviewable under Crim.R. 32.1, governing motions to withdraw a
guilty or no-contest plea, because Merritt was convicted upon guilty pleas not
following a trial and he did not seek by his motion to withdraw those pleas. The
claims were not reviewable under R.C. Chapter 2731, governing mandamus, under
R.C. Chapter 2721, governing declaratory judgment, or under R.C. Chapter 2725,
governing habeas corpus, because the motion in which the claims were advanced did
not satisfy those statutes’ procedural requirements. See R.C. 2731.04, 2721.12(A),
and 2725.04. And Crim.R. 57(B) did not require the common pleas court to entertain
the claims under Civ.R. 60(B), because Merritt’s convictions were reviewable, and
were reviewed, under the procedures provided for a direct appeal.
Sentence was not void
{¶10} Finally, a court always has jurisdiction to correct a void sentence. See
State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d
263, ¶ 18-19. A sentence is void if it was imposed by a court acting without personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction. See State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-
Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 4-6 and 41.
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶11} In sentencing Merritt, the trial court had personal jurisdiction by
virtue of his appearance before the court upon his indictment for felony offenses.
And the trial court acted with subject-matter jurisdiction in imposing sentences upon
finding him guilty of those offenses. Accordingly, the claimed sentencing errors, even
if demonstrated, would not have rendered Merritt’s sentences void.
Judgment Affirmed
{¶12} The common pleas court properly dismissed Merritt’s postconviction
allied-offenses claim for lack of jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.23. His statutory-
violation claims were not reviewable under the postconviction statutes. But the court
properly dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction, because the claims were not
reviewable under any other postconviction procedure provided by statute or rule. See
State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 668 N.E.2d 4897 (1996), paragraph one of the
syllabus; State v. Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 526 N.E.2d 816 (1988).
Accord State v. Gipson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-960867 and C-960881, 1997 WL
598397, *7 (Sept. 26, 1997) (affirming a lower court’s judgment that was “right for
the wrong reason”). Nor could the court have granted relief under its jurisdiction to
correct a void sentence, because the alleged sentencing errors would not have
rendered Merritt’s sentences void. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment
dismissing his “Motion in Support of Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Void Sentence.”
Judgment affirmed.
MYERS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
5