State v. Mitchell

[Cite as State v. Mitchell, 2017-Ohio-6888.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 105053
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
BRIAN A. MITCHELL
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-16-603899-A
BEFORE: McCormack, J., Keough, A.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 20, 2017
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Rick L. Ferrara
2077 East 4th Street, Second Floor
Cleveland, OH 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Kristin M. Karkutt
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
TIM McCORMACK, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Brian Mitchell appeals from the consecutive sentences
imposed by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for his convictions of four
counts of sexual battery. Mitchell was the youth minister at Columbia Road Baptist
Church. During a two-month period of time in 2015, he engaged in sexual conduct with
a 16-year-old girl who was a member of the church’s youth ministry (“victim” hereafter).
He pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual battery and received consecutive prison terms
totaling ten years. On appeal, he argues the trial court failed to make the statutory
findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} Mitchell was indicted with ten counts of sexual battery in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A)(12). Under that statute, sexual battery is a third-degree felony. The statute
prohibits a cleric from engaging in sexual conduct with a minor who is a member of the
cleric’s congregation. Mitchell, 31 years old and a father of three young children,
allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with the 16-year-old victim on ten occasions
between August 15, 2015, and September 25, 2015.
{¶3} Mitchell pleaded guilty to four of the ten counts of sexual battery and the
remaining counts were nolled. Before sentencing, he submitted 33 letters from friends
and family vouching for his character. At sentencing, the trial court heard from several
members of the victim’s family about the devastating effect Mitchell’s conduct had on the
victim and her family, who began attending the church years ago when the victim’s father
passed away. The prosecutor then read a long letter from the victim, which revealed
how Mitchell took advantage of his leadership position in the church’s youth group and
pursued the victim for a sexual relationship. Over time, Mitchell worked to earn the
victim’s trust, telling her he thought of her as a daughter. The victim believed Mitchell
was someone whom she could turn to for advice and guidance. Mitchell then began to
pursue her intensively by sending her frequent text messages. The tone of the text
messages turned from innocent to serious over time. Mitchell also began to confide in
the victim regarding his marital problems. The relationship then turned sexual.
Mitchell would come to the victim’s home while her mother was working and engage in
sexual intercourse with her in his car. Even after the events had come to light and
Mitchell was arrested for his offenses, the victim was startled to find that he was still
sending her emails under a fictitious name professing his love for her.
{¶4} The trial court sentenced Mitchell to five years of prison on each of the four
counts of sexual battery, with Counts 2 and 6 running consecutive to each other. On
appeal, Mitchell raises two assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed plain error by failing to make the findings
necessary to impose consecutive sentences.
2. The trial court erred when it imposed a term of imprisonment of ten
years that was clearly and convincingly disproportionate to the
danger appellant posed to the public.
{¶5} A review of the argument under the two assignments of error shows that
both claims relate to the disproportionality finding required for an imposition of
consecutive sentences. We address the two assignments together.
{¶6} H.B. 86, enacted in 2011, revived a presumption of concurrent sentences.
Consecutive sentences can be imposed only if the trial court makes the required findings
pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177,
16 N.E.3d 659. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), in order to impose consecutive
sentences, the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect
the public from future crime or to punish the offender,” that such sentences “are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public,” and that one of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
{¶7} “When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender
and to defense counsel.” Bonnell at ¶ 29, citing Crim.R. 32(A)(4). “Findings,” for
these purposes, means that “‘the [trial] court must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and
that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the given bases
warrants its decision.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326,
715 N.E.2d 131 (1999). However, “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the
statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court
engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to
support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell at ¶ 29. The
trial court is not required to give a “talismanic incantation” of the words of the statute,
provided the necessary findings can be found in the record. Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶8} In addition, in an appeal involving consecutive sentences, such as the
instant case, we are required under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) to review the record, including
the findings underlying the sentence, and, to modify or vacate the sentence when we
clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s findings
under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶9} Here, our review of the sentencing transcript reflects that the trial court
narrated extensively on the lifetime of trauma created by the horrific nature of the
offenses committed by Mitchell. The court stressed that Mitchell’s position of spiritual
trust and authority enabled him to earn the victim’s trust readily, rendered his relationship
with the victim “extremely abusive.” The court characterized the crime in this case as
a “power crime” perpetrated by one in the position of authority against a powerless
victim. The court characterized the emotional and psychological damage described by
the victim as classic signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. Before imposing
consecutive sentences on two of the four counts of sexual battery, the court stated
So the Court having considered all these things and the nature of this
offense, and the specific facts of this offense * * * [a]nd the Court now is
confronted with what is an appropriate consequence[.] How much time in
prison is necessary to punish you? How much time is not disproportionate
to what you did? How much time is necessary to protect the community?
How much time is necessary due to the unusual amount of harm, the great
amount of harm? And there’s great harm here. And this is — this test is
not an easy test in your situation.
And your sort of delusional sort of excuse, some sort of emotion and
love involved with this is troubling. That’s troubling. Because that’s —
that’s extremely delusional, and it will take considerable work on your part
to see this could never be anything but abusive. Never could it have been.
And that’s why these sex offender laws are in place. That’s why there’s
such harsh consequences.
And so I’m balancing all of this. I’ve considered all of those factors.
***
I am going to run Counts 2 and 6 consecutive to each other * * * . The
amount of harm is so great or unusual a single prison sentence is not
adequate.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶10} Mitchell argues the trial court failed to make the finding regarding
proportionality and also argues the record clearly and convincingly shows that his
sentence was disproportionate to the danger he posed to the pubic. We disagree with his
contentions.
{¶11} While the trial court did not recite the statutory finding word for word
regarding proportionality, we are able to clearly discern that the trial court engaged in the
correct analysis and to determine that the record contains evidence to support the finding.
Bonnell at ¶ 29. The court signaled its awareness of the necessity of the
proportionality finding when it stated, “How much time in prison is necessary to punish
you? How much time is not disproportionate to what you did? How much time is
necessary to protect the community?” The court’s reasoning, although not a verbatim
recitation of the statutory finding that “the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate
to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
public,” reflects that the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis and also placed the
finding on the record.
{¶12} Furthermore, our review of the record supports the trial court’s finding.
The victim’s father passed away while she was at a very young age, and she was raised in
the church. While an impressionable teenager, she joined the church’s youth ministry to
seek guidance and direction for her life. Mitchell, taking advantage of his position of
spiritual authority and the victim’s faith in God, manipulated and groomed the victim for
his own sexual gratification.
{¶13} Mitchell argues that the record does not support a finding that his
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the danger he poses to the public
because, as a convicted felon, he will no longer be a member of the clergy and the victim
would reach the age of majority within two years. We note that proportionality finding
regarding “the danger the offender poses to the public” is not the same as recidivism for
the same crime. Moreover, there are no specific statutory factors for the
danger-to-the-public finding; neither is the trial court obligated to state reasons to support
its finding. State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101575, 2015-Ohio-1023, ¶ 14,
citing Bonnell at syllabus. Mitchell’s brazen betrayal of the congregation who had
entrusted him to provide spiritual leadership for their young followers could be one of the
factors when the court assessed the danger he poses to the public. Given the facts of this
case, we do not “clearly and convincingly” find that the record does not support the trial
court’s finding. The first and second assignment of error are without merit.
{¶14} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_______________________________________
TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR